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FOREWORD 
The Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs (JLIA) 
created this issue as a collection of papers presented at 17th biennial 
meeting of the International Academy of Commercial and Consumer 
Law. While a foreword traditionally reflects the contents of a 
publication, here JLIA has elected to reflect on the passing of two of 
the issues contributors, Louis Del Duca and Norbert Reich. In 
memory of these two esteemed members of the legal community, JLIA 
dedicates this issue. Additionally below, JLIA has included two 
reflections on Louis Del Duca and Norbert Reich to commemorate 
their meaningful contributions to law.  
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IN MEMORY OF LOUIS DEL DUCA 
By Mary Hiscock 
In the 34 years of the history of 
the International Academy of 
Commercial and Consumer Law (the 
Academy), some colleagues stand out 
as exemplars and custodians of the 
principles and values that are the 
foundation of the Academy. These 
were summarised by Professor Don 
King when he wrote a Dedication at 
the beginning of the published 
Proceedings of the 4th Meeting of the 
Academy, which was held in 
Melbourne in 1989. 
To the commercial and consumer lawyers of the new age, to 
whom national boundaries are but a useful basis for comparison, and 
international harmony of law is not just a dream, their knowledge is in 
the wisdom of the past, the development of the present, and the trends 
of the future; their satisfaction is in the mastery of complex subjects, 
the conveyance of knowledge to students, the fellowship of colleagues, 
the creativeness of scholarship, and the furtherance of just and needed 
reforms.1 
Don King, Louis Del Duca, and Norbert Reich immediately 
come to mind as such men. Tragically we have lost the continuing 
presence and contributions of all three. 
Louis Del Duca was a scholar of distinction on the national 
and international scene. His learning constantly evolved and reacted to 
contemporary issues in commercial law. He was actively involved in 
the current work of the United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law (UNCITRAL) on developing a framework for dispute 
resolution for online cross border contracts, particularly those where 
                                                 
1   Essays on Comparative Commercial and Consumer Law, v, (ed) Donald 
King, Fred B. Rothman & Co, Littleton Colorado 80127 (1992).  
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there is high volume and low value of transactions. He was concerned 
with not only its implications for consumer transactions, but also for 
commercial transactions in domestic as well as international law. He 
was immersed in planning for the next Meeting of the Academy in 
2016, to be held in Fukuoka, Japan. As usual, he was scheduled to 
contribute to this Meeting, as he had at every past Meeting. 
Louis characteristically reached out and involved others in his 
work, regularly phoning and emailing and chivvying, where necessary. 
He was the most generous friends and colleague in the giving of advice 
and in his concern for the welfare of friends and colleagues. 
Louis was a man of transatlantic culture as well as learning. He 
had a legendary love of opera and performance.  In his youth he was 
torn between pursuing a life of music or of law.  In the end, he had 
both. 
Most of all, Louis was a family man. One of his gifts to the 
Academy was the opportunity to establish a friendship with Frances, 
his wife. When Frances was around, there was always an extra sparkle 
in Louis. This was most evident in the hospitality in 2000, when Louis 
hosted the 10th Meeting of the Academy at Dickinson Law at Carlisle. 
Louis joined the Faculty of Law at Dickinson at the beginning 
of the academic year 1956-7, and “retired” 57 years later. He had 
completed military service in the US Navy. He had received the 
degrees of BA at Temple, LL.B at Harvard, and a Doctorate of Law at 
the University of Rome, La Sapienza. He had also briefly practised law, 
and taught political science in the intermezzo between Rome and 
Carlisle. 
Throughout his long career, Louis taught generations of 
students Secured Transactions, Comparative Commercial Law, and 
European Union Law. He initiated the program for the Master of 
Comparative Law for overseas students and subsequently the Summer 
Session Abroad based in Europe. His editorial responsibilities included 
the Pennsylvania Bar Association Quarterly and the Uniform 
Commercial Code Law Journal. He was a member of the Committee 
of the US Secretary of State on International Trade Law, and was active 
in AALS. 
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Louis’ most recent major work was “Secured Transactions 
under the UCC” with Edwin Smith, Marie Reilly and Peter Winship, 
and many many articles on online dispute resolution. 
We will all miss him. 
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IN MEMORY OF NORBERT REICH 
By Hans-W. Micklitz 
Norbert Reich 1937-2015, 
Professor for German and 
European Civil Law, co-founder of 
the Journal of Consumer Policy 
1976, Director of the Centre for 
European Legal Policy at the 
University of Bremen, 1982-1991, 
Director of the Riga Graduate Law 
School 2001-2004 and a faithful 
member of the International 
Association of Commercial and 
Consumer Law. 
 
Norbert Reich’s understanding of law as a discipline is deeply 
rooted in American legal sociology and critical German and American 
legal theory. That is where his interdisciplinary and cross-cultural 
international understanding came from. Consumer law and policy 
became a topical issue at the right moment in Norbert’s academic life. 
Consumer law and policy cut across thinking in boxes, in particular 
disciplines of social science or in national legal orders. There were two 
stages in Norbert’s academic involvement of consumer law and policy: 
first, an early commitment to German consumer law and, at a later 
second stage, an ever stronger focus on European consumer law and 
policy. 
Norbert Reich began research on German consumer law as 
early as the mid-1970s. Together with Klaus Tonner and Hartmut 
Wegner, and on behalf of the then social-liberal government, he 
published the first draft of what would later be referred to as consumer 
law. Yet his emphasis was rather on the derivation and creation of a 
critical economic law, in which consumer law played an essential and 
permanent role. As early as in 1974, he advocated a structural 
reorganisation of civil law that was based on status. He writes: “I would 
like to distinguish between three fields following the reflections of the 
2015 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 4:1 
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socialist theory of civil law:2 a) the legal communication of businesses 
(in the field of production capital), i.e., company law (companies in terms 
of antitrust law and not in terms of commercial law HWM), b) the 
exchange of goods between businesses and final consumers (in relation 
to the ownership of means of production to the ownership of 
consumer goods), i.e., consumer law (in the strict sense of the term – in 
the broader sense consumer law refers to administrative, penal and 
procedural rules; see Reich 1974), c) the field of private legal 
communication between citizens (classification and exchange of 
ownership of consumption means), i.e., citizen law.” As a logical 
conclusion of the case for an autonomous consumer law, he argued 
persuasively for a constitutionalisation of consumer law, a reversal of 
the relationship of dispositive and mandatory law and a reorientation 
of the legal dogmatic principles towards social science. 
If one looks back to the initial situation of the 1970s, it comes 
as a surprise that the trisection of civil law has largely become a reality 
– within and through the Europeanisation of consumer law. The 
status-based revision of private and economic law has prevailed, 
strongly promoted by the European Union that had gradually become 
the driving force of consumer legislation. Norbert Reich had prepared 
the shift of national consumer law towards the European level through 
the then nine member states reports that the European Commission 
(through Ludwig Krämer) had commissioned.3 The country reports 
were published in the late 1970s with Norbert Reich as editor (Reich 
1980/1981). From now on, Norbert Reich followed the creation and 
the development of a genuinely European consumer law in his role as 
managing director of the Centre for European Legal Politics (ZERP) 
at the University of Bremen. 
His own research peaked in the monograph with the title “Civil 
rights in the European Union,” published in 1999. The subtitle clarifies 
the topic: “Subjective rights of Union citizens and third-country 
citizens with particular focus on the legal situation according to the 
                                                 
2   Norbert Reich wrote his habilitation on Soviet Civil Law. He translated 
from Russian to German Pēteris Stučka the second important Marxist theorist 
Paschukanis. Pēteris Stučka, DIE REVOLUTIONÄRE ROLLE VON RECHT UND STAAT 
(Norbert Reich trans., 1969).  
3   The nine country reports are available in English, the comparative 
analysis in English, French and German. 
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case law of the ECJ and the Treaty of Amsterdam.” In order to justify 
the necessity of the protection of subjective rights in a transnational 
quasi-state institution such as the European Union, Norbert Reich 
chose Georg Jellinek’s System of Subjective Rights (1892) as the starting 
point. There is a direct link between the ground breaking contribution 
on the reorientation of civil and economic law (1974), the publication 
on the promotion and protection of diffuse interests in the European 
legal order (1987), and his work on the civil rights in the European 
Union (1999). During a period of 25 years, Norbert Reich not only 
contributed to the Europeanization of civil and economic law, but also 
illustrated the necessity of their integration into a European 
constitution. 
In 2001, Norbert Reich was appointed rector of the Riga 
Graduate Law School. He focused on the eastward expansion, 
especially on questions of a modernisation of consumer, civil, and 
economic law in the Baltic States as well as in the former central and 
eastern European block states, the integration of which into the EU 
had been agreed (and came into effect in 2004). After his retirement in 
2005, he again dealt with European consumer law and union law in the 
shape of a conceptual and dogmatically thought-through overall 
presentation. It is due to his indefatigable energy and dedication that 
Intersentia published the second edition of the “European Consumer 
Law” under Reich’s overall responsibility (Reich et al. 2014). Shortly 
before his death, the new edition of his work “Understanding EU 
Internal Market Law” was published. This is not another introduction 
to EU law; rather, it focuses on the “internal market,” the civil and 
economic law of the EU that is surrounded by civil rights, and their 
leading principles. Although these two later works may be reason 
enough to trace his enormous creative power, his intellectual legacy lies 
in a dense monograph on the “General Principles of EU Civil Law” 
that was published in 2014. This book brings full circle his work on 
the reorientation of civil and economic law he first argued for 40 years 
ago. The careful choice of the title reflects the economic and socio-
political significance of civil law. European Civil Law should be guided 
by general principles that are rooted in the constitutional order of 
European society. 
The International Academy of Commercial and Consumer 
Law will remember him as a loyal participant to the biannual 
2015 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 4:1 
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conference, an inspiring mind who contributed heavily to our 
international community he hosted the 12th biannual meeting of the 
IACCL in Riga/Lativa 2004. We will miss his bright ideas and his 
endurance for the role and importance of consumer law in an 
international economy that is more guided by efficiency than by matter 
of social justice. We did not only lose a great scholar and one of the 
pillars of European consumer law, we will miss a friend who was out 
there with his unlimited preparedness to provide advice and support. 
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ON THE INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF 
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT AND 
REGULATION 
Hans-W. Micklitz* 
INTRODUCTION 
Are we private lawyers not convinced that we share a common 
understanding of “freedom of contract,” of “freedom”1  and 
“contract,” and of restrictions on that freedom of contract through 
“regulation?”2 Is this common understanding not the basis on which 
we all operate implicitly or explicitly in our intellectual discourse 
cutting across different legal traditions and different legal cultures?3 At 
the very least, is not the notion of contract freedom shared in all 
countries governed by a market society and even more so if the market 
society is embedded into the Westernized model of democracy?4 
What if this common assumption turns out to be wrong or is 
no more than a rather superficial “gentleman’s agreement,” which 
allows us to communicate with each other whilst maintaining our own 
preconceptions? Digging deeper into intellectual history, legal theory, 
and legal philosophy reveals that, for example, a French lawyer and an 
                                                 
*    Professor, European University Institute Florence.    
1   See generally UDO DI FABIO, DIE KULTUR DER FREIHEIT (2005) (for a 
German understanding of freedom of contract). 
2   See HUGH COLLINS, REGULATING CONTRACTS (1999); Gary Marks, 
Liesbet Hooghe & Kermit Blank, European Integration from the 1980s: State-Centric v. 
Multi-level Governance, 34 J. COMMON MARKET STUD. 3341 (1996). 
3   See Kaarlo Tuori, Regulation Theories, in TRANSNATIONAL LAW: 
RETHINKING EUROPEAN LAW AND LEGAL THINKING 11-57 (Miguel Maduro, 
Kaarlo Tuori & Suvi Sankari eds., 2014); THE MANY CONSTITUTIONS OF EUROPE 
(Kaarlo Tuori & Suvi Sankari eds., 2010). 
4   Gunther Teubner, Contracting Worlds: The Many Autonomies of Private Law, 
9 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 399 (2000). 
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English common lawyer may not necessarily be talking about the same 
thing when they argue about “freedom of contract.” This becomes 
even more complicated if we look at the limitations and restrictions on 
“freedom of contract,” which are set out via statutory regulation.5 
These lawyers might agree on what a state is by equating it with the 
“nation state,” but might encounter more problems in understanding 
and agreeing on the meaning of “regulation.” Regulation can be private 
or public. When created statutorily, regulation might facilitate or 
restrict freedom of contract. Statutory intervention, might, depending 
on one’s perspective (liberal or welfarist), trigger very different 
expectations, feelings, or sentiments. Our perception of “regulation” 
very much depends on what we expect as citizens from “our” state. 
This paper starts with two examples that are meant to highlight 
deeper cultural differences in deciding conflicting contractual issues. 
One example is taken from the French/German context, the other 
example is from the German/American context. These examples serve 
to underpin the hypothesis that the understanding of contract and 
regulation in the three countries under investigation – France, 
Germany and the United Kingdom – differs considerably and the 
reasons for the differences can be found in the intellectual history of 
the respective states. Further, this paper continues by contrasting the 
three different models of freedom of contract and regulation with the 
emerging European model. The hypothesis is that the European 
Union is yielding its own model which differs from the Member States 
model. This is not only due to the particular legal nature of the 
European Union as a quasi-state, but also to the changing economic 
and political environment after World War II. The conclusions remain 
tentative. The reader is invited to stand back and carefully look at the 
ongoing transformations of contract and regulation. Intellectual 
history and comparative research are the appropriate tools for such an 
exercise. 
                                                 
5   ROLF KNIEPER, ZWANG, VERNUNFT, FREIHEIT: STUDIEN ZUR 
JURISTISCHEN KONSTRUKTION DER GESELLSCHAFT (1981). 
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I.         ENGLISH-FRENCH DEFECTIVE SWIMMING POOLS 
A well-known pair of cases6 were decided before English and 
French courts facing a nearly identical problem.7 In Ruxley, a 
homeowner mandated a construction company to build a swimming 
pool in his garden.8 The water depth did not comply with what was 
agreed upon in the contract by twenty-two centimeters. The 
homeowner asked the construction company to rebuild the swimming 
pool. The House of Lords did not grant the homeowner specific 
performance.9 The House of Lords found that the swimming pool was 
usable, although not in the envisaged way; therefore, pecuniary 
damages sufficed to compensate the homeowner. Implicit in the 
House of Lords decision is the idea that it does not make sense to 
destroy a usable swimming pool just to satisfy the original contract. 
This combination of pragmatic and utilitarian considerations will be 
explained as the “English model.” 
Similarly, in France, a home was built thirty-three centimeters 
lower than what was agreed upon in the contract. In contrast to the 
House of Lords in Ruxley, however, the French Cour de Cassation held 
that the construction company must rebuild the house because it did 
not deliver exactly what was agreed to between the parties. Moreover, 
the construction company had to bear the full cost of reconstruction, 
and pecuniary damages did not suffice to compensate the homeowner 
for the broken promise.10 The “reason” behind the agreement 
prevailed over any other considerations one might have invoked. This 
“French model” will later be examined under this rationale. 
                                                 
6   Ruxley Electronics and Construction Ltd. v Forsyth, [1996] A.C. 344 
(H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.); Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial 
matters] 3e civ., May 11, 2005, Bull. civ. III, no. 103 (Fr.). 
7   I have taken this example from Ruth Sefton-Green. Ruth Sefton-Green, 
The European Union, Law and Society: Making the Societal-Cultural Difference, in PRIVATE 
LAW AND THE MANY CULTURES OF EUROPE 37, 52 (Thomas Wilhelmsson et al. eds., 
2007). 
8   Id. at 52. 
9   Ruxley Electronics and Construction Ltd., [1996] A.C. 344. 
10   Cour de cassation [Cass.][supreme court for judicial matters] 3e civ., 
May 11, 2005, Bull. civ. III, no. 103 (Fr.). 
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Comparative lawyers who study these and other similar cases 
are aware of the differences between English common law and the 
French Civil Code.11 However, the fact that a layperson, had they to 
decide the case, would come to the same result tells us something 
about our legal consciousness, and the deeper assumptions we share 
about our own legal systems based on the expectations we have in the 
functioning of the courts and of society, for good and for bad. The 
Eurobarometer is a neat indicator that allows for a deeper look into 
these differing preconceptions at least between the twenty-eight E.U. 
Member States.12 We may speculate on what courts in the United 
States, Canada, Brazil, Israel, Italy, or Germany would have decided in 
a case similar to the English or French cases. I am sure there are similar, 
if not identical, cases, and I assume that a survey of the citizens of these 
countries would lead to results similar to my English-French 
comparison.13 If my assumption is correct, there must be a deeper layer 
of rationales enshrined in long-grown cultures and traditions behind 
the legal rules.14 
II.         GERMAN TOURISTS STRANDED IN FLORIDA 
My second example deals with consumer law, which restricts 
and limits freedom of contract via statutory intervention. In the early 
                                                 
11   Ruxley and the French example are not unique. They represent a well- 
established and long standing doctrine. See id.; see also Franz Werro, Comparative Studies 
in Private Law: A European Point of View, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION ON 
COMPARATIVE LAW 132-33 (Mauro Busani & Hugo Mattei eds., 2012). 
12   Since 1973, the European Commission has been monitoring the 
evolution of public opinion in the Member States, thus helping the preparation of 
texts, decision-making and the evaluation of its work. The surveys and studies 
address major topics concerning European citizenship: enlargement, social situation, 
health, culture, information technology, environment, the Euro, defence, etc. See, e.g., 
European Commission, Public Opinion, 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2015). 
13   For example, the Trento Common Core Project is based on the idea 
that the same case is looked at through the eyes of different legal orders. THE 
COMMON CORE OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW, http://www.common-core.org/ 
(last visited Jan. 27, 2015). 
14   At this point in my paper, I do not argue that these rationales are 
“eternal” in the sense of Pierre Legrand’s argument that European legal cultures are 
not converging. See Pierre Legrand, European Legal Systems Are Not Converging, 45 INT’L 
& COMP. L.Q. 52 (1996). 
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1990s, German tourists used a tour operator to book all-inclusive trips, 
which included transportation, accommodations, and meals, to Florida 
at a favorable price. The trip operator went bankrupt, and the German 
tourists found themselves stranded in Florida. The tourists were forced 
to buy tickets at their own cost to return to Germany.15 
The German tourists sued the German state under the 
Francovich doctrine.16 The tourists sought restitution or compensation 
of the costs for their return tickets.17 At the time of litigation, Germany 
had not implemented Directive 90/314/EEC on package tours.18 This 
Directive obliges Member States to shield consumers from the 
bankruptcy of tour operators and shifts the risk of default from the 
individual traveler to the community of travelers. The risk is thereby 
socialized, as all potential travelers must cover the costs for a fund the 
tour operator provides.19 The German state lost and its liability was 
later confirmed by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) 
in Dillenkofer.20 This was a costly lesson for the German state which 
had to pay roughly 20 million German Marks (10 million Euros). 
Consumer organizations and consumer victims celebrated the 
judgment as a great success. 
The societal dimension of the conflict underlying the case is of 
particular interest here. At the time of the intense debate on who 
should bear the costs of the stranded tourists, a German television 
                                                 
15   For the facts and the subsequent decision of the CJEU, see Joined 
Cases C-178, 179/94 & C-188-90/94, Dillenkofer v. Germany, 1996 E.C.R. I-4845. 
16   Joined Cases C-6/90 & C-9/90, Francovich v. Italy, 1991 E.C.R. I-
5395. The Francovich doctrine creates non-contractual liability of Member States for 
violations of EU law: “a State must be liable for loss and damage caused to 
individuals as a result of breaches of [European Union] law for which the State can 
be held responsible.” Id. ¶ 35. 
17   Dillenkofer, 1996 E.C.R. I-4845. 
18   Council Directive 90/314 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 13 June 1990 on Package Travel, Package Holidays, and Package Tours, 
1990 O.J. (L 15) (EC). 
19   Id. at art. 7; see STEPHEN WEATHERILL, EU CONSUMER LAW AND 
POLICY 98-101 (2005); Klause Tonner, Kommentierung des Kapitel 13: Reisevertrag, in 
ZIVILRECHT UNTER EUROPÄISCHEM EINFLUSS: DIE RICHTLINIENKONFORME 
AUSLEGUNG DES BGB UND ANDERER GESETZE – ERLÄUTERUNGEN DER 
WICHTIGSTEN EG-VERORDNUNGEN (Herausgeber Gebauer & Thomas Wiedmann 
eds., 2010). 
20   Dillenkofer, 1996 E.C.R. I-4845. 
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program invited several of the stranded tourists and an American 
lawyer to discuss the proper remedy in the case. When given the 
opportunity to tell their stories, the German tourists said that, since a 
single return ticket cost three to four times more than the package tour, 
they went to the German embassy asking for financial support. At 
some point during the television program, the American lawyer asked 
the stranded tourists and the listeners a simple question: why not 
charter a plane? The lawyer suggested that chartering a plane would 
have been much less expensive for both the stranded tourists and for 
Germany. 
The lawyer’s question brings to light the expectations of 
German citizens, particularly the economically suspect deal of two 
weeks holidays in Florida for 500 to 600 German Marks. The tourists 
trusted the contract adage that a deal is a deal. Maybe the tourists 
subconsciously were also convinced that the German state would bail 
them out if their contractual expectations turned out to be wrong. 
Would consumers of a state other than Germany have had the same 
expectations of their contract with a package tour operator and of their 
state? Similarly, would these consumers have bombarded their 
embassies with complaints, or would they have chartered a plane? I 
assume that the expectations differ considerably. 
However, there is more at stake than the help provided by 
national embassies for stranded citizens. As a result of the Francovich 
doctrine, E.U. law equips all E.U. citizens with individually enforceable 
rights to force their state to pay for the transfer, provided the 
respective state has not implemented, or has not correctly 
implemented, the Directive on package tours. How is this possible? It 
is not that the Member States accept liability voluntarily. Instead, it is 
the European Union which imposes such liability on Member States 
via the CJEU. Thus, the regulation of package tours by the European 
Union not only sets boundaries for the freedom of package tour 
operators, who are forced to abide by the E.U. rules when exercising 
their economic activity, but also paves the way for more 
entrepreneurial freedom in a European market. 
2015 Micklitz 4:1 
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III.        THE CONDITIONS FOR A JOURNEY INTO INTELLECTUAL 
HISTORY 
This paper will now discuss the rationales behind the notion of 
freedom of contract by examining the German, French, U.K., and E.U. 
legal systems, all of which I am familiar with from extensive training 
and practice.21 I want to ground this discussion in my experiences with 
                                                 
21   A word is needed on my knowledge of foreign legal systems, especially 
since current comparative legal methodology is in a state of crisis. When I was 
educated in comparative legal research in the 1970s and 1980s, the thinking in 
Europe followed the ground-breaking work of Zweigert and Kötz. See generally 
KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 
(Tony Weier trans., 3d ed. 1998); TONY WEIR ON THE CASE (Catherine Barnard et 
al. eds., 2012) . Legal systems were grouped around “legal families”—namely the four 
European families, the Romanic, the Germanic, the common law, and the Nordic 
countries—all of which share a common European culture, i.e., Roman law and 
Christian canon law. See Franz Wieacker & Edgar Bodenheimer, Foundations of 
European Legal Culture, 38 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 (1990); FRANZ WIEACKER, 
VORAUSSETZUNGEN EUROPÄISCHER RECHTSKULTUR VERLAG GÖTTINGER 
TAGEBLATT (1985). The method applied was a functional comparison by looking for 
the “best solution,” or the solution that best fit the differing traditions of the states. 
What is more important here was the pedagogical message inherent to the idea of 
legal families. Engaging in comparative law and comparative legal method requires 
not only knowledge of the language, but also knowledge of the country and the 
cultural foundations of the respective societies. This kind of knowledge, however, 
must be gained through training and education in the country itself. In that spirit, I 
benefited from the opportunity to study law in Switzerland (the French speaking 
part), France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Italy. Today, such a 
rigorous training requirement seems old-fashioned, as comparative lawyers have to 
engage in the comparison of countries and legal systems even if they know neither 
the language nor have fully experienced the country’s culture. The E.U. promoted 
this type of approach through its insistence on “inclusion,” which does not follow 
the traditional division of legal families, but converges the legal orders of twenty-
eight Member States. This approach leads to a comparison of legal systems via 
simplistic methods, such as tables and charts. I admit that I have been involved in 
this more modern approach. Interestingly enough, legal origin theory (LOT) took 
the legal families approach seriously, which could have reinvigorated the approach 
of Zweigert and Kötz. See generally LEGAL ORIGIN THEORY (Simon Deakin & 
Katharina Pistor eds., 2012) (analyzing the different strains of legal origin theory. 
However, what actually happened was that LOT revealed the weakness of thinking 
in families, as it cannot do justice to the deeper traditions and cultures of the 
countries compared. Professor Ralf Michaels labelled LOT “comparison in 
numbers,” and questioned why comparative lawyers remained so speechless in their 
reaction and did not defend the functional method. Ralf Michaels, Comparative Law 
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the countries’ culture and history. Building on previous research on 
social justice in private law22 and the (un)systematics of European legal 
culture,23 I seek to identify the dominating Rechtsbewußtsein, i.e., legal 
conscience,24 with respect to intellectual history, legal theory, and legal 
philosophy. Then, I want to transpose the intellectual history to my 
question on the cultural and societal foundations of freedom of 
contract. I am fully aware that modelling by country is risky and that it 
might look as if traditions and cultures are not subject to political, 
economic, and social change.25 I would defend, nevertheless, that such 
grouping around models is useful in identifying differences and maybe 
in deepening the mutual understanding of our conceptions of freedom 
of contract and the regulation thereof. 
                                                 
by Numbers? Legal Origins Thesis, Doing Business Reports, and the Silence of Traditional 
Comparative Law, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 765 (2009); see also Mathias M. Siems, 
Comparative Law (Oct. 21, 2014), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2512938. 
22   See THE MANY CONCEPTS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE IN EUROPEAN PRIVATE 
LAW (Hans-W. Micklitz ed., 2011). 
23   Hans-W. Micklitz, The (Un)-Systematics of (Private) Law as an Element of 
European Legal Culture, in TOWARDS A EUROPEAN LEGAL CULTURE 81-115 
(Geneviève Helleringer & Kai Purnhagen eds., 2014). 
24   See Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850-
2000, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 19 (David M. Trubek & 
Alvaro Santos eds., 2006); The Rule of Law, Political Choices and Developing Common Sense, 
in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 95 (David M. Trubek & Alvaro 
Santos eds., 2006); MENTALITÄTEN-GESCHICHTE: ZUR HISTORISCHEN 
REKONSTRUKTION GEISTIGER PROZESSE (André Burguière & Ulrich Raulff eds., 
1987); Hagen Schulze, Mentalitätsgeschichte – Chancen und Risiken eines Paradigmas der 
französischen Geschichtswissenschaft, 36 GESCHICHTE IN WISSENSCHAFT UND 
UNTERRICHT 247 (1985). See also Sebastian Conard & Shalini Randeria, Geteilte 
Geschichten – Europa in einer postkolonialen Welt, in JENSEITS DES EUROZENTRISMUS: 
POSTKOLONIALE PERSPEKTIVEN IN DEN GESCHICHTS-UND 
KULTURWISSENSCHAFTEN 9-49 (Sebastian Conard & Shalini Randeria eds., 2002).  
25   See WOLFGANG STREECK, RE-FORMING CAPITALISM: INSTITUTIONAL 
CHANGE IN THE GERMAN POLITICAL ECONOMY 251 (2009) (strongly critiquing that 
the ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ neglects the two major driving forces of change in 
capitalist societies: the fear of workers and the greed of entrepreneurs); Dorothee 
Bohle & Béla Greskovits, Varieties of Capitalism and Capitalism << tout court >>, 50 
EUR. J. SOCIETY 355 (2009); Peter A. Hall & David Soskice, An Introduction to Varieties 
of Capitalism, in VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE (Peter A. Hall & David Soskice eds., 2001)(a stock 
taking of the debate).  
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IV.         WHERE TO START WITH THE INTELLECTUAL HISTORY? 
The analysis of the notion of freedom contract should begin 
with the Roman law. We can refer to the history of Roman law, and 
how its foundations have survived the last 2,000 years in both 
continental and common law countries;26 however, the historical 
ground might be less stable and less safe than its promoters pretend.27 
Regulation is much more complicated. The Roman Empire used what 
today we call “regulation” to govern the economy. “Regulations,” 
whether back then or now, have almost always been associated with 
the existence of a state and a territory. This brings us to the Peace of 
Westphalia, concluded in 1648, which laid the foundations for what 
later became the nation state. 
The benchmark for the beginning or the reinvigoration of 
Roman law is the foundation of the University of Bologna around 
1130/1140 and the scholastic school of law. According to Harold 
Berman, the conflict between Pope Gregory VII and Henry IV, Holy 
Roman Emperor, a century earlier over the independence of the 
Church from the temporal power heralded and triggered the re-
establishment of Roman law, private law, and contract law.28 Berman 
argues that the separation of spiritual and temporal power not only 
initiated early state building and paved the way for the development of 
the nation state after the religious wars of the sixteenth and 
seventeenth century, but also led to the creation of the scholastic 
school of law first in Bologna and then elsewhere in Europe.29 The 
Crusades between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries led to a 
stronger intellectual exchange between the West and the East through 
the reinvigoration of Greek and Roman philosophy, as well as through 
                                                 
26   See Reinhard Zimmermann, “Heard Melodies are Sweet, but Those Unheard 
are Sweeter . . .” Condicio tacita, Implied Conditions und die Fortbildung des europäischen 
Vertragsrechts, 193 ARCHIV FÜR CIVILISTISCHE PRAXIS 121 (1993). 
27   Thomas Duve, Von der Europäischen Rechtsgeschichte zu einer Rechtsgeschichte 
Europas in globalhistorischer Perspektive, 20 J. FOR MAX PLANCK INST. FOR EUR. LEGAL 
HIST. 16 (2012) (a more nuanced analysis of the transfer and re-transfer of laws 
between European countries and what later became their colonies). 
28   See generally, HAROLD J. BERMAN, RECHT UND REVOLUTION: DIE 
BILDUNG DER WESTLICHEN RECHTSTRADITION (2001). 
29   Id. at 146, 215.  
2015 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 4:1 
10 
commercial exchange.30 Hence, there is a connection between the 
rediscovery of Roman law, the split of spiritual and temporal power, 
and the Crusades, which renders the intellectual history of Western law 
to that époque indispensable. 
One might alternatively argue that the starting point of my 
undertaking could and should be the discovery of the Americas in the 
fifteenth century and the conflict between the Spanish and English 
empires, without which the deeper intellectual history of the United 
States cannot be fully understood. New research initiated by Thomas 
Duve, the Director of the Max-Planck-Institut at Frankfurt am Main, 
emphasizes the cultural, political, and economic interaction and 
interchange between Europe and the “New World,” or the two 
Americas.31 My approach is more modest and is more closely tied to 
my European cultural roots, the younger history of codified 
continental law, and the established role of the state in the economy 
and society. 
This paper owes its origins to an invitation to speak on social 
justice in private law at the Cour de Cassation in Paris.32 Thinking 
about justice in the French academic and judicial environment must 
coincide–at least this is what I am convinced of–with an analysis of the 
connection between state-building and constitution-building, as well as 
private legal order building and codification in the aftermath of the 
French revolution 1789. Whilst such a starting point offers joint 
perspectives in comparing France and Germany, it falls short by not 
taking the United Kingdom into account. If anything, a parallel may be 
drawn between the French Revolution of the late eighteenth century 
and German state-building of the nineteenth century on the one hand, 
and the Civil War and the conflict between the English Crown and 
Oliver Cromwell in the seventeenth century on the other. This period, 
i.e. the seventeenth throughout the nineteenth century, is roughly the 
period I investigated in attempting to explain where the different 
patterns of freedom of social justice derive from. I use these findings 
                                                 
30   See id.  
31   See Duve, supra note 27.  
32   Hans-W. Micklitz, Speech at the Cour de Cassation Paris: From Social 
Justice to Participatory Justice (2007). 
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in my attempt to transfer them an understanding of the deeper layers 
of freedom of contract. 
V.         MODELING THE MANY FACES OF “FREEDOM OF CONTRACT” 
Table 1 illustrates my understanding of freedom of contract and 
regulation, rooted in intellectual history. This section will first explain the 
categorization of England, France, Germany, and the European 
Union.33 I will then provide a rough account of the socio-economic 
and political background to the different models of autonomy and 
regulation in those three countries and the European Union, thereby 
elaborating on the characteristics of the many faces of freedom of 
contract in a bottom-up perspective. 
  
                                                 
33   The following analysis is a developed and adjusted version of Hans-W. 
Micklitz, supra note 23. 
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Table 1: Understandings of Freedom of Contract, Regulation 
and Their Intellectual History (France, Germany, United Kingdom 
European Union) 
Country Model of 
freedom of 
contract 
Intellectual 
history 
Regulation 
France  A political 
project 
Code Civil 
French 
rationalism 
Enlightenment 
Regulating 
contracts as a 
political 
counter-
project  
Germany A liberal 
authoritarian/ 
paternalistic  
project 
Bürgerliches 
Gesetzbuch 
German idealism 
Metaphysics 
Regulating 
contracts as a 
technical 
bureaucratic 
exercise 
United 
Kingdom 
A liberal 
pragmatic 
project 
Common law 
Empiricism and 
Utilitarianism 
Pragmatism  
Regulating 
contracts to 
solve 
‘concrete 
Problems’ 
European 
Union 
A technocratic 
project 
Regulatory 
private law 
Instrumentalism 
and 
functionalism 
Regulated 
freedom – 
enabling and 
shaping 
autonomy 
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A.         The English Model: Liberal and Pragmatic 
In English history there is no comparable event to the 
adoption of the Civil Code in France or in Germany. The civil war that 
took place in the seventeenth century in England led to major changes 
in society and the parliamentarian system. However, the English Civil 
War neither yielded a constitution nor a coherent codified body of civil 
law; rather, it only made way for the Declaration of the Bill of Rights 
in 1689. The French and the German legal systems, as seen through 
the eyes of a common law lawyer (daring to suggest that this is possible 
for me, a civil law lawyer), share a relatively homogenous view on the 
role and function of freedom of contract in society. These legal 
systems are united in the idea of universal values that infiltrate legal 
principles and concepts. “Autonomy” or “autonomie” is at the core of 
these values, and this is exactly where common lawyers run into 
difficulties.34 
The true difference between continental law and common law 
dates further back than the French revolution, and it was crucial to 
identify the point at which the continental and common law systems 
diverged. I considered the clash between different philosophies, and 
to the remaining influence of the scholastic in continental Europe and 
its growing critique through nominalism in the United Kingdom. I also 
considered that the divergence occurred during medieval times when 
the relative cultural unity of Europe broke into pieces.35 Therefore, I 
think empiricism is responsible for the deep differences between 
continental and common law legal systems. Despite the strong 
intellectual exchange, especially between France and England, Hobbes 
imported ideas from France, Rousseau referred to John Locke, and the 
ideas and concepts of Francis Bacon’s empiricism became prevalent 
after the failure of Cromwell. Empiricism paved the way for 
utilitarianism–and here we have not only the key to understanding 
English reservations against regulatory intervention into the economy, 
                                                 
34   See Lord R. Goff, The Future of the Common Law, 46 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 
745 (1997). 
35   BERMAN, supra note 28, at 265. 
2015 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 4:1 
14 
but also the explanation for English pragmatism,36 which allows for 
regulatory intervention when there is a concrete need for action. 
Both historical strings, which are tied together in my discussion 
above, justify the assumption that the continental European 
understanding of freedom of contract does not comply with 
philosophical, historical, economic, and legal structures in England. In 
other words, England has paved the way for a legal system which is 
deeply rooted in nominalistic and utilitarian thinking. Freedom of 
contract lies at the crossroads of these deep roots in English 
intellectual history. Nominalism served to cut away the ideological 
barriers enshrined in the scholastic school of law and to free English 
contract law from the Pandectist heritage; utilitarianism went hand in 
hand with the rise of the English “trading state” (Handelsstaat), which 
has its origins in the nineteenth century.37 The heart of English 
contract law lies in the freedom of commerce and the freedom to 
conclude contracts. Freedom of contract, therefore, means first and 
foremost the economic freedom to voluntarily engage in economic 
transactions without any risk of statutory interferences, with the 
exception of paying taxes to the Crown.38 
Compared to German Idealism (Kant, Fichte, Hegel, 
Schelling) and French Rationalism (Descartes, Pascal, Voltaire, 
Rousseau), the English view of the role and function of contract law is 
much more economic in its basic assumptions. It is a much smaller 
argumentative step from utility to economic efficiency and economic 
effectiveness, compared with duty, reason, will, or spirit (Pflicht, 
Vernunft, Wille, Verstand, Geist). English contract law can be much 
more easily adapted to European “integration through law,”39 where 
                                                 
36   See Goff, supra note 34; Basil Markesinis, Learning from Europe and 
Learning in Europe, in THE GRADUAL CONVERGENCE: FOREIGN IDEAS, FOREIGN 
INFLUENCES, AND ENGLISH LAW ON THE EVE OF THE 21ST CENTURY (Basil 
Markesinis ed., 1994); Thijmen Koopmans, The Birth of European Law at the Crossroads 
of Legal Traditions, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 493 (1991). 
37   See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW (1909). 
38   LAWRENCE JAMES, THE RISE AND THE FALL OF BRITISH EMPIRE (1st 
ed. 1994). 
39   See “INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW” REVISITED: THE MAKING OF THE 
EUROPEAN POLITY (Daniel Augenstein ed., 2012); Integration Through Law: Europe and 
the American Federal Experience, in INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW 3-68 (Mauro 
Cappelletti, Monica Seccombe & Joseph Weiler eds., 1986). 
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the judicial system is given a major role in the realization of the Internal 
Market.40 
What is the relationship between the particular English variant 
of freedom of contract and English legal culture? The English state is 
a liberal state. Its function is not to control economic behavior but to 
guarantee freedom of contract. In the seventeenth century this 
concerned the merchant adventurer, today it concerns the business 
environment at large.41 Statutory intervention in the economy is 
feasible if there is a political need. Labor law and consumer law 
legislation illustrate this approach. The U.K. Parliament was at the 
forefront of consumer legislation. With regard to consumer credit and 
consumer safety, the U.K. Parliament has long set the benchmark for 
statutory intervention. Pragmatism is the guiding idea of statutory 
regulation restricting the freedom to contract. 
This approach can be felt in the way in which the transposition 
of European consumer law directives are integrated into the English 
system. Directive 99/44/EC42 is an example. The U.K. Parliament 
rejected any attempt to revise the English law on contracts. Such an 
attempt would have challenged the foundations of freedom of contract 
by creating a separate legislation to stand side-by-side with the 
common law on contracts on the one hand, and the Sale of Goods Act 
                                                 
40   No research has been undertaken as to whether there is a link between 
the adherence of the United Kingdom to the Europe Union and the deepening of 
European integration via case law. Whilst the building blocks van Gend en Loos and 
Costa Enel were decided before the UK joined the EU, the ground-breaking 
judgments of Dassonville and Cassis de Dijon paved the way for the development of the 
Internal Market and were made with the participation of UK judges. Today’s pattern 
of integration might have changed. Christian Joerges, What is left of the integration 
through law project? A reconstruction in conflicts-law perspectives, in THE EUROPEAN RESCUE 
OF THE EUROPEAN UNION? 37-67 (Edoardo Chiti, Augustín José Menéndez, Pedro 
Gustavo Teixeira eds. 2012) (speaks of “integration without law,” referring to the 
dominance of politics and the influential role of governance.) 
41   PATRICK S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 
(1985); DAVID J. IBBETSON, A HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF 
OBLIGATIONS (1999) (showing that the real turning point was between 1790 and 
1830, when the last remnants of just price were stripped away). 
42   Council Directive 99/44 on certain aspects of the sale of consumer 
goods and associates guarantees, 1999 O.J. (L 171) (EC). 
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on the other.43 Under E.U. Directive 93/13/EEC, a similar continuity 
can be demonstrated in the recent decisions of the House of Lords on 
the control of unfair contract terms in consumer contracts.44 This piece 
of E.U. law has led to irritation in the English system, as it submits 
standard terms to a general fairness test, an approach which runs 
counter to the ideology of the English Parliament,45 where regulatory 
intervention is not meant to challenge the significance of freedom of 
contract in general but to solve concrete problems.46 
In conclusion, the basic formula which lies at the heart of 
English legal culture can be condensed into one single formula–what 
is useful is right. Here nominalism, empiricism and utilitarianism come 
together. Freedom of contract is foundational to the common law on 
contracts, and statutory intervention is acceptable as long as it aims at 
solving concrete consumer or labor concerns. 
B.         The French Model: Rational and Political 
France has a particular historical role in the legal and 
theoretical discourse on the interrelationship between constitution-
building and the making of private legal order. The results of the 
French revolution are still shaping our understanding of constitutions, 
civil codes, “contract,” and “tort” today. In only twenty years the key 
events in France which would define these notions occurred. In 
contrast, in the United Kingdom similar notions developed from an 
evolutionary process, where no clear-cut moment of constitution 
building and private legal order making can be fixed. The French 
Revolution led to a break with feudalistic structures47 and instituted a 
                                                 
43   See LUCINDA MILLER, THE EMERGENCE OF EU CONTRACT LAW – 
EXPLORING EUROPEANIZATION (2011) (analyzing the struggle in the UK over the 
implementation of Directive 99/44). 
44   Council Directive 93/13 of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer 
contracts, 1993 O.J. (L 95) (EC).  
45   See Gunther Teubner, Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How 
Unifying Law Ends Up in New Divergencies, 61 MOD. L. REV. 11 (1998). 
46   See Office of Fair Trading v. Abbey Nat’l plc & Others, [2009] UKSC 
6, [2010] 1 A.C. 696 (appeal taken from Eng. and Wales); General of Fair Trading v. 
First Nat’l Bank plc, [2001] UKHL 52, [2002] A.C. 481 (appeal taken from Eng. and 
Wales); Hein Kötz, Schranken der Inhaltskontrolle bei den Allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen 
der Banken: Entscheidung des britischen Supreme Court, 25 ZEuP 332 (2012). 
47   See HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION (1963). 
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bourgeois society governed by individual freedom and equality of 
rights, which became even more visible in the Code Civil and in the 
French Constitution.48 The Revolution’s legacy can easily be found in 
the German Civil Code, which was adopted a century later. 
To portray the French understanding of freedom of contract 
and regulation, I start from two premises. First, the vision of the 
French revolution, which was proclaimed in the Declaration of Human 
Rights, pinned down in a Constitution, and later codified in the Civil 
Code, has deeper social, cultural, economic, and intellectual roots. I 
argue that today’s conception of freedom of contract in France can 
best be understood as a political forward-looking concept, which can 
be traced back to French Rationalism49 and Descartes.50 
Secondly, French society may be characterized by the tension 
between intellectual projects guided by “les grandes idées,”–the French 
Constitution and the French Code–which strengthen the power of the 
Executive to the detriment of the Judiciary, and the highly politicized 
bottom-up resistance against an excessively far-reaching executive 
power.51 The fight over “the Social”52—the regulatory intervention to 
protect workers in employment contracts and later the consumers in 
business to consumer (B2C) contracts—has demonstrated that setting 
limits to freedom of contract through statutory intervention is a highly 
politicized matter that is subject to potential conflicts. 
Just as in England, the intellectual turning point in France can 
be attributed to the fading influence of scholastic thinking.  Academic 
                                                 
48   See FRANZ WIEACKER, PRIVATRECHTSGESCHICHTE DER NEUZEIT 343 
(1967). 
49   For a deeper analysis, see LAURENCE BONJOUR, IN DEFENSE OF PURE 
REASON (1998); Laurence BonJour, A Rationalist Manifesto, 18 CANADIAN J. OF PHIL. 
SUPPLEMENTARY 53 (1992). 
50   See EGON FRIEDELL, KULTURGESCHICHTE DER NEUZEIT: DIE KRISE 
DER EUROPÄISCHEN SEELE VON DER SCHWARZEN PEST BIS ZUM ERSTEN 
WELTKRIEG (2007) (discussing Descartes and his methodological thinking). 
51   This is my own interpretation of the French development. 
52   See Kennedy, supra note 24, at 19, 95 (discussing the rise of “The Social” 
and its intellectual origins); from a German perspective, but taking the French impact 
into account, in particular Duguit, Salleilles and Gény, see Wieacker, supra note 48, at 
543 § 28 (“Der Zerfall der inneren Einheit des Privatrechts und das Sozialrecht”.) In 
that vain, law has a particular social function to fulfill. 
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questioning of the spirit evolved from the methodological constraints 
of scholasticism and paved the way for a new rational method in 
philosophy. French philosopher Michel Eyguem de Montaigne (1533-
1592) set long-lasting incentives for critical reflection of all existing 
knowledge and values, which later came to be known as 
“Enlightenment.”53 This new method to investigate the “truth” and 
the concept of the truth was left in the seventeenth century to 
Descartes, who began with his Discours de la Méthode.54 Descartes 
claimed that a particular method to acquire the truth was needed to 
solve all philosophical questions. Unlike utilitarianism, Descartes 
believed that what is true is useful. Without Descartes’s theory, it is 
difficult to understand the political conception of the French Civil 
Code. Descartes’ philosophy results in the priority of theory over 
practice, which is the basic thesis of French intellectualism. 
Based on this premise, the link between the French political 
project of freedom of contract and the particularities of the French 
legal culture become clear. Freedom of contract is first and foremost 
tied to the key function of the “reason,” “raison,” or “Vernunft” in the 
French civil law system. The idea is that freedom of contract is more 
than just an exercise to maximize mutual economic benefit. More is at 
stake in the communication between the parties, namely, the 
commitment to a contract is the product of a reasonable decision. 
Autonomie de la volonté is bound in the belief or assumption (“Einsicht”) 
in a higher reason that is deeper than the individual transaction.55 This 
is the Cartesian side of the concept of autonomie de la volonté. However, 
there is also the Rousseauean side, and it is here where the political 
dimension of the concept of automomie de la volonté is more obvious. 
Autonomie de la volonté may not be equated with individual freedom in 
the meaning of German idealism, which is inward looking. To the 
contrary, it is outward looking toward society itself and to the 
embedding of reason into the political environment. This is what 
Rousseau called the volonté générale (general will). Without Rousseau’s 
concept of democracy and the conviction that the people will consent 
                                                 
53   See FRIEDELL, supra note 50. 
54   RENÉ DESCARTES, DISCOURS DE LA MÉTHODE POUR BIEN CONDUIRE 
SA RAISON, ET CHERCHER LA VÉRITÉ DANS LES SCIENCES (1637).  
55   This implies the need to look for a certain substantive equivalence in 
the mutual contractual relations, in German “das materielle Äquivalenzprinzip der 
vernunftsrechtlichen Vertragslehre.”  
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to the volonté générale, it is not possible to understand the political 
dimension of the concept of autonomy in the French civil code.56 
In France, there is also a peculiar understanding of the role and 
function of regulatory intervention in the economy to protect workers 
and consumers and, more in general, to restrict freedom of contract in 
commercial transactions through statutory regulation. Since 
mercantilist times, the French government played a strong role in the 
organization and creation of the economy.57 The economy must follow 
political prerogatives in order to address social concerns and any other 
political requirements. What matters for our discussion is the strong 
connection between the role and function of the political, and the 
understanding of regulatory intervention. The political dimension 
must not necessarily materialize in a top-down fashion, i.e. through 
legislative acts on what nowadays is called social regulation or 
executive intervention into the management of the economy of the 
country. The political may also emerge bottom-up, through resistance 
on the streets against the supremacy of the state managed economy 
over politics. 
To demonstrate the continuity of the French legal conscience 
(Rechtsbewußtsein) and of the breadth and depth of the political in social 
regulation, I will again start with reference to the implementation of 
E.U. Directive 99/44/EC on consumer sales. Under strong pressure 
from civil lawyers and civil law doctrine, the French legislature decided 
that, rather than integrate the rules on consumer protection into the 
Civil Code, it would place the respective articles in the Code de la 
Consommation.58 This strategy preserved the integrity of the Civil Code 
as an “eternal” political project, which might be regarded as an integral 
part of the French identity.59 However, there is one notable difference 
                                                 
56   I am fully aware that Rousseau differs from Descartes in his image of 
the person. 
57   See KARL PRIBRAM, GESCHICHTE DES ÖKONOMISCHEN DENKENS, [A 
HISTORY OF ECONOMIC REASONING] 194 (Erster Band ed., Horst Brühmann trans., 
1998); COLIN HEYWOOD, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FRENCH ECONOMY 1750-
1914 (1995). 
58   See MILLER, supra note 43 (reconstructing the political fights over the 
correct way to implement Directive 99/44 in the French legal system). 
59   French scholars had a strong reaction against the idea of a European 
Civil Code. See YVES LEQUETTE, QUELQUES REMARQUES A PROPOS DU PROJET DE 
CODE CIVIL EUROPEEN DE MONSIEUR VON BAR 2202-14 (2002); Bénédicte 
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to the English method of transposition. Contrary to the problem based 
U.K. approach on consumer protection, the French Code de la 
Consommation was originally designed according to a political model, a 
blueprint which was similar to the Civil Code in that it could guide the 
development in Europe of a consistent body of consumer law rules.60 
Contrary to most other Member States in the European Union, 
the consumer movement in France bore a strong political dimension, 
at least in the 1970s and 1980s, which largely derived from 
politicization through integrating consumer policy into politics. Trade 
unions in France were tied to various left wing parties, each of which 
had to leave their footprint on the then new policy.61 It is only because 
the European Union took over consumer policy in the second half of 
                                                 
Fauvarque-Cosson, Faut-il un code civil européen?, REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT 
CIVIL 463 (2002); see also Christian Joerges, Der Europäisierungsprozess als Herausforderung 
des Privatrechts: Plädoyer für eine neue Rechtsdisziplin, in EUROPÄISCHES PRIVATRECHT IM 
WISSENSCHAFTLICHEN DISKURS 133, 142 (Andreas Furrer ed., 2006) (interpreting 
the conflict between the German professorial model of the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch 
(BGB) and the democratic tradition of the Code Civil); Wolfgang Wurmnest, Common 
Core, Grundregeln, Kodifikationsentwürfe, Acquis-Grundsätze – Ansätze internationaler 
Wissenschaftlergruppen zur Privatrechtsvereinheitlichung in Europa, 11 ZEUP 714 (2003); 
Bénédicte Fauvarque-Cosson, Droit europen des contrats: première réaction au plan d’áction 
de la Commission, RECUEIL DALLOZ 1171 (2003); Philippe Malinvaud, Réponse-hors 
délai-à la Commission européenne: à propos d’un code européenne des contrats, in PENSEE 
JURIDIQUE FRANCAISE ET HARMONISATION EUROPEENNE DU DROIT 231 
(Bénédicte Fauvarque-Cosson & Denis Mazeaud eds., 2003)  ; JEAN HUET, NOUS 
FAUT-IL UN ‘EURO’ DROIT CIVIL? 2611-14 (2002). Whether or not the French Civil 
Code would pass the identity test under the Lisbon Treaty is another story. See Hans-
W. Micklitz, German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht BVerfG) 2 BvE 2/08, 
30.6.2009 – Organstreit Proceedings between Members of the German Parliament and the Federal 
Government, 7 EUR. REV. CONT. L. 528 (2011). 
60   JEAN CALAIS-AULOY, COMMISSION DE LA REFONTE, LE DROIT DE LA 
CONSOMMATION EN FRANCE (1981). 
61   This might explain why attempts to build connections between labor 
law and consumer law were particulary strong in France, to some extent in Italy, and 
only marginal in Germany. See MICHEL MIAILLE, UNE INTRODUCTION CRITIQUE 
AU DROIT (1976); ENZO ROPPO, VERBRAUCHERSCHUTZ UND KLASSENTHEORIE 
109 (1976); KLAUS TONNER, VERBRAUCHERSCHUTZ ALS GEWERKSCHAFTLICHE 
AUFGABE 252 (1979); KLAUS TONNER, VERBRAUCHERSCHUTZ UND 
KLAASSENTHEORIE – ERWIDERUNG AUF ENZO ROPPO 241 (1976). 
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the 1980s after the Single European Act62 that consumer policy became 
de-politicized in France. 
C.         The German Model: Liberal and Authoritarian/Paternalistic 
The German Civil Code is 100 years younger than the French 
Civil Code. In 1815, the aftermath of the Congress of Vienna and the 
scattered German regions that comprised various kingdoms and 
counties (earldoms) failed to unite into a German state under a 
common constitution. It took until 1871 before Germany managed, 
under the regime of the Prussian king and his chancellor Bismarck, to 
finally adopt a constitution. It took an additional thirty years before the 
Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB), as it is called in German, was enacted. 
My arguments are built upon two major guiding assumptions. 
First, there is a direct line from Kant to Savigny to Weber and the 
formal rationality of the private law system, which serves to constitute 
the capitalist society. The Kantian philosophy inspired Savigny to 
formulate the so-called Historische Schule (Historical School), which was 
influential during the nineteenth century among private law theorists 
and, remarkably, continues to be influential even after the fall of the 
wall in 1989.63 Historische Schule has created a particular way of thinking, 
favoring the transition from “The Social” to the “pure” private law 
system. Social issues and regulations were outsourced by a technocratic 
decision to specialize private law legislation outside the BGB, although 
adopted 100 years later than the more integrative approach of the 
French Code Civil.64 This time period gave the German BGB a 
                                                 
62   Single European Act, Feb. 28, 1986, 1987 O.J. (L 169) (entered into 
force July 1, 1987). 
63   See Reinhard Zimmermann, Savigny’s Legacy: Legal History, Comparative 
Law, and the Emergence of a European Science, 112 L.Q. REV. 576 (1996); Horst 
Eidenmüller et al., The Common Frame of Reference for European Private Law – Policy Choices 
and Codification Problems, 28 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 659 (2008) (criticizing the 
European private law codification project, which is inspired from and based on the 
destruction of the common philosophical ground of private law in the civil and 
common law systems). 
64   Both the French Code Civil and the German BGB covered tenant law. 
In France, tenant law has remained an integral part of the civil code, whereas German 
tenant law has become a legal field in itself, outsourced in special acts and only 
partially integrated in the BGB through the modernization of the law of obligations 
(Schuldrechtsmodernisierungsgesetz) in 2002. For details on the development of 
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particular ideological outlook, which maintained and defended an early 
nineteenth century bourgeois model of society and economy against 
the rising political and social transformations brought about by the 
industrial age and the labor movement.65 
Second, there is the link between Fichte, Hegel, Thibaut, 
German idealism, and legal naturalism, as expressed in Jhering, von 
Gierke, Ehrlich, Weber, and Kantorowicz wherein national ideals were 
tied to the social ideals of a society and a nation.66 Such a vision can 
hardly be connected to the authoritarian Prussian state, which 
provided social protection to workers67 only as a means to compensate 
workers for their exclusion from political participation (Sozialistengesetze 
1978). The German version of legal naturalism favors an instrumental 
use of social regulation, but carefully avoids and downplays the 
political dimension inherent in “The Social.”68 
The intellectual quarrel between two German law professors, 
Thibaut and Savigny, over the value of a codified German Civil Code 
is paradigmatic for tensions arising in the German legal system: 
Thibaut fought enthusiastically in Heidelberg–inspired by German 
Idealism and les grandes idées of the French revolution–for a genuine 
German Code; Savigny fought brilliantly (but not enthusiastically) for 
the maintenance of the old Roman law.69 Law-making in Germany in 
the early nineteenth century was understood as an academic exercise, 
quite contrary to the democratic discussion that surrounded the 
                                                 
tenant law in Europe, see Christoph U. Schmid & Jason R. Dinse, The European 
Dimension of Residential Tenancy Law, 9 EUR. REV. CONT. L. 201 (2013).  
65   There is a connection between the late industrialization relative to the 
UK, the labor movement, and the Bismarckian reaction. See, e.g., HUGO SINZHEIMER, 
EIN ARBEITSTARIFGESETZ: DIE IDEE DER SOZIALEN SELBSTBESTIMMUNG IM 
RECHT (1916).  
66   See WIEACKER, supra note 48. Most of the legal auxiliary sciences such 
as criminology and legal sociology have their origin in legal naturalism and in the 
Freirechtsschule (Free Law Movement). 
67   E.g., 1883 health insurance, 1884 accident insurance. 
68   See Hermann U. Kantorowicz who attacks Savigny’s influence on the 
construction of the Civil Code and on what I call here “Rechtsbewußtsein”. 
Hermann U. Kantorowicz, Was ist uns Savigny, 1 RECHT UND WIRTSCHAFT 47, 76 
and seq. (1911). 
69   ANTON FRIEDRICH JUSTUS THIBAUT & FRIEDRICH CARL VON 
SAVIGNY, IHRE PROGRAMMATISCHEN SCHRIFTEN, MIT EINER EINFÜHRUNG VON 
HANS HATTENHAUER (1973). 
2015 Micklitz 4:1 
23 
adoption and distribution of the French Civil Code.70  The outcome 
was a civil code that lacked the required “socialist oil.”71 This defect 
was remedied in the twentieth century by judges through judge-made 
law, and by the legislator through the adoption of numerous special 
laws. 
German legal culture has two main components: a liberal 
dimension, which is shared by English law and enshrined in 
commercial freedom to contract; and a political dimension, which is 
shared by French law and enshrined in the much stronger commitment 
to “The Social.”72 The English streak dates back to the merging of the 
German Länder (states) under a tight Prussian grip, which triggered the 
industrial revolution and led to an amazing boost for the economy. In 
this context, the predominance of the market and a sense of English 
pragmatism can be felt. The German state, however, is not a liberal-
enabling state in the Anglo-Saxon sense. The German state is rooted 
in the authoritarian heritage of pre-democratic times. As such, the state 
is seen as the key regulator to realize not only economic but also 
political objectives, which brings German legal culture nearer to its 
French counterpart. However, contrary to France where the political 
also bears a strong top-down dimension, the political dimension in 
Germany is more bottom-up as it is always connected to expectations 
set by the citizens of the state. Today, the early Bismarkian regulatory 
state and the post-World War II welfare state still bears elements of 
authoritarian care-taking, which is different from England due to the 
strong interventionist side and different from France due to the lack 
of an open political discourse. The tension between the liberals and the 
                                                 
70   See Reinhard Zimmermann, Consumer Contract Law and General Contract 
Law: The German Experience, 58 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 415 (2005); Harm Schepel, 
Professorenrecht? The Field of European Private Law, in LAWYER’S CIRCLES – LAWYERS 
AND EUROPEAN LEGAL INTEGRATION 115 (2004); Rainer Maria Kiesow, 
Rechtswissenschaft – was ist das?, 12 JURISTEN ZEITUNG 585, 586 (2010). 
71   OTTO VAN GIERKE, DIE SOZIALE AUFGABE DES PRIVATRECHTS 13 
(1889); TILMAN REPGEN, DIE SOZIALE AUFGABE DES PRIVATRECHTS: EINE 
GRUNDFRAGE IN WISSENSCHAFT UND KODIFIKATION AM ENDE DES 19. 
JAHRHUNDERTS (2001). 
72   GERT BRÜGGEMEIER, ENTWICKLUNG DES RECHTS IM 
ORGANISIERTEN KAPITALISMUS, BAND 1: VON DER GRÜDERZEIT ZUR WEIMARER 
REPUBLIK (1977); GERT BRÜGGEMEIER, ENTWICKLUNG DES RECHTS IM 
ORGANISIERTEN KAPITALISMUS, BAND 2: VOM FASCHISMUS BIS ZUR GEGENWART 
(1979). 
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authoritarians explains why political debates in Germany so easily turn 
into ideological conflicts, just as it was between Thibaut and Savigny. 
What does this mean for the German variant of freedom of 
contract—or private autonomy (Privatautonomie) as phrased in the 
context of the intellectual history—and the limitation of freedom of 
contract via statutory regulation? Private autonomy centers on the 
individual. But who is the individual? The reasonable Cartesian French 
person/citizen, the utilitarian Englishman, or the idealistic 
Kantian/Hegelian subject? The key question in German legal theory—
although not in commercial transactions, freedom of contract, the 
common law of contracts, or the droit des obligations—is how this 
individual can bind himself legally. The conceptual difference is visible 
in the comparison between the common law and the German Civil 
Code. Only the German BGB contains a General Part (Allgemeiner Teil), 
which not only precedes the law of contract, but also precedes family 
law and the law of succession. The General Part holds the entire 
German private law system, as laid down in the BGB, together. Its 
content triggers irritation and uncertainty outside Germany (what is a 
juridical act? Ein Rechtsgeschäft?73). The key to understanding the 
idealistic German concept of private autonomy is to appreciate its 
roots in the so-called “will theory” (Willenstheorie), which states that the 
individual is bound through his will, rather than through his 
declaration (Erklärung).74 It is true that the Prussian legislator 
introduced corrections to the “will theory” into the BGB, which have 
been amplified by the judiciary in the twentieth century. Idealistic 
thinking embedded in the concept of private autonomy is still alive: it 
has been taken up by the Freiburg school, ordo-liberalism, and the 
private law society.75 Its counterpart, the resistance against restrictions, 
more often than not bears a strong ideological bias that is outweighed 
                                                 
73   The Academic Draft Common Frame of Reference contains such a 
general part in compliance with the German BGB. 
74   The “will theory” is extremely helpful because it combines European 
legal thought with American legal thought. See Duncan Kennedy, From the Will Theory 
to the Principle of Private Autonomy: Lon Fuller’s “Consideration and Form,” 100 COLUM. L. 
REV. 94 (2000). 
75   See ERNST-JOACHIM MESTMÄCKER, A LEGAL THEORY WITHOUT LAW: 
POSNER V. HAYEK ON ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 174 (2007) (responding to the 
critics of law and economics against ordo-liberalism). 
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by intense legislative activities in the twentieth century for the benefit 
of those contracting parties with weaker bargaining power. 
Again, I will use Directive 99/44/EC as a blueprint to explain 
the continuity of the German Rechtsbewusstsein and the tension between 
the liberal and authoritarian views of freedom of contract. In the 
shadow of the so-called modernization of German contract law 
(Schuldrechts-Modernisierungsgesetz) in 2002, the executive, i.e., the 
Ministry of Justice, used the expiry of the two-year implementation 
period to complete the twenty-year long pending project of revising 
the German Civil Code, thereby “smuggling” the bulk of consumer 
contract law rules into the German Civil Code. This integration of Civil 
Code and consumer contract law perhaps was not an authoritarian, but 
a paternalistic move.76 The academic debates focused almost entirely 
on the proposed revision of the prescription rules, in particular, on 
Leistungsstörungsrecht (law on the interference with or impairment of the 
performance of an obligation). This revision has been performed as a 
technical bureaucratic exercise.77 Pragmatism might have guided 
German scholars to accept the development of a new sales law, as a 
common pattern for business to business (B2B) and B2C relations; 
however, contrary to France and the Netherlands, there was no deeper 
political discussion, especially on the possible role of consumer law as 
an integral part of the civil code, in the open democratic fora in 
Germany. Until today, consumer law has remained a foreign body in 
                                                 
76   There is a deeper discussion needed on the difference between 
(Prussian) authoritarianism and (post-Second World War) German paternalism. See 
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA ch. VI (1835), for a starting 
point on this distinction (“[a]bove this race of men stands an immense and tutelary 
power, which takes upon itself alone to secure their gratifications and to watch over 
their fate. That power is absolute, minute, regular, provident, and mild. It would be 
like the authority of a parent if, like that authority, its object was to prepare men for 
manhood; but it seeks, on the contrary, to keep them in perpetual childhood: it is 
well content that the people should rejoice, provided they think of nothing but 
rejoicing. For their happiness such a government willingly labors, but it chooses to 
be the sole agent and the only arbiter of that happiness; it provides for their security, 
foresees and supplies their necessities, facilitates their pleasures, manages their 
principal concerns, directs their industry, regulates the descent of property, and 
subdivides their inheritances: what remains, but to spare them all the care of thinking 
and all the trouble of living?”). 
77   See, e.g., Stephan Lorenz, Fünf Jahre “neues” Schuldrecht im Spiegel der 
Rechtsprechung, 1-2 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 1 (2007). 
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the German BGB. The integration of “The Social” has not led to an 
overall re-thinking of the foundations of the German BGB. Instead, 
the two parts, although located in the same civil code, are each rooted 
in their very particular intellectual history.78 
D.        The European Model: Enabling and Restricting 
Over the last sixty years, the European legal order and the 
European constitutional charter79 have yielded a genuine model of 
freedom of contract to protect participants in an ever-growing Internal 
Market. At the same time, however, the European legal order and 
constitutional charter have also set boundaries to this established 
freedom of contract.80 How is it possible that the European Union is 
able to generate a distinct model, different from national ones? I am 
not so much interested in whether the emerging European model 
should be understood as some kind of reaction to the globalization of 
markets.81 My focus is on the intellectual history of the European legal 
order that underpins Europe and the European Union. Although 
Europe and the European Union are intertwined, they must be kept 
separate in our discussion. 
Perspective matters. Europe is treated as a homogenous whole 
by those on the outside, and particularly by U.S. legal scholars. Two 
examples of such over-generalized discussions about Europe include 
the work of James Whitman on U.S. consumerism versus E.U. 
                                                 
78   See HANS-W. MICKLITZ, BRAUCHEN KONSUMENTEN UND 
UNTERNEHMEN EINE NEUE ARCHITEKTUR DES VERBRAUCHERRECHTS? GUT-
ACHTEN A ZUM 69. JURISTENTAG 129 (2012); Hans-W. Micklitz, Do Consumers and 
Business Need a New Architecture for Consumer Law? A Thought Provoking Impulse, 32 Y.B. 
EUROPEAN L. 266 (2012). 
79   Neil Walker, Big “C” or Small “c”?, 12 EUR. L.J., 12 (2006). 
80   See Guido Comparato & Hans-W. Micklitz, Regulated Autonomy between 
Market Freedoms and Fundamental Rights in the Case Law of the CJEU, in GENERAL 
PRINCIPLES OF EU LAW AND EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW 121-54 (Ulf Bernitz, Xavier 
Groussot & Felix Schulyok eds., 2013); NORBERT REICH, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF 
EU CIVIL LAW (2013). 
81   KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION (1944); KARL 
POLANYI, GLOBALISATION AND THE POTENTIAL OF LAW IN TRANSNATIONAL 
MARKETS (Christian Joerges & Josef Falke eds., 2011). 
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producerism,82 and the work of Daniel Kelemen on Eurolegalism.83 In 
general, scholars tend to treat the south and north, the east and west, 
and the European Union and European Council the same. Similarly, 
there is little discussion in contemporary research on where Europe 
ends: European countries are considered a single entity, this entity is 
often implicitly equated with the European Union, and then the entity 
is compared with the United States.84 
Does the conception of freedom of contract and its statutory 
limitation reflect a common denominator of English Utilitarianism, 
French Rationalism, and German Idealism? Is there a foundation 
shared by the English liberal and pragmatic, French rational and 
political, and German liberal and authoritarian? To what extent does 
this intellectual crossover mutually impact England, France, and 
Germany? Those who stress a common cultural foundation insist on 
an intellectual exchange between the great minds behind the concepts 
of empiricism, utilitarianism, rationalism, enlightenment, and idealism. 
For centuries, European intellectuals shared a common language, 
Latin, which gradually vanished between the seventeenth and 
nineteenth centuries. The deeper cultural foundation, however, cannot 
be based in language alone. For example, in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, leading private lawyers from all over Europe 
and the United States were involved in intellectual exchange, but all 
wrote in their respective languages.85 It seems as if the intellectual 
                                                 
82   James Q. Whitman, Consumerism Versus Producerism: A Study in 
Comparative Law, 117 YALE L.J. 340, 407 (2007). 
83   R. DANIEL KELEMEN, EUROLEGALISM: THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
LAW AND REGULATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (2011). 
84   This kind of stereotyped, over-simplified thinking has been promoted 
by the Integration Through Law Project by Mauro Cappelletti, Monica Seccombe, 
and Joseph Weiler to compare the constitutional architecture of the then European 
Economic Community and the United States. See INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW: 
EUROPE AND THE AMERICAN FEDERAL EXPERIENCE, supra note 39, at 3-68; 
“INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW” REVISITED: THE MAKING OF THE EUROPEAN 
POLITY, supra note 39. This kind of thinking might be due to the historical 
circumstances in which it took places. In the mid 1980s there was still the political 
idea pending that the Member States of the European Union would be ready and 
willing to transform the European Union into a fully fledged federal United States 
of Europe.   
85   René Demogue, La Notion de Sujet De Droit, REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE 
DROIT CIVIL 611-55 (1909); RECUEIL SIREY, ÉVOLUTIONS ET ACTUALITES 
CONFERENCES DE DROIT CIVIL 29-51 (1936).  
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exchange was much more intense hundreds of years ago than it is 
today, since today the English language dominates the intellectual 
discourse and non-English contributions to the intellectual history of 
Europe are no longer perceived. 
Wieacker is perhaps one of the few scholars who looks behind 
the three main intellectual historical strains and condenses the 
common European legal culture that unites the private law in der 
Neuzeit86 (in modern times) into three invariables. The first invariable 
is personalism, which is directly connected to the role of the individual, 
autonomy, and freedom in private law. The second invariable is 
legalism in which decisions are bound to the rule of law. The third 
invariable is European intellectualism, which drives European legal 
thinking in the direction of thematization, conceptualization, and 
contradiction-free consistency of the law. 
Is Wieacker’s theory correct? Is the revitalization of the 
common European legal culture after the Second World War not 
guided by the political purpose it had to fulfill? Can the common 
European legal culture be regarded as an attempt to rewrite legal 
history? I fear that these questions are too broad for this paper.87 The 
debate on the possible legal philosophical foundations of Europe88 and 
European private law89 is just about to start. The handbook edited by 
Julie Dickson and Pavlos Eleftheriadis90 on the philosophical 
foundations of E.U. law mainly focuses on European constitutional 
                                                 
86   This is the title of Franz Wieacker’s masterpiece, which was translated 
into English by Tony Weir. See generally WIEACKER, PRIVATRECHTSGESCHICHTE DER 
NEUZEIT, supra note 48. 
87   See, e.g., WOLFRAM KAISER, CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY AND THE 
ORIGINS OF EUROPEAN UNION (2007); RAOUL CHARLES VAN CAENEGEM, 
EUROPEAN LAW IN THE PAST AND THE FUTURE: UNITY AND DIVERSITY OVER TWO 
MILLENNIA (2002); FRIEDRICH HEER, THE INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF EUROPE 
(1968); see also Kolleg-Forschergruppe Working Paper Series, KOLLEG-FORSCHERGRUPPE: 
THE TRANSFORMATIVE POWER OF EUROPE, (2009-2015) available at 
http://www.polsoz.fu-
berlin.de/en/v/transformeurope/publications/working_paper/index.html. 
88   See JAMES Q. WHITMAN, THE LEGACY OF ROMAN LAW IN THE 
GERMAN ROMANTIC ERA: HISTORICAL VISION AND LEGAL CHANGE (2014). 
89   THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW (Roger 
Brownsword et al. eds., 2011). 
90   PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN UNION LAW (Julie 
Dickson & Pavlos Eleftheriadis eds., 2012). 
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theory, rather than European private law and European private law 
theory.91 
To understand the European model of freedom of contract, it 
is helpful to look at the intellectual history, and perhaps the 
constitutional history, of the European Union. This understanding 
requires a leap to the post-war period, when the European Economic 
Community was launched and the European Union was created.  
Scholars92 advocated for the revitalization and re-invigoration of a 
common European culture to enable a peaceful and prosperous future 
for the European peoples. For example, scholars advocated for peace 
through economic integration, and in 1986, the Single European Act 
added social integration to the new European legal order.93 
Economic integration of the European Union is based on the 
free movement rights and competition. In particular, German 
academics in the ordo-liberal tradition have argued that private 
autonomy is enshrined into the free movement rights.94 Economic 
integration aims at enabling the growth of, or paving the way for, 
private entrepreneurship in the ever-bigger common European 
market. The abundant case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
on the four freedoms often involves contractual disputes in which one 
party seeks access to the market but is barred by national statutory 
                                                 
91   The Oxford University Press series, where Julie Dickson and Paylos 
Eleftheriadis also appeared, includes an ongoing project on the philosophical 
foundations of private law. 
92   These scholars include academics such as Wieacker, Grossi, and Coing, 
and political scholars such as Monnet, Schuman, de Gaspari, de Gaulle, and 
Adenauer. 
93   Fritz Scharpf was one of the most influential scholars in this field. See 
generally FRITZ SCHARPF, GOVERNING IN EUROPE: EFFECTIVE AND DEMOCRATIC? 
(1999) (analyzing the relationship between economic and social integration in 
Europe). 
94   See Stefan Grundmann, The Concept of the Private Law Society: After 50 
Years of European and European Business Law, 16 EUR. REV. PRIVATE L. 553 (2008). For 
a nice account of the European economic constitution and its influence on 
(European) private law, see Sabine Frerichs & Teemu Juutilainen, Rome under Seven 
Hills? An Archeology of European Private Law (Helsinki Legal Studies Research Paper 
Ser., Paper No. 32, 2014), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2465873. 
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regulation.95 Private autonomy then obtains a different meaning, 
namely, it is bound to trans-border business and European economic 
integration. The European variant is functional and instrumental. 
Social regulation in European private law is very much focused 
on consumer protection.96 The tone of such social regulation is set by 
the famous Sutherland Report.97 Consumers and consumer protection 
rules are needed to complete the Internal Market (the 1986 program 
behind the Single European Act). Putting it differently, the price to pay 
for the Completion of the Internal Market is the adoption of minimum 
social (protection) standards.98 The overall philosophy is enshrined in 
the wording of Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
Europe Union (TFEU), formerly Article 95 EC and Article 100a 
respectively, which adopted measures to complete the Internal Market 
in realizing social protection standards.99 In the late 1970s and early 
1980s, several consumer and labor protection rules were adopted 
under the unanimity principle, the enabling of autonomy and the 
limitation of autonomy go hand-in-hand. The broadening of economic 
freedoms, similar to common law freedom of contract, preceded the 
development of protective standards that limited freedom of contract, 
mainly through binding legal standards. 
This development is by no means limited to the field of 
traditional private law, contract law and consumer protection, or 
employment contracts and labor protection. European private law is 
                                                 
95   Gareth Davies, Freedom of Contract and the Horizontal Effect of Free 
Movement Law, in THE INVOLVEMENT OF EU LAW IN PRIVATE LAW RELATIONSHIPS 
(Dorota Leczykiewicz & Stephen Weatherill eds., 2013). 
96   See Weatherill, supra note 19; HANS-W. MICKLITZ ET AL., EUROPEAN 
CONSUMER Law (2d ed., 2014). 
97   PETER SUTHERLAND ET AL., THE FUTURE OF THE WTO: ADDRESSING 
INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES IN THE NEW MILLENIUM: REPORT BY THE 
CONSULTATIVE BOARD TO THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL SUPACHAI PANITCHPAKDI 
(2004).  
98   The European Commission has made an enormous effort after 2000 
to transform the minimum social protection standards into maximum standards. 
However, this effort has largely failed. See Hans-W. Micklitz & Norbert Reich, Crónica 
de una Muerte Anunciada: The Commission Proposal for a “Directive on Consumer Rights,” 46 
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 417 (2009). 
99   Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union art. 114, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47 [hereinafter TFEU]. 
2015 Micklitz 4:1 
31 
regulatory by nature, as the European Union is and will be under 
constant construction. Legal rules remain a key instrument for 
regulation. The most prominent field of action beyond traditional 
private law and even traditional fields of social regulation (e.g., 
consumer and labor protection) has been the so-called regulated 
markets. The liberalization and privatization policy implemented by 
the Single European Act in telecom, energy, postal services, transport, 
and financial services, the dismantling of former state monopolies, 
amounts to a political decision to establish markets where there were 
none.100 This policy enabled freedom of contract with statutory 
limitations. Therefore, enabling and restricting are the two parameters 
that characterize the European model of freedom of contract. 
E.         Stand and Stare 
Provided my analysis contains an element of truth–and I hope 
it does–what is the added value of this finding for our understanding 
of freedom of contract and even more so for the communication 
between lawyers across legal cultures and traditions, just like those 
lawyers in our Academy for International Commercial and Consumer 
Law? First and foremost, the value added is to “Stand and Stare,”101 
and to distance ourselves from our subjects of analysis and own 
cultural roots and traditions. 
“Stand and Stare,” however, is just the first step. I do not want 
to argue that our legal cultures and traditions are set in stone and that 
there is no room for mutual learning and for change. Indeed, there is 
arguably an emerging European legal culture, certainly in key areas of 
                                                 
100   See Hans-W. Micklitz, The Visible Hand of European Private Law, 28 
YEARBOOK OF EUROPEAN LAW 3 (2009); in Italian, La mano visibile del diritto privato 
europeo in materia normativa – La trasformazione del diritto privato europeo dall’autonomia al 
funzionalismo nella concorrenza e enella regolamentazione, in SEMINARI DEL CONSIGLIO 
NAZIONALE FORENSE: COLLANA “STUDI STORICI E GIURIDICI” 125-92 (Guido 
Alpa & Roberta Mazzei, eds. 2010); in Finnish, Lakimies 3/2010, 330-56; in Japanese, 
Yōroppa kisei watashi-hō no mokuteki-teki shuhō: Yōroppa watashi-hō no, kyōsō to kisei ni okeru 
jiritsu kara kinō shugi e no hen’yō, 12 HOKKAIDO JOURNAL OF NEW GLOBAL LAW AND 
POLICY 17 (2011); in French, La main visible du droit privé réglementaire Européen, 28  
REVUE INTERNATIONAL DE DROIT ECONOMIQUE 5-57 (2014).  
101   Roger Brownsword, The Theoretical Foundations of European Private Law: 
A time to Stand and Stare, in FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW 159 (Roger 
Brownsword et al. eds., 2011). 
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private law102–some would argue this legal culture has been enshrined 
in Europe since the ius commune. There is also an emerging culture of 
transnational law,103 which is now gaining ever stronger attention with 
a refocused understanding and design of comparative and 
transnational (legal) history.104 I fear, however, that we are approaching 
a divided legal world—a world where each state contains a national 
legal order in which the territory and language are transnational. There 
is a chance for deepening our understanding of the “many faces of 
freedom of contract,” for learning from each other and for developing 
even a common cultural ground.105 
                                                 
102   TOWARDS A EUROPEAN LEGAL CULTURE (Genevieve Helleringer & 
Kai Purnhagen eds., 2014). 
103   See Kaarlo Tuori, Transnational Law: on Legal Hybrids and Legal 
Perspectivism, in TRANSNATIONAL LAW, RETHINKING EUROPEAN LAW AND LEGAL 
THINKING 11 (Miguel Madur, Kaarlo Tuori & Suvi Sankari eds., 2014). 
104   See Thomas Duve, European Legal History – Global Perspectives Working 
paper for the Colloquium “European Normativity – Global Historical Perspectives” (Max Planck 
Inst. for Euro. Legal Hist. Research Paper Ser. No. 2013-06, 2013). 
105   See Hans-W. Micklitz, An Essay on the Bifurcation of Legal Education - 
National vs Transnational (forthcoming 2015). 
Penn State 
Journal of Law & International Affairs 
2015 VOLUME 4 NO. 1 
INTERNATIONAL B2B CONTRACTS – 
FREEDOM UNCHAINED? 
Prof. Dr. Ingeborg Schwenzer, LL.M. & Claudio Marti Whitebread, MLaw*  
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................. 34 
I. PROTECTED PERSONS AND/OR TRANSACTIONS ...................... 34 
A. Consumers ...................................................................... 34 
B. Small and Medium Size Enterprises............................ 36 
C. Standard Terms or Individually Negotiated Terms .. 37 
II. EXCLUSION OR LIMITATION OF LIABILITY CLAUSES ............. 38 
A. Typical Clauses ............................................................... 39 
B. Restrictions ..................................................................... 39 
1. Reasonableness ............................................................. 39 
2. Personal Injury ............................................................. 40 
3. Gravity of Fault ........................................................... 40 
4. Warranty and Guarantee ............................................. 41 
5. Minimum Adequate Remedy  ....................................... 42 
III. EXCLUSION AND LIMITATION OF LIABILITY CLAUSES IN   
       CISG CONTRACTS ...................................................................... 42 
CONCLUSION ..................................................................................... 43 
A. B2B v. B2C ..................................................................... 43 
B. Unified Approach in International B2B Contracts ... 43 
C. Criteria to be Considered .............................................. 45 
 
  
                                                 
* Prof. Dr. Ingeborg Schwenzer, LL.M. (Berkeley) is a professor of private 
law at the University of Basel. Claudio Marti Whitebread, MLaw, attorney at law, is 
a research and teaching assistant at the University of Basel. 
2015 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 4:1 
34 
INTRODUCTION 
Freedom of contract is regarded to be a general core principle 
in international Business to Business (B2B) contractual relationships.1 
This is especially true for sales contracts governed by the U.N. 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG), 
which in Article 6 explicitly provides that “[t]he parties may . . . 
derogate from or vary the effect of any of its provisions.” 
Although domestic legal systems also recognize the principle 
of freedom of contract in commercial practice, they still vary 
considerably with regard to the extent of this principle and to its 
possible limitations. First, this paper will discuss how international 
instruments as well as domestic legal systems draw the line between 
Business to Consumer (B2C) and B2B contracts. Second, the validity 
of exclusion and limitation of liability clauses will be examined as the 
most prominent example for the exercise of judicial control of clauses 
in B2B contracts. 
I. PROTECTED PERSONS AND/OR TRANSACTIONS 
A.         Consumers 
It is generally agreed that consumers deserve special protection 
in B2C relationships.2 However, the definition of who is a consumer 
considerably differs on both the international and the domestic level. 
The most widely used definition of “consumer” is found in 
Article 2(a) CISG, according to which a consumer is a person who 
buys goods for “personal, family, or household use.”3 This definition 
                                                 
1   M. G. BRIDGE, THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS ¶ 1.28 (3d. ed. 
2013); 1 CHITTY ON CONTRACTS ¶ 1-029 (H. G. Beale et al. eds., 31st ed. 2012); E. 
A. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 23 (4th. ed. 2004).  
2   CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT ON CONSUMER LAW 2-3 (Hans-W. 
Micklitz, J. Stuyck, E. Terryn, & Dimitri Droshout, eds. 2010); G. WOODROFFE & 
R. LOWE, CONSUMER LAW AND PRACTICE  ¶ 1.15 (9th ed. 2013); G. HOWELLS & S. 
WEATHERILL, CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW 8-9 (2d. ed. 2005). 
3  United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/18, art. 2(a) (1980), available at 
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is also typically used by common law4 and some Asian jurisdictions.5 
The emphasis here is clearly on the intended use of the goods sold.6 
The European Directive on Consumer Rights, which entered into 
force on 13 June 2014, defines consumer as a “natural person who . . . 
is acting . . . outside its trade, business, craft or profession.”7 Thus, this 
approach is slightly different to the CISG’s; however, it should not 
yield very different results. The UNIDROIT Principles, on the other 
hand, do not contain a specific definition of the “consumer.” Instead, 
they focus on the term “commercial” contracts, which leaves much 
leeway for interpretation.8 
In Ibero-American legal systems it is common to find 
references to the ultimate purchaser, which suggests a focus on the 
relative position of a person in the supply chain.9 This definition is 
much broader than the ones described above. It may well lead to 
friction when dealing with a contract governed by an international 
instrument such as the CISG. 
                                                 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/sales/cisg/V1056997-CISG-e-
book.pdf [hereinafter CISG].]. 
4   Business Practices and Consumer Protection Act, S.B.C. 2004, c. 2, pt. 
1(1) (Can.); Unfair Contracts Term Act 1977, c. 50, § 12(1) (U.K.). 
5   Framework Act on Consumers, Act. No. 8372, Sep. 27, 2006, art. 2(2) 
(S. Kor.); Consumer Act of the Philippines, Rep. Act No. 7394, art. 4(n), (q) (July 2, 
1991) (Phil.); Ordinance of Protection of Consumer’s Interest, art. 1 (Viet.). 
6   M. P. FURMSTON, ET AL., LAW OF CONTRACT 28 (16th ed. 2012); CASES, 
MATERIALS AND TEXT ON CONSUMER LAW, supra note 2, at 31; I. Schwenzer & P. 
Hachem, in SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER: COMMENTARY ON THE UN 
CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES OF GOODS (CISG) (3d. ed. 2010). 
7   Council Directive 2011/83, art. 2(1), 2011 O.J. (L 304)(EC) [hereinafter 
Directive 2011/83]. Art. 2(f) of the Common European Sales Law (CESL) contains 
a similar definition. Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on a Common European Sales Law, at art. 2(f), COM (2011) 635 final (Oct. 
11, 2011) [hereinafter CESL]. 
8   International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, UNIDROIT 
Principles of International Commercial Contracts (2010) [hereinafter UNIDROIT 
Principles], preamble, cmt. 2, available at 
http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2010/integralvers
ionprinciples2010-e.pdf. 
9   Consumer Protection Law, art. 2 (Costa Rica); Consumer Code, L. No. 
29571, art. 2 (Peru).  
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B.         Small and Medium Size Enterprises 
Many legal systems broaden the scope of protection so as to 
also encompass certain small and medium size enterprises. In essence, 
there are two different approaches to extend the protection to this 
group. A variety of jurisdictions include into their consumer protection 
laws those artisans and small companies who acquire products or 
services to integrate them into a production process for the supply of 
products or services to third parties. For example, under Chinese and 
Mongolian law, farmers who purchase materials for production still 
qualify as consumers.10 In other jurisdictions—especially in Ibero-
America—the same result is achieved by using the ultimate purchaser 
approach.11 
Other legal systems distinguish according to the size of the 
respective enterprise. With regard to the control of standard terms, the 
English and Scottish Law Commission suggests a revision to the 
Unfair Contract Terms Act to extend protection to small enterprises 
that do not employ more than nine persons.12 A similar approach can 
be found in the Netherlands. There, enterprises having less than fifty 
employees or otherwise not obliged to publish their annual balance are 
put on a par with consumers.13 
Another approach sets a monetary limit in distinguishing the 
level of judicial protection. Again, the English and Scottish Law 
                                                 
10   SCHWENZER, HACHEM & KEE, GLOBAL SALES AND CONTRACT LAW 
¶ 6.25 (2012). 
11   Law No. 22240, Sept. 22, 1993, art. 1 (Arg.); Lei No. 8.078, de 11 
septiembre de 1990, art. 2, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÁO [D.O.U.] 12.09.1990 (Braz.); 
Law No. 19496, Marzo 7, 1997, art. 1, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile); Law on 
Consumer Protection, July 10, 2000, art. 2 (Ecuador); Ley No. 842, 10 Oct. 2013, 
Ley de Protección de los Derechos de las Personas Consumidoras y Usuarias [Law 
on Protection of the Rights of Consumers and Users] art. 4, DIARIO OFICIAL [L.G.], 
10 Oct. 2013 (Nicar.); Law No. 1334, 1998, art. 4 (Para.); Consumer Protection Law, 
art. 2 (Uru.). See also E. MUÑOZ, MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS AND SALES IN LATIN 
AMERICA, SPAIN AND PORTUGAL 47 (2011). 
12   The Law Comm’n & The Scottish Law Commission, UNFAIR 
CONTRACT TERMS: REPORT ON A REFERENCE UNDER SECTION 3(1)(E) OF THE LAW 
COMMISSIONS ACT 1965 ¶ 5.40 [hereinafter Unfair Contract Terms], available at  
http://www.scotlawcom.gov.uk/files/2512/7989/6621/rep199.pdf. 
13   Art. 6:235(1)(a) BW (Neth.). 
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Commission suggests, in the course of the Unfair Contract Terms Act, 
to apply the same control of standard terms as for consumers to 
transactions involving small enterprises with a volume of less than 
₤500.00 GBP.14 The Australian Competition and Consumer Act 2010 
applies to all transactions for the supply or sale of goods and services 
up to a limit of approximately $40.00 AUD.15 
C.         Standard Terms or Individually Negotiated Terms 
The classical German approach draws a sharp line between 
standard terms and individually negotiated terms. In general, 
individually negotiated clauses are not subject to special judicial 
scrutiny. The picture immediately changes as soon as a clause is part of 
standard terms.16 Judicial practice shows that virtually the same 
standard applies to both B2C and B2B contracts.17 Recently, this 
approach has received severe criticism.18 Anecdotally, German 
companies frequently opt out of German law and choose Swiss law to 
circumvent the German courts’ scrutiny of standard terms.19 
Unfortunately, the German approach has made its way to the 
European level. The distinction between standard terms and 
                                                 
14   Unfair Contract Terms, supra note 12, ¶ 5.59. 
15   Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) s 4B(2)(a) (Austl.). 
16   BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], Aug. 18, 1896, 
REICHSGESETZBLATT [RGBL.] 195, as amended, § 307 (Ger.) [hereinafter BGB]. 
17   Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice], May 16, 2007, 
NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 2007 (2176) (Ger.); Bundesgerichtshof 
[BGH][Federal Court of Justice], Sept. 19, 2007, BeckRS 2007 (18417); 
Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice], Mar. 3, 1988, NEUE 
JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 1785, 1988 . 
18   C. Kessel, Zur Frage einer Reform des AGB-Rechts im unternehmerischen 
Rechtsverkehrs, in STÄNDIGE DEPUTATION DES DEUTSCHEN JURISTENTAGES 69 
2012; E.M. Kieninger, AGB-Kontrolle von grenzüberschreitenden Geschäften im 
unternehmerischen Verkehr, in EINHEIT UND VIELHEIT IM UNTERNEHMENSRECHT 179 
2013; I. Schwenzer & F. Lübbert, Neues AGB-Recht im unternehmerischen Rechtsverkehr?, 
ANWALTSBLATT, H. 4. S. 292 (Apr. 2012); K.P. Berger, Für Eine Reform des AGB-
Rechts im Unternehmerverkehr, NJW 2010, 465 . 
19   Ingeborg Schwenzer, in STÄNDIGE DEPUTATION DES DEUTSCHEN 
JURISTENTAGES 69 (2012); T. Pfeiffer, Flucht ins schweizerische Recht, in ZWISCHEN 
VERTRAGSFREIHEIT UND VERBRAUCHERSCHUTZ, FESTSCHRIFT FÜR FRIEDRICH 
GRAF VON WESTPHALEN 555 (F.C. Genzow, B. Grunewald & H. Schulte-Nölke eds., 
2010); S. Brachert & A. Dietzel, Deutsche AGB-Rechtsprechung und Flucht ins Schweizer 
Recht, ZGS 2005, 441. 
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negotiated terms was first introduced into the Directive on Unfair 
Terms in Consumer Contracts.20 It was restricted to B2C contracts;21 
however, the Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR),22 and 
subsequently the Common European Sales Law (CESL),23 which was 
approved by the European Parliament in February 2014, extended the 
distinction between standard terms and negotiated terms to the area of 
B2B relationships. 
In many other legal systems—at least insofar as B2B contracts 
are concerned—the fact that a certain clause formed part of standard 
terms is only one criterion among many others when assessing the 
fairness of the respective clause. This is true for most Common law 
jurisdictions,24 and also for Switzerland25. 
II. EXCLUSION OR LIMITATION OF LIABILITY CLAUSES 
The litmus test for any approach of judicial control of freedom 
of contract in B2B relationships is the question how a certain system 
deals with exclusion and limitation of liability clauses. These clauses 
can be found in almost every commercial contract, especially on an 
international level. Together with the description of the contractual 
duties, they form the core part of the contract and decide whether the 
aggrieved party may rely on a breach of contract and—if so—can get 
redress for it. It is all the more problematic that the different 
                                                 
20   Council Directive 93/13, 1993 O.J. (L 095) (EC) [hereinafter Directive 
93/13]. 
21   Id. art. 3(1). 
22   PRINCIPLES, DEFINITIONS, AND MODEL RULES OF EUROPEAN 
PRIVATE LAW: DRAFT COMMON FRAME OF REFERENCE (DCFR) OUTLINE 
EDITION, art. II.-9:405 (Christian von Bar et al. eds., 2009), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/civil/docs/dcfr_outline_edition_en.pdf 
23   CESL, supra note 7, at art. 86.  
24   INGEBORG SCHWENZER, PASCAL HACHEM & CHRISTOPHER KEE, 
GLOBAL SALES AND CONTRACT LAW ¶ 12.03; FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, at 582-
91. 
25   R.M. HILTY, BASLER KOMMENTAR: BUNDESGESETZ ÜBER DEN 
UNLAUTEREN WETTBEWERB (UWG), Art. 2, ¶ 2 (2013); M.M. PEDRAZZINI & F.A. 
PEDRAZZINI, UNLAUTERER WETTBEWERB (UWG) ¶ 4.06 (2d ed. 2002); 
C. BAUDENBACHER, LAUTERKEITSRECHT: KOMMENTAR ZUM GESETZ GEGEN DEN 
UNLAUTEREN WETTBEWERB (UWG), Art. 2, ¶ 7 (2001). 
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approaches yield different results, thus making the outcome of a 
possible dispute highly unpredictable. 
A.         Typical Clauses 
Limitation of liability clauses typically appear in three forms. 
First, they may seek to exclude liability entirely by excluding a certain 
cause of action or by increasing the threshold to meet the requirements 
for a certain cause of action. Second, they may seek to exclude liability 
for certain types of losses. Third, these clauses may seek to put an 
upper limit to the quantum of recoverable losses. In practice, more 
often than not all three forms of limitation of liability clauses are 
combined. For example, a clause may stipulate that the seller is liable 
only for gross negligence, that recovery of consequential losses is 
excluded, and that in all instances the quantum of recoverable loss is 
limited to the contract price.26 
B.         Restrictions 
There is agreement among all legal systems that, in both B2C 
contracts and B2B relationships, exclusion and limitation of liability 
clauses are subject to certain legal restrictions.27 
1. Reasonableness - The common starting point seems to be that 
such a clause is only valid if it is not unreasonable, unfair, 
unconscionable, or the like. Some legal systems explicitly refer to such 
a standard, including the English and Scottish Unfair Contract Terms 
Act,28 the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) in the United States,29 
or the general clause in the German Civil Code.30 It is noteworthy, 
                                                 
26   Cf. 1 CHITTY ON CONTRACTS ¶ 14-003 (H. G. Beale et al. eds., 31st ed. 
2012); SCHWENZER, ET AL., supra note 24, ¶ 44.299; EWAN MCKENDRICK, 
CONTRACT LAW: TEXTS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 406–09 (4th ed. 2010). 
27   See, e.g., BGB, supra note 16, § 276(3); Art. 1229 C.c. (It.); Art. 1102 C.C. 
(Spain); Obligationenrecht [OR] [Code of Obligations] Mar. 30, 1911, art. 100 
(Switz.) [hereinafter Code of Obligations]; U.C.C. §§ 2-316, 2-719 (2014); Civil Code 
of Québec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64, art. 1474 (Can.).  
28   Unfair Contracts Term Act 1977, supra note 4, § 2(2) (U.K.). 
29   U.C.C. § 2-302 (2014). 
30   BGB, supra note 16, at § 307. 
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however, that the majority of legal systems do not distinguish between 
an outright exclusion and a mere limitation of liability.31 
2. Personal Injury - It is often alleged that it is universally 
recognized that a party may not limit or even exclude its liability for 
personal injury.32 However, this is only clear in the case of personal 
injury to a consumer and where the exclusion or limitation of liability 
clause is found in standard terms.33 Although it is true that personal 
injury will mostly occur to the ultimate purchaser or user of goods, and 
that in those situations the exclusion or limitation of liability most likely 
will be part of standard terms, there are no convincing reasons why the 
threshold of protection should be lowered in the case of personal 
injury to a business person or where the respective clause has been 
individually negotiated. Explicit equation of all cases of personal injury 
can be found in the English and Scottish Unfair Contract Terms Act,34 
as well as in the Civil Code of Quebec35. Similarly, in Switzerland, at 
least some scholarly writings suggest this result.36 
3. Gravity of Fault - Civil law legal systems follow the fault-based 
liability approach.37 Accordingly, restrictions on the ability of the 
parties to exclude or limit their liability are directed to the gravity of 
the culpa. However, the restrictions on the freedom of the parties to 
limit their liability to a certain degree of fault differ among legal systems 
and even differ within individual legal systems depending on whether 
                                                 
31   See id. § 309, No. 7; C.C. art. 1229 (It.); Civil Code of Québec, supra 
note 27.  
32   Cf. SCHWENZER, ET AL., supra note 24, at ¶ 44.317; MARCEL FONTAINE 
& FILIP DE LY, DRAFTING INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS 386 (2009). 
33   See BGB, supra note 16, at § 309, No. 7(a); Directive 93/13, supra note 
20, at annex (a); U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (2014). 
34   Unfair Contracts Term Act 1977, supra note 4, at § 2(1) (U.K.).  
35   Civil Code of Québec, supra note 27. 
36   INGEBORG SCHWENZER, SCHWEIZERISCHES OBLIGATIONENRECHT 
ALLGEMEINER TEIL ¶ 24.14 (6th ed. 2012); P. TERCIER & P. PICHONNAZ, LE DROIT 
DES OBLIGATIONS ¶ 1267 (5th ed. 2012); W. WIEGAND, H. HEINRICH & N.P. VOGT, 
BASLER KOMMENTAR: OBLIGATIONENRECHT I art. 100, ¶ 4 (5th ed. 2011). 
37   SCHWENZER, ET AL., supra note 24, ¶ 44.63; KONRAD ZWEIGERT & 
HEIN KÖTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 494 (3d. ed. 1998). 
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the clause is part of non-negotiated terms and whether it is a B2C or a 
B2B contract.38 
Broadly speaking, legal systems employing a fault-based 
liability approach agree that in consumer transactions liability for one’s 
own gross negligence and intent cannot be excluded in standard 
terms.39 Again, this approach is similar to the one with regard to 
exclusion or limitation of liability in the case of personal injury. Some 
of these systems allow an exclusion of liability for gross negligence 
where the clause has been individually negotiated and/or is part of a 
B2B contract.40 Furthermore, if the breach of contract is due to the act 
or omission of an auxiliary, exclusion or limitation is possible even if 
this person acted intentionally,41 at least if it is not part of standard 
terms in a B2C contract.42 
4. Warranty and Guarantee – Many, if not most, legal systems 
prohibit exclusion and limitation of liability if the obligor expressly 
warrants or guarantees certain features of the contract, especially 
specific features of the goods in sales contracts.43 It would appear 
contradictory to allow the obligor to limit or even exclude its liability 
where an express warranty or guarantee is given.44 Here, however, 
                                                 
38   SCHWENZER, ET AL., supra note 24, ¶¶ 44.311, 44.312. 
39   See, e.g., CÓDIGO CIVIL (Civil Code), Apr. 2, 1976, art. 350(1) (Bol.); 
BGB, supra note 16,  §§ 309, No. 7(b), 475; Art. 1.102 C.C. (Spain); Código Civil 
Federal [CC][Federal Civil Code], as amended, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 
Aug. 30, 1928, art. 2106 (Mex.); Código Civil (Civil Code), art. 1328 (Peru). 
40   See, e.g., Civil Code, art. 417(4) (Arm.); Civil Code, art. 372(4) (Belr.); 
BGB, supra note 16, at § 276(3) (Ger.); Code of Obligations, art. 395(2) (Geor.); 
GRAZHDANKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code] art. 401 
(Russ.). 
41   BGB, supra note 16, §§ 278, 276(3); Civil Code, art. 809, 800 (Port.); 
Code of Obligations, supra note 27, art. 101(2) (Switz.). 
42   BGB, supra note 16, § 309 No. 7(b). 
43   See, e.g., BGB, supra note 16, § 444. See also U.C.C. § 2-316(1) (2014). 
44   H. P. Westermann, in MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM 
BÜRGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH, VOL. 3 § 444 ¶ 14 (F.J. Säcker & R. Rixecher, eds., 
6th ed. 2012); JAMES WHITE & ROBERT SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
576 (2010). 
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everything will depend on when and how such a warranty or guarantee 
can be assumed in a B2B relationship. 
5. Minimum Adequate Remedy - In accordance with the notion 
that no party may relieve itself of all risks under a contract by excluding 
its liability entirely, legal systems agree that each party must retain a 
minimum of remedial protection under a contract. A particularly 
visible statement is found in the United States where the Official 
Comment on Section 2-719 U.C.C. states, “it is of the very essence of 
a sales contract that at least minimum adequate remedies be 
available.”45 The same reasoning underlies the German rule that, if 
repair of defective goods fails, the obligee at least must retain the right 
to either reduce the purchase price or avoid the contract.46 
III. EXCLUSION AND LIMITATION OF LIABILITY CLAUSES IN 
CISG CONTRACTS 
The question whether a party may exclude or limit its liability 
under a CISG sales contract is important yet controversial. The CISG 
Advisory Council is currently preparing an opinion on this subject. 
According to Article 4 CISG, the “Convention . . .  is not concerned 
with: (a) the validity of the contract or any of its provisions . . . .”47 
However, the CISG itself defines which questions are considered to 
be questions of validity and thus to be decided under domestic law.48 
It is, in essence, agreed that exclusion and limitation of liability clauses 
are questions concerning matters governed by the Convention in the 
sense of Art. 7(2) CISG.49 Debate remains among the CISG Advisory 
Council, however, if general principles within the CISG can be found 
to settle this question. 
                                                 
45   U.C.C. § 2-719, cmt. 1 (2014). 
46   BGB, supra note 16, § 309 No. 8(b)(bb). 
47   CISG, supra note 3, art. 4. 
48 H.P. WESTERMANN, MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM BÜRGERLICHEN 
GESETZBUCH, Vol. 3, art. 4 CISG, ¶ 8 (W. Krüger & H.P. Westermann, eds., 6th ed. 
2012); Schwenzer & Hachem, supra note 6, art. 4, ¶ 31; C. BRUNNER, UN-
KAUFRECHT – CISG, Art. 4, ¶ 5 (2005). 
49   Cf. WESTERMANN, supra note 48, art. 4 CISG, ¶ 6; Schwenzer & 
Hachem, supra note 6, art. 4, ¶ 43. 
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CONCLUSION 
A.         B2B v. B2C 
It seems to be unanimously agreed that, with regard to judicial 
control of contract terms and exclusion and limitation of liability 
clauses, there must be a clear distinction between B2C and B2B 
relationships.50 Whereas consumers typically can neither influence the 
content of a contract nor have any real alternative to turn to, and thus 
freedom of contract has lost its justification altogether, in B2B 
contracts the situation is completely different. It is there where 
freedom of contract still retains its legitimate place as a starting point. 
However, this does not mean that there is unchained freedom of 
contract in these relationships below the threshold of public policy. 
B.         Unified Approach in International B2B Contracts 
It has been shown that many different approaches and levels 
of scrutiny can be found in domestic legal systems. However, in cross 
border transactions, foreseeability and predictability is of utmost 
importance. This is particularly true for the core area of any contract, 
the respective liability regime, and its limits. Therefore, it is a matter of 
priority to achieve uniform results in this respect. If it were not 
possible to have these questions governed by the CISG, at least in 
international sales contracts, it must be a primary aim to strive for 
unification on an international level. 
Having regard to the comparative overview the starting point 
for judicial control of contract terms in international B2B relationships 
seems straight forward. Hard and fast rules as they can be found in 
black (conclusively invalid) or grey (presumptively invalid) lists (or 
unfair or invalid contract terms) are suitable for B2C relationships. In 
                                                 
50   Eva–Maria Kieninger, AGB bei B2B-Verträgen: Rückbesinnung auf die Ziele 
des AGB-Rechts, ANWALTS BLATT 301, 306 (Apr. 2012) (Ger.), available at 
https://ius.unibas.ch/uploads/publics/40215/20121206163733_50c0bbbd851e8.p
df; Barbara Dauner-Lieb, &Constantin Axer, Quo vadis AGB-Kontrolle im 
unternehmerischen Geschäftsverkehr?, ZIP, 2010, at 312-14 (Ger.); Barbara Dauner-Lieb 
& A. Khan, Betriebsausfallschäden als Gestaltungsproblem, in ZWISCHEN 
VERTRAGSFREIHEIT UND VERBRAUCHERSCHUTZ, FESTSCHRIFT FÜR FRIEDRICH 
GRAF VON WESTPHALEN 70-71 (Genzow, Grunewald, Schulte-Nölke, eds.). 
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B2C relationships, the bargaining positions and relevant interests of 
the parties involved do not differ very much. As previously indicated, 
business parties generally have the superior bargaining power. 
Likewise, the content of contracts in specific branches of trade is 
comparable. Therefore, in B2C relationships, standard terms prevail in 
these relationships. This militates unitary and simple rules. 
In contrast, B2B contracts, and especially international B2B 
contracts, cannot be measured by the same yardstick. The respective 
bargaining position of the parties to an international contract can vary 
considerably. The same holds true for the contents of such contracts. 
Therefore, B2B contracts require differentiated solutions that can be 
adjusted to the individual circumstances of the case. Instead of black 
and grey lists, a general clause seems to be preferable. 
The approach to the validity of exclusion and limitation of 
liability clauses in international B2B contracts should be one of fairness 
or reasonableness. As already explained above,51 reasonableness and 
fairness can be found in the English and Scottish Unfair Terms Act,52 
the UNIDROIT Principles talk about clauses being grossly unfair,53 
the U.C.C. uses the term unconscionability,54 and the German Civil 
Code employs the term of contravening principles of good faith albeit 
only related to standard terms.55 As regards the CISG reasonableness 
can be regarded as a general principle underlying the CISG in the sense 
of Art. 7(2) CISG.56 To meet the needs of foreseeability and 
predictability, a general clause must be accompanied by a list of criteria 
to be considered in the individual case. 
                                                 
 
 
52   Unfair Contracts Term Act 1977, c. 50, §§ 4(1), 11(1) (U.K.). 
53   UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 8, art. 7.1.6.  
54   U.C.C. § 2-302 (2014). 
55   BGB, supra note 16, § 307(1). 
56   CISG Advisory Council Opinion No. 6, Calculation of Damages under 
CISG Article 74, cmt. 2.1, available at 
http://www.cisgac.com/default.php?ipkCat=128&ifkCat=148&sid=148; J. VON 
STAUDINGERS KOMMENTAR ZUM BÜRGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH, WIENER UN-
KAUFRECHT (CISG) art. 7, ¶ 45 (ULRICH MAGNUS & MICHAEL MARITNEK eds., Jan. 
2005). 
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C.         Criteria to be Considered 
One of the first criteria to be considered should be the position 
of the parties in the market and their respective bargaining power. This 
takes up the idea that many legal systems tend to extend the protection 
provided for consumers to small and medium sized enterprises 
(SMEs). A flexible approach certainly seems advisable, as there is a 
great variety also among SME’s. 
The fact of a specific clause forming part of standard terms or 
being individually negotiated might also be one criterion among others. 
However, this should not be the sole approach used to decide which 
level of judicial control to apply in international B2B contracts. To save 
transaction costs and due to the complex nature of the subject matter 
of the contract, most international B2B contracts depend on pre-
formulated contract terms without one party necessarily being in a 
superior bargaining position. This is clearly evidenced by the current 
discussion in Germany, which heavily criticizes the practice of control 
of standard terms in B2B contracts.57 
In assessing the validity of an exclusion and limitation of 
liability clause in a B2B contract, regard should be given to the contract 
as a whole, especially in relation to other contractual terms.58 This 
holds true for the interplay between warranties and guarantees on the 
one hand and exemption clauses on the other. 
Unlike in many existing legislation which apply the same rules 
to exclusion as well as to limitation of liability clauses59 the two should 
be clearly distinguished. There undoubtedly exists a difference whether 
liability is entirely excluded where certain kinds of damages are 
excluded or where the amount of recoverable damages is capped. 
Consequently, the level of scrutiny must be higher when liability is fully 
excluded than in the case of a mere limitation. It is here, too, where 
the principle of minimum adequate remedy should have its legitimate 
scope of application. 
                                                 
57   Kessel, supra note 18. 
58   See CESL, supra note 7, art. 86(2)(c). 
59   See id., § III(B)(1). 
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Neither gross negligence nor intentional breach of contract 
should lead to a limitation of liability clause to be void ab initio as is 
currently the case in many legal systems. Rather, the gravity of fault 
should be only one criterion among others to invalidate such a clause. 
The only case in which an ab initio invalidity is conceivable relates to 
personal injury where a differentiation between consumer and business 
person seems hardly justifiable. 
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SHOULD CLAUSES PROHIBITING 
ASSIGNMENT BE OVERRIDDEN BY 
STATUTE? 
Louise Gullifer* 
Many contracts for the supply of goods or services include a 
clause prohibiting assignment by the supplier of its rights under the 
contract. The existence of such clauses, both in particular contracts 
and more generally, can have a chilling effect on the use of receivables 
as collateral to obtain financing. Thus, there is a legislative override for 
such clauses so that they are not enforceable against third parties. 
There has been an ongoing debate as to whether the law of England 
and Wales should follow suit and, if so, what form the override should 
take. While the debate continues among academics and practitioners, 
the Government has enacted a power to make reforms in the Small 
Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015.1 This paper examines 
the arguments for and against an override in English law, informed by 
two small-scale surveys undertaken by the author and others over the 
last four years.2 The detailed form of an override will not be discussed 
                                                 
*   Professor of Commercial Law, University of Oxford; Fellow and Tutor 
in Law, Harris Manchester College, Oxford. 
1   The Department of Business, Innovation and Skills has consulted on 
draft Regulations and further work is continuing, of which the author is a part. See 
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Invoice finance: nullifying the ban 
on invoice assignment contract clauses,  
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/invoice-finance-nullifying-the-
ban-on-invoice-assignment-contract-clauses (2015); see also Small Business, 
Enterprise and Employment Act, 2015, c. 26 (U.K.). 
2   One of the surveys was carried out by Hugh Beale and Louise Gullifer 
in 2011 (“2011 Study”) with the assistance of Anna Kloeden. The survey was funded 
by the Asset Based Finance Association (ABFA), which stressed from the outset that 
it wanted a completely independent view. The second survey was carried out in 2014 
as part of the work of the Secured Transactions Law Reform Project (“2014 Study”) 
by Sarah Paterson. I am grateful to both Hugh Beale and Sarah Paterson for 
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for reasons of space. The model that is likely to be adopted in England 
and Wales is that found in the Uniform Commercial Code Article 9, 
which provides that an anti-assignment clause is generally ineffective.3   
I.  THE ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST AN OVERRIDE 
In order to maximize the availability of finance and credit in 
the economy, it is important that as many sources of wealth as possible 
can be used as collateral. To do this, the source of wealth (the asset) 
must be able to be alienated to the secured creditor. The obvious assets 
which could be alienated are tangible assets: goods and land. However, 
sources of wealth also include intangible assets, most importantly, 
rights to be paid by another. Thus, many centuries ago, it became 
possible to use obligations owed to a borrower as collateral for a loan, 
first by pledging a document which represented that obligation (a 
documentary intangible), and then by enabling the benefit of 
obligations to be assigned, either absolutely or by way of security. A 
major difference between the use of tangible property as collateral, and 
the use of such obligations, known in English law as choses or things 
in action,4 is that in the latter case there is another person to consider, 
namely the obligor. There is no real problem when the obligor takes 
on an obligation that is designed to be transferred, for example, a 
negotiable instrument. But, where the obligation can be transferred 
without the agreement, or even the knowledge, of the obligor, a policy 
imperative arises in competition to that of maximizing available 
collateral by permitting alienability: that of protection, where 
necessary, of the obligor. This policy can be seen in English law, for 
example, by the rule that only an assignee who has taken a statutory 
assignment can sue the debtor.5 If an equitable assignment is taken, the 
assignor must be joined in any action. There are three main criteria for 
a statutory assignment: (1) the assignment must be in writing; (2) the 
assignment must not relate to part of a debt or a future debt; and (3) 
                                                 
permitting me to use the results of the surveys in this paper, and for many useful 
discussions. 
   3 U.C.C. § 9-406(d) (2015).  
4   Also known as intangibles; however, the category of intangibles is 
potentially wider than just choses in action, e.g., intellectual property and carbon 
trading units. 
5   Law of Property Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 20, § 136 (Eng.).  
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notice of the assignment must be given to the debtor. All serve some 
function in protecting the debtor. Additionally, the policy of protecting 
the obligor can be seen by the rule that the benefit of a contract for 
personal services cannot be assigned,6 and more generally, by the fact 
that an obligor is permitted to protect himself by restricting the ability 
of the obligee to assign the benefits of the obligation to another. This 
permission, though, is justified by the even more fundamental policy 
of protection of freedom of contract. 
Thus, whether there should be a statutory override of anti-
assignment clauses can be seen as a matter of balancing competing 
policy imperatives: alienability of assets, which maximizes available 
collateral, and freedom of contract, which allows obligors to protect 
themselves against adverse effects of assignment of the right to which 
their obligation correlates. On that basis, many jurisdictions and 
transnational instruments favor alienability.7 Gilmore described the 
view in favor of the unrestricted and unrestrictable alienability of 
contract rights as “so fundamental an order [that] belief is instinctive 
and irrational, not logical and reasoned.”8 This argument has been used 
to justify a statutory provision making an anti-assignment clause 
unenforceable against third parties. 
I would like to suggest that the policy position is not so simple. 
At least from the English law perspective, there is a view that the policy 
imperatives can be satisfied without any statutory interference and that 
legislative change has to be justified both by economic arguments 
(based on the effects of uncertainty of outcome), and by evidence that 
the availability and cost of borrowing is actually affected by the 
                                                 
6   Tolhurst v. Assoc. Portland Cement Mfrs. (1900) Ltd., [1903] A.C. 414 
(H.L.). 
7   See ANTHONY DUGGAN & DAVID BROWN, AUSTRALIAN PERSONAL 
PROPERTY SECURITIES LAW 32 (2012) (relating to Personal Property Securities Act 2009 
(Austl.)); UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON SECURED TRANSACTIONS, at sec. II 
par. 107, U.N. Sales No. E.09.V.12 (2010), available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/security-lg/e/09-82670_Ebook-
Guide_09-04-10English.pdf; see also U.N. Secretary-General, Legal Aspects of 
Receivables Financing, ¶ 23, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/397 (Apr. 29, 1994); U.N. Secretariat, 
Receivables Financing: Analytical Commentary on the draft Convention on Assignment of 
Receivables in International Trade, ¶ 100, U.N Doc. A/CN.9/489 (Mar. 13, 2001). 
8   GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 212 
(1965).  
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existence (or potential existence) of anti-assignment clauses in 
contracts giving rise to receivables. This is for several interconnected 
reasons. First, the current law, to a large extent, accommodates the 
protection of the obligor and validity of a proprietary interest of the 
assignee. Second, receivables financiers in England and Wales have 
managed reasonably well by adopting “workarounds” to enable 
themselves to function within the current system. Third, the main 
concern about anti-assignment clauses relates to borrowers who are 
small businesses, and is part of a larger problem of inequality of 
bargaining power. Finally, anti-assignment clauses play an important 
and justifiable role in loan agreements, derivative contracts, and other 
financial transactions. In fact, there is real concern about defining the 
scope of statutory controls so that these benefits are not lost. 
II. THE ACCOMMODATION OF THE CURRENT LAW 
In analysing the law, terminology can be confusing.  In this 
analysis, terms are adopted that relate to receivables arising from 
supply contracts, since this is the context in which anti-assignment 
clauses are said to cause most problems.9 The parties to the contract 
giving rise to the receivable are called the “supplier,” (the obligee) and 
the “customer,” (the obligor). The supplier is the client of the 
“financier” to whom it assigns, or attempts to assign, the receivable. 
A financier is concerned about three things in relation to the 
receivables it takes as collateral. First, a financier has a proprietary 
interest in the receivables and their proceeds, which will survive the 
insolvency of the supplier.  Second, a financier has priority over any 
subsequent assignee or other person claiming an interest in the 
receivables.  Third, if the customer does not pay, the financier can 
ensure that the debt is enforced, and it has a proprietary claim to the 
proceeds of that enforcement. 
Under English law, there are two types of assignments. The 
first type of assignment is a statutory assignment under section 136 of 
the Law of Property Act 1925, which takes place when certain 
                                                 
9   Another context, i.e., receivables under loan agreements, is considered 
infra section V. 
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conditions are satisfied.10  The most important condition, for purposes 
of this paper, is that there must be notification to the obligor (the 
customer). This means that the customer will, and indeed must, pay 
the financier rather than the supplier.11 If the customer fails to pay, the 
financier is able to sue the customer directly. In effect, the supplier 
drops out of the picture. A statutory assignment will also give the 
financier a proprietary interest in the receivable in the event of the 
insolvency of the supplier, or if there are competing interests.12 There 
is clear authority that a receivable containing an anti-assignment clause 
cannot be the subject of a statutory assignment13 so that the customer 
can continue to pay the supplier and cannot be sued (at law) by the 
financier. 
The second type of assignment is an equitable assignment. An 
assignment is equitable when one of the conditions for a statutory 
assignment is not fulfilled. For example, a valid equitable assignment 
can occur without notifying the customer. A financier who takes an 
equitable assignment has a proprietary interest in the receivable, which 
survives the insolvency of the supplier, and will also have priority over 
a competing interest, subject to the rules on priority. Until the 
customer is notified, if it pays it will, of course, pay the supplier and 
will get a good discharge by so doing. The supplier will then hold those 
proceeds on trust for the financier.14 Further, valid set-offs may 
                                                 
10   See Law of Property Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 20 (Eng.). 
11   If the customer pays the supplier, it will have to pay the financier as 
well and try to recover the payment made to the supplier. 
12   The priority rules, which depend on those set out in the nineteenth 
century case Dearle v. Hall, (1828) 38 Eng. Rep. 475, are somewhat complex. If a 
receivable is assigned twice, the first assignee to give notice to the debtor will have 
priority, providing that he did not have notice of the other assignment at the time he 
took his own assignment. If the debtor has not been notified at all, the assignment 
that is first in time wins. The position is even more complex if one or both of the 
assignments is a security interest, as security interests are required to be registered, 
and registration can, but does not necessarily, constitute notice.  
13   See Linden Gardens Trust Ltd. v. Lenesta Sludge Disposals Ltd., [1994] 
1 A.C. 85, 106-09 (H.L.). Of course, the true effect of any contractual provision 
(including an anti-assignment clause) will always depend on its exact wording. Thus, 
the Linden Gardens case, though laying down certain principles, was considering a 
particular form of words.   
14   This trust is often expressly declared, but would arise in any event. See 
G.E. Crane Sales Pty. Ltd. v. Comm’r of Taxation (1971), 126 CLR. 177, 213-14 (Austl.); 
Barclays Bank Ltd. v. Willowbrook Int’l Ltd., [1987] 1 F.T.L.R. 386 (Eng.). 
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continue to arise between the supplier and customer until the customer 
receives notification of the assignment;15 after this, only set-offs arising 
from the contract itself or closely connected claims can arise.16 If the 
customer does not pay, the financier cannot, in theory, sue the 
customer for non-payment without joining the supplier to the action, 
although this rule is less restrictive than it sounds. It is easy to join a 
party to an action since no consent is needed if they are joined as a 
defendant, and the court will not require joinder if there is no good 
reason.17 Also, if the financier wishes to enforce, it will first give notice 
of the assignment to the customer. Doing so will not only require the 
customer to pay the financier rather than the supplier,18 but will also, 
in most cases, convert the equitable assignment into a statutory 
assignment,19 thus enabling the financier to sue the customer direct. Of 
course, where the financing is on a non-notification basis, such as 
invoice discounting, the financier would normally expect the supplier 
to enforce against the non-paying customer. If the financing is with 
recourse, the financier would have contractual rights against the 
supplier so that the risk of non-payment is on the supplier.20 It is only 
when the supplier either refuses to sue or is insolvent that the financier 
would be concerned to have the right to sue the customer itself. Even 
then, the financier might not need to enforce directly if there is an 
                                                 
15   Roxburghe v. Cox, [1881] 17 L.R. 520 (Ch. D.) (Eng.); Gov’t of Nfld. 
v. Nfld. Ry. Co., [1888] 13 App. Cas. 199 (P.C.); Bus. Computers Ltd. v. Anglo-
African Leasing Ltd., [1977] 1 W.L.R. 578 (Eng.). 
16   Known in English law as “transaction set-off.” 
17   See William Brandt’s Sons & Co. v. Dunlop Rubber Co. Ltd., [1905] 2 
A.C. 454 (Eng.); Sim Swee Joo Shipping Sdn. Bhd. v. Shirlstar Container Transp. 
Ltd., (unreported) 17 Feb. 1994; Raiffeisen Zentralbank Österreich AG v. Five Star 
General Trading LLC, [2001] EWCA (Civ) 68, 60, [2001] 2 W.L.R. 1344 (Eng.). 
Good reasons include the possibility that the supplier might contest the assignment, 
or that the assignment is only part of the debt, so that unless the supplier is before 
the court, the customer might face more than one action. 
18   Jones v. Farrell, [1857] 1 De G & J 208; Brice v. Bannister, [1878] 3 
Q.B.D. 569; William Brandt’s Sons & Co. v. Dunlop Rubber Co. Ltd., [1905] 2 A.C. 
454 (H.L). 
19   This would not be the case if the conditions for a statutory assignment 
were not fulfilled, for example, if the assignment was for part of a debt. 
20   See HUGH BEALE ET AL., THE LAW OF SECURITY AND TITLE-BASED 
FINANCING (2d ed. 2012). 
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efficient means of enforcing against the customer through the 
insolvency process of the supplier.21 
If the receivable contains an anti-assignment clause, some, but 
not all, of the above analysis changes. The customer, who is discharged 
by paying the supplier before notification of the assignment, is also 
discharged by paying the supplier after notification: it is entitled to 
ignore the notification. Once the debt is paid, though, the supplier will 
hold the proceeds on trust for the financier despite the anti-assignment 
clause. There is little direct authority on this point in English law, but 
there are a number of dicta22 and academic support23 supporting this 
view. In fact, it is extremely common for invoice discounting 
agreements to include an express provision that the proceeds are held 
on trust for the financier, and an anti-assignment clause will not 
prevent such provision being effective.24 It is thought that even if the 
clause purported to prohibit such a declaration, it would be ineffective 
to prevent such a trust arising since the customer has no interest in 
preventing the alienation of the proceeds and such a clause would be 
against public policy.25 However, this point has never been litigated, so 
the position is not entirely clear. 
                                                 
21   See discussion in the rest of this section. 
22   Re Turcan, [1888] 40 Ch. D. 5, 10-11 (supported by Lord Browne-
Wilkinson in Linden Gardens, [1994] 1 A.C. at 106; Barbados Trust Co. Ltd. v. Bank 
of Zambia, [2007] EWCA (Civ) 148, 28, 77 (C.A.) (Eng.). See also Devefi Pty. Ltd. v. 
Mateffy Perl Nagy Pty. Ltd., [1993] 113 ALR. 225, 236 (Austl.); Don King Prods. Inc. 
v. Warren, [2000] 3 W.L.R. 276 (C.A.) (Eng.). 
23   See Bob Allcock, Restrictions on the Assignment of Contractual Rights, 42 
C.L.J. 328, 335–36 (1983); Gregory Tolhurst, Prohibitions on Assignment and Declaration 
of Trust: Barbados Trust v. Bank of Zambia, LLOYD’S MAR. & COM. L.Q. 278 (2007); 
Gerard McMeel, The Modern Law of Assignment: Public Policy and Contractual Restrictions 
on Transferability, LLOYD’S MAR. & COM. L.Q. 483, 507-08 (2004); MARCUS SMITH, 
THE LAW OF ASSIGNMENT 347 (2007); Peter Zonneveld, The Effectiveness of Contractual 
Restrictions on the Assignment of Contractual Debts, 22 J. INT’L BUS. & F. L. 313 (2007); 
Chee Ho Tham, Notice of Assignment and Discharge by Performance, LLOYD’S MAR. & 
COM. L.Q. 38, 77 (2010); GOODE ON LEGAL PROBLEMS OF CREDIT AND SECURITY 
3-39 (Louise Gullifer ed., 5th ed. 2013). 
24   Don King Prods. Inc., [2000] 3 W.L.R. 276; MARCUS SMITH & NICO 
LESLIE, THE LAW OF ASSIGNMENT: THE CREATION AND TRANSFER OF CHOSES IN 
ACTION, Part 25.33–25.36 (2nd ed. 2013).   
25   Roy Goode, Inalienable Rights?, 42 MOD. L.R. 553 (1979); Linden 
Gardens, [1994] 1 A.C. at 108 (per Lord Browne-Wilkinson at 108). The supplier 
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If the customer does not pay, it is clear that the financier 
cannot sue directly, as there can be no statutory assignment. However, 
provided that the agreement between the supplier and financier can be 
said to give rise to a trust of the unpaid receivable (either expressly or 
impliedly),26 it is likely that the financier can sue the customer, joining 
the supplier as defendant to the action under a procedure known as 
the Vandepitte procedure. A beneficiary under a trust of a right can 
bring an action to force the trustee to bring an action to enforce that 
right for its benefit. The Vandepitte procedure merely short-circuits this 
process by enabling the beneficiary to instigate an action, which brings 
all parties before the court. In a case dealing with the purported 
assignment of a syndicated loan containing a restriction on assignment, 
a majority of the Court of Appeal decided that the Vandepitte 
procedure27 was available to the “assignee.”28 However, other judges 
have expressed doubt as to the appropriateness of the Vandepitte 
procedure in this context.29 
Further, if there is an effective trust of the receivable, the 
financier will have a proprietary interest which survives the supplier’s 
insolvency, and is effective against competing interests in the 
receivable. What is not entirely clear, however, is whether it is possible 
for a well-drafted anti-assignment clause to prevent a trust of the 
receivable from arising. The judges in Barbados Trust were divided on 
                                                 
would be in breach of contract by declaring the trust, but it is hard to see what the 
damages would be. 
26   Whether this is the case depends on the interpretation both of the anti-
assignment clause and the purported assignment. Two recent cases show that this 
interpretation is fact specific, and therefore subject to considerable uncertainty. See 
Co-operative Group Ltd. v. Birse Developments Ltd., [2014] EWHC (TCC) 530 
(Eng.); Stopjoin Projects Ltd. v. Balfour Beatty Engineering Services (HY) Ltd., 
[2014] EWHC (TCC) 589. 
27   The Vandepitte procedure is named after the case of Vandepitte v. 
Preferred Accident Insurance Corp. of New York, [1933] A.C. 70 (P.C.) (Eng.). 
Where there is a trust of an obligation, the trustee would usually enforce the 
obligation by suing the obligor.  If the trustee refuses to sue, the beneficiary can sue 
the trustee to force him to do so. The Vandepitte procedure avoids the duplicity of 
actions, by allowing the beneficiary to sue the obligor direct, providing that the 
trustee is joined as defendant. If the action is successful, the court will order payment 
to the trustee, who will then hold those funds on trust for the beneficiary. 
28   Barbados Trust, [2007] EWCA (Civ).  
29   Don King Prods. Inc., [2000] 3 W.L.R. 276 (Lightman J); Barbados 
Trust, [2007] EWCA (Civ) at 139 (Hooper LJ). 
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this issue.30 A strong case can be made for an analysis whereby the trust 
is invalid to the extent that it affects the customer, but is valid as 
between the financier and the supplier.31 However, there is still 
considerable uncertainty as to the correct legal analysis.32 
From the point of view of the customer, the anti-assignment 
clause protects its position by enabling it to get a good discharge by 
paying the supplier: it will never be required to pay anyone else. Even 
if it is sued by the financier under the Vandepitte procedure,33 the order 
will be that the customer pay the supplier (the trustee), who will then 
hold the proceeds on trust for the financier. Further, a notice of 
assignment received by the customer is ineffective to prevent set-offs 
arising between the supplier and the customer.34 
Therefore, the overall legal position is that the interests of the 
financier and the customer can both have a certain degree of 
protection if an anti-assignment clause is used. This position is subject 
to several caveats. First, the law is complex and quite uncertain in some 
areas. There are few cases precisely on the relevant point, and even 
those that there are have generally not arisen in the context of 
receivables financing.35 Second, the legal position will depend on the 
                                                 
30   Barbados Trust, [2007] EWCA (Civ) at 44-47, 88, 129-39.  
31  GOODE ON LEGAL PROBLEMS OF CREDIT AND SECURITY 3-42 (Louise 
Gullifer ed., 5th ed. 2013). 
32   A contrary view is that the clause renders the receivable inalienable so 
that a valid trust cannot be declared of it. See Andrew McKnight, Contractual 
Restrictions on a Creditor’s Right to Alienate Debts, 18 J. INT’L BANK. L. & REG., no. 2, 
2003, at 43 (2003); Gerard McMeel, The Modern Law of Assignment: Public Policy and 
Contractual Restrictions on Transferability, LLOYD’S MAR. & COM. L.Q. 483 (2004); 
Gregory Tolhurst & John Carter, Prohibitions on Assignment: A Choice to Be Made, 73 
C.L.J. 405 (2014); Peter Turner, Charges of Unassignable Rights, 20 J. CONT. L. 97 (2004). 
33   This would only occur if, despite the clause, a valid trust of the 
receivable existed. 
34   If, despite the clause, there is a valid declaration of trust, this will break 
the mutuality required for set-off. If the clause renders a trust invalid to the extent 
that it affects the customer, then the notification of the trust could be said to be 
ineffective for all purposes, including preventing set-offs. See J. Marshall, Declaring a 
Trust Over Rights Under an “Unassignable” Contract, 12 INSOLVENCY INTELLIGENCE 1 
(1999).   
35   Linden Gardens, [1994] 1 A.C. 85; Don King Prods. Inc. v. Warren, 
supra note 23; Barbados Trust, [2007] EWCA (Civ) EWHC (TCC) 530. The one 
exception is Stopjoin, [2014] EWHC (TCC) 589.   
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precise wording of the anti-assignment clause and the purported 
assignment or declaration of trust.36  Third, even if a financier is 
protected by the rule that the proceeds are held on trust, this will not 
help if the supplier has not kept the proceeds in an identifiable state so 
that they can be traced on its insolvency. A financier might be better 
off with a proprietary right to a debt owed by a solvent customer, than 
to proceeds that may or may not be held by an insolvent supplier. 
It should be pointed out that the fact that there is a reasonable 
degree of protection in the current law does not necessarily rule out 
statutory intervention. For example, Uniform Commercial Code 
(U.C.C.) (1952) article 9-318(4),37 which contained an override of anti-
assignment clauses, was included in the original U.C.C. (1952) to reflect 
existing U.S. law rather than to change it.38   However, this was in the 
context of a codification of commercial law and the introduction of a 
new system for secured financing. To make a case for free-standing 
legislation, a policy imperative is essential. 
III. INDUSTRY WORKAROUNDS 
Until recently, there were two main types of receivables 
financing: factoring, which is on a notification basis, and invoice 
discounting, which is non-notification.39 Factoring tends to be used for 
smaller suppliers, where a financier has concerns about the ability of 
the supplier to run its ledger properly and to operate a trust account, 
and also where the financier has concerns about the supplier’s financial 
position.40 Since factoring involves a statutory assignment, it gives the 
financier much more control over the collection of the debts. 
                                                 
36   Id.  
37   Now revised U.C.C § 9-406(d) (2010). 
38   This is made clear by the official comment to the original U.C.C. Article 
9, which states: “[the provision] can be regarded as a revolutionary departure only by 
those who still cherish the hope that we may yet return to the view entertained some 
two hundred years ago by the Court of the King’s Bench.” However, this is an 
overstatement. There were contrary cases that were overruled by the legislation, such 
as Allhusen v. Caristo Construction Corp., 103 N.E.2d 891 (N.Y. 1952). 
39   Much of the information in this section comes from the 2011 Study, 
updated to take into account recent developments. 
40   Sometimes a financier will shift a client from an invoice discounting 
basis to a factoring basis if the client gets into financial difficulties. 
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Factoring is more expensive for the supplier than invoice discounting, 
and a supplier can pay even more for extra services, such as the taking 
on by the financier of the credit risk of the customer.41 In invoice 
discounting, the collection of the receivables is carried out by the 
supplier, who holds the proceeds in a trust account for the financier. 
Recently, two variations on these structures have become more 
popular, although the details vary in each case. One is discounting of 
individual invoices over an online platform: this takes place on a non-
notification basis, with the platform merely acting as an intermediary. 
Another is supply chain financing whereby a customer arranges with a 
financier that the latter purchases receivables owed by the customer to 
its suppliers at the point when the receivables arise, once the invoice 
has been confirmed by the customer. This has the advantage that there 
is less likely to be disputes about the invoice, and also that it allows the 
financing to be based on the credit rating of the customer rather than 
that of the (smaller) supplier.42 Having said this, this kind of financing 
is usually only offered to established suppliers whose invoices reach a 
certain, reasonably high, level and is also only offered by large 
customers.43 There is also a concern that supply chain financing 
encourages large customers to extend the credit period they require, 
forcing small businesses to pay for a longer period of financing, albeit 
at a lower rate.44 
                                                 
41   Most receivables financing is on a recourse basis whereby the supplier 
either guarantees payment of the receivables or agrees to repurchase unpaid 
receivables. 
42   The U.K. Government launched a scheme in 2012 to encourage 
businesses and government agencies to offer supply chain financing. See Prime 
Minister’s Office, Prime Minister Announces Supply Chain Finance Scheme, GOV.UK 
(Oct. 23, 2012), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/prime-minister-
announces-supply-chain-finance-scheme.   
43   2011 Study, supra note 2. 
44   See John Antunes, The Supply Chain Finance Scheme: Hit or Miss?, 
REALBUSINESS (Nov. 8, 2012), http://realbusiness.co.uk/article/15791-the-supply-
chain-finance-scheme-hit-or-miss; James Hurley, Payment Concerns Over Supply-Chain 
Finance Move, TEL. (Oct. 26, 2012 7:00 AM), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/yourbusiness/9634184/Payment-concerns-
over-supply-chain-finance-move.html; Supply Chain Finance Scheme: A Good Idea? 
SELECT FACTORING (2012), http://www.selectfactoring.co.uk/supply-chain-
finance-scheme.  
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Although some of the workarounds discussed below are 
adopted regardless of whether particular receivables arise from 
contracts containing an anti-assignment clause, English financiers very 
frequently check for the presence of anti-assignment clauses (and for 
other problematic clauses) in the invoices they finance.45 Thus, one of 
the major arguments for a statutory override made in other 
jurisdictions (that it is not feasible for a receivables financier to 
discover anti-assignment clauses, causing the whole cost of financing 
to rise)46 is not really made out in England and Wales. However, 
checking contracts is burdensome and takes time, particularly if it is 
necessary to consult lawyers about the effect of a particular clause.47 
The need to do so clearly increases costs, although it is probably the 
case that some checking would still take place even if there were to be 
a statutory override of anti-assignment clauses. It is also the case that 
most supply contracts are on a customer’s standard terms, and 
financiers get to know the terms of large customers and whether they 
contain an anti-assignment clause, so checking involves merely looking 
at who the customers are rather than reading individual contracts. 
If the financing is on a non-notification basis, the presence of 
an anti-assignment clause does not create problems for the financier 
on a day-to-day basis, since the customer does not know of the 
assignment and continues to pay the supplier.48 Of course, the supplier 
would be in breach of contract: this may be of concern if, for example, 
the breach entitled the customer to terminate the supply agreement.49 
                                                 
45   Those interviewed for the 2011 Study all said that they checked for the 
presence of anti-assignment clauses. The picture was more mixed in relation to the 
2014 Study, although most said that they checked at least in many cases. 
46   Personal Property Securities Act 2009 (Austl.); ANTHONY DUGGAN & 
DAVID BROWN, supra note 7.  
47   2011 Study, supra note 2. 
48   In the 2011 Study we were told that anti-assignment clauses created 
great problems for online auctions.  However, the 2014 Study revealed that since 
then this part of the industry has developed workarounds similar to those in regular 
invoice discounting, and so what is said in relation to that also applies to online 
auctions. 
49   Although such a breach is unlikely to be repudiatory, it could fall within 
a clause entitling the customer to terminate for “any material breach” (which is quite 
common) or could trigger a cross-default clause.  The absence of a general duty of 
good faith in English law could mean that a customer could rely on such a 
termination clause even if its real motivation for termination was something entirely 
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The financier might worry about two situations: (1) if the supplier 
becomes insolvent, and (2) if the customer does not pay and the 
supplier refuses to enforce.50 
In relation to the first situation, financiers almost universally 
protect themselves by taking a security interest over all assets of the 
supplier.51 This has the effect, under English law, of enabling the 
financier to appoint an administrator of the supplier should it become 
insolvent.52  The financier is then in a good position to direct the 
administrator to collect the receivables and pass the proceeds to it. 
There seems to be little concern among financiers about the collecting 
in of debts if an administrator is appointed (even if not appointed by 
that particular financier), although the costs are sometimes a problem 
if the supplier is a very small business.53 Financiers also see an “all 
assets” security interest as having an additional benefit, namely that it 
will cover receivables that are not assigned to the financier because of 
an anti-assignment clause. Sometimes, financiers specify that such 
“non-vesting debts” fall within a fixed charge, while much of the all 
assets security interest will be a floating charge. However, depending 
on the wording of the clause, to the extent that it prevents a valid 
assignment, an anti-assignment clause may also prevent the creation of 
a valid security interest.54 
                                                 
different. In theory, a breach could entitle a customer to obtain an injunction to 
prevent further breaches (although this is unlikely) or to sue for damages. However, 
it is usually hard to see what loss is suffered. 
50   The 2014 Study indicated that the latter concern is at least as important, 
and, for invoice discounters, more important than the 2011 Study, although the 
sample for this particular question was small. 
51   2011 and 2014 Study, supra note 2. 
52   The Insolvency Act 1986 provides that a qualifying floating charge 
holder can appoint an administrator out of court. The Insolvency Act 1986, c. 45, 
sch. B-1, ¶ 14 (U.K.). 
53   Seminar to explore and discuss the merits of an online register for all 
security interests, including outright assignments of receivables, Secured 
Transactions Law Reform Project, May 8, 2014; 2014 Study, supra note 2. 
54   Although a charge is not, in theory, an assignment, many charges are 
drafted as equitable mortgages, which involve an equitable assignment of the 
receivables. A fixed charge has been treated as an assignment in a number of cases. 
See Biggerstaff v. Rowatt’s Wharf Ltd., [1896] 2 EWCH 93 C.A. (U.K.); N W Robbie 
& Co. v. Witney Warehouse Co., [1963] 1 W.L.R. 1324 (C.A.) (U.K.); Foamcrete 
(UK) Ltd. v. Thrust Engineering Ltd., [2000] EWCA (Civ) 351. See also Re Turner 
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Another mode of protection often coupled with the all assets’ 
security interest is for financiers to take a personal guarantee from the 
directors of the supplier company.55 Of course, the effectiveness of 
such guarantee depends on the credit-worthiness of the directors, and 
also may entail costs in enforcing the claims under the guarantees, to 
which there could be arguable defenses. 
Yet another possibility is for the financier to take a power of 
attorney enabling it to sue the customer in the name of the supplier.56 
This protection tends to be more useful in the second situation: when 
the supplier is solvent but refuses to sue. For the power of attorney to 
be irrevocable on the insolvency of the supplier, the financier must 
have some sort of proprietary right in the receivables or must be owed 
the receivables directly.57 Where there is an anti-assignment clause, the 
latter is clearly not the case, and it is unclear whether a right under a 
trust is a sufficient proprietary interest to render the power irrevocable. 
The legal position is uncertain and untested.58 
An anti-assignment clause causes much greater problems for 
financiers who operate on a notification basis. Here, there is a 
likelihood that the customer will refuse to pay the financier when 
notified, and will, instead, pay the supplier.  The financier is then at 
risk of the proceeds being dissipated by the supplier, leaving the 
financier at the credit risk of the supplier. As a result, such financiers 
often refuse to finance receivables arising from contracts containing 
such clauses, or demand that the customer agrees to a waiver.59 The 
evidence from the 2014 study is that financiers only sometimes pursue 
a waiver. There was considerable agreement60 that the time and effort 
                                                 
Corp. Ltd. (In Liq), [1995] 17 ACSR 761 (Austl.) (where the Federal Court of Australia 
took the view that a clause prohibiting assignment also prohibited a charge). 
55   2011 and 2014 Study, supra note 2. 
56   2014 Study, supra note 2. 
57   Powers of Attorney Act, 1971, c. 27, § 4 (Eng.). 
58   See M. BRIDGE, L. GULLIFER, G. MCMEEL & S. WORTHINGTON, THE 
LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 29-43 (2013). 
59   2011 Study, supra note 2. It should be pointed out that invoice 
discounters also sometimes refuse to finance receivables if they contain an anti-
assignment clause, will only finance them on a factoring basis, or will demand a 
waiver.  This is particularly true if, for some reason, a security interest over the 
supplier’s assets is not taken. 
60   Twelve out of the eighteen respondents agreed. 
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involved in obtaining a waiver was substantial or significant, and that 
by no means all customers were willing to agree to a waiver. Some 
customers would only agree to a waiver on terms that were 
disadvantageous to the supplier: this depended on the bargaining 
power between them and also on whether the financing was being 
sought at the beginning of the supplier/customer relationship. 
In one sense, the increasing availability of supply chain 
financing is a workaround.  This is customer driven: the customer 
waives the anti-assignment clause to enable supply chain financing 
with its nominated financier, but relies on the clause to prevent the 
supplier obtaining financing elsewhere. This means that the supplier is 
locked into the supply chain financing deal, which could be seen as 
anti-competitive. The discount rate for such financing is usually 
reasonably low since it is based on the credit rating of the (large) 
customer, but the period for which financing is required may be 
increased.61 Nevertheless, supply chain financing does achieve 
protection for the customer; only invoices approved by the customer 
are financed, which reduces disputes, and the customer does not have 
to deal with a financier with whom it has no relationship. 
It can be seen that the receivables industry has developed a 
number of workarounds which mean that, with the exception of the 
situation where factors cannot or do not try to obtain a waiver, 
receivables containing anti-assignment clauses are actually being 
financed. The workarounds, however, are costly in terms of time and 
effort, and also create more uncertainty, which can lead to costly 
disputes. In fact, one concern of the industry is that the existence of 
an enforceable anti-assignment clause may give a customer traction in 
disputes which it would not otherwise have, or will enable the 
customer to negotiate benefits for itself which would otherwise not 
exist. Although it is hard to prove, it seems likely that the existence of 
enforceable anti-assignment clauses will increase the cost of 
financing.62 
                                                 
61   See above, [text to notes 43 – 45]. 
62   In the 2014 Study, eleven out of eighteen answered “always” or 
“sometimes” to the question: “Do you consider that (a) receivables are purchased at 
a greater discount to face value, or (b) the advance rate applied to the purchase of 
receivables will be reduced, as a result of the possibility that the contract governing 
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IV. INEQUALITY OF BARGAINING POWER 
At this point it is necessary to consider the reasons why a 
customer might want to include an anti-assignment clause in a supply 
contract. The reasons usually given in the literature are that the 
customer wishes to avoid paying the wrong party, that the customer 
wishes to make sure that set-offs can continue to arise between it and 
the supplier, and that the customer wishes to continue to deal with the 
supplier rather than the financier, who is an unknown quantity.63 The 
information gathered from the two surveys (which came from all three 
constituencies: customers, suppliers, and financiers) shows that the 
motivations are more mixed. There appeared to be little concern about 
paying the wrong party per se,64 but there did appear to be genuine 
concern about incorrect invoicing and the sorting out of disputes.65 It 
was thought that financiers would be more concerned that the invoice 
was paid, and would wish disputes to be sorted out afterwards between 
the customer and the supplier. The problem of incorrect invoicing was 
being tackled both by self-invoicing and electronic invoice platforms.66 
However, the desire to retain the relationship with the supplier in order 
to sort out disputes is ongoing.67 Not surprisingly, opinions varied as 
                                                 
the receivable may contain a valid prohibition on assignment than would apply if 
such prohibitions on assignment were not binding as against an assignee?” However, 
only a small minority answered “yes” to the question: “Do you consider that the cost 
of finance is increased as a result of the inclusion of a prohibition on assignment 
within funded ledgers?” This discrepancy may be explained by the latter question 
being interpreted as relating only to where receivables with anti-assignment clauses 
were actually included in the funded ledger, which is seldom the case in factoring 
arrangements. 
63   See, e.g., Orkun Akseli, Contractual Prohibitions on Assignment of 
Receivables: an English and UN perspective, 7 J. BUS. L. 650, 656 (2009); LOUISE 
GULLIFER & JENNIFER PAYNE, CORPORATE FINANCE LAW: PRINCIPLES AND 
POLICY 378–79 (2011); Roy Goode, Contractual Prohibitions against Assignment, 
LLOYD’S MAR. & COM. L.Q. 300, 302 (2009). 
64   This was only mentioned by the financiers in the 2011 Study, but by 
no one else. 
65   Especially evidence from customers. 2011 Study, supra note 2. 
66   See, e.g., TUNGSTEN, http://www.tungsten-
network.com/uk/en/expertise/e-invoicing/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2015).  
67   This desire was mentioned by a number of respondents to the 2014 
Study. 
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to how helpful the financiers were in sorting out disputes and how 
aggressively they sought payment. 
Perhaps surprisingly, the issue of set-off did not seem to be of 
great importance to the parties.68 This may reflect the fact that 
transaction set-off, that is, set-off of cross-claims arising out of the 
same contract or closely related to the claim, is not affected by 
assignment of the receivable. The desire to lock the supplier into a 
supply chain finance agreement was mentioned by one respondent to 
the 2014 Study and one respondent to the 2011 Study mentioned one 
customer who wanted total confidentiality and did not want its identity 
revealed to a financier. However, there seemed to be considerable 
consensus that, in many cases, customers did not include anti-
assignment clauses to prevent receivables financing, but rather to 
prevent “assignment” (or sub-contracting) of suppliers’ obligations 
under the contract. Of course, under English law an obligation cannot 
be assigned, and so such a clause would be unnecessary, but it might 
be included out of ignorance or in order to make the sub-contracting 
of obligations a repudiatory breach, which would entitle the customer 
to terminate the relationship. In any event, many financiers felt that 
the clauses, in the form in which they precluded receivables financing, 
were included without a great deal of thought: out of habit or fear of 
the unknown or out of an over-abundance of caution by lawyers who 
drafted the boilerplate contract.69 
It is certainly the case that anti-assignment clauses are generally 
found in standard form contracts used by large companies for their 
small and medium-sized suppliers.70 The suppliers cannot negotiate the 
terms of the contracts and, as previously discussed, may find it difficult 
to obtain a waiver. Where the balance of bargaining power is reversed 
so that the supplier is a large company and the customer is a small 
company or consumer, the latter are not able to bargain for the 
protection of an anti-assignment clause. Control of anti-assignment 
clauses therefore raises the broader question of protection of small 
                                                 
68   This was the view of the customers in the 2011 Study, though one 
supplier thought that it was critical. 
69   2014 Study, supra note 2. 
70   All respondents to the 2014 Study selected either large companies or 
government agencies (or both) as likely to include anti-assignment clauses in their 
contracts, although four also selected small companies.  
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businesses against potentially unfair terms. Under English law, 
unreasonable exclusion and limitation clauses in standard form 
contracts are unenforceable against businesses of all sizes71 and penalty 
clauses are sometimes unenforceable,72 but otherwise any control of 
unfair terms relates to consumer contracts. The Law Commission 
suggested in 200573 that some control should be extended to contracts 
with micro businesses,74 but this suggestion has not been implemented. 
Some of the suppliers who responded to the 2011 Study suggested that 
there was a problem with unfair terms in supply contracts75 which was 
wider than just with anti-assignment clauses, and that either legislation 
or wider codes of practice76 were needed. 
If it is right that inequality of bargaining power enables large 
customers to impose potentially unfair terms on small suppliers, then 
statutory control of anti-assignment clauses could have the effect that, 
deprived of this protection, the customers just imposed more 
swingeing terms in other areas.77 
V. THE ROLE OF ANTI-ASSIGNMENT CLAUSES IN FINANCIAL 
TRANSACTIONS 
In many financial transactions, there are specific reasons for 
the inclusion of anti-assignment clauses that are important for the 
proper functioning of the market. In some cases, the clause does not 
ban assignment, but permits it to certain entities and requires consent 
                                                 
71   Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, c. 50, §§ 3, 6(3), 7(3) (U.K.).   
72   GUENTER H. TREITEL, THE LAW OF CONTRACT 20-129 to 20-145 
(Edwin Peel ed., 14th ed. 2015).  
73   THE LAW COMMISSION AND THE SCOTTISH LAW COMMISSION, 
UNFAIR TERMS IN CONTRACTS, 292 (2005).  
74   Micro businesses are defined as businesses with nine or fewer 
employees. 
75   One example is a term making large sums payable on termination of 
the contract by the supplier.   
76   See, e.g., GROCERIES CODE ADJUCIATOR, GROCERIES SUPPLY CODE 
OF PRACTICE, 2009 (U.K.), available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/groceries-supply-code-of-practice. 
77   For example, a term that an invoice for goods or services is not payable 
until the invoice has been approved by the customer. This possibility was discussed 
with the respondents to the 2011 Study, but is, of course, speculation because there 
can be no hard evidence. 
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for assignment to others. Thus, for example, in syndicated loan 
agreements, it is very common for the relevant clause to permit 
assignment to certain financial institutions, but require consent for 
assignment to others. This stems from a concern that were the loan to 
be assigned to, for example, a hedge fund specializing in distressed 
debt, it would be enforced in a much more aggressive way than it 
would be by a bank.78 It also stems from a concern that a loan might 
be sold to one of the competitors of the borrower.79 In derivatives 
contracts, which depend on close-out netting to protect against credit 
risk and for enforcement, it is critical that mutuality of parties is 
maintained and so restrictions on assignment are very important. 
The existence of these reasons for anti-assignment (or 
restrictions on assignment) clauses to be enforceable means that any 
statutory override of anti-assignment clauses has to be limited in scope 
to the context in which such clauses cause most problems, namely, 
receivables financing. This, of course, raises definitional issues: for 
example, how do you exclude contracts for financial products without 
also excluding contracts for the provision of services relating to finance 
(such as computing services and financial advice)? The difficulties that 
such definitional issues pose, and the concern about the effects on the 
financial industry for getting the limitation of scope wrong, have led to 
considerable opposition to the statutory control of anti-assignment 
clauses from lawyers operating in the City of London and bankers. 
VI. SHOULD THERE BE A STATUTORY OVERRIDE? 
As I have indicated, the debate in England and Wales has 
moved from a clash of policies to a discussion based on pragmatism 
and cost-benefit analysis. In most situations, the presence of anti-
assignment clauses does not prevent suppliers from financing their 
receivables. This is because the law has developed in such a way that a 
financier will generally have an equitable interest in, at least, the 
proceeds of the receivables and probably in the receivables themselves.   
                                                 
78   The market has therefore developed ways of transferring the risk and 
benefit of the loan without actually assigning it, such as loan participation and, more 
commonly, credit default swaps. 
79   THE LAW COMMISSION NO. 296, COMPANY SECURITY INTERESTS, 
2005, Cm. 6654, at126, (U.K).  
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Further, the industry has developed a number of workarounds, which 
means that the receivables will be collected for the ultimate benefit of 
the financier both where the customer does not pay and when the 
supplier is insolvent. None of this is surprising. In the absence of any 
statutory control of anti-assignment clauses it is to be expected that 
both the law and the industry will accommodate the interests of all 
parties to the extent that it can. 
This, however, is not the end of the story. If the current 
position imposes costs on the industry, and thus on financing, which 
are not outweighed by the benefit of such clauses to the customers, 
then this would be a good reason for legislation. A further reason could 
be if certain suppliers were unable to obtain financing. Moreover, if it 
were felt that legislation could do little or no harm, but would have the 
beneficial effect of clarifying the existing law and making the balance 
of protection between all parties clear, this could also justify legislative 
change. All three of these arguments pertain in England and Wales 
today. 
It is reasonably clear from both surveys80 that some small 
suppliers, whom financiers will not finance on the basis of invoice 
discounting because of concerns about their ability to collect in the 
receivables and hold them on trust for the financier, are unable to have 
certain invoices financed because they contain anti-assignment clauses. 
The only way round this problem is for the customer to waive the 
clause, and this is only possible on some occasions. Often it will not 
be possible, either because the costs of waiving outweigh the benefits 
to both the supplier and the financier, or because the supplier has little 
bargaining power compared to the customer. The U.K. Government 
is very concerned about the funding of small businesses at the 
moment: they are seen as critical to economic recovery.81 The effect 
on small businesses, then, is a good reason for a statutory override of 
anti-assignment clauses. 
                                                 
80   It should be born in mind that both surveys were fairly small-scale. 
81   Small Business, Big Support Confirmed by Prime Minister, GOV.UK (Jan. 27, 
2014), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/small-business-big-support-
confirmed-by-prime-minister. 
2015 Gullifer 4:1 
67 
It is also clear that the presence of such clauses leads to costs 
for the financing industry. While it should not be overemphasized,82 
there is the cost of discovering such clauses. Waivers can also be costly, 
as is the development and execution of the workarounds discussed 
above. Moreover, the existence of the workarounds themselves 
increases ex ante uncertainty, both in terms of the law83 and also in that 
it increases the possibility of disputes. Finally, the law itself is complex 
and uncertain. A financier cannot be sure that it has a valid interest in 
a receivable containing an anti-assignment clause. It is clearer that it 
has an equitable interest in the proceeds, but this is not any good if the 
proceeds are not traceable. 
Are these costs outweighed by the benefits of the clauses? It is 
clear that such clauses are of value in the context of financial contracts. 
However, some of the reasons why customers seem to include them 
in their contracts are of little or no merit,84 and the results from the 
(small-scale) surveys suggest that some do not seem of concern in the 
real world.85 The concern about preserving a relationship with the 
supplier in the event of dispute or incorrect invoices is a real one. Yet, 
the latter concern can be overcome with modern invoicing techniques, 
and the former argument is undermined by the fact that customers are 
prepared to permit assignment to a financier of their choice under a 
supply chain finance scheme. The argument that a financier might be 
more aggressive than a supplier in enforcing invoices is also flawed, 
since the risk of a third party influencing enforcement is an ever 
present one: the supplier could be taken over by more aggressive 
management. The customer’s concern to remain in a relationship with 
the supplier may have more to do with the fact that the supplier is a 
small business compared to the customer, and therefore the customer 
is more likely to have the upper hand in negotiations than it would with 
                                                 
82   This is because financiers are familiar with the standard terms of the 
big customers, and also because they would read the contracts anyway for other 
adverse clauses. 
83   For example, whether a power of attorney will be enforceable on 
insolvency of the supplier, or whether an anti-assignment clause renders a charge 
void. 
84   The prevention of sub-contracting does not require an anti-assignment 
clause, and the “habit” or “fear of the unknown” reasons seem unmeritorious. 
85   There seems to be little concern about set-off, or about the danger of 
paying the wrong party. 
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a financier. The use of an anti-assignment clause to lock a supplier into 
supply chain financing also seems unmeritorious. If the supply chain 
financing was sufficiently attractive to the supplier, it would choose it 
over other sources of financing. 
This brings us to the argument that a statutory override would 
do little harm, and could do some good in clarifying the law. One 
possible harm, however, is that the override is not sufficiently limited 
and might cause problems in the financial markets. This is a serious 
risk, but could be overcome by careful drafting, even if this were at the 
expense of not including some borderline cases within the override. 
Another possibility is that an override may lead to harsher terms being 
imposed by large customers on small suppliers in other areas. This 
again would be serious, but could be controlled by a code of practice.86 
It therefore seems that the benefit in clarifying the law would outweigh 
any possible detriment. 
CONCLUSION 
This paper has sought to elucidate the arguments both for and 
against a statutory override of anti-assignment clauses in English law. 
It is suggested that the arguments are not ones of principle, or even 
policy, but are more pragmatic. Since such clauses have not ever been 
the subject of statutory intervention, the common law has developed 
in such a way as to give all parties limited protection, and the industry 
has worked around the law to enable receivables financing to take 
place. However, on the basis of two recent surveys, the pragmatic 
arguments are assessed, and it appears that a statutory override would 
be beneficial. 
 
 
                                                 
86   See, e.g., GROCERIES CODE ADJUCIATOR, GROCERIES SUPPLY CODE 
OF PRACTICE, 2009 (U.K.), available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/groceries-supply-code-of-practice.  
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AZIZ CASE AND UNFAIR CONTRACT 
TERMS IN MORTGAGE LOAN 
AGREEMENTS: LESSONS TO BE 
LEARNED IN SPAIN* 
Immaculada Barral-Viñals** 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper provides an overview of the judgments given by the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) concerning unfair contract terms 
(UCTs) in mortgage loan agreements. My analysis of recent ECJ 
decisions will focus on three aspects. First, focusing on the consumer-
friendly interpretation of the UCT Directive,1 which has led to the 
development of substantive criteria for ascertaining unfairness, most 
notably in Aziz v. Catalunyacaixa.2 Second, I will identify various points 
at which the Spanish transposition of the UCT Directive needs to be 
revised. Third, I will focus on the possibility of controlling UCTs in 
mortgage foreclosure proceedings. 
This article’s approach will be based on a comparison of 
developments in ECJ decisions and recent decisions by Spain’s 
Supreme Court, the Tribunal Supremo (T.S.). This comparison 
indicates that the T.S. has adopted an interpretation rule for mortgage 
loan agreements that is far from consumer-friendly. This finding is 
                                                 
*  The final version of  this text was ended on October 15, 2014. 
** University of Barcelona; ibarral@ub.edu. 
1   Council Directive 93/13, 1993 O.J. (L 95) (EC).  
2   Case C-415/11, Mohamed Aziz v. Catalunyacaixa, 2013 EUR-Lex 
CELEX LEXIS 191 (Mar. 14, 2013).  
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supported by decisions made by the T.S. on May 9, 2013,3 a month and 
a half after the ECJ decision in Aziz, and September 8, 2014.4 
The “social engineering” that emerges from ECJ decisions is a 
clear indication of the situation in Spain today, where judges seek 
preliminary rulings concerning the scope and interpretation of the 
UCT Directive to develop principles for a more consumer-friendly 
interpretation of mortgage foreclosure proceedings.5 The lower courts 
in Spain are taking the lead to further develop these principles to 
protect consumers in real estate transactions, because the Spanish 
legislature and the T.S. seem reluctant to do so in what has become a 
major concern of Spain’s social policy.6 For instance, the most far-
reaching legislation requires renegotiation of mortgage terms only 
when “low-income borrowers” are involved.7 “Low income 
borrowers” is a category that varies in the different statutes but which 
is highly limited in scope to include only those with very low or none 
incomes, and a high average of the rent used in paying the loan (more 
than 60%).8 The ultimate option in this case for this category of 
consumers is the datio pro soluto, i.e., providing the same effects as 
non-recourse loans available in the United States, which affects an 
even smaller group of borrowers. Besides carving out an exception for 
this small, unique group of consumers, legislation reforms have 
focused chiefly on what constitutes unfair contract terms. 
                                                 
3   S.T.S., May 9, 2013 (R.J., No. 1916/2013) (Spain).  
4   S.T.S., Sept. 8, 2014 (R. J., No. 3903/2014) (Spain).  
5   See JOSÉ MARÍA FERNÁNDEZ SEIJO, LA DEFENSA DE LOS 
CONSUMIDORES EN LAS EJECUCIONES HIPOTECARIAS (2013). 
6   Hans-W. Micklitz, Unfair Contract Terms—Public Interest Litigation before 
European Courts—Case C-415/11 Mohamed Aziz, in LANDMARK CASES OF EU 
CONSUMER LAW: IN HONOUR OF JULES STUYCK 615 (Evelyne Terryn, Gert 
Straetmans & Veerle Colaert eds., 2013).   
7   See Urgent Measures to Protect Low Income Mortgage Debtors (B.O.E. 
2012, 60) (Spain); Urgent Measures to Strengthen Protection Measures to Mortgage 
Debtors (B.O.E. 2012, 276) (Spain); Rights of  Persons with Disabilities and their 
Social Inclusion (B.O.E. 2013, 289) (Spain) [hereinafter Rights of  Persons with 
Disabilities].  
8   Id.  
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This article seeks to ascertain the consequences of ECJ Aziz 
case on UCTs.9 My main goal is to examine the way in which the ECJ’s 
interpretation of UCTs has given rise to the construction of a 
substantive concept of unfairness by analysing standard contract terms 
(SCTs) included in almost all mortgage loans granted in Spain.  
Further, this paper will focus on the way in which these non-binding 
clauses can result in a stay of foreclosure proceedings and can also 
reduce the mortgager’s debt. Indeed, UCTs in Spain today constitute 
an indirect remedy against foreclosure, which can dramatically impact 
medium to low income families. 
I. UNFAIR CONTRACT TERMS: WHY THEY SEEM TO BE A USEFUL 
TOOL IN MORTGAGE LOAN AGREEMENTS 
SCTs often used in mortgage loan agreements are considered 
a means of unilaterally fixing contract clauses. As such, SCTs 
significantly limit freedom of contract, a notion embodied in the term 
“free will” in Article 1255 C.C.10 The seller or supplier of mortgage 
loans fixes SCTs in advance, and the borrower must accept or reject 
them on a “take it or leave it” basis. Since SCTs are not individually 
negotiated, they are subject to both an incorporation and a fairness test 
when the adherent－the non-professional party－is legally considered 
a consumer.11 In Spain, SCTs are governed by two different 
regulations, depending on whether the adherent is a consumer or not: 
the Standard Contract Terms Act of 1998 (Ley de Condiciones 
Generals de la Contratación (LCGC)),12 which governs SCTs in any all 
kinds of contract, and the General Law for the Protection of 
Consumers (consolidated by Royal Legislative Decree 1/2007, Que 
Aprueba el Texto Refundido de la Ley General para la Defensa de 
Consumidores y Usuarios y Otras Normas Complementarias 
                                                 
9   I will not conduct an in-depth analysis of mortgage foreclosure 
proceedings, which is the main issue raised by Aziz. 
10   C.C., art. 1255 (2011) (Spain); Elena Lauroba Lacasa, Rapport Introductif: 
Les Clauses Abusives, in LES CLAUSES ABUSIVES, SOCIETE DE LEGISLATION 
COMPAREE 9 (Yves Picod, Denis Mazeaud & Elena Lauroba eds., 2013). 
11   General Law for the Defense of Consumers and Users (B.O.E. 2007, 
287) (Spain) [hereinafter TRLGDCU]. 
12   General Conditions of Contract (B.O.E. 1998, 89) (Spain) [hereinafter 
LCGC]. 
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(TRLGDCU)),13 which only applies to business-to-consumer (B2C) 
contracts. For contracts that do not involve consumers, if the adherent 
has knowledge of existence of SCTs in the contract, the contract will 
be binding on both parties, even if the adherent has not yet read or 
understood the SCTs. As such, the law deals only with the external 
control of SCTs by employing the incorporation test, under which 
SCTs may be considered part of the binding contract if the adherent 
has had the possibility of knowing that the contract contains SCTs.14 
The incorporation test also applies when a contract containing SCTs 
involves a consumer. However, a fairness test is an additional internal 
control applied with respect to the content of the SCTs. This test 
determines whether there is a significant imbalance between parties’ 
bargaining power so that and if an SCT is deemed unfair, it will not be 
binding on the consumer.15 
The Spanish legal framework in relation to UCTs has not 
evolved due to the economic crisis of 2008, except in one aspect: 
Article 27 of Act 3/201416 referring to the non-revision of a UCT, 
which is explored further below. However, the ECJ’s ruling in Aziz 
lead to the Act 1/2013 of 14 May,17 on measures to strengthen the 
protection to mortgagors, debt restructuring and social rent that had 
                                                 
13   TRLGDCU (B.O.E. 2007, 287). 
14   However, the adherent’s acceptance does not imply that he has actual 
knowledge of  the material scope of  each term. Whether the SCTs are incorporated 
as part of  a binding contract depends on “accessibility” of  the adherent to the SCTs. 
Thus, it is unreasonable to uphold that the adherent has consented to the content of  
the STCs, since the existence of  a possibility for the adherent to know the STCs does 
not necessarily mean that the adherent has made an informed decision. See EUGENIO 
LLAMAS POMBO, COMENTARIOS A LA LEY GENERAL DE DEFENSA DE 
CONSUMIDORES Y USUARIOS 284 (2005). 
15   A further condition for enforcing SCTs is that they must be drafted in 
plain, intelligible language and have an interpretation contra proferentem, i.e., the 
supplier must assume the consequences of  confusing wording. A lack of  
transparency is a ground for non-incorporation, since confusing clauses cannot form 
part of  a contract. LCGC art. 5, 7 (B.O.E. 1998, 89). This idea is developed further 
in the T.S. judgment of  9 May 2013, S.T.S., May 9, 2013 (R.J., No. 1916/2013) 
(Spain), which seeks to construe unfairness in terms of  a lack of  transparency.  
16   See Consumer Protection Act (B.O.E. 2014, 76) (Spain). 
17  Measures to Protect Mortgagees, Debt Restructuring and Social Rents 
(B.O.E. 2013, 116) (Spain) [hereinafter Measures to Protect Mortgagees, Debt 
Restructuring and Social Rents].  
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modified the Mortgage Act (Ley Hipotecaria –LH-)18 and the Code of 
Civil Procedure (Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil) with regard to the 
consequences for mortgage foreclosure proceedings when the 
mortgage loan agreement contains clauses or terms that are be deemed 
unfair. Although various ECJ cases have redefined Spanish legislation 
on UCTs in mortgage agreements,19 these cases are contrary to the May 
9, 2013 decision issued by the T.S., which has generated considerable 
controversy. The practical impact of these ECJ judgments on SCTs is 
of great importance, since the majority of mortgage loan agreements 
in Spain contain STCs. 
The lower Spanish courts—Audiencias provinciales—have 
examined a number of frequently used SCTs in mortgage loan 
agreements that might be deemed unfair, including SCTs relating to: 
(1) the early maturity of the loan, (2) the default interest rate, (3) the 
unilateral determination of the amount owed, and (4) the so-called 
“floor clause” in variable interest loans. In Aziz, the ECJ ruled on the 
fairness of the first three types of SCTs. Preliminary rulings by the ECJ 
focused on two aspects: the criteria to be applied in examining the 
fairness of a clause and the effects of an unfair clause. Similarly, the 
T.S. has ruled on the “floor clause,” which is a problem only in Spain 
in the context of the UCT Directive concerning the scope of 
application of the fairness test to the main subject matter of the 
contract. 
We start by examining this latter point as a prius for the analysis 
of the above-mentioned clauses. 
II. THE APPLICATION OF THE FAIRNESS TEST TO THE MAIN 
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CONTRACT 
An initial set of ECJ and T.S. decisions deal with the 
transposition of the UCT Directive by the Spanish legislature. Article 
                                                 
18   Mortgage Act) (B.O.E. 1946, 58) (Spain) [hereinafter Mortgage Act].  
19   Case C-484/08, Caja de Ahorros de Madrid v. Ausbanc, 2010 E.C.R. 
I-04785; Case C-618/10, Banco Español de Crédito v. Joaquín Calderón Camino, 
2012 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 4274 (June 14, 2012); Case C-415/11, Mohamed 
Aziz v. Catalunyacaixa, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 191 (Mar. 14, 2013); Case 
C-226/12, Constructora Principado v. José Ignacio Menéndez-Álvarez, 2014 EUR-
Lex CELEX LEXIS 7 (Jan. 6, 2014). 
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4(2) of the UCT Directive states that the assessment of the unfairness 
of a contractual term should not include the “main subject matter of 
the contract nor to the adequacy of the price and remuneration . . . as 
against the services or goods supplied in exchange . . . .”20 As such, the 
ECJ has been requested to give a preliminary ruling as to whether it is 
actually possible to assess the fairness of the subject matter of the 
contract and the adequacy of the price and remuneration in light of the 
value of the services or goods supplied in exchange, that is to say, the 
fairness of the contract price. 
The question is whether the transposition of the UCT 
Directive by the Spanish legislature complies with Article 4(2) of the 
Directive, given that Spanish law has not expressly transposed this 
limit to the assessment of fairness. This question was answered by the 
ECJ in Caja de Ahorros de Madrid v. Ausbanc.21 The Court in Ausbanc held 
that a Spanish law providing for an assessment of the fairness of terms 
relating to the main subject matter of the contract was consistent with 
the UCT Directive.22 The ECJ determined that Article 4(2) is not a 
binding provision. Member States may opt not to transpose Article 
4(2) and, in so doing, may afford a higher level of protection than that 
established by the Directive.23 This option satisfies the requirement in 
the UCT Directive of “minimum harmonisation” of national 
                                                 
20   Council Directive 93/13, supra note 1, art. 4(2). 
21   See Ausbanc, 2010 E.C.R. I-04785.   
22   In Ausbanc, the T.S. requested the ECJ make a preliminary ruling 
regarding the unfairness of  a SCT that allowed the bank to round up the interest rate 
in a variable mortgage agreement to the next quarter of  a percentage point. See id. 
23   It follows from the wording of  Article 4(2) of  the UCT Directive that 
“[Article 4(2)] . . . cannot be regarded as laying down the scope ratione materiae of  the 
Directive.” Id. at I-4837. Article 4(2) cannot be inferred as constituting “a mandatory 
and binding provision and that, as such, its transposition by Member States was 
obligatory. On the contrary, the Court merely held that, in order to safeguard in 
practice the objectives of  consumer protection pursued by the Directive, any 
transposition of  Article 4(2) had to be complete, with the result that the prohibition 
of  the assessment of  the unfairness of  the terms relates solely to those which are 
drafted in plain, intelligible language.” Id. at I-4838. Further, the Court in Ausbanc 
stated that “it must be held that, in authorising the possibility of  a full judicial review 
as to the unfairness of  terms such as those referred to in Article 4(2) of  the Directive, 
provided for in a contract concluded between a seller or supplier and a consumer, 
the Spanish legislation at issue in the main proceedings makes it possible for 
consumers to be afforded, in accordance with Article 8 of  the Directive, a higher 
level of  protection than that established by that directive” Id. at I-4838. 
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legislation.24 A number of decisions by the T.S. adhere to this 
interpretation of the UCT Directive, as I will explain. Notably, prior to 
Ausbanc, the T.S. had already ruled in a manner consistent with the 
ECJ’s holding. For example, in T.S. judgement of 1 July, 2010,25 which 
concerned clauses defining risks in insurance contracts, the T.S. ruled 
that courts should assess the fairness of clauses related to the main 
subject matter of such contracts because it determines the price of the 
insurance. 
Yet, more noteworthy is the judgment against this 
interpretation, since it deals with mortgage contracts, bearing in mind 
that only a clause unrelated to the subject matter of the contract or the 
adequacy of the price can be submitted to the unfairness test. Thus, 
the question is that the T.S. resolution of 18 June, 2012, which is 
concerned with remunerative interest rate, states that Spanish 
legislation on UCTs prohibits the assessment of the fairness of 
contract clauses that are related to price.26 It appears that the 
remunerative interest rate, which is the main tool for calculating the 
contract price, is outside the scope of the unfairness test. 
Control of the remunerative interest rate clearly entails an 
analysis of the adequacy of the contract price, since the assessment of 
the nominal interest rate applied is the “price” of the loan. No 
assessment of fairness, however, is undertaken in fixing this rate. 
Instead, fairness is assessed as to the price agreed to by the parties. 
This conceptual separation of Article 4(2) of the UCT Directive of the 
control of the price as the main subject matter of the contract, and the 
adequacy of the price and the remuneration, on the one hand, as 
against the services or goods supplied in return, on the other, was 
highlighted by the ECJ in Constructora Principado v. Álvarez.27 The nature 
of unfairness does not require an economic imbalance in the contract, 
which the Court understands as not being relevant. Instead, unfairness 
refers to the legal imbalance created by those contract clauses that 
                                                 
24   Id. at I-4836. 
25   S.T.S. Jul. 1, 2010 (R.J., No. 6031/2010) (Spain).  
26   S.T.S. June 18, 2012 (R.J., No. 5966/2012) (Spain).  
27   In Constructora Principado (like Ausbanco, a preliminary request from a 
Spanish judge), the ECJ was asked to determine whether obliging consumers to pay 
for expenses that by law need to be borne by the sellers is unfair. See Case C-226/12, 
Constructora Principado, 2014 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 7, ¶ 44 (Jan. 6, 2014). 
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impose on the consumer certain charges for which he is not liable 
under the applicable law. In other words, it is unfair to create a legal 
imbalance, irrespective of the economic impact on the parties.28 
Spanish scholars29 have reached a consensus that UCTs are not 
the appropriate tool for determining the adequacy of the contract price 
and remuneration as against the services or goods supplied in return. 
Spanish law calls for complete freedom of parties to determine 
contract prices, and therefore, there are no remedies30 for seeking a fair 
price.31 Thus, the control assessment of fairness is not about the 
adequacy of the price, which is separate from the possibility of 
assessing unfairness, but about the way some clauses help to determine 
the total price that consumers have to pay for the loan. This is precisely 
why many SCTs in mortgage loans might be considered unfair.32 
                                                 
28    See IMMACULADA BARRAL VIÑALS, CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS DE 
CONSUMO, ABUSIVAS POR DESEQUILIBRIO IMPORTANTE, PERO NO IMPORTA LA 
CANTIDAD (2014) (detailing a discussion on legal imbalance not being an economic 
imbalance in the ECJ decisions). 
29   See SERGIO CÁMARA LAPUENTE, EL CONTROL SOBRE LAS CLÁUSULAS 
“ABUSIVAS” SOBRE ELEMENTOS ESENCIALES DEL CONTRATO 71 (Thompson-
Aranzadi ed., 2006) (discussing the tension between unlimited freedom to negotiate 
the contract price and social justice). 
30   An exception to the general rule that no remedies exist for seeking a 
fair contract price is the laesio ultra dimidium in Catalonia for immovable property 
under certain circumstances.  This exception, however, is beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
31   See IGNASI FERNÁNDEZ DE SENESPLEDA, PABLO IZQUIERDO WHITE, 
ADELA RODRIGUEZ SERRA & GUILLEM SOLER SOLÉ, CLÁUSULAS ABUSIVAS EN LA 
CONTRATACIÓN BANCARIA 86 (2014) (calling for the impossibility of  controlling the 
price by the fairness test). Nevertheless, the argumentation cited deals precisely with 
the idea of  adequacy between the price and the services and goods supplied. See also 
LAPUENTE, supra note 29, at 71 (discussing the liberal doctrine of  freedom of  pricing 
and the social justice of  the contract). However, we understand that the thesis of  
social intervention of  the contract exceeds the issue of  unfair terms and seeks, not 
to determine whether there is an imbalance in a specific contract, but rather to restore 
a prior balance when starting from the premise that both parties have very different 
powers of  negotiation. 
32   Article 32 of  the Directive on Consumer Rights inserts Article 8 to the 
UCT Directive, stating that when a Member State adopts provisions in accordance 
with Article 8, it must inform the Commission, especially if  those provisions “extend 
the unfairness assessment to . . . the adequacy of  the price or remuneration.” Council 
Directive 2011/83, on Consumer Rights, 2011 O.J. (L 304) 64 (EU), amending 
Council Directive 93/13, supra note 1, and Council Directive 1999/44, 1999 O.J. (L 
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In terms of remunerative rates of interest, it should be stressed 
that control of the amount, if any, is concerned directly with assessing 
the adequacy of the service provided against the remuneration. In 
short, the control of the amount impacts pricing freedom. Article 1 of 
the Repression of Usury Act of 23 of July 1908 governs the 
determination of whether the remunerative rate of interest is excessive 
or not.33 The Usury Act is useful for controlling the adequacy of the 
loan price because it mandates that the lending of money cannot be 
considered binding where there is an “interest notoriously higher than 
the normal price of money or clearly out of proportion in the 
circumstances of the case, or leonine. . .”34 However, when the lending 
is excessive or leonine, the loan is void in its entirety. Thus, the 
requirements of the Usury Act differ from the unfairness test, under 
which only the unfair clauses would be non-binding. In short, there is 
a specific tool in Spanish law for analysing when the price of the loan 
is excessive, namely, the adequacy of the price, which lies outside the 
scope of laws that address UCTs. 
An important case that addresses the issue of price control is 
the Judgement of 9 May 2013,35 a T.S. decision which was published 
shortly after the ECJ decided Aziz. The T.S. held that, although the 
rate of default interest constitutes part of the main subject matter of 
the contract, it can only be deemed unfair if the clause lacks 
transparency. These issues are discussed below in section IV, sub-
                                                 
171) 12 (EC), and repealing Council Directive 85/577, 1985 O.J. (L 372) 31 (EC) and 
Council Directive 97/7, 1997 O.J. (L 144) 19 (EC). The Directive on Consumer 
Rights was transposed by the Spanish legislature in the Consumer Protection Act, 
(B.O.E. 2014, 76) (Spain), amending TRLGDCU. Importantly, note that Article 8 
does not deal directly with the price as the main subject matter of  the contract, but 
rather with the adequacy of  the price or remuneration.  
33   Represión de la Usura (Usury Repression Act) (B.O.E. 1908, 206) 
(Spain) [hereinafter Usury Repression Act]. 
34   Nevertheless, the main idea of  the Usury Repression Act is to provide 
a subjective approach by taking into account the personal characteristics of  the 
debtor in determining whether the loan is usurious or not. See Immaculada Barral-
Viñals, Freedom of  Contract, Unequal Bargaining Power and Consumer Law on 
Unconscionability, in UNCONSCIONABILITY IN EUROPEAN PRIVATE FINANCIAL 
TRANSACTIONS: PROTECTING THE VULNERABLE (Mel Kenny, James Devenney & 
Lorna Fox O’Mahony eds., 2010) (relating the concept of  unconscionability in 
common law and how this Act might be considered the first Spanish law protecting 
the weak part of  the contract).  
35   S.T.S., May 9, 2013 (R.J., No. 1916/2013) (Spain) 
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section C in conjunction with the criteria for determining fairness, 
because unlike remunerative interest rates, default interest rates do not 
form part of the price. Instead, default interest rates are part of the 
compensation for the eventual damage suffered by the creditor 
because of non-payment. In other words, these rates fall outside the 
notion of price and, as such, are susceptible to an unfairness test.36 
These T.S. cases permit application of the fairness test to any 
kind of clause in a mortgage loan, and this application should be the 
first step in considering individual clauses typically included in 
mortgage loan agreements in Spain. 
III. SUBSTANTIVE CRITERIA FOR DEALING WITH THE CONCEPT OF 
“UNFAIRNESS” 
The ECJ has issued a number of guidelines on determining the 
fairness of SCTs. These guidelines are only of persuasive authority for 
judges in national courts because the Court in Luxembourg only gives 
instructions to the referring court in accordance with the interpretation 
of the scope of the fairness control provided in the UCT Directive.37 
In Aziz, however, the ECJ provided national courts with direct 
guidance—which has been cited in subsequent cases such as 
Constructora Principado—for analysing SCTs. All in all, the ECJ analyses 
                                                 
36   MARIA CARMEN GONZALEZ CARRASCO, CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS DE 
CONSUMO, LA CLÁUSULA QUE IMPONE UN INTERÉS DE DEMORA 
DESPROPORCIONADO DETERMINA LA APRECIACIÓN DE OFICIO DE LA NULIDAD 
DE LA MISMA SIN POSIBILIDAD DE ONTEGRACIÓN JUDICIAL(2013).  
37   The judgments that stress the idea that the ECJ only gives instructions 
to the referring court in accordance with the interpretation of the scope of the 
fairness control provided in the UCT Directive are numerous. See Case C-243/08, 
Pannon GSM Zrt. v. Erzsébet Sustikné Győrfi, 2009 E.C.R. I-04713; Case C-137/08, 
VB Pénzügyi Lízing Zrt. v. Ferenc Schneide, 2010 E.C.R. I-10847; Case C-92/11, 
RWE Vertrieb AG v. Verbraucherzentrale Nordrhein-Westfalen eV, 2013 EUR-Lex 
CELEX LEXIS 4659 (Mar. 21, 2013). A summary of  this construction  can be found 
in Case C-472/10, Nemzeti Fogyasztóvédelmi Hatóság v. Invitel Távközlési Zrt., 
2012 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 4104 (Apr. 26, 2012) (“it is for that [national] court 
to determine, in light of  those criteria, whether a particular contractual term is 
actually unfair in the circumstances of  the case . . . . It is thus clear that the Court of  
Justice must limit itself, in its response, to providing the referring court with the 
indications which the latter must take into account in order to assess whether the 
term at issue is unfair.”).  
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three different clauses used in virtually all mortgage loan agreements. 
These clauses are discussed separately below. 
A. The “Early Maturity of the Loan” Clause 
The “early maturity” clause is an SCT that confers on the bank 
the right to call in the totality of the loan on expiry of a stipulated time 
limit where the debtor fails to fulfill his obligation to pay any part of 
the principal or the interest on the loan. This clause implies the 
acceleration of the loan due to any kind of non-compliance. The ECJ 
in Aziz referred to this clause as the “acceleration clause.” 
There is considerable variety of early maturity clauses used for 
a range of circumstances, such as when a debtor enters into insolvency 
proceedings and in the sale of an immovable property. The discussion 
in this section focuses on the type of early maturity clause considered 
in the case brought before the ECJ: one that provides for early maturity 
on account of non-payment of a loan installment. For this clause to 
take effect, there must be a failure to comply with an obligation that is 
of essential importance in the contractual relationship, such as non-
payment in due time by the borrower.38 But, the substantive issue 
discussed by the ECJ was the early maturity that occurred, or could 
occur, as a consequence of the non-payment of a single installment, 
and whether the early maturity clause may be considered unfair 
because of being disproportionate. The problem is not the possibility 
of calling in the loan because of the debtor’s non-compliance. Rather, 
the problem is the imbalance between the term and the amount of the 
loan, and the non-payment of a single installment.39 Some Spanish 
scholars argue that, since early maturity for non-compliance is 
authorized by Spanish regulations on UCTs,40 the central problem is 
whether absolute non-compliance can be assumed after defaulting on 
just one installment.41 The meaning of non-payment is not defined in 
                                                 
38   See, e.g. S.T.S., Dec. 16, 2009 (R.J., No. 8466/2009) (Spain).  
39   See PASCUAL MARTÍNEZ ESPIN, CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS DE CONSUMO, 
ES ABUSIVA LA CLÁUSULA DE VENCIMIENTO ANTICIPADO POR IMPAGO DE UNA 
CUOTA DE LA HIPOTECA (2013). 
40   TRLGDCU art. 85(4) (B.O.E. 2007, 287). 
41   See Carlos Ballugera Gómez, Carácter Abusivo del Vencimiento Anticipado 
por Impago de una Sola Suota del Préstamo Hipotecario en la STS de 16 de Diciembre de 2009, 
7507 DIARIO LA LEY 10, 10 (2010); Maria Teresa Alonso Pérez, Cláusulas Frecuentes 
en Préstamos Hipotecarios para Adquisición de Vivienda: Cláusula Suelo, Cláusula de 
2015 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 4:1 
80 
the regulations. However, the ECJ provides three criteria –marked in 
bold- for determining whether the non-compliance is sufficiently 
serious: “whether that right is provided for in cases in which such non-
compliance is sufficiently serious in the light of the term and amount 
of the loan, whether that right derogates from the relevant 
applicable rules and whether national law provides for adequate 
and effective means enabling the consumer subject to such a 
term to remedy the effects of the loan being called in.”42 
Even though the ECJ does not conclude whether this clause is 
unfair, its criteria reflects the normal circumstances of a mortgage loan 
for a family home in Spain. Typically, banks in Spain grant mortgage 
loans with pay back time of at least thirty years.43 As such, non-
payment of a single monthly installment, without more, does not 
appear to be a severe violation of the borrower’s payment obligation. 
In line with these criteria, the Spanish legislature set a limit on 
the maximum delay of payment, beyond which would indicate a 
serious intention of the borrower to breach his payment obligation. In 
2013, the legislature promulgated Act 1/2013,44 which modifies Article 
693(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure to require a finding of non-
compliance with the loan agreement based on non-payment of 
monthly installments for three or more months or its equivalent if the 
terms are not quantified in a monthly basis. 
Act 1/2013 also takes into account the second criterion 
provided by the ECJ, and addresses the question of whether the right 
to call in the loan for the non-payment of one installment derogates 
from the relevant applicable rules. If there is no early maturity clause 
in the contract, the mortgage can only be executed following the 
“essential non-compliance” in the terms provided by Article 1124 
C.C.,45 which seems to require more than the non-payment of a single 
                                                 
Vencimiento anticipado y Cláusula de Cntereses Moratorios Excesivamente Elevados, in 
VIVIENDA Y CRISIS ECONÓMICA 183 (María Teresa Alsonso Pérez ed., 2014). 
42   L.E. CIV art. 693(2) (Spain). 
43  See, e.g., Case C-415/11, Mohamed Aziz v. Catalunyacaixa, 2013 EUR-
Lex CELEX LEXIS 191 (Mar. 14, 2013) (the mortgage loan at issue was for thirty-
three years). 
44   See Measures to Protect Mortgagees, Debt Restructuring and Social 
Rents (B.O.E. 2013, 116).   
45   C.C. art. 1124 (Spain).  
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installment. Thus, by specifically requiring three months of non-
payment, Act 1/2013 establishes a criterion in which non-compliance 
is of essential importance. 
However, the last criterion provided by the ECJ on the need 
to examine whether there are adequate means to remedy the effects of 
the clause is largely ineffective. Article 693(3) of Code of Civil 
Procedure clearly provides for the possibility of the debtor thwarting 
the execution of the mortgage by paying the due installments, a power 
conceded to the debtor of the mortgage on the family home, without 
the consent of the creditor. Therefore, in light of the effectiveness of 
reacting to the implementation of the clause, the Spanish legal system 
provides reasonable solutions to ensure the clause is not deemed 
unfair. 
Act 1/2013 establishes that, in the absence of non-payment for 
at least three months, the judge cannot proceed to foreclosure. 
However, the question remains as to whether, even if the bank has 
declared the loan is expired after the minimum time limit for 
compliance established by law, the contract contains a clause for early 
maturity for non-payment of a single installment. Courts are likely to 
declare this clause unfair and therefore not binding on the debtor, in 
which case there would be a stay on mortgage foreclosure due to the 
lack of necessary procedural prerequisites, i.e., the credit has not fallen 
due.46 Here, however, judges must decide on a case-by-case basis 
whether the elements listed above for determining whether a clause is 
unfair are present. In fact, the Code of Civil Procedure does not make 
early maturity clauses unfair only upon one or two non-payments. 
Instead, the Code of Civil Procedure only limits the foreclosure of the 
mortgage to three unpaid installments, which indicates a poor 
understanding of the judgment in Aziz. 
B. The Clause for Unilateral Quantification of the Amount Owed 
Clauses for unilateral qualification of the amount owed allow 
banks to immediately and unilaterally determine the balance of a loan 
by submitting a certificate indicating the amount owed. This clause is 
                                                 
46  Encarna Cordero, Y Ahora Viene lo Difícil: ¿Cómo Controlar en el Ejecutivo 
Hipotecario el Carácter Abusivo de la Cláusula?, 5 REVISTA CESCO DE DERECHO DE 
CONSUMO 26 (2013). 
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essential to the security provided by a mortgage because it provides the 
creditor with recourse to the procedures set out in Article 572(2) of 
Code of Civil Procedure.47 Article 572(2) requires providing for the 
presentation of certification of the amount owed, duly verified before 
a notary, to determine the outstanding balance to proceed to 
enforcement. If such certification does not exist, the enforcement 
proceedings cannot be initiated owing to the absence of one of the 
procedural requisites, viz., the liquidity of the debt.48 Prior to the 
enforcement proceeding, the debtor would be required to initiate a 
declaratory proceeding to establish the amount due. Therefore, the law 
allows unilateral declaration to establish the liquidity of the debt. 
Clauses for unilateral qualification of the amount owed might 
seem unfair because they require only unilateral declaration by the 
bank. However, such a clause whose requirements and effects are 
provided for by procedural legislation49 can hardly be considered unfair 
provided that all the requirements and effects of the clause are clear. 
In fact, this was the approach used by the Advocate General in Aziz, 
which highlights the essential character of this type of SCT for 
initiating enforcement.50 He also pointed out the need to analyze the 
rules of this procedure and, in particular, the debtor’s power of 
challenge, which appears guaranteed when claiming more than is due 
as regulated in Art. 558 Code of Civil Procedure.51 
Aziz, however, deviates from Advocate General opinion for 
analyzing the procedures of mortgage enforcement proceedings and 
directly adopts the comparison with national legislation in the absence 
of an agreement.52 Yet, without a unilateral determination clause, 
                                                 
47   L.E. CIV.art. 572(2) (Spain).  
48   See FERNÁNDEZ DE SENESPLENA, supra note 31, at 175.  
49   L.E. CIV. art. 572 (Spain).  
50   See Case C-415/11, Mohamed Aziz v. Catalunyacaixa, 2013 EUR-Lex 
CELEX LEXIS 191 (Mar. 14, 2013).  
51   L.E. CIV. art. 558 (Spain). 
52   Aziz, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS, at ¶ 75 (“With regard, finally, to 
the term concerning the unilateral determination by the lender of  the amount of  the 
unpaid debt, linked to the possibility of  initiating mortgage enforcement 
proceedings, it must be held that, taking into account paragraph 1(q) of  the Annex 
to the directive and the criteria contained in Articles 3(1) and 4(1) thereof, the 
referring court must in particular assess whether and, if  appropriate, to what extent, 
the term in question derogates from the rules applicable in the absence of  agreement 
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enforcement proceedings may not be initiated, so, this SCT is clearly 
carrying consequences detrimental to the consumer. Therefore, Aziz 
indicates that the unilateral declaration of the amount is unfair, since 
this requires an agreement that derogates the applicable law. In the 
absence of an agreement, the law provides for the creditor to initiate 
declaratory proceedings to settle the debt, thus losing the advantages 
of the mortgage enforcement, which is one of the lender’s most 
obvious advantages. Enforcement based on unilateral declaration of 
the amount owed offers few safeguards for the debtor, because 
unilateral declaration does not contain a phase in which objections 
might be lodged, nor is it corrected by the intervention of the notary. 
In short, in light of Spanish procedural law, it seems more effective to 
address the issue of the clauses for unilateral qualification of the 
amount owed from the perspective of the guarantee of procedures 
rather than from that of the unfair nature of the clause itself. 
C. Disproportionate Default Interest Rate Clause 
The disproportionate default interest rate clause is also 
analyzed in Aziz. Unlike the remunerative rate of interest, which forms 
part of the price, the default interest is the price (compensation) for 
the debtor’s failure to pay, which derives from the default and is 
provided for under Article 1108 C.C.53 Thus, as indicated in Section 
III, the critical issue is not whether it is possible to control the content 
of the clause. Rather, the issue is whether the interest rate is 
disproportionate, and because of that, become unfair. 
The ECJ opined in Aziz that the rate of default interest should 
be appropriate for ensuring the attainment of its objectives: so, a 
disproportioned default interest rate cannot be imposed because it 
settles a disproportionate compensation. The ECJ establishes two 
criteria for establishing a proportionate default interest rate: first, a 
comparison with what is provided for under national law in the 
absence of any agreement; and second, the rate of default interest 
applicable in art. 1108 Civil Code.54 Clearly, the agreement of a default 
                                                 
between the parties, so as to make it more difficult for the consumer, given the 
procedural means at his disposal, to take legal action and exercise rights of  the 
defence.”). 
53  C.C. art. 1108 (Spain). 
54   See Aziz, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS,¶ 74 (“regarding the term 
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interest rate alters the legal framework under Article 1108 C.C., which 
provides that the legal interest rate should be four percent,55 a figure 
that is well above the usual percentage in mortgages. The question is 
what standard of comparison should be employed, and there are at 
least three possible answers: first, to take Article 1108 C.C., which 
establishes the legal interest rate of borrowing in the event of no 
agreement,56 as a point of reference; second, to apply in accordance 
with Spanish legislation the limit on the legal interest rate of tacit 
overdrafts on personal loans subject to Article 20(4) LCC,57 which is 
2.5 times the legal interest rate;58 and third, to compare the 
remunerative rate of interest of the loan itself with the default interest 
rate. 
Consumers often default on their loan payments at the risk of 
foreclosure proceedings and find themselves unable to pay high rates 
of default interest. Therefore, RD-L 6/2012, before providing a ruling 
in the Aziz case, determined an upper limit for default interest rate in 
mortgage foreclosures affecting debtors with few resources (Article 4 
RD-L 6/2012).59 This regulation provides for the so-called “debtor on 
the threshold of social exclusion,” who enjoys special protection and 
                                                 
concerning the fixing of  default interest, it should be recalled that, in light of  
paragraph 1(e) of  the Annex to the Directive, read in conjunction with Articles 3(1) 
and 4(1) of  the directive, the national court must assess in particular, as stated by the 
Advocate General in points 85 to 87 of  her Opinion; first, the rules of  national law 
which would apply to the relationship between the parties, in the event of  no 
agreement having been reached in the contract in question or in other consumer 
contracts of  that type; and, second, the rate of  default interest laid down, compared 
with the statutory interest rate, in order to determine whether it is appropriate for 
securing the attainment of  the objectives pursued by it in the Member State 
concerned and does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve them”). See also Case 
C-488/11, Dirk Frederik Asbeek Brusse, Katarine de Man Garabito v. Jahani BV, 
2013 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 2538 (May 30, 2013). 
55   State Budget 2014 (B.O.E. 2013, 309) (Spain) (stating the state budget 
for 2014. Additional disposition 32).  
56   C.C. art. 1108 (Spain). 
57   Consumer Credit Act art. 9 (B.O.E. 1995, 72) (Spain) (derogated by 
Consumer Credit Act (B.O.E.  2011, 151) (Spain) [hereinafter Consumer Credit Act]. 
Neither of  the two statutes apply to mortgage loan agreements. 
58   See FERNÁNDEZ DE SENESPLEDA, supra note 31, at 145. This criterion 
has been followed by provincial courts seeking a limit in the default interest rate in 
the face of  recent legal reforms. 
59   Urgent Measures to Protect Low Income Mortgage Debtors (B.O.E. 
2012, 60) (Spain).   
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is limited to the remunerative interest agreed to by parties at the time 
of making the loan agreement plus 2.5% of the loan principal. 
Nevertheless, the requirements for being recognized as this type of 
debtor are cumbersome and complicated, and few debtors are deemed 
eligible for this protection. 
The ceiling on default interest in Article 114 LH, amended by 
Law 1/2013 limits default interest to a rate that is three times the 
statutory interest rate when the mortgage is for the acquisition of the 
main residence and the mortgage agreement has been secured on that 
residence. Thus, a solution was implemented to depart from the 
statutory interest rate provided by the C.C. and to increase the ceiling 
on personal loans. Today, there is a legal limit on interest rates when 
the rate has been agreed to in a new mortgage contract. Hence, 
disposicion trasitoria (DT) 2 of Act 1/2013 applies this limit to 
foreclosures that are pending or to be initiated after the effective date 
of Act 1/2013 that will have a greater impact as a lot of cases can be 
in its scope of application.60  This indicates that the court clerk or 
notary will recalculate the rate of interest if it exceeds the statutory 
limit. As such, DT 2 of Act 1/2013 seems to represent an effort to 
moderate the clause in opposition to ECJ case law and the provisions 
in Article 85 TRLGDCU, which will be further discussed in Section V 
below. 
Another interesting aspect of disproportionate default interest 
rate clauses concerns the proceedings taken when an interest rate is 
declared unfair and therefore void. The provincial courts have adopted 
two approaches to this issue. The first approach is to apply a zero 
interest rate if a court declares the default interest rate void as 
disproportionately high and the judge is unable to moderate the clause, 
as demonstrated in Section V. The second approach is to apply Article 
1108 C.C., which provides that, in the absence of an agreement 
between the parties, the rate of default interest shall be the statutory 
interest rate. I favor this second approach because the supplementary 
application of Article 1108 C.C. does not constitute a revision of the 
clause, but only a use of the statutory interest rate in the absence of an 
agreement between the parties, defined as lack of foresight or 
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Rents (B.O.E. 2013, 116).  
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unenforceability by other cause.61 The logic of Article 1108 C.C. is to 
provide a model for the quantification of the legal obligation for paying 
default interest, which is used by the ECJ as a reference for finding 
unfairness. The agreement on a default interest rate modifies the 
application of this precept.62 
D. The “Floor” Clause 
In Spain, most loan agreements for purchasing a family home 
charge a variable interest rate. A “floor” clause affects the variability of 
a loan by providing a fixed interest rate. Floor clauses do not allow 
lower rates of interest to be applied, even if a lower rate is available 
under the Euribor or other mechanism of calculation. Financial 
institutions use floor clauses to protect themselves against possible 
falls in the Euribor. Hence, the potential unfairness of floor clauses 
has been called into question because such clauses cause an imbalance 
in the contract, since the debtor is unable to benefit from interest rate 
cuts lower than the limit established by the floor clause, and it can be 
deemed unfair because the lack of financial knowledge of the debtor 
means he may be unaware that the clause might be applied, which has 
occurred during the present economic crisis. Although the ECJ has not 
addressed the fairness of floor clauses, the T.S. ruled on this issue in 
the May 9, 201363 and September 8, 2014 decisions64 and applied much 
more restrictive criteria. 
The T.S. cases considered floor clauses from two points of 
view. The first, which is contrary to the interpretation by the ECJ in 
Aziz, is that “floor” clauses, insofar as they determine the contract 
price, cannot be considered unfair. The second is that floor clauses can 
only be considered invalid for lack of transparency. Thus, the test for 
fairness is its inclusion within the loan agreement (Articles 5 and 7 
LCGC and 80 of TRLGDCU), which is understood to be made when 
                                                 
61   See Miguel Martin Casals, Les Clauses Abusives Dans le Projet de Cadre 
Commun de Reference, in LES CLAUSES ABUSIVES: APPROCHES CROISEES FRANCO-
ESPAGNOLES 73 (Yves Picod, Denis Mazeaud, & Elena Lauroba eds., 2012) (pointing 
out that the contract remains when a clause is unfair either because the clause is not 
essential to the contract’s purpose or because the law includes a defective application 
of  the norm. In our case, the defective norm is C.C. art. 1108).  
62   See GONZALEZ CARRASCO, supra note 36, at 4.  
63 See S.T.S., May 9, 2013 (R.J., No. 1916/2013) (Spain).  
64 See S.T.S., Sept. 8, 2014 (R.J., No. 3903/2014) (Spain).  
2015 Barral-Viñals 4:1 
87 
the bank complies with all previously established information and 
documentation requirements.65 Surprisingly, the T.S. checks the 
transparency of contractual clauses that cannot be deemed unfair as 
they form part of the price in function of the criterion of transparency 
in what is known as “double filter transparency”. Indeed, this criterion 
for the transparency of contract clauses is not contemplated by Article 
82 TRLGDCU, which is limited to requiring only that the content of 
the clauses shall not be “contrary to the requirement of good faith” or 
“cause a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations 
arising under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer and user.” 
Nor does Article 3 of the UCT Directive require a check on the 
transparency of contract clauses. Thus, the transparency control in 
Spanish law is effectively a control of the incorporation of general 
contract conditions, and not a control over the fairness of the SCT.66 
Indeed, the control of accessibility tackles the issue of fairness more 
directly than the control of transparency because the former is based 
on whether the consumer had the opportunity of knowing the content, 
while the latter is only a posterior analysis of whether the clause is 
worded clearly or not. Further, even if the wording of the contract term 
is unclear, it will be ineffective rather than unfair.67 
In practice, the T.S. adopts the ECJ’s interpretation of the 
concept of unfairness due to a lack of transparency, which provides 
that the clarity of the contract language requires the lender to fulfill its 
affirmative duty of supplying sufficient information for the consumer 
to appreciate the circumstances related to contract formation.68 This 
requirement is grounded in the idea that the test for unfairness should 
require that consumers understand the economic significance of the 
contract terms. This is precisely the concept that the T.S. adopts in 
                                                 
65 See Orden Sobre Transparencia de las Condiciones Financieras de los 
préstamos hiptecarios (May 5, 1994) (B.O.E. 1994/112) (on transparency of  the 
financial conditions of  mortgage loans or credits) (derogated by Orden 
EHA/2899/2011, de Transparencia y Protección del cliente de servicios bancarios 
(Oct. 28, 2011) (B.O.E. 2011/261) (on transparency and protection of  bank clients)). 
66   FRANCISCO PERTÍÑEZ VÍLCHEZ, LAS CLÁUSULAS ABUSIVAS POR UN 
DEFECTO DE TRANSPARENCIA (2004). 
67   See Consumer Protection Act art. 10 (B.O.E. 2014, 76) (Spain) 
(amended to require clarity with the material delivery of  the conditions).  
68   See Nemzeti Fogyasztóvédelmi Hatóság v. Invitel Távközlési Zrt., supra 
note 37; Hans-W. Micklitz & Norbert Reich, The Court and Sleeping Beauty: The Revival 
of  the Unfair Contract Terms Directive (UCTD), 51 C.M.L.R. 771, 771-808 (2014).  
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determining the lack of transparency: the floor clause is void due to a 
lack of transparency because such a clause prevents the consumer from 
understanding the economic significance of the loan. However, the 
problem is that both transparency and reporting obligations to 
highlight the economic significance of the contract are for the ECJ, 
examples of substantive criteria for determining the unfair nature of a 
clause because they generate imbalance and are contrary to good faith, 
regardless of the clarity of writing. In other words, the argument of the 
economic importance of the contract is useful, but then we talk about 
content control, which is precisely what the T.S. rejects at the 
beginning of its argument, indicating that the floor clause refers to an 
essential contract element. In my opinion, it is more useful to start 
from the fact that floor clauses are unfair terms, and avoid the question 
of transparency because the content control would address the fairness 
issue in a more direct manner. 
IV. ON THE EFFECTS OF UNFAIRNESS: NON-REVISION AND FULL 
RESTITUTION 
Another important issue concerns the difference between the 
way in which the Spanish legislature and the T.S. interpret the effects 
of unfair terms and the doctrine established by the ECJ. First, until 
2013, the TRLGDCU had authorized judges to integrate terms that 
had been declared unfair. Second, the T.S., in its 9 May, 2013 
decision,69 stated that the law did not require restitution of the amounts 
paid under a “floor clause” that had been declared unfair due to a lack 
of transparency. Here, the discussion will focus on these two points: 
the non-revision of an unfair contract term, and the restitution effect 
when it is declared unfair. 
A. Non-revision of an Unfair Contract Term 
An even more surprising issue that arises from the 
transposition of the UCT Directive by the Spanish legislature is that 
Article 85 of RD 1/2007 allowed Spanish courts to revise unfair 
clauses. However, as reported in a number of ECJ judgments,70 
                                                 
69   S.T.S., May 9, 2013 (R.J., No. 1916/2013) (Spain).   
70   Case C-76/10, Pohotovosť s. r. o. v. Iveta Korčkovská, 2010 E.C.R. I-
11557.  
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revision of UCTs by courts is not permissible under Article 6 of the 
UCT Directive.71 
In 2014, the Spanish legislature amended the TRLGDCU: L 
3/2014, which transposes the 2011 Directive on consumer rights, 
provides in Article 27 that unfair terms are null and void and cannot 
be revised by judges: Article 27 amends  Article 83 of TRLGDCU. So, 
judges are not permitted to revise unfair contract terms because the 
supplier or seller bears the risk of the use of the clause, i.e., the supplier 
or seller cannot benefit from a partial implementation of the agreement 
when the clause is unfair.72 
This subject is currently of great interest because of its effects 
on default interest clauses. Besides what has been discussed regarding 
the application of the statutory limit provided in art. 1108 C.C. in the 
absence of agreement, there is another controversial provision, the DT 
2 1/2013 that appears to permit revision by judges upon finding UCTs. 
DT 2 1/2013, which amends Article 114 LH, grants the court clerk or 
notary the power to authorize the creditor to recalculate interest if the 
clerk or notary finds that the default interest clause exceeds the 
statutory limit in C.C. This rule, the constitutionality of which has been 
questioned,73 seems to permit the revision of a term that is no longer 
                                                 
71   See, e.g., Case C-618/10, Banco Español de Crédito SA v. Joaquín 
Caldéron Camino, 2012 EUR-Lex CELEX Lexis 4274 (June 14, 2012). “Article 6(1) 
of  Directive 93/13 cannot be understood as allowing the national court, in the case 
where it finds that there is an unfair term in a contract concluded between a seller or 
supplier and a consumer, to revise the content of  that term instead of  merely setting 
aside its application to the consumer.” Id. at ¶ 71. In addition, it is for the court to 
ascertain what which national rules are applicable to the dispute and to take the whole 
body of  domestic law into consideration and apply the interpretative methods 
recognized by domestic law, with a view to ensuring that Article 6(1) of  Directive 
93/13 is fully effective and achieves an outcome consistent with the objective 
pursued by it. Id. at ¶ 72.  See also Case C-282/10, Dominguez v. Centre Informatique 
du Centre Ouest Atlantique, 2012 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 4658, ¶ 27 (January 24, 
2012). The answer to the second question is that Article 6(1) of  Directive 93/13 
must be interpreted as precluding legislation of  a Member State, such as Article 83 
of  Legislative Decree 1/2007, which allows a national court, if  it declares void an 
unfair term in a contract concluded between a seller or supplier and a consumer, to 
modify that contract by revising the content of  that term. Banco Español de Crédito 
v. Joaquín Calderón Camino, 2012 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 4274. 
72   See Micklitz & Reich, supra note 68, at 793.  
73   Spain’s Constitutional Court has admitted application 4985-2013, 
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permitted under Article 83 TRLGDCU. If the interest rate in the SCT 
exceeds the statutory maximum, its unfairness can be assessed by the 
court or the debtor can make the corresponding allegation so the 
interest rate is not applied. 
B. Full Restitution 
The unfairness of a term might imply that the debtor has paid 
more than what he should have been paid, so he is entitled to 
restitution in accordance with the regulations of each Member State. 
Restitution is clearly recognized by the ECJ.74 The T.S., however, has 
held that the annulment of floor clauses is not retroactive, so 
restitution is not warranted.75 Yet, Article 1303 C.C.76 provides that the 
nullity involves recovery of benefits and that it acts ex tunc. Besides this 
rather unusual ruling－or “invention”－of non-retroactive annulment, 
the T.S.’s holding in judgement 9 May, 2013 has no legal basis.77 The 
T.S. judgement is presenting four arguments: First, the existence of 
rules that do not involve retroactivity in case of annulment, but it is 
clear that in the case of unfair terms, there is no reason to deviate from 
the general system. Second, the lack of transparency does not entail 
annulment because the clause could be lawful. However, the reasoning 
for this argument is clearly circular because the term is either unfair for 
lack of transparency as held by the T.S., or the term is unfair but does 
not lack transparency, in which case the law permits annulment. Third, 
judges may make a retroactive revision. However, this possibility was 
removed by the amendment of Art. 83 TRLGDCU, which was 
promulgated after the T.S. judgment.78 
Finally, the only argument of any weight, although not a legal 
argument, is the “risk of serious difficulties in the economic public 
                                                 
presented by more than fifty members of  parliament from the Socialist Group, 
against this precept. Also the judge in the Avilés court of  first instance (nº 7) has 
presented a claim of  unconstitutionality.   
74  Nemzeti Fogyasztóvédelmi Hatóság v. Invitel Távközlési Zrt., supra 
note 37; Case C-397/11, Joros v. Aegon, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 2540 (July 
18, 2013).  
75   S.T.S., May 9, 2013 (R.J., No. 1916/2013) (Spain). 
76   C.C. art. 1303 (Spain).  
77   For an impeccable analysis, see Alonso Perez, supra note 41, at 170.  
78   TRLGDCU art. 83 (B.O.E. 2007, 287). 
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order.”79 So, the T.S. permitted revision of the amount of the 
execution, but did not allow recovery of the amounts unduly paid. 
V. EXPLORING THE RESULTS OF UNFAIRNESS CRITERIA IN 
MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS 
The most significant consequence of Aziz is the promulgation 
of Act 1/2013 to reform mortgage foreclosure proceedings. Indeed, 
besides the unfair nature of certain clauses, Aziz holds that the 
mortgage foreclosure process, by not permitting the control of unfair 
terms, is inconsistent with the principle of effectiveness in the UCT 
Directive.80 Aziz also points out that the rules of Member States 
contradict those of the Community if they do not provide for the 
possibility of controlling unfair terms in foreclosure proceedings, or if 
these proceedings cannot be suspended providing interim relief, if the 
unfair nature of these terms is discussed in a declaratory judgment.81 
Although the law regulates the effects of an unfair contract term in 
these proceedings, the legislation on unfair terms remains the same: 
the reforms have led to the redrafting of the Mortgage Act (Article 
129) in those cases in which the foreclosure is made extrajudicially 
before a notary. In these cases, the notary has control of the unfair 
terms and has the authority to suspend the sale of the mortgaged 
property if a claim on the UCT has been filed.82 
For practical purposes, greater importance should be attached 
to the amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure, which are widely 
used by lawyers to identify the effect of suspending foreclosure 
proceedings, although the suspension only delays the loss of the 
mortgagor’s house as he is unable to repay the loan.83 Two 
amendments have been made to the Code of Civil Procedure. First, 
the Code directly foresees an avenue for controlling the terms by the 
                                                 
79   S.T.S., May 9, 2013 (R.J., No. 1916/2013, ¶ 293) (Spain).  
80   See Case C-415/11, Mohamed Aziz v. Catalunyacaixa, 2013 EUR-Lex 
CELEX LEXIS 191 (Mar. 14, 2013) 
81   Id. 
82   See Mortgage Act art. 129 (B.O.E. 1946, 58) (Spain).  
83  Andres Dominguez Luelmo, La STJUE de 14 de Marzo De 2013: 
Dificultades de Interpretación y aplicación por los Tribunales, 5 REVISTA CESCO DE 
DERECHO DE CONSUMO 5 (2013). 
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judge with a pre-hearing process,84 the need for which has been called 
into question.85 The pre-hearing process is resolved via a judicial writ 
in which the decision is made as to whether to proceed with the 
foreclosure as presented given the absence of any unfair terms; or, if 
unfair terms are thought to exist, foreclosure can be denied if the unfair 
term is the basis for the foreclosure or to reach an agreement, but for 
a smaller amount, if the term only affects the amount.86 
Second, a procedural step was introduced to enable the debtor 
to invoke the unfairness of a term, which is a direct consequence of 
Aziz: the possibility of objecting to foreclosure because of the 
existence of an unfair term in the loan agreement.87 These proceedings 
(incidente de oposicion) only permit an allegation of the unfairness of a 
term that either allows the proceedings to be stayed, or for the amount 
due to be modified, while all other remedies must be sought in 
declaratory proceedings.88 If the judge finds the clause to be fair, the 
foreclosure proceedings continue; otherwise, the judge must either 
dismiss the proceedings on grounds that the term forms the basis of 
the foreclosure or continue the proceeding for a smaller amount of 
money.89 The first draft of this incidente de oposición only allows the bank 
to appeal against the writ, which is the subject of the recent judgment 
of the ECJ of 17 July 2014.90 The response of the Spanish legislature, 
in this case, has been nothing short of instantaneous: RD Law 
                                                 
84   L.E. Civ., art. 552.1, 681.1 (Spain).  
85  Alberto Lafuente Torralba, El Control de las Cláusulas Abusivas en la 
Ejecución Hipotecaria: Luces y Sombras de la Regulación Legal, in VIVIENDA Y CRISIS 
ECONÓMICA 232 (Maria Teresa Alonso Perez ed., 2014). 
86   L.E. Civ., supra note 42, art. 561.1.3, 695.3.  
87   According to Carrasco Perera a coherent solution would be to allow 
the judge to arbitrate and then to open contentious proceedings, but not to duplicate 
the routes available for controlling unfairness. See ANGEL FRANCISCO CARRASCO 
PERERA, CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS DE CONSUMO, LA LEY 1/2013, DE 14 DE MAYO, DE 
REFORMA HIPOTECARIA Y LA ARTICULACIÓN PROCESAL DEL CONTROL SOBRE 
CLÁUSULAS ABUSIVAS EN LA EJECUCIÓN HIPOTECARIA (2013).  
88   L.E. Civ. art. 557.1.7, 695.1.4 (Spain). 
89   Id. at art. 695.3. 
90   Case C-169/14, Juan Carlos Sánchez Morcillo and María del Carmen 
Abril García v Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA (July 17, 2014), available at 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?td=ALL&language=en&jur=C,T,F&num=C-
169/14. 
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11/2014, of 5 September, amending Art. 695 Code of Civil Procedure, 
allows both parties the right of appeal.91 
Thus, both in the judge’s assessment of unfairness and the 
incidente de oposicion, the possibility of avoiding the foreclosure process 
by analysing the unfairness of the contract terms so far is discrete. 
Indeed, the appreciation of the early maturity clause is the basis of this 
incidente de oposición, because if the clause is declared invalid, the debt is 
not due and cannot be executed; however, this SCT can hardly be 
regarded as unfair. The unfairness of a unilateral declaration of a debt 
clause suspends foreclosure, because the debt would have no liquidity 
and cannot be executed. Moreover, neither the unfairness of the 
default interest clause nor the “floor clause” permits proceedings to be 
suspended. The unfairness of such clauses only results in modifications 
to the amount due, and in the latter case, involving only very small 
amounts relative to the sum for which foreclosure is executed, as 
occurred in Aziz. 
Moreover, the criteria of unfairness provided by the ECJ can 
be used to determine whether a clause is unfair in declaratory 
proceedings. In addition, Aziz focused on the assumption that, after 
initiating foreclosure proceedings–and without the legal means to 
analyze the fairness–the debtor can initiate declaratory proceedings 
concerning the existence of unfair terms that lack suspensory effect of 
the foreclosure proceedings. The bottom line is that the judge in 
declaratory proceedings could grant interim relief92 –the staying of 
those enforcement proceedings and this possibility was explicitly 
accepted by the ECJ93. However, the Spanish legislature has not 
addressed this issue, so the possibility of a suspensory effect in the 
foreclosure proceeding continues to be of uncertain application given 
the rigidity of the precepts that govern the enforcement process. This 
is unfortunate because declaratory proceedings are a better forum for 
discussing the scope of an unfair term than foreclosure proceedings. 
                                                 
91   Urgent Insolvency Matters (B.O.E. 2014, 217) (Spain).  
92   See Case C-415/11, Mohamed Aziz v. Catalunyacaixa, 2013 EUR-Lex 
CELEX LEXIS 191 (Mar. 14, 2013). 
93   See id. at ¶ 77.  
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CONCLUSION 
The legal developments following Aziz on the control of 
unfair SCTs have been somewhat limited. However, these 
developments highlight the difference between European consumer 
protection law and domestic procedural law with regard to 
enforcement proceedings and have given grounds for challenging the 
legal system and some lessons are to be learned: 
First, in Aziz, a consumer-friendly interpretation has been 
given to the UCT Directive which has led to the development of 
substantive criteria for ascertaining unfairness in three SCT that almost 
every housing mortgage loan has in Spain: the early maturity of the 
loan, the unilateral declaration of the debt and the default interest rate. 
Second, coming from Aziz, various points at which the 
Spanish transposition of the UCT Directive needs to be revised have 
been identified: On the one hand, the non-revision of the unfair clause 
by the judge has been finally stayed by an amending of art. 83 
TRLGDCU, but it still remains in the foreclosure proceedings by the 
means of DT 2 Act 1/2013. That shows how the Spanish legislature 
has not understood the Aziz doctrine. On the other hand, the ECJ opts 
for a full restitution when a clause is deemed unfair, nevertheless that 
has not been the case in the two Spanish T.S. judgements referring to 
a floor clause considered unfair by lack of transparency. 
Third, the possibility of controlling UCTs in mortgage 
foreclosure proceedings has not become a reality. Even if Aziz states 
that a way of controlling fairness should be granted in the foreclosure 
proceedings, it is true that the clauses abovementioned have no deep 
impact on the possibility of staying the foreclosure, and in some cases 
–disproportioned default rate- are only able to low the amount of the 
debt. 
In short, the problem of defaulting on mortgage loan 
repayments is not strictly an issue of controlling UCTs, and consumer 
protection provides no more than indirect tools to stay the mortgage 
foreclosure. Given that many mortgagors find themselves unable to 
make their loan payments—and thus at risk of losing their homes—
shifting attention to UCT legislation has been helpful in seeking a stay 
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on foreclosure proceedings and the ECJ judgements have questioned 
the Spanish procedural law in mortgage foreclosures. Yet, problems 
still exist in areas such as the over-indebtedness of consumers (a 
question that the Spanish legislator has largely ignored); weak Spanish 
legislation protecting consumer rights with regard to financial products 
and the role of the Bank of Spain as regulator of the sector; and 
mortgage foreclosure regulations that provide the banks with many 
facilities of recovery while lenders may fail to clear their debt if the 
value of their home does not cover the total amount owed. Deeper 
research in these three mentioned areas is needed to find a legal 
solution to unpaid housing mortgages as a whole. 
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FROM PAPER TO ELECTRONIC ORDER: 
THE DIGITALIZATION OF THE CHECK 
IN THE USA* 
Benjamin Geva** 
INTRODUCTION 
A check is a paper instrument embodying an unconditional 
order in writing. It is signed by a drawer and addressed to a drawee 
bank with which the drawer typically maintains an account. The check 
instructs the bank1 to make payment on demand to, or to the order of, 
a designated payee, or to the bearer.2 The person to whom a check is 
payable and who is in the possession of the check is its holder.3 A check 
is issued when the drawer delivers it to the first holder,4 who is either 
the payee of a check payable to order or the first bearer of a check 
                                                 
* Reprinted with editorial changes from the Law of Electronic Funds 
Transfers with permission. Copyright 2014 LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved. 
** Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall York University, and Counsel, Torys 
LLP, Toronto, Canada. The article substantially updates and expands on Benjamin 
Geva, Recent International Developments in the Law of Negotiable Instruments and Payment and 
Settlement Systems, 42 TEX. INT’L L.J. 685, 687-99 (2007) and is a sequel to B. Geva, Is 
Death of the Paper Cheque upon Us? The Electronic Presentment and Deposit of Cheques in 
Canada, 30 B.F.L.R. 113 (2014). I am grateful to Joe Wahba of the 2016 graduating 
class of Osgoode Hall Law School for his research assistance. All errors are mine. 
1  “Bank” is broadly defined to include any person “engaged in the 
business of banking.” See U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(4) (2014). Undoubtedly, any institution 
that either takes deposit and/or offers account services falls into this definition. 
Technically, however, the account relationship requirement is not spelled out by 
statute. 
2   U.C.C. §§ 3-104(f), 3-103(a)(8) (2014).  
3   U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(21)(B) (2014). 
4  See U.C.C. § 3-105(a) (2014) (defining “issue” as “the first delivery of an 
instrument by the maker or drawer, whether to a holder or nonholder, for the 
purpose of giving rights on the instrument to any person.”). Issue to a non-holder is 
less common and is outside the scope of the present discussion. 
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payable to bearer. Once issued, a check may circulate from hand to 
hand by negotiation, namely by its delivery from one holder to another. 
In the case of a check payable to order, negotiation consists of delivery 
accompanied by the signature of the holder, called “indorsement.”5 To 
obtain payment, the last holder is to have the check physically 
presented to the drawee bank.6 
Nowadays, there is very little circulation of checks, so 
presentment is usually made by or on behalf of the first holder. 
Regardless, a holder typically will not present the check to the drawee 
bank in person. Rather, the holder is likely to have the check deposited 
with and collected by a depositary bank with which the holder 
maintains an account. The depositary bank will then either present the 
check directly to the drawee bank, or will negotiate it to an intermediary 
bank. There may be one or more negotiations with one or more 
intermediary banks. The last intermediary bank will present the check 
for payment to the drawee. In that process, all banks other than the 
drawee, namely the depositary bank and each intermediary bank, are 
collecting banks, the drawee bank is the payor bank, and the collecting 
bank that presents the check for payment to the drawee bank is the 
presenting bank.7 
The normal life cycle of a check thus entails a series of physical 
deliveries of the piece of paper embodying it. First, the check is 
physically issued by the drawer to the first holder. Second, there may 
be one or more physical negotiations outside the banking system. 
Third, there is the physical delivery of the check by the holder to the 
depositary bank. Fourth, there may be one or more deliveries of the 
check to intermediary bank(s). Fifth, the process concludes with a 
physical presentment of the check to the drawee. Following payment, 
there is possibly a sixth and post-concluding stage in which the 
cancelled check is delivered by the payor bank to the drawer, together 
with the periodic statement containing it. Alternatively, where the 
                                                 
5   U.C.C. §§ 3-201(a), 3-201(b), 3-204 (2014). 
6   This point is implied, though not specifically provided for, in U.C.C. 
§ 3-501(b)(2) (2014), which addresses the exhibition of the check to, and its handling 
by, the drawee. 
7   For applicable definitions, see U.C.C. §§ 4-104, 4-105 (2014). 
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drawee dishonors the check, the check is returned in a reversed 
itinerary. 
Modern law facilitates variations by agreement. On occasion, 
it may further provide for the impact of such variations on third parties 
not privy to agreed variations. First, a check may be given as a source 
of information to be used  
to initiate a one-time electronic fund transfer, often described as an 
“electronic check.” Second, a check may be remotely created. Third, a 
check may be presented for payment electronically. Fourth, a check 
may be negotiated to a collecting bank, whether by its customer the 
holder or another collecting bank, by means of electronic transmission. 
At the same time, a practice of electronic negotiation other than to 
banks has not developed so that no provision for such electronic 
transmission has been made. Finally, there is the possibility that a 
payment order will be issued electronically and will not be embodied 
in a piece of paper at its inception. 
As a source of information, a check may be given to the payee 
with the authority to convert it to an electronic image. A remotely 
created check is drawn by the payee, as an agent of the drawer, on the 
basis of information provided by the drawer to the payee, typically over 
the telephone. This practice is more concerned with the remote 
creation of a paper check rather than with its dispensation and thus is 
not addressed in this article. Both electronic negotiation and 
presentment involve check truncation, namely a procedure in which 
the physical movement of checks is curtailed or eliminated, being 
replaced, in whole or in part, by electronic transmission of 
information.8 Issued and processed electronically, and thus not being 
“written,” an electronic payment order is not an “order” under U.C.C. 
Section 3-103(a)(8). As such it is not a “draft” under Section 3-104(e) 
and thus not a “check” under Section 3-104(f). However, an electronic 
payment is a functional equivalent for a check. Being the logical 
                                                 
8   See, e.g., the definitions listed in COMMITTEE ON PAYMENT AND 
SETTLEMENTS, A GLOSSARY OF TERMS USED IN PAYMENTS AND SETTLMENT 
SYSTEMS (2003). For similar definitions focusing on the conversion of data on a 
paper to an electronic image, see Wells Fargo Bank v. Burrier (In re Burrier), 399 B.R. 
258, 264 (Bankr. D. Co. 2008). 
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conclusion of the check electronification process, this method of 
payment is addressed in this article. 
This article explores the various stages in the check payment in 
which electronic transmission has replaced physical delivery. Part I 
discusses converting the check into an electronic entry at a point of 
sale of goods and services. Part II addresses the electronic presentment 
of a check. Part III deals with the possible conversion of the check 
from paper to electronic, and vice versa, within the interbank check 
collection system. Interbank exchange of check images is the subject 
of Part IV. Part V addresses the electronic order that operates like a 
check but that has never been in a paper format. This article examines 
the applicable provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, U.S. 
federal regulations and legislation, and proposals for reform, as well as 
private-sector norms. Having explored existing norms and proposals, 
the article concludes with a plea for advancing the process of the 
complete electronification of the check and its collection process as 
well as for the establishment of a comprehensive legal scheme to 
govern such matters 
I. THE SO-CALLED “ELECTRONIC CHECK” 
On occasion, a check may not be “issued” with the view of 
giving the payee the rights to enforce payment on it in discharge of the 
underlying obligation.9 Rather, contrary to the usual presumption of 
conditional payment by check,10 a check may be given to the payee 
merely as a source of information to be used to initiate a one-time 
electronic fund transfer from the drawer’s account in payment of the 
obligation. The check is then used as a source document for the 
drawer’s routing number and account number, as well as the check’s 
serial number, and the sum payable. In effect, the check is thus 
converted to a single debit entry, which is then input into the 
Automated Clearing House (ACH) Network. This arrangement is 
                                                 
9   “Issue” is defined as “the first delivery of an instrument by the maker 
or drawer, whether to a holder or nonholder, for the purpose of giving rights on the 
instrument to any person.” U.C.C. Section 3-105(a) (2015). 
10   For an explanation of this presumption, see U.C.C. Section 3-310(b) 
(2015) (“[u]nless otherwise agreed . . . if . . . an uncertified check is taken for an 
obligation, the obligation is suspended . . . until dishonor of the check or until [the 
check] is paid or certified”). 
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particularly common in consumer transactions. Thus, where the check 
is mailed to the payee-merchant, the check is converted to an ARC—
Accounts Receivables Entry. Similarly, where the check is given to the 
payee-merchant in a face-to-face transaction, the check is converted to 
a Point-of-Purchase (POP) Entry.11 Once converted, the check itself is 
voided; practically speaking in a face-to-face transaction the voided 
check is typically returned to the consumer-drawer.12 
The electronic image created by the merchant, usually at the 
point-of-sale, is often colloquially referred to as an “electronic check.” 
However, as will be further discussed below, the term may have been 
“hijacked” by the Federal Reserve Board to denote the digital image of 
a check. In any event, in the present context, “electronic check” is a 
misnomer; rather, what is generated, is an ACH debit entry. Payment 
is thus not governed by U.C.C. Articles three and four, but instead is 
covered by Regulation E, issued by the Federal Reserve Board, which 
governs consumer electronic fund transfers.13 Regulation E requires 
the merchant to “provide a notice that the transaction will or may be 
processed as an EFT14 and obtain a consumer’s authorization for each 
transfer.”15 
                                                 
11   Related entries are TEL and WEB, respectively, ACH entries made on 
the basis of payment instructions made by phone-calls and over the Internet rather 
than at a physical point of sale as the POP entry. 
12   See, e.g., NACHA OPERATING RULES AND GUIDELINES AND ACH 
OPERATING RULES, A COMPLETE GUIDE TO THE RULES GOVERNING THE ACH 
NETWORK, Sections 3.7 and 3.8 (2014) (providing a brief explanation of the “ACH 
Primer” preceding National Automated Clearing House Association (NACHA) 
Operating Rules) [hereinafter NACHA OPERATING GUIDELINES].  
13   Electronic Fund Transfers (Regulation E), 12 C.F.R. § 205(c) (2015) 
(Regulation E does not cover “[a]ny transfer of funds originated by check.”). The 
theory of the check conversion is, however, that the transfer is initiated by the 
converted debit entry, rather than the check that has been used as a mere source of 
information. 
14   EFT stands for Electronic Fund Transfer. 
15   12 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(2). See also generally 12 C.F.R. § 205 (Briefly stated, 
the underlying theory of the requirement is that conversion may change the 
consumer’s position, e.g., insofar as payment is likely to be speedier and the cancelled 
check will not prove payment.). 
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II. ELECTRONIC CHECK PRESENTMENT 
Electronic presentment is provided for by U.C.C. Section 4-
110. Thereunder, the presentment of a check may be made pursuant 
to an interbank agreement for presentment. An “agreement for 
electronic presentment” can be in the form of an agreement, clearing-
house rule, or Federal Reserve regulation or operating circular.16 The 
agreement is to provide “that presentment . . . may be made by the 
transmission of an image of [a check] or information describing [it] . . . 
rather than delivery of the [check] itself.” The transmission of the 
image or information constitutes a “presentment notice”; its receipt is 
the actual presentment. Other elements that may be covered by the 
agreement for electronic presentment are “procedures governing 
retention . . . payment, dishonor and other matters.” Arguably, return 
procedures fall within the scope of the agreement. 
An interbank voluntary agreement may be either bilateral or 
multilateral.17 In any event, per the language quoted above, an 
“agreement for electronic presentment” under U.C.C. Section 4-110 
may not be entirely consensual. This is, however, consistent with the 
general principle under which “Federal Reserve regulations and 
operating circulars, clearing-house rules, and the like have the effect of 
                                                 
16   See, e.g., Collection of Checks and Other Items by Federal Reserve 
Banks and Funds Transfers Through Fedwire (Regulation J), 12 C.F.R. § 210 (2015) 
(defining “item” in Section 210.2(i) to include “electronic item,” such as an electronic 
image of a check or any other paper item). See also FEDERAL RESERVE FINANCIAL 
SERVICES FEDERAL RESERVE BANKS, OPERATING CIRCULAR NO. 3: COLLECTION 
OF CASH ITEMS AND RETURNED CHECKS (2012) (electronic access to Reserve Bank’s 
Services is governed by Section 5 and Appendices E (MICR presentment services), 
E1 (truncation service), E2 (MICR presentment plus service), and E3 basic (MICR 
presentment service)). 
17   One such multilateral agreement is under the rules of the check 
truncation program of NACHA for electronic images of truncated checks input to 
the ACH Network. See NACHA OPERATING GUIDELINES, supra note 12, at § 1(2)(c) 
(check truncated items input to the ACH Network are TRC/TRX entries referred to 
as a category of Payment Applications which are governed by Art. 10 of the NACHA 
Operating Rules). See also NACHA OPERATING GUIDELINES, supra note 12, at ACH 
Primer § C(3). For bulk electronic payments processed through the ACH Network 
and for NACHA, as well as for NACHA Operating Rules and Guidelines, see Section 
5 infra. 
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agreements . . . whether or not specifically assented to by all parties 
interested in items handled.”18 
III. THE “SUBSTITUTE CHECK” 
Electronic negotiation to a collecting bank is the most 
elaborate statutory and regulatory scheme. The scheme is governed by 
the Check Clearing for the 21st Century Act (“Check 21 Act”)19 and 
implemented by Regulation CC subpart D.20 In essence, the Check 21 
Act authorizes a collecting bank to create a substitute paper check21 for 
further negotiation or presentment. Having agreed to receive a check 
in an electronic form, a collecting bank that receives the electronic 
check image or information is authorized under the Check 21 Act to 
create a substitute check. Upon compliance with specified 
requirements, the substitute check becomes “the legal equivalent of the 
original check for all purposes.”22 The Check 21 Act further includes 
warranty and indemnity provisions, as well as expedited re-credit 
procedures, designed to protect substitute check recipients.23 
In practice, the creation of a substitute check by a collecting 
bank is predicated upon the existence of two preconditions. First, the 
creating bank must receive a transmission of an image of the original 
check, instead of the check itself. The sender of that transmission 
could be a customer, the holder of the check, in which case the creating 
bank is the depositary bank. Alternatively, the sender of that 
transmission could be a collecting bank, in which case the creating 
bank is an intermediary bank. Second, the bank to receive the 
                                                 
18   U.C.C. § 4-103(b) (2015). 
19   12 U.S.C. §§ 5001 et seq. (2003). 
20   Availability of Funds and Collection of Checks (Regulation CC), 12 
C.F.R. § 229 (2015). 
21   See 12 U.S.C. § 5001(b)(1) (where an explicit purpose of the Check 21 
Act was “[t]o facilitate check truncation by authorizing substitute checks.”) 
22   12 C.F.R. § 229.51(a). 
23   For a comprehensive overview, though written prior to the 
promulgation of the final text of 12 C.F.R. § 229.51, see PAUL S. TURNER, ANALYSIS 
OF THE CHECK CLEARING FOR THE 21ST CENTURY ACT (“CHECK 21”) (2004). For 
more on the background of the Check 21 Act, see Availability of Funds and 
Collection of Checks, 12 C.F.R. § 229, 69 Fed. Reg. 1470 (July 26, 2004) (to be 
codified at 12 C.F.R. § 229), and Availability of Funds and Collection of Checks, 69 
Fed. Reg. 47290 (Oct. 22, 2004) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 229). 
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substitute check, being either an intermediary bank or the drawee bank, 
has not agreed to accept electronic transmission of an image, which 
would be the case for a small bank that does not have the required 
processing equipment. 
Stated otherwise, the Check 21 Act does not require banks to 
accept electronic transmissions of check information or check images. 
Rather, it authorizes a collecting bank that agrees to accept the 
electronic transmission, whether from its customer or a prior collecting 
bank, to issue a substitute check to be processed onward as if it were 
the original check. A bank, either a subsequent collecting/intermediary 
bank or the drawee bank, must accept the substitute check as the 
equivalent of the original check. By the same token, a customer who 
has received original checks with the periodic statement showing 
account activity cannot object to receiving the substitute check in lieu 
of original checks that have been so truncated in the collection 
process.24 
By truncating the paper check, the Check 21 Act eliminates 
long-distance transport of the physical checks, though the act does not 
eliminate or bypass intra-city or local check transportation. For 
example, suppose Drawer has a bank account with Drawee/Payor 
Bank in New York. Drawer sends a check drawn on that account to 
Payee in California who in turn deposits the check in their account 
with a California Depositary Bank (Depository Bank). Assume the 
Depositary Bank is a large institution that has equipment necessary for 
the transmission of the check’s image. At the same time, the Payor 
Bank is a small institution that lacks the processing equipment capable 
of receiving the electronic transmission of a check. There is nothing 
within the U.C.C, the Check 21 Act, or anywhere else, to force Payor 
Bank to accept electronic transmission; hence, electronic presentment 
is precluded for this transaction. Rather, Depositary Bank may transmit 
the image of the check to an Intermediary Bank in New York, which 
is capable of accepting such transmissions.25 In effect, this is an 
                                                 
24   See 12 U.S.C. § 5003(a) (an agreement of the recipient is dispensed with 
for a substitute check deposited, presented, sent for collection, or returned, “so long 
as a bank has made the warranties in section 5 with respect to such substitute check.”) 
25   Interbank settlement between California Depositary Bank and New 
York Intermediary Bank may take various forms. For example, it may be either 
bilateral (on a correspondent account one bank has with the other), or part of 
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electronic negotiation of the check. Having agreed to accept the 
electronic transmission, the New York Intermediary Bank is now 
required under the Check 21 Act to create a paper substitute check. 
The Act further requires Payor Bank to accept the presentment of the 
substitute check as if it were the original check. Finally, any 
requirement, either by statute or agreement, to provide the canceled 
check, as under the contract between Drawer and Payor Bank, is to be 
satisfied under the Check 21 Act by providing the substitute check. In 
this hypothetical example, coast-to-coast physical transportation was 
eliminated; only local delivery of the substitute check could not be 
avoided. 
A substitute check is a paper production of the original check 
that contains the image of the front and back of the original check. It 
bears a MICR26 line containing the same information whichs appears 
on the MICR line of the original check, and conforms, particularly in 
paper stock and dimension, to generally applicable standards for 
substitute checks. As a result, the check is suitable for automated 
processing in the same manner as the original check.27 Moreover, a 
substitute check, to be the legal equivalent of the original, must 
“accurately represent . . . all of the information on the front and back 
of the original check as of the time the original check was truncated” 
and bear the legend “This is a legal copy of your check. You can use it 
the same way you would use the original check.”28 
As in the hypothetical above, a substitute check is typically 
created by a collecting intermediary bank. A substitute check, however, 
can also be created by the depositary bank when it agrees to receive 
the deposit of the check from the payee/holder by means of electronic 
                                                 
multilateral clearing house settlement. If the check is collected through the Reserve 
Banks, settlement will take place on the books of the Reserve Banks. The Check 21 
Act does not deal with interbank settlement arrangements. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 5001-
5018. 
26   MICR stands for Magnetic Ink Character Recognition Code (MICR 
Code), which is a character-recognition technology facilitating the automated 
processing of checks. The code typically includes the document-type indicator, bank 
code, bank account number, cheque number, cheque amount, and a control 
indicator. The technology allows MICR readers to scan and read the information 
directly into a data-collection device. 
27   12 U.S.C. § 500(16); 12 C.F.R. § 229.2. 
28   12 U.S.C. § 5003(b)(2); 12 C.F.R. § 229.51(a). 
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transmission. Furthermore, a substitute check may be created even by 
the payee/holder. For example, substitute check creation may be 
desirable for a large organization that receives checks in various 
locations, but would rather deposit them in one place. The 
organization may then arrange for the electronic transmission of check 
images to one place where substitute checks will be created. 
Alternatively, even an individual may transmit a check image to a 
depositary bank using a mobile device.  In general, a check may be 
transformed from electronic form to substitute checks form several 
times in the course of the collection and return process. 
In connection with a substitute check, the Check 21 Act 
provides for warranties and an indemnity. The warranties ensure the 
substitute check meets the requirements for legal equivalence and also 
protects against double payment on the original check, or any other 
representation of the check.29 The indemnity is “to the extent of any 
loss incurred . . . due to the receipt of a substitute check instead of the 
original check.”30 Other than for costs, expenses, and reasonable 
attorney’s fees, amount to be indemnified is the extent of loss 
proximately caused by the breach of warranty.31 In the absence of a 
breach of a warranty, amount of indemnity is limited to the amount of 
the substitute check.32 Either way, amount of loss to be indemnified is 
reduced by amount representing loss resulting “from the negligence or 
failure to act in good faith on the part of an indemnified party.”33 An 
example of loss incurred notwithstanding the lack of any breach of 
warranty occurs where forgery, proof of which would have allowed a 
purported drawer to avoid liability, cannot be proved on the substitute 
check, but allegedly could have been proved on the original. Thus, on 
occasion, an effective method to determine the authenticity of a 
manual signature could be by measuring the pen pressure input by the 
signer.34 This feature does not carry over to the copy of the check and 
certainly not to a substitute check created from the image of the check. 
                                                 
29   12 U.S.C. § 5004 (2003); 12 C.F.R. § 229.52(a). 
30   12 U.S.C. § 5005(a).  
31   12 U.S.C. § 5005(b)(1).  
32   12 U.S.C. § 5005(b)(2).  
33   12 U.S.C. § 5005(c) (2003); see also 12 C.F.R. § 229.53 (2015). 
34   See e.g., PAUL S. TURNER, supra note 23, at 26.  
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Substitute check warranties are given by each bank “that 
transfers, presents, or returns a substitute check and receives 
consideration for the check.”35  A “reconverting bank” is not listed. 
Being the bank that creates the substitute check or, where the 
substitute check is created by the depositor, the first bank that transfers 
or presents the substitute check, this bank can hardly be described as 
a bank that transfers a substitute check, unless “transfer” is to include 
the first delivery or issue.  This indeed appears to be the view of the 
Federal Reserve. 
In turn, indemnity liability is incurred by “[a] reconverting bank 
and each bank that subsequently transfers, presents, or returns a 
substitute check in any electronic or paper form, and receives  
consideration for such transfer, presentment, or return.”36  
Accordingly, the reconverting bank is listed as one to become liable to 
indemnify for loss caused by the breach of warranty. 
As indicated, a substitute check need not necessarily be created 
by a bank; rather it may be created by a person other than a bank, 
typically a large organization-payee. In such a cases, under the Check 
21 Act, warranties and indemnity liability originate from not from 
either payee or the creator of the substitute check, but rather from the 
first bank that transfers or presents such substitute check; such a bank, 
being the depositary bank, is then considered to be the “reconverting 
bank” in the collection process. 
Both substitute check warranties and the indemnity are stated 
to run to the benefit of the transferee, any subsequent collecting or 
returning bank, the depositary bank, the drawee, the drawer, the payee, 
the depositor, and any endorser.37 Since a check can be transformed 
from electronic form to substitute check form several times in the 
course of the collection and return process, it is possible that there 
could be multiple substitute checks, and thus multiple reconverting 
banks, with respect to the same payment transaction. A subsequent 
participant may thus benefit from warranties and indemnity of more 
than one reconverting bank. As well, a collecting bank receiving an 
electronic representation of a substitute (rather than original) check 
                                                 
35   12 U.S.C. § 5004.  
36   12 U.S.C. § 5004-5005; see also 12 C.F.R. §§ 229.52, 229.53. 
37   12 U.S.C. §§ 5004-5005. 
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will both receive and pass on the reconverting bank’s Check 21 Act 
warranty and indemnity protections. 
The Check 21 Act further contains provisions covering 
expedited re-credit for consumers and banks. First, Section seven 
permits a consumer to challenge a debit for a substitute check either 
where the check was not properly charged to the consumer’s account 
or where the consumer has a warranty claim.38 In each case, the 
consumer must have suffered a resulting loss, and the production of 
the original check or a better copy of it is necessary to determine the 
validity of the challenge or claim. Second, Section eight governs a claim 
by a bank that is obligated to provide an expedited re-credit to the 
consumer or that has otherwise suffered loss in circumstances where 
“production of the original check . . . or a better copy of [it] is 
necessary to determine the validity of the charge to the customer 
account or any warranty claim connected with such substitute check.”39 
The claim is a claim for indemnity from another bank that incurred the 
indemnity liability to the claimant bank under Section eight.40 
The Check 21 Act allocates losses only among banks that 
handle a substitute check. However, it is possible that the problem 
giving rise to liability under the Check 21 Act was created prior to the 
creation of a substitute check. For example, electronic information 
derived from the check may have consisted of a poor image of the 
original check. This would preclude the reconverting bank from 
creating a legally equivalent check and thus cause it to be in breach of 
a substitute check warranty. Otherwise, a substitute check created by 
the payee and deposited at the depositary bank may have been deficient 
in one way or another. At the same time, neither warranties nor 
indemnity liabilities are provided in the Check 21 Act in connection 
with the electronic transmission of check image or information. 
Similarly, no warranties or indemnity liability are fastened on a payee 
who creates a substitute check. Responsibilities of transmitters of 
electronic information and depositors of substitute checks are thus to 
be provided by their respective contracts with the immediate recipients 
of electronic information and substitute checks. This is consistent with 
                                                 
38   12 U.S.C. § 5006.  
39   12 U.S.C. § 5007(a)(1)(D).  
40   See 12 C.F.R. §§ 229.54-.55 (corresponding to and implementing 12 
U.S.C. §§ 5006-5007). 
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the overall position under the Check 21 Act, under which no bank is 
required to receive electronic transmission of check data and no 
depositary bank is required to accept the deposit of substitute checks. 
Having nevertheless agreed to accept such information or substitute 
checks, it is up to the collecting banks to execute their contractual 
obligations. 
Contract, however, is not the exclusive source of regulating 
responsibilities outside the Check 21 Act. Under Regulation J, a sender 
of an electronic item derived directly from the original check makes 
two sets of warranties for the electronic item. First, the sender makes 
transfer warranties as if the item was a paper check governed by the 
U.C.C. Second, the sender makes warranties as if the item were a 
substitute check governed by the Check 21 Act.41 For checks handled 
by Reserve Banks governed by Regulation J, an end-to-end combined 
U.C.C and Check 21 liability structure is thus provided.42 
IV. INTERBANK EXCHANGE OF CHECK IMAGES 
The Check 21 Act43 does not provide rules to govern image 
exchange, inter-bank electronic negotiation, or electronic presentment 
or return. Rather, the Check 21 Act requires a collecting bank that 
agrees to accept the electronic transmission, whether from its customer 
or a prior collecting bank, to issue a substitute check to be processed 
onward as if it were the original check. 
A bank’s authority to accept an electronic check transaction 
derives from the U.C.C. As indicated, under U.C.C Section 4-110 (b), 
“[p]resentment of an item pursuant to an agreement for presentment 
is made when the presentment notice is received.” Under U.C.C 
Section 4-110(a), “Agreement for electronic presentment”  is defined 
to mean  “an agreement, clearing-house rule, or Federal Reserve 
regulation or operating circular, providing that presentment of an item 
may be made by transmission of an image of an item or information 
describing the item (“presentment notice”).” While this is limited to 
                                                 
41   See Collection of Checks and Other Items by Federal Reserve Banks 
and Fund Transfers Through Fedwire, 12 C.F.R. §§ 210.2, 210.6, 210.12 (2015). 
42   For background see 12 C.F.R. 210 (2015). 
43   12 U.S.C. § 5001 et seq. 
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the electronic presentment of checks, U.C.C Section 4-103(a) is 
broader. Thereunder, in general and subject to limitations relating to 
disclaimer clauses, “[t]he effect of the provisions of . . . Article [4] may 
be varied by agreement.” While such agreements bind only those who 
are parties to them, under U.C.C. Section 4-103(b), “Federal Reserve 
regulations and operating circulars, clearing-house rules, and the like 
have the effect of agreements under subsection (a), whether or not 
specifically assented to by all parties interested in items handled.” 
“Clearing house” is defined in Section 4-104(a)(4) as “an association 
of banks or other payors regularly clearing items.” Accordingly, 
bilateral and multilateral agreements, clearing house rules, and Federal 
Reserve regulations and operating circulars may govern the exchange, 
namely the interbank negotiation presentment and return of check 
images or information relating to them, as substitutes to physical 
delivery. 
In practice, there are two principal sets of image exchange 
rules. Essentially, both endeavor to equate the position of check 
images to that of the checks themselves under existing legislation and 
other sources of law. In fact, they extend the legal framework of the 
Check 21 Act44 to cover image exchanges. The first set of image 
exchange rules is Subpart A of Regulation J governing interbank 
exchange through Federal Reserve Banks.45 Further implemented by 
Operating Circular No. 3, it specifically deals with the collection of 
checks and other items by Federal Reserve Banks. Thereunder, an 
“item” is broadly defined to cover an electronic image of a paper 
check.46 The second is Electronic Check Clearinghouse Organization 
(ECCHO) Operating Rules. 
ECCHO47 is “a national not-for-profit ‘rule-making 
organization’ owned entirely by its member banks.”48 As “an 
                                                 
44   12 U.S.C. §§ 5001 et seq. (2003). 
45   12 C.F.R. § 210. 
46   12 C.F.R. § 210.2(i)(1)(ii). 
47   See ELECTRONIC CHECK CLEARING HOUSE ORGANIZATION, RULES 
SUMMARY (2012); see also Membership Overview, ECCHO, 
http://www.eccho.org/membership (last visited Oct. 18, 2015); see also VIVECA Y. 
WARE, CHECK IMAGE EXCHANGE: COVERING LEGAL BASES (2008).  
48   Alvin C. Harrell, Electronic Checks, 55 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 283 
(2001). 
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association of banks or other payors regularly clearing items,” ECCHO 
is a clearing house under U.C.C Section 4-104(a)(4). This is so even 
though ECCHO does not process payments. Rather, ECCHO 
develops rules governing electronic exchanges of check images. Such 
rules qualify as “clearing-house rules” under U.C.C Section 4-103(b), 
which govern bilateral and multilateral exchanges of member banks 
that choose to adhere to them. Per that provision, “all parties 
interested in [the checks]” are bound by such rules governing their 
exchange.49 
ECCHO was established in 1990. It is common knowledge 
that the primary drive behind its establishment was  to address the 
increased risk resulting from the introduction of tight funds availability 
schedules for checks under Regulation CC.50 The use of electronics 
expedited both the forward presentment and return processes so as to 
allow banks to meet the statutory tight schedules. 
ECCHO has four membership classes: Full Members, Affiliate 
Members, Participating Members, and Sponsored Members. The 
different classes reflect variations in Members’ roles in the corporate 
governance of the organization. A Member must establish the 
technological and communication methods for exchanging electronic 
check transactions with another Member. 
ECCHO Rules apply to the interbank exchange, by negotiation 
or presentment, of check images. ECCHO Rules do not, however, 
apply to the substitute checks that reproduce check images. Substitute 
checks, and to some extent, images of substitute checks, are governed 
by Check 21 Act51 and provisions of Regulation CC52 implementing it. 
ECCHO Rules govern only electronic check transactions between two 
Members. A Member is not required, by virtue of its membership, to 
send and receive electronic check transactions with another Member. 
Member agreements may designate a particular electronic 
communication switch or a check image archive to exchange electronic 
check images and are outside the ECCHO framework. While 
                                                 
49   U.C.C. § 4-103(b) (2015). 
50   Availability of Funds and Collection of Checks (Regulation CC), 12 
C.F.R. § 229 (2015). 
51   12 U.S.C. §§ 5001 et seq. (2003). 
52   12 C.F.R. § 229. 
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supporting a number of processes for check image exchange, ECCHO 
Rules do not establish the rules for accessing or using private 
networks/archives. Members may thus exchange electronic check 
transactions in whatever way they choose. On occasion, two networks 
may agree to establish a “bridge” or link to facilitate an exchange 
between sending and receiving Members each using a separate 
network. 
A Member which agreed with another Member to exchange 
electronic check transactions under ECCHO Rules is bound to comply 
with ECCHO Rules. These Rules do not constitute customer 
agreements, but they bind customers by virtue of U.C.C Section 4-
103(b). 
ECCHO Rules provide for the legal framework for both 
forward check image presentment and return of a check image. In a 
forward check image presentment, both the Electronic Image and the 
related MICR line information are sent53 or made available to the 
receiving Member by an applicable deadline.  The check itself is not 
sent to the receiving Member. Under ECCHO Rules,  
the Electronic Image is an “item” as well as “check” under the U.C.C 
and Regulation CC.54 ECCHO Rules also provide for the time 
presentment is actually made and further address diverse matters such 
as indorsements and storage and retrieval of the original check.55 To 
protect the receiving Member in each electronic check transaction, 
ECCHO Rules provide for indemnifications and warranties, some of 
which are in addition to those provided under the U.C.C and 
Regulation CC.56 Particularly, these warranties relate to the compliance 
with ECCHO Rules as well as the accuracy and quality of the 
Electronic Image. 
An important warranty given by a sending bank is a warranty 
against double payment. This warranty is originated by the first bank 
                                                 
53   For transmission of an electronic image of a check via wire 
communication, albeit to a Federal Reserve Bank, see, e.g., United States v. Jinian, 712 
F.3d 1255, 1259 (9th Cir. 2013). 
54   12 C.F.R. § 229. 
55    ELECTRONIC CHECK CLEARING HOUSE ORGANIZATION, 
OPERATING RULES AND COMMENTARY (2014). 
56   Id. 
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that transferred an image. A bank may mistakenly send the same image 
more than once. Where the first image is created by the depositor, a 
few alternative scenarios may develop as the result of either error or 
fraud. The holder may send an image of the check for deposit more 
than once, and may not send it to the same bank. Alternatively the 
holder may send the image of the check for deposit to a bank and then 
negotiate the paper check to a subsequent holder. Practically, the latter 
may be a check cashing service, or even another depositary bank. The 
chance is that any subsequent holder, including a depositary bank 
which took either the paper check or an electronic image of it, will be 
a holder in due course.57 
The warranty given by the bank that originated the image is 
designed to protect the payor bank in all such scenarios. Thus, a payor 
bank that paid twice may not be able to debit the drawer-customer’s 
account more than once and will recover on the aforesaid warranty. 
The Paying Bank is only required to establish the existence of a double 
payment for the same item and that the Paying Bank incurred a loss as 
a result. ECCHO Rules do not provide for a warranty or any other 
responsibility on a depositor who remotely deposited the check by 
capturing its image and sending it to the depositary bank. It is up to 
the latter to provide for a recourse against the capturing depositor in 
its customer agreement. 
The application of the warranty against double payment in the 
context of a holder in due course is consistent with and furthers the 
general underlying policy as expressed in the warranty provisions of 
the Check 21 Act,58 Regulation CC59 provisions applicable to substitute 
checks, and the ECCHO Rules. This policy aims at protecting the 
payor bank and drawer customer from losses associated with double 
payment of a check image or substitute check. Moreover, where the 
first image was created by the depositor, it is appropriate for the 
depositary bank to bear risk of loss from any resulting double payment. 
This is so because the bank that transferred the first check image 
introduced the risk of double payment into the system by allowing its 
customer to engage in remote deposit capture. 
                                                 
57   U.C.C. §§ 3-302, 4-211. 
58   12 U.S.C. §§ 5001 et seq. (2003).  
59   12 C.F.R. § 229. 
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Under a proposal of the Board from 2013,60 and unless 
otherwise agreed by the sending and receiving banks,61 electronic 
images of checks and electronic information related to checks that 
banks send and receive by agreement would be subject to Subpart C 
of Regulation CC as if they were paper checks. Under the earlier 
version of the Proposal from 2011, the object of each such electronic 
transmission was called “electronic collection item” or, in the case of 
returning it dishonored, “electronic return.” The 2013 Proposal 
preferred to rename them “electronic check” and “electronic return 
check,” respectively. 62  In departure from the 2011 version, under the 
2013 Proposal, electronic checks and electronic returned checks could 
consist of either check electronic image or check electronic 
information, and not necessarily both.63 
Since under proposed Section 229.30(a)64 electronic checks 
and electronic returned checks are subject to the provisions of subpart 
C as if they are checks, a bank that handles them gives all checks 
warranties and indemnities.65 Proposed §229.34(a) will provide for 
additional “Check-21-like warranties”66 specifically given with respect 
to electronic checks and electronic returns.  Under proposed 
§229.34(a)(1), each bank that transfers or presents an electronic check 
                                                 
60   Availability of Funds and Collection of Checks, 79 Fed. Reg. 6673-
6737 (Feb. 4, 2014) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. 229) [hereinafter FRS Availability 
Proposal]. 
61   In 12 C.F.R. § 229.37(a), the FRS Availability Proposal would permit a 
sending and receiving bank by agreement to vary the warranties the sending bank 
makes to the receiving bank for electronic checks and electronic returned checks. 
Such an agreement could provide, for example, that the bank transferring the 
electronic check does not warrant that the electronic image or information are 
sufficient to create a substitute check. The agreement would not, however, vary the 
effect of the warranties with respect to banks and persons not bound by the 
agreement. Id. at 6684. 
62   Availability of Funds and Collection of Checks, 76 Fed. Reg. 16862 
(Mar. 25, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 279). 
63   See FRS Availability Proposal, supra note 60.  
64   Id.  
65 See Availability of Funds and Collection of Checks (Regulation CC), 12 
C.F.R. §229.34(d)-(f) (2015) (warranties relating to (i) settlement amount, encoding, 
and offset; (ii) returned checks; and (iii) notice of nonpayment). 
66   See FRS Availability Proposal, supra note 60 at 6683.  
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or electronic returned check and receives a settlement or other 
consideration for it warrants that: 
(i) The electronic image accurately represents all 
of the information on the front and back of the 
original check as of the time that the original 
check was truncated and the electronic 
information contains an accurate record of all 
MICR line information required for a 
substitute check . . .  and the amount of the 
check, and 
(ii) No person will receive a transfer, presentment, 
or return of, or otherwise be charged for an 
electronic check or electronic returned check, 
the original check, a substitute check, or a 
paper or electronic representation of a 
substitute check such that the person will be 
asked to make payment based on a check it has 
already paid.67 
This is a double warranty for (i) the accuracy and completeness 
of the electronic record, and (ii) double payment of the check. Under 
paragraph 2, the beneficiary of the double warranty, is: 
(i) In the case of transfers for collection or 
presentment, the transferee bank, any 
collecting bank, the paying bank, and the 
drawer; and 
(ii) In the case of transfers for return, the 
transferee returning bank, any subsequent 
returning bank, the depositary bank, and the 
owner.68 
                                                 
67   See id. at § 229.34(a)(1). 
68   See id. (Board requested comment on whether the drawer under sub-
paragraph (i) or owner under sub-paragraph (ii) should be required to make a claim 
against his or her bank before making a breach of warranty claim against a prior 
collecting bank.).  
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Under proposed §229.34(g), an additional indemnity is given 
in the case of a remote deposit capture, namely where an electronic 
check is created by the depositor. This indemnity inures to the benefit 
of a depositary bank to which the depositor, having deposited the 
electronic check, deposited the original paper check with another 
depositary bank. In such a case, an indemnity is given by a depositary 
bank which “(i) [i]s a truncating bank under § 229.2(eee)(2) because it 
accepts deposit of an electronic check related to an original check; (ii) 
[d]oes not receive the original check; (iii) [r]eceives settlement or other 
consideration for an electronic check or substitute check related to the 
original check; and (iv) [d]oes not receive a return of the check 
unpaid.”69 Such a depositary bank shall indemnify a depositary bank 
that accepts the original check for deposit for losses incurred by that 
depositary bank if the loss is due to the check having already been paid. 
The indemnity would allow a depositary bank that accepted a 
deposit of an original (paper) check to recover directly from a bank 
that permitted its customer to deposit the check through remote 
deposit capture. 
Under proposed §229.34(i)(1), the indemnity amount shall not 
exceed the sum of— 
(i) The amount of the loss of the indemnified 
bank, up to the amount of the settlement or 
other consideration received by the 
indemnifying bank; and 
(ii) Interest and expenses of the indemnified bank 
(including costs and reasonable attorney’s fees 
and other expenses of representation).70 
However, under proposed §229.34(i)(2)(i), and without 
reducing “the rights of a person under the UCC or other applicable 
provision of state or federal law,”71 if such loss 
                                                 
69   See id. 
70   See id.  
71   See id. at §229.34(i)(2)(ii). 
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results in whole or in part from the indemnified bank’s 
negligence or failure to act in good faith, then the 
indemnity amount . . . shall be reduced in proportion 
to the amount of negligence or bad faith attributable to 
the indemnified bank.72 
In its Commentary to the Proposal, the Board rationalized the 
allocation of the double deposit risk to the truncating bank as follows: 
[T]he depositary bank that introduced the risk of 
multiple deposits of the same check by offering a 
remote deposit capture service should bear the losses 
associated with multiple deposits of a check. A 
depositary bank that receives the benefit of permitting 
its customers to use remote deposit capture should also 
internalize any risk or cost to other banks that may 
result from remote deposit capture. One such risk is 
that the customer will deposit the original check at 
another bank. That bank that accepted the check by 
remote deposit capture is in a better position than any 
other bank to minimize those costs and risks through 
the terms of its contract with its customer.73 
At the same time, the Board requested comments on 
unintended consequences that might result from the indemnity as well 
as “on whether the depositary bank that accepts the original check for 
deposit would be able to identify the depositary banks against which it 
may bring a claim for indemnity . . . and whether there are other more 
efficient or practical remedies to address the underlying problem.”74 
However, no remedy is provided in the case of multiple electronic 
checks created by a depositor related from the same paper check. 
It should be noted that, under the U.C.C., a bank that receives 
an electronic deposit of a check may arguably be able to control the 
risks of multiple deposits and negotiation of the paper check to a 
                                                 
72   Id. 
73   Id. at 6685. 
74   Id.  
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holder in due course by having the negotiability of the check 
curtailed.75 Thus, U.C.C Section 3-104(d) effectively provides76 that: 
a check is [a negotiable instrument even] if, at the time 
it is issued. . ., it contains a conspicuous statement, 
however expressed, to the effect that the promise or 
order is not negotiable or is not an instrument 
governed by this Article.77 
This language does not appear to preclude a requirement made 
by a bank receiving an electronic deposit to have the check marked as 
“non-negotiable” or some other language to that effect at the time of 
the deposit (as opposed to the time of its issue). Such marking may 
even preclude a competing depositary bank from claiming a holder in 
due course status to the extent that U.C.C Section 4-205 protects a 
depositary bank claiming a holder in due course status only against the 
lack of indorsement but not otherwise.78 
A more limited protection appears to be offered under U.C.C 
Section 4-201(b), providing that once an item has been indorsed with 
words such as “pay any bank,” “only a bank may acquire the rights of 
                                                 
75   For the holder in due course and the holder in due course power to 
defeat competing claims to the instrument, see U.C.C. §§ 3-302, 305, 306 (2015). 
76   The provision reads in full as follows: “A promise or order other than 
a check is not [a negotiable instrument] if, at the time it is issued or first comes into 
possession of a holder, it contains a conspicuous statement, however expressed, to 
the effect that the promise or order is not negotiable or is not an instrument governed 
by this Article.”  
77   U.C.C. § 3-104 (2015).  
78   See U.C.C. § 4-205 (2015) (stating that “[i]f a customer delivers an item 
to a depositary bank for collection: (1) the depositary bank becomes a holder of the 
item at the time it receives the item for collection if the customer at the time of 
delivery was a holder of the item, whether or not the customer indorses the item, 
and, if the bank satisfies the other requirements of U.C.C. § 3-302 (2015), it is a 
holder in due course.”); see also U.C.C Section 4-104(a)(9) (2015) (where “item” is 
defined as “[a negotiable] instrument or a promise or order to pay money handled 
by a bank for collection or payment”.).  While an item need not necessarily be 
“negotiable,” under U.C.C § 3-302, a holder in due course may exist only in 
connection with a negotiable instrument.  
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a holder”79 so as to be able to defeat an adverse claim by a non-bank, 
albeit not necessarily by a competing depositary bank. However, along 
these lines, protection expands and becomes maximal under U.C.C 
Section 3-206(c) covering a check bearing: 
an indorsement (i) described in Section 4-201(b), or (ii) 
in blank or to a particular bank using the words “for 
deposit,” “for collection,” or other words indicating a 
purpose of having the instrument collected by a bank 
for the indorser or for a particular account . . . .80 
In this case, Section 3-206(c) states: 
(1) A person, other than a bank, who purchases the 
instrument when so indorsed converts the 
instrument unless the amount paid for the 
instrument is received by the indorser or applied 
consistently with the indorsement. 
(2) A depositary bank that purchases the instrument or 
takes it for collection when so indorsed converts 
the instrument unless the amount paid by the bank 
with respect to the instrument is received by the 
indorser or applied consistently with the 
indorsement.81 
Effectively, this means that to achieve maximum protection,82 
and notwithstanding the fact that from a business perspective this may 
                                                 
79 See U.C.C § 4-201(b) (2015) (where this is so, until the item has been: 
“(1) returned to the customer initiating collection; or (2) specially indorsed by a bank 
to a person who is not a bank.”) 
80   U.C.C. § 3-206(c) (2015). 
81   Id. 
82   Having transmitted to Bank A an image of a check indorsed to Bank 
A, a defrauding depositor may erase the indorsement, indorse the check to Bank B 
(or to non-bank C), and transmit the image for deposit to Bank B (or negotiate the 
paper check to non-bank C). I would argue that in such a case, the defrauding 
customer effectively either forged the holder’s indorsement on the check or altered 
the check in which the starting point for the discussion on the loss allocation is either 
U.C.C. §§ 3-403 or 3-407 (2015).   
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be unappealing, a depositary bank would be advised to accept 
electronic deposit only of images of checks indorsed specifically to it. 
V. ELECTRONIC PAYMENT ORDER (EPO) AS “PAPERLESS CHECK”83 
So far, the electronification of check transaction has been 
discussed as it relates either to the issue of a check on the basis of the 
issue of electronic instruction, or to the “conversion,” deposit, 
interbank negotiation, and presentment of the check. Other than inter-
party negotiation outside the bank collection system for which, so far, 
no strong business case has been made, the “last mile” in check 
electronification is concerned with the elimination of paper as early as 
on the issue of the “check.” This is feasible technologically and 
efficient economically; it is indeed said that the EPO possesses features 
such as “speed, finality, relatively low cost, and ubiquity.”84 At the same 
time, from a legal perspective, the legal features of the EPO are not 
entirely clear. Particularly, strictly speaking, this payment method is not 
a “check” as it does not involve anything tangible in writing. Indeed, 
check truncation in all its forms is premised on an image as well as a 
substitute check as derivations of a paper check issued by the drawer 
to the payee (or bearer). 
In the absence of a statutory or otherwise precise definition, 
broadly speaking, an electronically issued payment order, with all other 
characteristics of a check, which is treated as a ‘paperless check’ is 
known as an EPO. Like a paper check,85 an EPO is typically issued by 
the drawer/payer and is addressed to the drawee/payor bank, ordering 
the payor bank to pay on demand a sum certain in money to the payee 
(or bearer) to whom the order is issued. As with a paper check, an EPO 
may be issued on behalf of the drawer by the payee or at the drawer’s 
                                                 
83   See, e.g., KATY JACOB ET AL., FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO: 
FINANCIAL MARKETS GROUP, DIGITAL CHECKS AS ELECTRONIC PAYMENT 
ORDERS (2009); see also MARY KEPLER, RETAIL PAYMENTS RISK FORUM, A 
SUMMARY OF THE ELECTRONIC PAYMENT ORDER FORUM (2013); see also PHYLLIS 
MEYERSON, ELECTRONIC PAYMENT ORDERS (EPOS) (2013). The discussion in this 
subsection draws on these sources. 
84   See generally KEPLER, supra note 83. 
85   “Paper-check,” as defined in U.C.C. § 3-104(f) (2015), in conjunction 
with U.C.C. §§ 3-103(a)(8) and 3-104(e) (2015), is used in this section in the sense of 
a “check” to distinguish it from the EPO. 
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instruction by the bank itself. In the former case it is the equivalent of 
either a Remotely Created Check (RCC), or even an electronic check.  
In the latter case, when issued by the drawer’s bank, it is the equivalent 
of a cashier’s check or a teller’s check.86 
An EPO generated from a mobile device such as a mobile 
phone is also referred to as a “digital check.” It is issued under a 
banking application which exploits the computing properties of the 
mobile platform to provide built-in authentication, communications, 
and security for electronic check writers. Thus, an account holder who 
wishes to make payment may use his or her mobile device to issue a 
“digital check.” He or she may access the address book on the mobile 
device for a list of potential payees. The list can be updated by the 
account holder using the mobile device at any time. The account 
holder then sets out the amount of the “check” and the date, and then 
physically ‘signs’ on the screen as if he or she signs manually on a piece 
of paper. As a security safeguard, the pressure and speed the writer 
uses in making the signature can be recorded for the transaction. This 
“improves” on the loss of the ability to determine pen pressure in 
images and, in the case of substitute checks, prevents disputes as to the 
authenticity of the payment instructions. A proposed complementary 
security method is that of a national check registry.87 
                                                 
86   See U.C.C § 3-104(g) (2015) ( a “‘[c]ashier’s check’ means a draft with 
respect to which the drawer and drawee are the same bank or branches of the same 
bank.”). A “‘[t]eller’s check’ means a draft drawn by a bank (i) on another bank, or 
(ii) payable at or through a bank.” Effectively,  a cashier’s check as well as a teller’s 
check is a check drawn by a bank. 
87   Id. (“Such a national registry would have been totally impractical to 
implement in an all-paper environment, but would be relatively straightforward in a 
digital environment. Given a national registry operating as a utility, EPO users could 
download blank check images from the national check registry. As EPOs were 
processed and cleared through the banking system, the existence of each item could 
be verified in the national registry. Each device could obviously have its own internal 
check registry for each separate account. As items cleared against an individual 
account, the update would be reflected on the internal registry so account holders 
would have an up-to-date picture of their account balances. In addition to helping 
with budgeting and self-control issues, this concurrent information would also be 
useful to detect potential fraud.” JACOB, supra note 67, at 15-16. However, the 
authors add a warning: “While straight forward conceptually, a national registry 
[being ‘organized as a top-down utility’] could end up being a roadblock to enhanced 
security over time.”)  
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The software check program then creates a visual image of 
both the front and the back of the “check,” and takes a screen shot of 
the image. The program then transmits an encrypted version of the 
imaged “check” (to which the “handwritten” signature is attached) to 
the payee who will then deposit it electronically to his or her account 
with the depositary bank. In principle, there is no preclusion from 
devising a scheme that will allow the electronic negotiation of the 
“check” outside the banking system prior to its deposit by the last non-
bank holder. 
Arguably, so far as payments out of consumer accounts are 
concerned, the Electronic Fund Transfer Act88 and Regulation E89 
implementing it would govern the relationship between the drawer and 
the drawee bank.90 In the absence of an existing comprehensive 
statutory and regulatory framework, private agreements are required to 
fill the gap and determine legal issues involving the EPO. A natural 
inclination is to resort to the U.C.C. and the Check 21 Act. Briefly 
stated, two caveats are to be mentioned. First, both U.C.C. Articles 3 
and 4 envisage paper documents and as such cannot be made to apply 
mechanically on a wholesale basis. Second, since there is no paper item 
to begin with, Article 4 does not apply on its own force as a statute. 
Accordingly, Section 4-103(b), under which “Federal Reserve 
regulations and operating circulars, clearing-house rules, and the like 
have the effect of agreements . . . whether or not specifically assented 
to by all parties interested in items handled,” cannot be relied upon to 
affect “parties interested in items handled” who have “not specifically 
assented to” them.91 
                                                 
88   15 U.S.C. § 1693 et seq. (2010). 
89   Electronic Fund Transfers, 12 C.F.R. § 205 (2015). 
90   See generally 12 C.F.R. § 205.3; see also 12 C.F.R. § 205.3(b) (“The term 
electronic fund transfer [to which the Regulation applies] means any transfer of funds 
that is initiated through an electronic terminal, telephone, computer, or magnetic 
tape for the purpose of ordering, instructing, or authorizing a financial institution to 
debit or credit a consumer’s account.”); see also 12 C.F.R. § 205.2(e) (Enumerated 
non-exclusive example focus on public access terminals. “Consumer” is defined as 
“a natural person.”).  
91   U.C.C. § 4-103(b) (2015). 
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Purporting to address the collection of EPOs,92 the Federal 
Reserve Board (“Board”) noted that not being derived from an original 
paper check, an electronically-created check image cannot be used to 
create a substitute check that meets the requirements of the Check 21 
Act and Regulation CC. The Board, however, observed that as a 
practical matter a collecting bank receiving an electronically-created 
check image cannot distinguish it from an image of a paper check that 
it receives electronically. The bank may transfer the image as if it were 
derived from a paper check, or produce a paper item that is 
indistinguishable from a substitute check. Under a proposed revision 
to Section 229.34 of Regulation CC, the Board proposed that a bank 
that transfers an image in the collection system would make all 
warranties the bank would make if the image were derived from a 
paper check. By the same token, such an image could be the basis from 
which a valid substitute paper check be created. 
In addition, under the proposal a bank receiving a warranty 
claim related to an electronic collection item, electronic return, or a 
nonconforming substitute check would be able to pass back its liability 
for the item to the bank from which it had received the electronically-
created image and information. Recognizing that in some instances the 
first bank to make the warranty may not know whether an image and 
information came from a paper instrument, the Board nevertheless 
expressed its view that that bank is in the best position to know and to 
protect itself contractually against the risk. 
Accordingly, under the Board’s 2013 Availability Proposal,93 
proposed Section 229.34(b) provides for an indemnity with respect to 
an electronic image or electronic information not related to a paper 
check. It covers situations where either the drawer or the payee under 
the drawer’s authority creates an electronic image. The latter case may 
be referred to as an eRCC.94  Under proposed Section 229.34(b): 
Each bank that transfers or presents an electronic 
image or electronic information that is not derived 
                                                 
92   Availability of Funds and Collection of Checks, 76 Fed. Reg. 16862 
(March 25, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. 229); see also FRS Availaibility Proposal, 
supra note 60.  
93   Availability of Funds and Collection of Checks, supra note 92.   
94   eRCC stands for a Remotely Created Electronic Check.  
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from a paper check and for which it receives a 
settlement or other consideration shall indemnify each 
transferee bank, any subsequent collecting bank, the 
paying bank, and any subsequent returning bank 
against losses as set forth in paragraph (i) of this section 
that result from the fact that the electronic image or 
electronic information is not derived from a paper 
check.95 
Presumably, the reference is to Proposed Section 
229.34(a)(1)(i) under which the warranty given with respect to 
electronic checks and electronic returns is that: 
The electronic image accurately represents all of the 
information on the front and back of the original check 
as of the time that the original check was truncated and 
the electronic information contains an accurate record 
of all MICR line information required for a substitute 
check . . . and the amount of the check.96 
As explained in the Commentary to the Proposal: 
Proposed § 229.34(b) would provide that a bank that 
transfers an electronic image or electronic information 
that is not derived from a paper check indemnify the 
transferee bank, any subsequent collecting bank, the 
paying bank, and any subsequent returning bank 
against any loss, claim, or damage that results from the 
fact that the image or information was not derived 
from a paper check. This proposed indemnity would 
protect a bank that receives an electronically-created 
item from a sending bank against any loss or damage 
that results from the fact that there was no original 
check corresponding to the item that the sending bank 
transferred.97 
                                                 
95   See FRS Availability Proposal, supra note 60.  
96   Id.  
97   See id. at 6695. 
2015 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 4:1 
124 
In particular, this purports to cover all losses caused by 
warranty breaches had the electronically-created item been derived 
from a paper check. It also covers losses caused by the absence of 
paper at any stage of the life of the payment item, a fact of which the 
drawee bank may be unaware. 
The indemnity under proposed Section 229.34(b) would not 
flow to the drawer, payee, or the depositary bank. The Board 
rationalized that “the payee and the depositary bank are in the best 
position to know whether an item is electronically created and to 
prevent the item from entering the check collection system.”98 The 
Board went on to explain that the depositary bank can contractually 
pass the risk to the payee. Finally, it is the drawer who introduced 
“items electronically created by the [drawer]” into the check collection 
system.99 At the same time, had the item been introduced as an eRCC 
without the purported drawer’s authority, the latter will be protected 
under U.C.C 4-401(a) as an item which is not “properly payable.” 
Under proposed Section 229.34(i)(1) the indemnity amount 
shall not exceed the sum of: 
(i) The amount of the loss of the indemnified 
bank, up to the amount of the settlement or 
other consideration received by the 
indemnifying bank; and 
(ii) Interest and expenses of the indemnified bank 
(including costs and reasonable attorney’s fees 
and other expenses of representation). 
However, under proposed Section 229.34(i)(2)(i), and without 
reducing “the rights of a person under the UCC or other applicable 
provision of state or federal law” if such loss “results in whole or in 
part from the indemnified bank’s negligence or failure to act in good 
faith, then the indemnity amount . . . shall be reduced in proportion to 
the amount of negligence or bad faith attributable to the indemnified 
bank.”100 The Board requested comment on its proposal to provide an 
                                                 
98   See id. 
99   Id. at 6696. 
100   See id. at § 229.34(i)(2)(ii). 
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indemnity claim related to electronically-created items instead of 
extending the check warranties of § 229.34 to electronically-created 
items.101 
 CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
Wishing to accommodate both manual and electronic handling 
of checks by the various participants in a check transaction, regulators 
have been providing for an extremely flexible scheme covering diverse 
situations and facilitating maximum freedom of movement between 
paper and image, original and copy. However, an environment in 
which one set of rights and duties is embodied in original paper, it any 
copy, and its electronic image, all of which co-exist, albeit not 
necessarily in the same hands, is quite unsafe, as it may lead to 
conflicting claims to the paper and its image. It is bound to create an 
‘explosive’ mixture leading to conflicting legitimate expectations. To 
minimize surprises, rules are to be detailed. At the same time they 
cannot satisfy every innocent party in the check transaction. 
In the final analysis, a move towards complete electronification 
from end to end seems to be appropriate in the electronic age and is 
to be encouraged. A fully electronic check transaction is 
interchangeable with a one-time electronic debit transfer. In the latter, 
the payor authorizes the payee to draw funds out of the payor’s 
account. The issuance of an EPO to the payee serves the same 
purpose. It is obvious then that the two transactions converge. From 
that perspective, the convergence between the laws that govern those 
transactions ought to be seriously considered. A cohesive forward-
looking legal framework, consisting of statutory, regulatory, and 
contractual sources, ought to address debit transfers as a distinct form 
of payment. This is true even if in response to business demands a 
mixed paper and electronic image environment is still to be 
accommodated, at least for some time. Indeed, Articles 3 and 4 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code provide a comprehensive framework 
governing the payment and collection of paper based debit 
instruments. At the same time consideration is to be given to the 
                                                 
101   Id. at 6684 (the Board further requested comment on whether losses 
proximately caused from not being able to make the warranty claim should be 
interpreted to cover damages awarded for violations of Regulation E). 
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drafting of a new Article 3A of the Uniform Commercial Code to form 
a comprehensive piece of legislation governing electronic debit 
transfers including the electronic cheque transaction. The current 
mixture of state and federal laws as well as private agreement is too 
segmented to guaranty a sound evolution of the law to address 
forthcoming innovations and the new issues they raise. 
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CLEAN BILL OF LADING IN CONTRACT 
OF CARRIAGE AND DOCUMENTARY 
CREDIT: WHEN CLEAN MAY NOT BE 
CLEAN 
Časlav Pejović* 
INTRODUCTION 
X is a small producer of plastic products from China. Searching on 
internet for suppliers of plastic raw materials X found Y, a supplier 
based in the United States, offering these materials at a very favourable 
price. X and Y entered into sale contract under Cost, Insurance, and 
Freight (CIF) terms.  Following CIF terms, payment was to be made 
by letter of credit. Y shipped the goods in a container and delivered for 
carriage within the agreed time. Carrier then inserted a “said to 
contain” clause into the bill of lading, and the bank accepted such 
document. When X opened container it discovered that the goods were 
in such bad condition that they could not be used in the manufacturing 
process. X contacted Y, by email, and demanded delivery of substitute 
goods, which would conform to the contract. Y refused, claiming that 
the goods were delivered for carriage in good condition. Y could not be 
reached by telephone, and its address stated on its website was wrong. 
X had no redress against the Carrier, because the Carrier validly 
excluded its liability with a “said to contain” clause. The Bank was 
also not liable, because this clause was acceptable under the letter of 
credit rules. X contacted a lawyer in the United States, and after 
receiving an estimate of attorney expenses, which would not be 
recoverable under the U.S. law, X decided to give up the case and bear 
the loss.1 
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It is common knowledge, in international trade community, 
that bills of lading (bills), under certain conditions, may contain 
reservations inserted by the master, and that banks normally should 
reject bills that are not clean. Yet, it is far less known that clean bills of 
lading, under the rules governing carriage of goods and those 
governing letters of credit may be not only different, but even 
contradictory. Specifically, certain clauses may make a bill of lading 
unclean under rules of carriage, but not under the letter of credit rules. 
It is interesting to note that all leading texts on letters of credit are 
silent on this issue.2 One of the few scholars who has identified this 
issue is Hugo Tiberg, one of the world’s leading maritime law 
authorities. Tiberg suggested that the Uniform Customs and Practices 
for Documentary Credits (UCP) 3  should expand the meaning of 
“uncleanliness.”4 
                                                 
Ph.D., Zagreb University. The author is grateful to Hugo Tiberg, Jan Ramberg, and 
Rawi Meckvichai for their constructive comments and suggestions, which helped to 
refine this article. I owe special thanks to David Meynell, Senior Technical Adviser 
to the ICC Banking Commission who provided valuable information regarding 
background of relevant provisions of the UCP.Of course, I remain responsible for 
all eventual errors in this paper. 
1   This is not hypothetical but a real case brought to my attention by my 
ex-student whose family was subjected to this kind of trouble. 
2   Ebenezer Adodo in his recent book on letters of credit, in an attempt 
to justify omission of a detailed discussion of transport documents in his text states 
that transport documents have not been “the subject of serious controversies in the 
last several decades”, and that the banks are not “in great need of fresh insights” 
regarding this theme: EBENEZER ADODO, LETTERS OF CREDIT: THE LAW AND 
PRACTICE OF COMPLIANCE 7.02 (2014). 
3   The Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits were 
promulgated by the International Chamber of Commerce (I.C.C.) in 1933, and were 
revised in 1951, 1962, 1974, 1983, 1993, and 2007 (I.C.C. Pub. No. 600). For most 
current version, see Int’l Chamber of Commerce, Uniform Customs and Practice for 
Documentary Credits, I.C.C. Pub. No. 600 (2007) [hereinafter UCP]. 
4   Hugo Tiberg, Carrier’s Liability for Misstatements in Bills of Lading, in 
MARITIME FRAUD 71 (1983). I have also written one paper on this issue, but from a 
different angle, with the main focus on the cause of the discrepancy of rules and 
different legal effects of clauses under two different sets of rules. Časlav Pejović, 
Clean Bill of Lading in Contract of Carriage and Contract of Sale: Same Name and Different 
Meanings, 2 J. INT’L COM. L. (2003). 
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The main objective of this article is to analyze the discrepancies 
between the rules governing carriage of goods by sea and the rules 
governing letters of credit, as well as highlight the potential problems 
that may arise as a consequence of this discrepancy, particularly in light 
of the risk of documentary fraud. The ultimate goal of this article is to 
draw attention to the need to revise the definition of a clean bill of 
lading in future UCP revisions. 
I. BACKGROUND 
The two most basic obligations in contracts of sale are (1) the 
obligation of the seller to deliver the goods and (2) the obligation of 
the buyer to pay the price. In international sales, the performance of 
both of these obligations is met with certain difficulties, mainly because 
of the distance between the parties. International sales involve a 
number of parties that are often geographically distant from each 
other; the seller’s obligation of delivery is performed through a carrier 
under a contract of carriage, while the buyer’s obligation of payment is 
normally performed through a bank, typically by letter of credit. The 
payment is regularly conditioned on evidence of the movement of the 
goods, i.e. by evidence that the goods are loaded onboard and are on 
their way to the destination. 
An essential characteristic of overseas sales is that the buyer 
pays not against the delivery of the goods, but against the tender of a 
set of documents usually comprised of an invoice, a bill of lading, and 
a marine insurance policy. This implies that the seller has an obligation 
to make two kinds of delivery: (1) delivery of the goods and (2) delivery 
of the documents.5 Because the documents appear to be the subject 
matter of the sale, this sale is sometimes referred to as a “sale of 
documents.” 6  Once in possession of documents required by the 
                                                 
5   Article 30 of the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale 
of Goods (CISG) provides for this double obligation: “The Seller must deliver the 
goods, hand over any documents relating to them . . . .” United Nations Convention 
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr. 10, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3, 
19 I.L.M. 671, art. 30 [hereinafter CISG].   
6 In Arnhold Karberg & Co. v. Blythe Green Jourdain & Co. [1915], 2 K.B. 379 at 
388 (Eng.), Scrutton J referred to a CIF (cost, insurance, and freight) contract as a sale 
of ‘documents relating to goods’ but this was disapproved on appeal Arnhold Karberg & 
Co. v. Blythe Green Jourdain & Co. [1916], 1 K.B. 495 at 510, 514 (Eng.). 
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contract of sale, the seller notifies the buyer that he will tender those 
documents against payment or acceptance. The seller then presents the 
bill of exchange to the buyer’s bank, together with a bill of lading and 
other documents. The bank should pay against the documents only if 
those documents are in accordance with requirements set by the UCP 
and the specific instructions of the buyer. 
This specific character of a documentary sale is based on the 
bill of lading. When the parties agree that payment is to be made 
against documents, the seller must transfer to the buyer the bill of 
lading at the moment the buyer pays the price. By transferring the bill 
of lading to the buyer, the seller furnishes proof that he exercised his 
obligations under the sale contract and transfers to the buyer the right 
to receive the goods when they arrive at the port of destination. In this 
way, the seller can receive the price while the goods are still in transit 
and is assured that the title to the goods cannot pass to the buyer 
before he pays the price, while the buyer is assured that the goods will 
be delivered to him after he pays the price. One of the factors that 
contribute to the reliability of bills of lading is that the carrier warrants 
the accuracy of statements regarding the goods and is liable to their 
third party lawful holders in case of their inaccuracy. A buyer cannot 
inspect the goods while they are at sea, so he has to rely on the 
statements in the bill of lading. These statements provide evidence that 
the seller has properly performed his obligations by loading on time 
the conforming goods.7 
II. CLEAN BILL OF LADING IN CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE 
After the goods are delivered to the carrier, and upon demand 
of the shipper, the carrier must issue a bill of lading. Under Article 3(3) 
of the Hague-Visby Rules, bills of lading must show the leading marks, 
quantity, weight, or number of packages or pieces, and the apparent 
condition of the goods, furnished in writing by the shipper.8 Similar 
                                                 
7   Under clause CIF A8 of the Incoterms 2010, the seller has a duty to 
provide the buyer with a “usual transport document.” This is usually understood to 
mean a clean on board bill of lading providing for the carriage of goods under deck, and 
for carriage to be performed without unreasonable deviation. INT’L CHAMBER OF 
COMMERCE, INCOTERMS 2010 cl. CIF A8 (2010), .  
8   International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law 
Relating to Bills of Lading, Aug. 25, 1924, 120 L.N.T.S. 155 (entered into force June 
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provisions are found in the Hamburg Rules 9  and the Rotterdam 
Rules.10 
The carrier can, under certain conditions, insert reservations in 
the bill of lading, which can drastically lessen its evidential value. 
Reservations are remarks inserted in a bill of lading by the carrier, his 
master, or his agent, which indicate the carrier does not guarantee the 
accuracy of particulars concerning the marks, nature, or quantity of the 
goods contained in the bill of lading, or that there are defects noticed 
in the condition of the goods or its packing for which the carrier is not 
responsible. 
Under Article 3(3) of the Hague-Visby Rules: 
no carrier, captain or agent of the carrier shall be bound 
to state or show in the bill of lading any marks, number, 
quantity, or weight which he has reasonable ground for 
suspecting not accurately to represent the goods 
actually received, or which he has had no reasonable 
means of checking. 
The literal meaning of this provision refers to something which 
its drafters probably never intended. It is difficult to imagine that they 
meant that the carrier can issue a bill of lading without particulars 
concerning the “marks, number, quantity or weight,” since those 
particulars are essential for the existence of a bill of lading.11  Under 
                                                 
2, 1931) [hereinafter Hague Rules], as amended by Protocol to Amend the 
International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to 
Bills of Lading, Feb. 23, 1968, 1412 U.N.T.S. 128 [hereinafter Hague-Visby Rules]. 
For the matter of simplicity, I will use the Hague-Visby Rules and will not refer to 
the Hague Rules, which are still applied in a number of jurisdictions. 
9   United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, Mar. 
31, 1978, 1695 U.N.T.S. 3, 17 I.L.M. 608 (entered into force Nov. 1, 1992) 
[hereinafter Hamburg Rules]. 
10   United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International 
Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea, G.A. Res. 63/122, U.N. Doc 
A/RES/63/122 (Feb. 2, 2009) [hereinafter Rotterdam Rules].Rotterdam Rules are 
not yet in force. 
11   It should be noted that the original text of the Hague Rules (1921) 
adopted by the International Law Association (ILA) was somewhat different. It 
provided that, “no carrier, master or agent of the carrier shall be bound to issue a bill of 
lading showing description, marks, number, quality, or weight which he has reasonable 
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this literal interpretation, problems may have arisen with Article 3(3) 
of The Hague-Visby Rules. Instead, remedying this error, the content 
of Article 3(3) has been interpreted to imply that the carrier, in fact, 
should insert particulars concerning the goods as furnished by the 
shipper. Additionally, the carrier is entitled to qualify those particulars 
by inserting in the bill of lading reservations under conditions specified 
in this article. 
The Hamburg Rules and the Rotterdam Rules expressly 
provide that the carrier has a duty to insert a reservations in the bill of 
lading under conditions that are essentially the same as in the Hague-
Visby Rules.12 Reservations are aimed at protecting the carrier from 
liability for inaccurate or false particulars furnished by the shipper. The 
justifications for these reservations are that the carrier cannot be asked 
to take responsibility for the accuracy of particulars that he cannot 
check and the necessity to protect the good faith of third party bill of 
lading holders. The reservations are not aimed at relieving the carrier 
from liability, but only at excluding the presumption that the goods are 
received for carriage by the carrier as described in the bill of lading. 
In practice, it is often disputed whether loss of, or damage to, 
the goods occurred during the voyage, or whether it existed before the 
goods were delivered for carriage. One of the crucial problems for the 
buyer is to establish who is responsible for damage: the carrier or the 
seller. Here the bill of lading may play a key role as evidence. If the bill 
of lading contains remarks stating that the cargo was loaded in poor 
condition, this may provide evidence of the seller’s liability for delivery 
of non-conforming goods. On the other hand, if the bill of lading 
contains no such remarks, this may evidence the carrier’s liability. 
If the carrier signs a bill of lading presented by a shipper 
without controlling the accuracy of the particulars furnished by him, 
he risks liability to a third party holder of the bill of lading if those 
particulars are inaccurate. This is why the carrier should be very careful 
                                                 
ground for suspecting do not accurately represent the goods actually received.” It is one 
thing that the carrier is not bound to issue a bill of lading, and a different one that the 
carrier issues the bill of lading but is not bound to state in the bill of lading the particulars 
concerning the goods (on file with author). 
12   Hamburg Rules, supra note 9, art. 16(1); Rotterdam Rules, supra note 
10, art. 40(1). 
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when receiving the goods from the shipper and should check the 
accuracy of the description of the goods as furnished by the shipper, 
as well as the apparent condition of the goods. However, sometimes it 
is impossible to perform such checks, e.g., if the goods are delivered 
for carriage shortly before the ship’s departure or if the goods are in 
sealed containers so that the number of packages and condition cannot 
be verified. In such cases the carrier is entitled to insert reservations 
into the bill of lading. 
There are two types of reservations: (1) reservations which 
refer to the particulars furnished by the shipper concerning the general 
nature, marks, number, and weight of the goods and (2) reservations 
concerning the condition of the goods. The legal effect of these two 
types of reservations is different. 
A.    Reservations Referring to the Nature, Marks, Number, and  
      Weight of the Goods 
Reservations referring to the particulars furnished by the 
shipper deprive those particulars of their evidential value. It is assumed 
that the carrier delivered the goods to the consignee as he received 
them from the shipper. Such a bill of lading is not even prima facie 
evidence of the particulars to which the reservation refers. Those 
particulars are deprived of every evidentiary effect, and are considered 
to be only a declaration made by the shipper, without the carrier’s 
liability for their accuracy. The carrier is only liable on the basis of the 
receipt of the goods (ex recepto), which means that he must deliver 
the goods to the consignee as he received them from the shipper. As a 
result, a third party holder of the bill of lading is entitled to the goods 
not as they are described in the bill of lading, but as they were delivered 
for carriage by the shipper. 
Reservations limit, but do not eliminate, the evidentiary effect 
of the bill of lading. Only the particulars to which the reservations refer 
lose their evidentiary value, while other particulars retain their 
evidentiary effect. For instance, a reservation referring to weight has 
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no influence on the evidentiary effect of the number of pieces stated 
in the bill of lading.13 
Reservations do not exempt the carrier from his responsibility, 
but only switch the burden of proof (onus probandi) from the carrier 
to the consignee. If the carrier fails to insert notations, he would be 
precluded from proving against third party holders of the bill of lading 
that the particulars in the bill of lading were inaccurate and would bear 
the burden to prove that he is not liable for loss or damage. In that 
case the consignee would not be bound to prove the carrier’s liability, 
but the carrier has the burden to prove that he is not liable for loss or 
damage. A reservation switches the burden of proof to the consignee, 
who must prove that the particulars in the bill of lading were correct 
and that the carrier is liable for loss or damage. 
The effect of reservations is that they make such proof more 
difficult. If the bill of lading does not contain reservations, the 
consignee would only have to prove that the goods he received from 
the carrier do not correspond with the bill of lading description leaving 
to the carrier to avail himself of any defenses to avoid liability. If the 
bill of lading does contain reservations, then the consignee cannot rely 
on the bill of lading as proof but must offer other evidence of carrier’s 
liability for damage. 
B.     Reservations Referring to the Condition of the Goods 
The bill of lading should show only the apparent condition of 
the goods, which means the external condition of the goods “so far as 
meets the eye.”14  Even if a bill of lading does not contain this clause, 
the goods will be considered as delivered for carriage in apparent good 
condition, unless the master has inserted remarks in the bill of lading 
stating the goods defects. 
Reservations referring to the condition of the goods are based 
on the carrier’s observation and represent, in fact, his statement of any 
defects in the goods noticed during the inspection of the goods at the 
port of loading. These reservations are prima facie evidence that the 
                                                 
13   Attorney General of Ceylon v. Scindia Steam Navigation Co., India 
[1962] A.C. 60 (Eng.). 
14   The Peter der Grosse [1875] 1 P.D. 414 (Eng.). 
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goods were loaded in the condition as described in the reservations. 
Therefore, they place the burden of proof on the consignee, who needs 
to prove that the goods were loaded in good condition, and that the 
damage occurred during the voyage. 
If the carrier fails to insert reservations concerning the 
condition of the goods and the goods are found to be damaged when 
delivered to the consignee, the carrier will be held responsible for 
damage unless he proves that the damage was caused by one of the 
circumstances for which he is not responsible. Where the goods are 
loaded in poor condition, it is still possible to avoid clausing a bill of 
lading. If the shipper’s description of the goods in the bill of lading 
provides a complete and accurate description of the cargo, there would 
be no need for any clausing of the bills of lading by the master. The 
goods that are properly described as damaged can be considered as “in 
good condition” in the sense of being in “proper” order and 
condition. 15  The cargo that is properly described as damaged or 
imperfect in some way can be stated to be in “good order and 
condition” in the sense of being in “proper” order and condition. Thus 
a cargo described in a bill of lading as “scrap” or as “hot rolled steel 
coils with pitting and gouging” can be stated to be in “good order and 
condition.”16 If the description of the goods is such that the master 
can sign a bill of lading that says that those goods, as described, are in 
“apparent good order and condition,” then the cargo will not be 
“subject to clausing of the bill of lading.” But if the master would have 
to make a notation on the bill of lading so as to reconcile the 
description of the goods with a statement that they are in “apparent 
good order and condition,” then the cargo is “subject to clausing of 
the bill of lading.”17 
The fact that the bill of lading does not state that the goods 
loaded are in bad condition does not exclude the possibility that there 
are defects in loaded goods.18 If the carrier proves that the damage to 
the goods was of such a character that it was impossible to discover it 
                                                 
15   Sea Success Maritime Inc. v. African Maritime Carriers Ltd. [2005] 
EWHC (Comm) 1542 (Eng.). 
16   Id. 
17   Id. 
18   Tokio Marine Fire & Ins. Co. v. Retla S.S. Co., 426 F.2d 1372 (9th 
Cir. 1970). 
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by an ordinary examination of their external condition, the cargo 
claimant would not only have to prove that the goods were not 
damaged when delivered for carriage, but also provide such proof as 
may be needed to impose carriage liability, e.g., that the ship was not 
seaworthy. However, if the consignee proves that the carrier knew, or 
should have known, that the goods were damaged when he received 
them for carriage, the carrier will be responsible if he failed to insert 
the reservation in the bill of lading stating that damage.19 
IV. CLEAN BILLS OF LADING IN LETTERS OF CREDIT 
In a documentary sale, the bill of lading serves as evidence of 
whether the goods are loaded, when they are loaded, and which goods 
are loaded. Based on the bill of lading, it can be established whether 
the goods were delivered for carriage and loaded on time, as stipulated 
by the contract of sale, as well as whether the goods delivered for 
carriage correspond with the goods agreed by the contract of sale. To 
perform its role in a documentary sale, the bill of lading must provide 
certainty to its holder with respect to the accuracy of the particulars 
contained in it, and the carrier must be precluded from denying the 
accuracy of those particulars. 
The letter of credit rules provide specific requirements related 
to reservations. As a matter of principle, the bill of lading should be 
free of all notations with respect to the apparent condition of the 
goods and packaging. Under Article 27 of the UCP, a clean bill of 
lading is defined as “one that bears no clause or notation which 
expressly declares a defective condition of the goods and/or the 
packaging.” Banks must refuse bills of lading that contain such clauses 
or notations, unless the letter of credit expressly stipulates the clauses 
or notations that may be accepted. The buyer can give instructions to 
its bank with respect to the requirements of the documents; if there 
are no such instructions, the requirements contained in the UCP rules 
will apply. 
                                                 
19   The Nogar Marin [1988] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 412 (Eng.); Dent v. Glen Line 
[1940] 67 Lloyd’s Rep. 72 (Eng.); Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Rouen, 
Oct. 10, 1991, D.M.F. 1993, 108 (Fr); Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] 
Paris, Apr. 17, 1995, D.M.F. 1985, 173 (Fr.). 
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V. DISCREPANCIES AND CONFUSION 
When the meaning of clean bill of lading under the rules 
applying to carriage of goods and to letters of credit is compared, 
discrepancies become obvious. All international conventions 
governing carriage of goods by sea provide that reservations regarding 
leading marks, quantity, the general nature of the goods, and their 
condition make a bill of lading unclean. 20  The UCP limits the 
definition of a clean bill of lading to notations declaring defective 
condition of the goods and/or packages. This definition is in line with 
some well-known cases.21 On the other hand, it deviates from other 
cases that gave effect to notations related to quantity, making such bills 
unclean under the rules governing carriage by sea.22 There are also 
other discrepancies, e.g., regarding the effect of “said to contain” 
clauses. 
At a more general level, the confusion about the meaning of a 
clean bill of lading is caused by the fact that the parties in a contract of 
carriage are usually also the parties in the contract of sale (the shipper 
is often the seller, while the consignee is often the buyer), and because 
the subject matter of these contracts is the same (the carried goods are 
identical with the sold goods). However, even though the same parties 
and goods appear in both the contract of carriage and the contract of 
sale, these two contracts are regulated by different rules. The rules 
regulating the contract of carriage are aimed at defining the duties and 
rights of the carrier and the shipper and/or consignee, while the rules 
regulating the contract of sale are aimed at specifying the duties and 
rights of the seller and the buyer. 
The rules regulating the liability of the carrier are limited in 
scope to the contract of carriage and are not concerned with the 
contract of sale. If the carrier issues a clean bill of lading, it does not 
mean that the goods are in conformity with the goods under the 
                                                 
20   Hague-Visby Rules, supra note 8, art. 3(3), Hamburg Rules, supra note 
9, art. 16(1); Rotterdam Rules, supra note 10, art. 40(1) referring to art. 36(1). 
21   British Imex Indus. Ltd. v Midland Bank Ltd. (1958) 1 Q.B. 542 
(Eng.); Golodetz & Co. v Czarnikow (1980) 1 W.L.R 495 (Eng.). 
22   New Chinese Antimony Co. Ltd. v. Ocean S.S. Co. [1917] 2 K.B. 664 
(Eng.), Attorney General of Ceylon v. Scindia Steam Navigation Co., India 
[1962] A.C. 60 (Eng.); The Mata K [1998] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 614 (Eng.). 
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contract of sale. The carrier is not entrusted with checking whether the 
goods comply with sale contract, but only with their carriage; he is 
responsible only if the goods do not correspond with their description 
in the bill of lading. The rationale of the carrier for inserting 
reservations is the protection of his own interests as a party in the 
contract of carriage. From the carrier’s perspective, the fact that he 
inserted reservations in a bill of lading, or that he failed to do so, is 
relevant only for his relation with the bill of lading holder. However, 
that fact can be very important for the relation of the parties in the 
contract of sale, as well as in letters of credit. 
The bill of lading is a transport document issued under a contract 
of carriage and is not always suitable to serve as evidence in a contract of 
sale. The buyer cannot rely on the carrier and transport documents as 
sufficient grounds for establishing whether the goods were in 
conformity at the moment of loading because the carrier applies his 
own standards and rules based on rules governing carriage of goods, 
and not sale, when checking the goods. 
The fact that the carrier has issued a clean bill of lading does not 
necessarily mean that the seller has delivered for carriage the goods as 
provided by the contract of sale, but only that the carrier acknowledged 
that the goods correspond with their description in the bill of lading and 
that they are in apparent good order and condition. For example, the 
seller might deliver for carriage the goods of a quality which does not 
correspond to one agreed by the contract of sale, but the carrier cannot 
be expected to state this discrepancy of quality in the bill of lading, since 
he is usually not an expert on the goods and is not liable for the quality 
of the goods. 
VI. SPECIFIC PROBLEMS UNDER THE UCP 
The UCP contains rather imprecise guidance regarding “clean 
bills of lading,” which deviates from the rules on clean bills of lading 
in the law governing carriage of goods by sea. There are even some 
discrepancies with the rules governing international sales, while some 
of problems are confined to the UCP. The problems may arise in cases 
of all particulars on the goods, as will be shown below. 
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A.     Quantity 
A bill of lading containing a notation that states a shortage of 
the goods cannot be clean. This fact is clearly stated in all international 
conventions regulating carriage of goods by sea and is confirmed by 
numerous court decisions. In a clear contrast to the rules governing 
carriage by sea, the UCP definition of clean bill of lading is restricted 
to the condition of the goods and packages. For some unclear reason, 
the reservations regarding quantity are omitted from the definition of 
clean bill of lading. Hugo Tiberg proposed a wider meaning of unclean 
bill of lading to refer to a “document bearing an express notation of 
insufficiency concerning either the quantity or condition of the goods 
or their packaging.”23 This proposal is the starting point for a more 
detailed elaboration on this issue below. 
The failure to include reservations related to quantity in the 
definition of clean bill of lading raises the issue of whether this failure 
can be remedied by other provisions of the UCP. To certain extent, 
Article 30 of the UCP may play this role. This provision does not 
specifically make reference to transport documents, but it obviously 
applies to them, as well as to the invoice. Article 30(b) provides for 
tolerance of 5% for quantity “provided the credit does not state the 
quantity in terms of a stipulated number of packing units or individual 
items and the total amount of the drawings does not exceed the 
amount of the credit”. This means that reservations indicating 
shortages of less than 5% of quantity would be acceptable, but this 
tolerance is not applicable to the number of packing units or individual 
items when stated in the letter of credit. 
The application of Article 30(b) depends on the type of 
merchandise shipped.24 Article 30(b) would apply where the credit 
states, e.g., “1000kg of coffee.” In this case, the beneficiary could ship 
up to 5% less, i.e., between 950kg and 1000kg, or up to 5% more, i.e., 
between 1000kg and 1050kg (subject to credit amount not being 
                                                 
23   See Tiberg, supra note 4, at 78. 
24   Example: letter of credit value is $100,000.00 (USD); Goods shipped: 
1000kg of coffee. In this case, the exporter is allowed to ship up to 1050kg (or 950 
kg) of coffee but not allowed to draw more than $100,000.00 (USD). This tolerance 
disappears in case of the number of packing units or individual items, e.g., if the bill 
of lading states that 1000 boxes containing bottles of wine are loaded. 
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exceeded). This means that banks should reject bills of lading when 
there is a discrepancy higher than 5% in the case of quantity, as well as 
in case of any discrepancy related to the number of packages. A 
problem may arise if a bill of lading indicates a shortage within the 
tolerance defined by Article 30(b), e.g., when it contains a clause 
stating: “10 tons missing” (if we assume that the total amount is 1000 
tons, a shortage of ten tons is just 1% of the total amount). Should the 
bank accept such bill of lading? From the position of the buyer, a 
shortage of the quantity should be valid cause for rejecting documents. 
On the other hand, under the UCP, the bank will be required to accept 
such bill of lading, unless specifically instructed not to do so. 
Article 30(b) creates a discrepancy in the rules applicable to 
letters of credit, as well as a number of ambiguities that may arise in 
various situations related to its application to bills of lading.  For 
example, why should a bank accept a bill of lading containing a 
shortage of ten tons of cargo when the quantity stated in the bill of 
lading is 1000 tons, and why should it reject the bill of lading when one 
out of a hundred boxes is missing? What is the logic? Is one box 
containing twelve bottles of mineral water more valuable and 
important than ten tons of coffee? There should be some reason for 
this kind of drafting of the UCP, but if so, it is far from obvious. 
A notation that refers to a minor defect may be acceptable to 
the buyer, but not to the bank, because such notation makes a bill of 
lading unclean under the UCP rules. On the other hand, a notation 
within the tolerance defined by Article 30(b) would be acceptable to 
the bank, but not necessarily to the buyer. Would the buyer agree to a 
every shortage that is less than 5%? There have been many cases where 
a buyer has sued the seller or carrier for far lower percentages of 
shortage. Article 30(b) may contradict the law governing contract of 
sale, for the law of each country sets out its own percentage of 
tolerance. The problem will arise particularly where the law governing 
contract of sale provides a lower tolerance. This means that Article 
30(b) of the UCP may contravene both the rules applying to carriage 
of goods by sea and those applying to contract of sale. The real risk for 
the buyer is that this provision requires the bank to pay against bill of 
lading which contains express reservation regarding shortage of 
quantity, where the shortage is within the tolerance of 5%. 
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The report on clean bills of lading prepared by the 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) states that clauses relating 
to quantity “are in a different class, in that they merely reflect a 
difference of opinion between seller and carrier as to the exact quantity 
of good loaded on board.”25  It is true that these clauses are in a 
different class, but not merely because they reflect a different opinion, 
because the clauses related to condition may also reflect a difference in 
opinion between seller and carrier. For example, there is often a 
discussion between the shippers and the master (or his agent) as to the 
proper description of the condition of the cargo.26 In fact, shipper and 
carrier are more likely to have “a difference of opinion” regarding 
condition rather than regarding quantity; quantity can be more easily 
verified, when in dispute, while the assessment of apparent condition 
of the goods is often based on subjective impression.  
The difference between these two types of clauses lies in their 
different legal effects: while clauses related to quantity deprive them of 
evidential legal effect, clauses related to condition create a presumption 
that the goods are loaded with defects as stated in the reservation. This 
difference does not justify omitting reservations related to quantity 
from the definition of clean bill of lading. It is obvious that a bill of 
lading with a notation stating shortage of quantity of goods cannot be 
a clean bill of lading, particularly from the perspective of the buyer’s 
interests. To avoid the risk, the buyer should specifically instruct its 
bank to reject clauses that refer to a shortage of the goods. 
While banks normally have no problem with accounting, why 
should the banks bear a duty to calculate the percentage of shortage 
and then determine whether the shortage is within the tolerated 
amount? Would it not be more practical to simply adopt the same rule 
as in carriage of goods: any reservation regarding quantity should make 
the bill of lading unclean? The tolerance of shortage should not be 
prescribed as a standard in the UCP, but it should be an exception 
agreed upon by the parties to the contract of sale. If the parties agreed 
certain degree of tolerance, the buyer should arrange to have this 
condition in the letter of credit so as to override the default 5% 
                                                 
25   INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, THE PROBLEM OF 
CLEAN BILLS OF LADING 14 (1962). 
26   Sea Success Mar. Inc. v. African Mar. Carriers Ltd. [2005] EWHC 
(Comm) 1542 (Eng.).  
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tolerance. In such case the applicant should expressly instruct the bank 
in the letter of credit that specified tolerances may be allowed; if the 
instructions are silent on this, there should be no tolerance. As it is 
shown above, there are plenty of arguments speaking in favor of 
expanding the UCP definition of clean bill of lading so as to include 
notations regarding quantity. 
B.     “Said to Contain” Clauses 
Another point of confusion relates to Article 26(b) of the UCP. 
According to this article, banks will accept bills of lading that contain 
clauses such as “shipper’s load and count,” “said by shipper to 
contain,” or words of similar effect.27 In the context of the UCP, this 
provision can be justified by the fact that these clauses do not expressly 
declare a defective condition of the goods and, therefore, do not make 
bills of lading unclean under the UCP rules. The situation, however, 
can be different in contract of carriage. 
In contracts of carriage clauses, “shipper’s load and count” or 
“said by shipper to contain” are often not given effect by the courts 
when they are pre-printed in bills of lading. In such cases, Article 31(ii) 
of the UCP would not cause problems. However, under certain 
conditions, these clauses can have effect under the rules governing 
carriage of goods and make a bill of lading unclean. Where the goods 
are carried in containers packed and sealed by the shipper, the carrier 
has no duty to open them to check the contents. In this case it is clear 
in re ipsa that the carrier cannot check the contents due to the 
conditions of carriage. This means that there is no need for the 
reservations to be specific and the carrier can insert reservations such 
as “said by shipper to contain” or simply “said to contain.”  This kind 
of reservations has been upheld in a number of jurisdictions.28 
English courts give effect to general reservations relating to 
weight or quantity unknown.29 If a bill of lading states that the weight 
                                                 
27   See UCP, supra note 3, art. 26(b).  
28   Robert Wijffels, Aspects juridiques du transport par conteneurs, E.T.L. 337 
(1967). 
29   The Mata K [1998] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 614 (Eng.); Noble Res. Ltd. v. 
Cavalier Shipping Corp. [1996] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 642 [hereinafter The Atlas] (Eng.); The 
Esmeralda [1988] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 206 (Eng.). 
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of goods is unknown, the carrier can rely on it as evidence to contradict 
the weight recorded in the bill of lading.30 In such case, no estoppel 
can be raised against the carrier, since he made no representation. In 
common law the main focus is on the fact of whether a representation 
is made, rather than whether the qualification is true.31 If the statement 
of the weight or quantity of goods in the bill of lading is qualified by 
such words as “weight or quantity unknown”, the bill of lading is not 
even prima facie evidence against the carrier of the weight or quantity 
shipped.32 Similarly, where goods are shipped in a container and the 
bill of lading is “said to contain” a given number of packages, so that 
it is plain that the carrier has no knowledge of the contents of the 
container, the carrier is not estopped from denying that the stated 
number of packages were in fact in the container. The onus is on the 
cargo-owner to prove what was in fact shipped.33 
Many other jurisdictions have taken a similar stance. In the 
United States, Section 7-301(b) of the Uniform Commercial Code 
(U.C.C.) recognizes the validity of clauses such as “contents, condition, 
and quality unknown,” and “said to contain,” in case of the goods 
“concealed in packages.”34 German law provides for the possibility of 
inserting the reservation “contents unknown” (“Inhalt unbekannt”) if 
the goods are carried packaged or in containers.35 Italian courts take a 
similar view “when it is reasonably impossible to establish if the carrier 
has no reasonable means of checking the information furnished by the 
                                                 
30   The Atlas, 1 Lloyd’s Rep. at 646. 
31   RICHARD AIKENS, RICHARD LORD & MICHAEL BOOLS, BILLS OF 
LADING 4.32 (2006). 
32   Conoco (UK) Ltd. v Limai Mar. Co.  [1988] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 613 (Eng.) 
[hereinafter The Sirina]. 
33   WILLIAM TETLEY, MARINE CARGO CLAIMS 351 (4th ed. 2008). 
34   Transatlantic Marine Claims Agency v. M/V IBN Zuhr, Civ. A. No. 
CV 493–292, 1994 WL 654548 (S.D. Ga. May 27, 1994); Recumar Inc. v. S/S Dana 
Arabia, 83 Civ. 6486 (BN) (JES), 1985 WL 479 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 5,1985); Aetna Ins. Co. 
v. General Terminals, 225 So.2d 72 (La. Ct. App. 4 1969); THOMAS SCHOENBAUM, 
ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW § 10-22 (4th ed. 2004). 
35   Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Hamburg Regional Court] Oct. 2, 1969 
VersR 1125, 1970 (Ger.); Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Hamburg Regional Court] Nov. 
30, 1972 VersR 344, 1973 (Ger.); SEEHANDELSRECHT 511 (Prussman-Rabe eds., 5th 
ed. 2000); SCHAPS/ABRAHAM: SEERECHT 821 (Walter de Gruyter ed., 1964).  
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shipper.”36 A similar position is taken by Belgian courts, which have 
held that the notation “said to contain” inserted in a bill of lading 
represents a valid qualification where the carrier is not able to check 
the condition of the goods.37 
Article 40(4) of the Rotterdam Rules contains specific 
provisions for situations in which goods are delivered for carriage to 
the carrier in a closed container. In such case the carrier may qualify 
the particulars on the goods if the goods inside the container have not 
actually been inspected by the carrier and the carrier did not have actual 
knowledge of its contents before issuing the transport document. With 
respect to the particulars on the weight of the goods, the carrier may 
qualify those particulars if he did not weigh the container, and the 
shipper and carrier had not agreed prior to the shipment that the 
container or vehicle would be weighed and the weight would be 
included in the contract particulars, or there was no physically 
practicable or commercially reasonable means of checking the weight 
of the container or vehicle. Another scenario is found in Article 40(1) 
of the Rotterdam Rules, which deals with situations in which goods are 
not delivered for carriage in a closed container, or when they are 
delivered in a closed container and the carrier actually inspects them. 
In this case the carrier may insert reservations in the transport 
document if he had no physically practicable or commercially 
reasonable means of checking the information furnished by the 
shipper, or he has reasonable grounds to believe the information 
furnished by the shipper to be inaccurate.38 
                                                 
36   Corte di Cassazione 29 November 1999, No. 13341, Giur. it. 2001, 
III, 729 (It.); Corte di Appello di Napoli, 21 June 1996, unreported, Rocco Giuseppe 
& Figli S.p.A. v. DI.A.R. Maritime S.r.l. (It.). 
37   Hof Van Beroep [HvB] [Court of Appeal] Antwerpen May 27, 2013, 
European Transport Law [E.T.L.] 2013, 581 (Belg.). 
38   Article 40(1) of the Rotterdam Rules may create problems in practice. 
For example, there might be disagreement as to what extent the carrier who actually 
inspected the goods in a closed container was able to verify the information furnished 
by the shipper. It is also not very clear who would have the burden of proof in case 
of a dispute: would the carrier have the burden of proof that he was entitled to insert 
qualification in the transport document, or would it be on the claimant to prove that 
the qualification was not justified? The answer to these questions can be obtained 
only if the Rotterdam Rules enter into force, and it is very likely that those answers 
may not be the same in all jurisdictions. Rotterdam Rules, supra note 10, art. 40(1). 
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The previous examples from several leading maritime 
jurisdictions and the text of the Rotterdam Rules demonstrate a clear 
discrepancy between the UCP and the laws governing carriage of 
goods by sea. Namely, under the UCP, clauses such as “said to 
contain” do not have effect on the status of bills of lading, which 
remain clean and acceptable by banks. On the other hand, similar 
clauses may have an effect under carriage by sea rules, making bills 
unclean. 
The UCP’s unreserved acceptance of “said to contain” type 
clauses can make the buyer a victim of fraud, if the seller as shipper 
furnishes the carrier with a false description of the goods loaded in a 
container (e.g., the bill of lading states that music records are loaded, 
while in fact some garbage is loaded), and the carrier inserts in the bill 
of lading the clause “said by shipper to contain.”39 In such a case the 
bank will pay against such a document, the carrier will not be liable for 
wrong description of the goods, and the seller may ‘disappear’ or 
become insolvent. Bills of lading should provide security to the buyer, 
and that security may be compromised if the banks accept bills which 
would not be acceptable to the buyer.  The UCP needs a revision of 
its text to avoid potential risks, confusion, and problems arising from 
the discrepancy of rules applicable to “said to contain” type clauses. 
One possible solution is simply to delete Article 26(b) and leave the 
parties to deal with these issues on a case-by-case basis. 
Under the existing rules the buyers can still protect their 
interests and ensure that banks will not accept transport documents 
that are not acceptable to them. The buyers are advised to include in 
the letter of credit requirements obligating the beneficiary (seller) to 
produce the certificate of control where the goods are to be carried in 
container sealed by the shipper. Less experienced traders may not be 
familiar with these protective devices, as the illustration that opened 
this text has shown, but such problems may happen even to large 
companies.40 
                                                 
39   Discount Records Ltd. v Barclays Bank Ltd. [1975] 1 W.L.R. 315 
(Eng.). 
40   Daewoo Int’l (America) Corp. v. Sea-Land Orient Ltd., 196 F.3d 481 
(3d Cir. 1999).  
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C.    Condition 
Serious difficulties may also arise with respect to notations on 
the condition of goods. It is not always clear which notations make a 
bill of lading unclean in documentary sale. Even a notation that is 
acceptable to the buyer is likely to cause a bank to refuse the bill of 
lading due to the “strict compliance” rule.41 A clean bill of lading does 
not always mean that the condition, and especially the quality, of the 
goods is in conformity with the sale contract in much the same way as 
an unclean bill of lading does not always mean that the goods are not 
in conformity with what the seller and buyer have agreed. This is 
because the notations in a bill of lading are aimed at protecting the 
carrier from liability under the contract of carriage. The notations are 
inserted by the carrier, who is not expected to know whether the goods 
delivered for carriage are in conformity with the goods under sale 
contract.  Therefore, those notations cannot be expected to offer a 
firm answer as to whether the goods correspond with the sold goods. 
A requirement for a clean bill of lading may serve the buyer as an 
excuse to refuse an unclean bill of lading, even when the reservation 
states a fact the seller and the buyer have agreed upon. 
A notation inserted by the carrier does not necessarily make a 
bill of lading unclean as between the seller and the buyer, even if it 
expressly declares the defective condition of the goods or packaging. 
For example, a bill of lading with the notation “atmospheric rust 
spotted” relating to iron products should not be refused by the buyer, 
because in the case of sea carriage of iron products traces of 
atmospheric rust are usual and perhaps even inevitable. 
Similar situations may arise in cases of description of packing. 
Buyers are, of course, mainly interested in goods rather than packing, 
which only serves to protect the goods. For example, the notation 
“used bags” would not necessarily make a bill of lading unclean, unless 
the buyer insists on new bags. Actually, it may well be that the buyer 
and the seller have agreed in a contract of sale on cheaper packing, 
which might not be very suitable for the goods but would enable the 
buyer to cut the price, e.g., carboard boxes instead of wooden boxes. 
In such a case a notation inserted by the carrier in the bill of lading 
                                                 
41   Golodetz & Co. v Czarnikow (1980) 1 W.L.R 495 (Eng.)..  
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stating insufficient packing will not give the buyer the right to refuse 
the bill of lading because the buyer agreed to such packing in the 
contract of sale.  
As far as the carrier is concerned, he is usually not interested 
in the transaction between the seller and buyer, but only in the proper 
performance of the duties he has under the contract of carriage. If he 
noticed upon receipt of the goods that the packing was insufficient and 
has stated this in the bill of lading, he will be protected in case of loss 
or damage caused by such packing. Needless to say, such notation will 
require the bank to refuse documents, unless specifically authorized to 
accept them. 
On the other hand, the buyer should also be aware that the 
carrier’s duty of control over the condition of the goods is limited to 
the apparent condition, so that a clean bill of lading does not have to 
mean that the goods are actually in good condition. 
The present UCP definition of clean bill of lading does not 
require change in the part regarding condition of the goods, but certain 
caution may be necessary in relying on such definition. Depending on 
the kind of goods, the buyer might need the services of a surveyor at 
the port of shipment to determine whether the goods correspond with 
the requirements of the contract of sale. 
D.    Marks and General Nature of the Goods 
Reservations related to marks should be stamped in such a 
manner that they are clear and legible not only at the moment of 
loading, but also at the time of delivery to the consignee. Marks can be 
very important for the buyer, and when the goods are properly marked 
they can be identified at the destination. On the other hand, improper 
leading marks may expose the buyer to serious risk and difficulties. It 
is not clear why the UCP failed to include reservations regarding 
deficiency of marks in the definition of clean bill of lading. Maybe 
those reservations are not often used, and practical importance is lower 
than in the case of remarks concerning condition. But, as a matter of 
principle, the UCP should have at least made a reference to those 
reservations. The same applies to the nature of the goods, although it 
may be assumed that reservations regarding the nature of the goods 
are very seldom used. 
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CONCLUSION 
The fact that a clean bill of lading has two different and 
sometimes contradictory meanings has not been adequately addressed 
so far in the literature on letters of credit. Problems related to 
discrepancy of rules may exist in cases of all particulars on goods 
inserted in bills of lading. Such discrepancies can cause serious 
difficulties to all parties involved. It is rather cumbersome and can be 
confusing to assess the legal effect of the same document by applying 
different and even conflicting rules and standards when there is no 
obvious reason for that. This is a flaw in the system that could be 
rectified by clearer rules. 
The UCP rules on clean bills of lading are not sufficiently clear, 
which may expose buyers to serious risks. The main controversies exist 
in cases of reservations related to quantity and “said to contain” type 
clauses. 
Serious problems may arise in case of reservations regarding 
the quantity of the goods, since the UCP lacks clear guidance in such 
situations. There is also a clear departure from the rules on clean bills 
that apply to contract of carriage, which is particularly confusing and 
difficult to explain. Reservations stating shortage of the quantity are 
usually not acceptable for the buyers, and it is difficult to understand 
why the UCP ignored this. Buyers should be aware of the risk that 
banks would pay against a bill of lading containing a reservation related 
to quantity where the shortage is within the tolerance of 5% as 
provided by Article 30(b). This provision, however, has a different 
objective and may not be suitable for applying to the reservations 
regarding quantity, which may create additional confusion and 
problems to buyers. To avoid this risk, buyers should expressly instruct 
banks not to pay against a bill of lading containing reservations 
regarding the quantity. 
Another problem that may arise is related to different 
standards regarding the legal effects of “said to contain” type clauses. 
This clause may make a bill of lading unclean under the contract of 
carriage, but will never do so under the UCP, thus exposing buyers to 
a potentially great risk. Drafters of the next UCP may consider deleting 
Article 26(b), which contravenes the carriage rules and may even 
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facilitate the fraud. To avoid the risk imposed by “said to contain” type 
of clauses, the buyer should arrange for inspection of the goods before 
their delivery to the carrier and demand the seller to produce the 
certificate of inspection. Relating to documentary fraud, the principle 
of autonomy applying to letters of credit, and the fact that banks are 
bound to examine merely whether the documents comply with the 
terms of the credit makes it easier for dishonest sellers to commit 
fraud. Part of the problem is that the UCP often rely on trust instead 
on verification. Things are made even worse by some court decisions, 
which restricted the fraud exception to fraud by the beneficiary, 
making third party fraud outside the scope of the fraud exception.42 
The shortcomings in the present text of the UCP are obvious. 
For an outsider, it is difficult to understand why the ICC failed to 
rectify them in numerous revisions of the UCP. One possible 
explanation is that banks are not prepared to take additional burdens 
in examining transport documents. Another possible reason is that 
letters of credit function relatively well and not many problems actually 
arise in practice. However, the risk of fraud should not be 
underestimated, as even large companies may be defrauded under the 
existing system.43 Manoeuvring through the murky waters of fraud 
infected letters of credit can be very risky and cumbersome. Revisions 
of the relevant UCP provisions may substantially reduce the potential 
for fraud. Prevention is better than cure. 
                                                 
42   United City Merchs. (Inv.) Ltd. v. Royal Bank of Can. [1983] 1 A.C. 
168 (Eng.).  
43   See, e.g., Discount Records Ltd. [1975] 1 W.L.R. 315; see also Daewoo 
Int’l., 196 F.3d 481. Recently (June 2015) I received information about similar 
problems facing one of the largest companies in Thailand. This company bought 
steel scrap from an U.S. company. The goods were shipped in containers sealed by 
the shipper. Carrier inserted “said to contain” clause in the bill of lading, the bank 
has made payments pursuant to the UCP. After the containers were opened it was 
found that 80% in the cargo was soil, and not scrap. The lawyers of the buyer are 
aware that there is no valid claim against the carrier, or against the bank. The only 
chance is to sue the seller, which seems to be without significant assets, so even if 
successful, the award may not be enforceable. This kind of trouble was ultimately 
caused by a defect in the UCP, and not only by failure to engage a surveyor. After 
all, many companies may not employ the surveyor’s services to verify condition of 
the scrap cargo.   
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The UCP should be drafted in the way to protect the 
customers, and many of its provisions on transport documents serve 
that purpose. Revisions of the UCP suggested by this text would not 
be difficult and would not cause problems in implementation. 
Harmonizing the rules on letter of credit with rules applying to 
contract of carriage, where possible, would reduce legal uncertainty 
and problems that arise in practice. This would also help the letters of 
credit to maintain its position as a leading instrument of payment in 
international trade in the face of challenges by other forms of 
financing. 
Under the assumption that at least some arguments in this 
paper are correct, the drafters of the next revision of the UCP should 
take care to correct shortcomings in its present text and make efforts 
to harmonize letter of credit rules on clean bills of lading with 
corresponding rules that apply in carriage of goods.  
Another recommendation would be that all provisions related 
to clean bills of lading should be placed in one article rather than being 
scattered in different provisions. This would contribute to greater 
clarity and would reduce unnecessary confusions. 
The UCP has proven to be a great success, achieving greater 
uniformity than any other international instrument has ever been able 
to achieve in the area of transnational commercial law. Of course, the 
credit for this success goes to its drafters. But nothing is so good that 
it cannot be improved further. It is hoped that ideas expressed in this 
paper may contribute to a still better UCP.44 
 
                                                 
44   I have shared this text and my views in informal contact with the ICC 
Banking Commission and the reaction was receptive and positive.  I hope that some 
of the ideas from this text may eventually be incorporated in the next revision of the 
UCP. 
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THE HAGUE PRINCIPLES, THE CISG, 
AND THE “BATTLE OF FORMS” 
Peter Winship* 
The Hague Conference on Private International Law is about 
to adopt Principles on Choice of Law in International Commercial 
Contracts (Principles).1  Assume an enterprise in Texas agrees to 
provide commercial services to an enterprise in Peru, and the parties 
agree that the law of Texas applies to any dispute arising from their 
contract. Will a court enforce this choice-of-law agreement?  Courts in 
most States will do so.  For these States the Principles provide a 
codification of basic rules together with some refinements. Some 
States, however, do not enforce such agreements or restrict their 
enforceability.  The Principles and the accompanying Commentary 
seek to persuade these latter States that recognizing party autonomy as 
to the choice of law is preferable. As the Introduction to the Principles 
states, “[p]arty autonomy . . . enhances certainty and predictability . . . 
                                                 
*  James Cleo Thompson Sr. Trustee Professor, SMU Dedman School of 
Law. 
1   The Hague Conference on Private International Law published a revised 
draft in July 2014.  HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE 
DRAFT HAGUE PRINCIPLES ON CHOICE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
CONTRACTS, Prel. Doc. No. 6 (revised) (July 2014) [hereinafter Hague Principles or 
Principles], available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/gap2014pd06rev_en.pdf.  
Member States of the Hague Conference had until August 31, 2014 to submit 
comments on recent amendments to the text of the Commentary.  COUNCIL ON 
GENERAL AFFAIRS AND POLICY OF THE HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ADOPTED BY THE 
COUNCIL, ¶ 2 (April 2014), available at 
http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/genaff2014concl_en.pdf.  In the light of these 
comments, the Conference’s Working Group will prepare a definitive final text, 
which the Conference will then circulate to Member States.  If there are no objections 
within sixty days the draft will be an official text of the Hague Conference. Id. [Ed. 
The Principles entered into force on March 19, 2015. The final text may be found at 
http://www.hcch.net/upload/conventions/txt40en.pdf]. 
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and recognises that parties to a contract may be in the best position to 
determine which set of legal principles is most suitable for their 
transaction.”2 
The Hague Principles are no stranger to the International 
Academy of Commercial and Consumer Law. At the Academy’s July 
2012 meeting in Mexico City, Neil Cohen, a participant in the Working 
Group drafting the Principles, traced the history of the project and 
identified the principal issues addressed by the Hague draft.3  Since his 
report the number of commentaries analyzing the Principles has 
grown.4 Most of this literature comments on the Principles as a whole.  
This paper, however, is more limited in scope. It considers only one 
issue: the relation of the Hague Principles to the United Nations 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG)5 
when parties to an international contract of sales refer during 
negotiations to their standard terms and these standard terms include 
choice-of-law terms that conflict. 
Paragraph 1 b) of Article 6 of the Principles purports to answer 
whether parties to an international commercial contract—including an 
international contract of sale—have agreed on a choice of law when 
they make such references without resolving differences in their 
standard terms.  Article 6 as a whole provides: 
Hague Principles 
Article 6 (Agreement on choice of law and battle of 
forms) 
Paragraph 1 
                                                 
2   Hague Principles, supra note 1, at ¶ I.3. 
3   Neil B. Cohen, The Proposed Hague Principles on Choice of Law in International 
Commercial Contracts, in THE EVOLUTION OF THE GLOBAL TRADE OVER THE LAST 
THIRTY YEARS 157-71 (Elvia Arcelia Quintana Adriano, ed., 2014). 
4  See HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, HAGUE 
DRAFT PRINCIPLES ON CHOICE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS: 
BIBLIOGRAPHY, available at  
http://www.hcch.net/upload/draft_principles_bibl-e.pdf.  
5   Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr. 10, 
1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3, 19 I.L.M. 671 [hereinafter CISG]. 
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Subject to paragraph 2 - 
whether the parties have agreed to a choice of law is 
determined by the law that was purportedly agreed to; 
if the parties have used standard terms designating two 
different laws and under both of these laws the same 
standard terms prevail, the law designated in the 
prevailing terms applies; if under these laws different 
standard terms prevail, or if under one or both of these 
laws no standard terms prevail, there is no choice of 
law. 
Paragraph 2 
The law of the State in which a party has its 
establishment determines whether that party has 
consented to the choice of law if, under the 
circumstances, it would not be reasonable to make that 
determination under the law specified in paragraph 1.6 
The solution in paragraph 1 b) draws heavily on the thoughtful 
analysis of Thomas Kadner Graziano, a Swiss member of the Working 
Group.7 In his preliminary analysis of the Hague Principles, Symeon 
Symeonides rightfully pays tribute to Professor Kadner’s contribution 
to resolving this “difficult problem”8—a problem acknowledged to be 
one of the more challenging problems in private international law.9  
Because of its novelty, the solution in Article 6 will no doubt attract 
considerable attention from scholars and possibly judges and 
arbitrators. To assist the reader, the Commentary to Article 6 analyzes 
four scenarios, the fourth of which purports to apply the Principle to 
a contract of sale governed by the CISG. 
                                                 
6   Hague Principles, supra note 1, at art. 6. 
7  Thomas Kadner Graziano, Solving the Riddle of Conflicting Choice of Law 
Clauses in Battle of Forms Situations: The Hague Solution, 14 Y.B. PRIV. INT’L L. 71 (2013).  
8   Symeon C. Symeonides, The Hague Principles on Choice of Law for 
International Contracts: Some Preliminary Comments, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 873, 877 (2013). 
9   See generally Gerhard Dannemann, The “Battle of the Forms” and the Conflict 
of Laws, in LEX MERCATORIA: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LAW IN 
HONOUR OF FRANCIS REYNOLDS 199 (F.D. Rose ed., 2000).  
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This paper considers only this last scenario: the relation of the 
Hague Principles to the CISG when a seller and a buyer fail to resolve 
differences in their choice-of-law standard terms.  I leave to separate 
papers the analysis of Article 6 and an evaluation of the Principles as a 
whole. The thesis of this paper is that the solution offered in the 
Commentary is not the only reasonable way to analyze the scenario. 
I.         PRELIMINARY REMARKS 
A.       The “Battle of Forms” 
The “battle of forms” is to academic lawyers what a candle is 
to moths.  Most of my acquaintances have written about the “battle.” 
They ask: Do persons who exchange forms with different pre-
established standard terms have a contract when neither reads the 
other’s form but each performs as if there is a contract?  And if there 
is a contract, what are its terms? They classify national and 
international solutions to these questions with descriptive tags—”no 
contract”; “first shot”; “last shot”; “knock out”; “hybrid”—used by 
aficionados who barely pause to elaborate.10 These classifications and 
the concept of non-negotiated standard terms are so familiar I will not 
take up space to define them. 
Something, however, should be said about the “battle of 
forms” and the CISG. As with other laws, there is a growing literature 
analyzing the problem.11 Attempts at the 1980 Diplomatic Convention 
to address the issue with a specifically-tailored provision failed.12 It is 
                                                 
10  See generally Kadner Graziano, supra note 7; see also Dannemann, supra 
note 9. 
11  A search in the bibliography of published commentaries maintained by 
the CISG Database maintained by Pace Law School yielded seventy-four entries with 
the word “battle” in the title.  Bibliography, PACE LAW SCH. INST. OF INT’L 
COMMERCIAL LAW,   
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/biblio.html (last visited June 30, 2014).  
12  At the 1980 diplomatic conference, Belgium proposed to add a 
paragraph (4) to Article 19 (“(4) When the offeror and the offeree have expressly (or 
implicitly) referred in the course of negotiations to general conditions the terms of which 
are mutually exclusive the conflict clauses should be considered not to form an 
integral part of the contract.”).  Report of the First Committee, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.97/11 (Apr. 7, 1980). 
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generally agreed that the solution must be found in Article 19 CISG, 
which, with slight modifications, requires the terms of an acceptance 
to be the same as those in the offer.13 Two solutions–”knock out” and 
“last shot”—have found favor with both courts and commentators. 
There appears to be a trend among commentators to favor the knock-
out solution;14 it is more difficult to identify a trend in the decisions of 
judges and arbitrators.15 
Despite the academic interest in the subject, most authors 
concede that it is far from clear that the “battle” is of much interest in 
practice. This is certainly true with respect to the CISG.  During the 
last twenty-five years, only a relatively small number of reported CISG 
cases have wrestled with the issue of conflicting standard terms.16  As 
for a “battle” between differing choice-of-law terms, the number of 
reported cases can be counted on the fingers of one hand.17 
B.      CISG Policies 
Before turning to analysis of the specific issue addressed, 
several basic policies embodied in the provisions in CISG Part I 
(Sphere of application and general provisions) should be noted. 
Article 1(1) is the basic provision defining when the 
Convention is applicable: 
CISG 
Article 1 
(1) This Convention applies to contracts of sale of 
goods between parties whose places of business are in 
different States: 
                                                 
13   CISG, supra note 5, at art. 19.  
14  See COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE 
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS Art. 19, ¶¶ 34-38 (Peter Schlechtriem & Ingeborg 
Schwenzer, eds., 2d ed. 2005). 
15  See generally UNCITRAL, Digest of Case Law on the United Nations 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, at 103-07 (2012).   
16   Id.  
17   Id.  
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when the States are Contracting States; or 
when the rules of private international law lead to the 
application of the law of a Contracting State.18 
Subsequent articles qualify this statement by excluding, for 
example, particular sale transactions and particular issues. For the 
purpose of this paper, however, the most relevant qualification is 
Article 6, which allows a seller and buyer to agree to exclude 
application of the CISG when the Convention would otherwise be 
applicable.  Article 6 provides in relevant part: 
CISG 
Article 6 
The parties may exclude the application of this 
Convention . . . .19 
It is the interplay between these CISG scope provisions and 
Article 6 of the Hague Principles that is at issue in this paper. 
When considering this issue, three general provisions in CISG 
Part I are of particular importance. Two of these provisions direct the 
reader as to how to interpret or construe the Convention, while the 
third sets out rules on the interpretation of a party’s acts or statements. 
Article 7(1) states: 
CISG 
Article 7 
(1) In the interpretation of this Convention, regard 
is to be had to its international character and to the 
need to promote uniformity in its application and 
the observance of good faith in international trade.20 
                                                 
18   CISG, supra note 5, at art. 1. 
19   Id. at art. 6. 
20   Id. at art. 7(1) (emphasis added). 
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Article 7(2) goes on to provide that: 
(2) Questions concerning matters governed by this 
Convention which are not expressly settled by it are to 
be settled in conformity with the general principles on 
which it is based or, in the absence of such principles, 
in conformity with the law applicable by virtue of the 
rules of private international law.21 
As for the interpretation of a party’s statements, sub-articles 
(1) and (2) of Article 8 state: 
CISG 
Article 8 
(1) For the purposes of this Convention statements 
made by and other conduct of a party are to be 
interpreted according to his intent where the other 
party knew or could not have been unaware what that 
intent was. 
(2) If the preceding paragraph is not applicable, 
statements made by and other conduct of a party are 
to be interpreted according to the understanding that a 
reasonable person of the same kind as the other party 
would have had in the same circumstances.22 
Article 9 supplements this article by binding parties to usages 
of trade and their course of dealing with each other.23 
II.         THE BASIC SETTING 
The Commentary to Article 6 of the Hague Principles analyzes 
the following scenario (Scenario 4): 
                                                 
21   Id. at art. 7(2) (emphasis added). 
22   Id. at art. 8(1) and (2). 
23   Id. at art. 9. 
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Party A to a transborder sales contract designates in its 
standard terms the law of State X, which is a CISG 
Contracting State, as the law applicable to the contract. 
Party B designates in its standard terms the law of State 
Y, which is also a CISG Contracting State, but 
explicitly excludes the CISG. The general contract law 
of State Y follows the knock-out rule. The case is 
brought before a court in a CISG Contracting State.24 
Paragraphs 6.25-6.27 of the Commentary apply Article 6 of the 
Principles to this scenario and conclude that the parties have not 
agreed on the designation of an applicable law and therefore have not 
excluded application of the CISG.25 
The analysis in the Commentary is straightforward. The law 
designated by each party’s choice-of-law term is examined to 
determine how that law would resolve a “battle of forms.” If under 
one or both of these laws no term prevails, the parties are deemed not 
to have chosen the applicable law.  Party A’s designation of the law of 
State X leads—in accordance with the general consensus of courts and 
commentators—to application of the CISG rather than domestic 
contract law.  Article 19, the relevant contract formation rule of the 
CISG, is then identified. The Commentary accurately notes that there 
is no consensus among courts and commentators on whether Article 
19 is a “knock out” or “last shot” rule, and the Commentary does not 
try to resolve this issue of CISG interpretation.  A separate analysis of 
Party B’s choice-of-law term is then made, although made simpler 
because the scenario itself indicates that State Y’s general contract 
law—which is applicable, because Party B’s term expressly excludes 
the CISG—follows the knock-out rule.  Because no term prevails 
under one (or possibly both, depending on interpretation of CISG 
Article 19) of the laws designated by the two forms, the alternative set 
out in paragraph 1 b) of Article 6 of the Hague Principles provides that 
there has been no choice of the applicable law.26 
A basic assumption of the Commentary is that no part of the 
CISG is relevant when determining whether the parties have agreed to 
                                                 
24   Hague Principles, supra note 1, Commentary at ¶ 6.24. 
25   Id. at ¶¶ 6.24-6.27.  
26   Id.  
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exclude the Convention pursuant to Article 6 of the CISG: “[i]f the 
parties enter into a choice of law agreement excluding the CISG, the 
CISG will not apply”27 and “[because under the doctrine of 
severability] the choice of law agreement is a separate contract that is 
distinguished from the main contract (e.g., the sales contract) . . . the 
Principles govern the choice of law agreement, whereas the CISG 
governs the sales contract . . . .”28 
The issue is therefore whether this assumption is correct. In a 
separately published analysis, Professor Kadner concedes that his 
position—which supports the solution in the Hague Principles—is 
contrary to the “currently dominant position.”29 He cites five authors 
and one court decision as favoring the view that the contract formation 
provisions of the CISG (Part II: Arts. 14-24) apply to the formation of 
the choice-of-law agreement.30  He rejects this position on the principal 
ground that a choice-of-law agreement is distinct (“severable”) from 
the contract of sale.31  For this proposition, he relies on Article 7 of the 
Hague Principles, which states the severability principle,32 and Article 
4 of the CISG, which states that the Convention “governs only the 
formation of the contract of sale and the rights and obligations of the 
seller and the buyer arising from such a contract.”33  In support of his 
interpretation, Professor Kadner suggests several useful consequences.  
He notes that looking to general contract law rather than Part II of the 
CISG has the advantage of providing more comprehensive contract 
formation rules.34  He also points out that, because Article 4(a) of the 
CISG excludes coverage of issues of validity, a solution that leads to 
                                                 
27   Id. at ¶ 6.25. 
28   Id. at ¶ 6.26 
29   To be accurate, Professor Kadner addresses the issue in his analysis of 
paragraph (1)(b) of Article 1 of the CISG.  That paragraph provides that the CISG 
governs a contract of sale if rules of private international law lead to the law of a 
Contracting State. Professor Kadner’s analysis of Article 1 is equally applicable to 
Article 6 of the CISG.  Kadner, supra note 7, at 95-98. 
30   Id. 
31   Id. 
32   Hague Principles, supra note 1, art. 7.  
33   CISG, supra note 5, art 4. 
34   Kadner, supra note 7, at 97. 
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general contract law provides a single law for issues of both formation 
and validity.35 
Without necessarily endorsing the dominant position—at least 
as it is summarized by Professor Kadner—I find Professor Kadner’s 
reliance on Article 4 of the CISG unpersuasive.  On its face, the CISG 
governs more than contract formation (Part II) and the rights and 
obligations of sellers and buyers (Part III).  The CISG clearly also 
governs the Convention’s sphere of application, not to mention the 
Final Provisions in Part IV.  There is little reason to think that the 
general provisions in Part I (Arts. 7-13) do not apply to interpretation 
of the sphere of application provisions (Arts. 1-6) as well as to the 
provisions of Parts II and III.  Thus, if the policies and rules of 
interpretation found in Part I support the proposition that the CISG 
determines whether the parties have agreed to exclude the CISG, there 
is no need to rely on direct application of Article 19 of the CISG. 
Moreover, I think Professor Kadner pays insufficient attention 
to the CISG policies and principles of interpretation noted above in 
this paper’s preliminary remarks.  Although the CISG does not deny a 
role for private international law as its predecessor (Uniform Law on 
the International Sale of Goods (ULIS)) did,36 the CISG subordinates 
the role of private international law to the Convention’s provisions and 
the general principles on which the CISG is based.  The subordination 
of private international law is evident in the basic scope provision of 
Article 1(1) of the CISG: if the seller and buyer have their places of 
business in different Contracting States, the CISG applies;37 only if that 
paragraph is not satisfied does private international law play a role in 
making the CISG apply. To argue that private international rules are 
the exclusive source of rules when determining whether the parties have 
agreed to exclude the CISG pursuant to Article 6 is to upset the agreed 
relation between the CISG and private international law.  It should not 
be forgotten that until it is shown that the parties agreed to exclude the 
CISG pursuant to Article 6 of the CISG, the Convention governs. In 
                                                 
35   Id. at 96-97.  
36   Uniform Law of International Sales, art. 2.  The Uniform Law is set 
out in the annex to the 1964 Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the 
International Sale of Goods, 834 U.N.T.S. 107 (1972). 
37   CISG, supra note 5, art. 1(1)(a). 
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other words, Article 6 itself is in a sense subordinate to the scope 
provisions of Article 1(1).38 
One reason for subordinating private international law is that 
the CISG endorses the policy of uniformity, and private international 
rules do not always lead to uniform outcomes. This is true in the 
context of contracts and is especially true when parties use standard 
terms, where the rules are uncertain in part because of the failure of 
commentators to analyze the issues. There is no assurance that the 
Hague Principles will be successful in securing uniformity by their 
formula for analyzing the battle of forms.  Even if widely implemented, 
the Hague Principles allow for potential non-uniform outcomes.  For 
example, the Principles rely on non-uniform rules of interpretation 
unlike the CISG, which, as noted earlier, incorporates uniform 
provisions on interpretation of the parties’ statements and on the 
binding quality of the parties’ course of dealing and usages of trade. 
III.        MORE DETAILED ANALYSIS OF SCENARIO 4 
In the scenario set out in the Hague Commentary, the judge 
sits in a State party to the CISG.39  The judge is bound by Article 1(1)(a) 
to apply the CISG unless it can be shown that Party A and Party B 
agreed to exclude the Convention pursuant to Article 6.  How the 
judge might analyze the issues involved may best be understood by 
considering several simpler hypothetical cases. 
If Party A and Party B had negotiated a term that expressly 
excluded the CISG but did not designate the applicable law, the issue 
whether the parties agreed to the term is a matter of interpreting Article 
6 of the CISG.  The CISG does not provide an explicit answer, so, 
before turning to private international law, Article 7(2) directs the 
reader to look to the general principles on which the CISG is based. 
These principles can be derived from Part II and can be summarized 
                                                 
38   For an analysis of the relation of Article 6 of the CISG and private 
international law, see COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE 
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS, supra note 14, Art. 6, ¶¶ 4-5 (“The formation and 
interpretation of the exclusion of the CISG is subject to the rules of the Convention 
as the CISG determines its sphere of application autonomously”).  
39   Hague Principles, supra note 1, Commentary at ¶ 6.24. 
2015 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 4:1 
162 
as requiring clear evidence of actual agreement. Article 19 would not 
be directly applicable, but indirectly the insistence on a “mirror-image” 
acceptance of an offer is evidence of this principle.  If a court should 
find that there was an agreement to exclude the CISG, the court would 
then apply private international law rules to determine which State’s 
law applies when the parties have not chosen the applicable law. 
This analysis becomes only slightly more complicated if Party 
A and Party B each includes in its standard terms a term excluding the 
CISG without designating another law as the law applicable. The 
complication arises because each of the exclusion terms must be read 
in the light of Article 8 of the CISG (and, when relevant, Article 9 on 
binding trade usages and the parties’ course of dealing). If each 
exclusion term is unambiguous there would be consensus on exclusion 
and again a judge would apply the national law applicable by virtue of 
the rules of private international law. If, however, one of the terms is 
interpreted as not excluding the CISG, the judge would look to the 
general principles on which the CISG is based as directed by Article 
7(2). This general principle, I suggest, is to enforce the agreement of 
the parties when interpretation of their statements and acts under 
Article 8 show that there is consensus.  The general principle is derived 
from Part II of the CISG and is not bound by any particular 
interpretation of Article 19. In a case where one standard term excludes 
the CISG and the other does not, a court should find that the seller 
and buyer have not agreed to exclude the CISG. 
Sellers and buyers will rarely agree to exclude the CISG without 
designating the law applicable instead. Somewhat more likely is a 
transaction where Party A and Party B negotiate a term excluding the 
CISG and a separate term that designates the law of State Z, a non-
CISG State, as the applicable law.  The judge in this case must answer 
two questions: Did the parties agree to exclude the CISG? and, Did 
the parties effectively choose the law of State Z?  As in the cases 
analyzed in the preceding two paragraphs, the judge should analyze the 
first of these questions in light of the CISG’s general principles on the 
formation of an enforceable agreement. That the parties purport to 
choose the law of State Z as the applicable law is some evidence of 
their intent to exclude the CISG. Whether or not their choice of State 
Z’s law is valid is a separate question.  If the judge concludes that the 
parties agreed to exclude the CISG, the judge must then determine 
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whether rules of private international law would give effect to the 
parties’ choice of the law of State Z. 
These same two questions are posed even if Party A and Party 
B include the exclusion and the choice of the law of State Z in a single 
term of their agreement—or in substantively-equivalent terms in each 
of their standard terms. There is no reason for the judge to analyze the 
case differently. Even if the parties use a more likely formula—the 
term merely designates the law of State Z as the applicable law—there 
are the same two questions and the same analysis. Note, in particular, 
that absent an express exclusion of the CISG the choice of the law of 
State Z might be intended merely to designate the applicable domestic 
law if there are gaps in the CISG.40 
Scenario 4 of the Hague Commentary also involves the same 
two questions and the same analysis. One standard term designates the 
law of State X, which effectively is a choice of the CISG; the other 
standard term designates the law of State Y but expressly excludes 
application of the CISG, which effectively is a choice of the domestic 
law of State Y.  Applying the CISG’s general principles on contract 
formation to the first question, there is no consensus on exclusion of 
the CISG under Article 6 of the CISG.  Nor, as it happens, is there an 
effective choice of the applicable law by application of the analysis 
found in the Commentary to Article 6 of the Hague Principles. The 
analysis of the two questions is simpler and more direct than that based 
solely on Article 6 of the Principles.  It recognizes a role, albeit a 
subordinate one, for private international law.  In other words, the 
analysis is a rational alternative to the reasoning of the Hague 
Principles. 
IV.         ADDITIONAL REMARKS 
Whether one analyzes Scenario 4 using the Hague 
Commentary or my alternative analysis the result is the same: Party A 
and Party B have not agreed to exclude application of the CISG so the 
Convention governs their transaction. Nevertheless, several additional 
remarks are in order. 
                                                 
40   CISG, supra note 5, art. 7(2). 
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First, the Commentary apparently assumes that there is at all 
times an enforceable sales contract.  This is apparently based on the 
concept of severability: whether or not the parties have a contract of 
sale excludes any consideration of choice-of-law terms even if all the 
terms are in a single document. It is difficult to imagine that sellers and 
buyers think of their “deal” as consisting of two distinct contracts. My 
alternate analysis leaves open the question of whether the parties have 
formed a contract of sale. If the parties have not agreed to exclude the 
CISG, a judge will determine whether the parties concluded a sales 
contract by looking to Article 19 and applying it to all terms (including 
the choice-of-law term) of the parties’ deal. 
Second, the Commentary makes the result appear easy by 
simply stating State Y’s contract law rule on battle of forms without 
going through the potentially difficult task of ascertaining and 
interpreting that rule.41  Having reported that the rule is a “knock-out 
rule” the result follows by a simple application of paragraph 1 b) of 
Article 6 of the Hague Principles: “if the parties have used standard 
terms designating two different laws and . . . [if] under one or both of 
these laws no standard terms prevail, there is no choice of law.”42 
Under the “knock-out rule” of State Y, no standard term prevails so 
there is no choice of law. In practice, however, identifying how a 
jurisdiction deals with conflicting standard terms may be contentious 
and time-consuming—and in the case of conflicting standard choice-
of-law terms the analysis will have to be done for each of the 
jurisdictions designated in the conflicting standard terms.43 
Third, it follows from the second point that, if Article 19 of 
the CISG is interpreted as adopting a “knock-out rule,”44 parties will 
never chose the applicable law if one of the parties designates the law 
                                                 
41   Hague Principles, supra note 1, Commentary ¶ 6.24. 
42   Id. at art. 6 1 b). 
43   If the CISG is interpreted as adopting a knock-out rule, there never 
will be a choice of law when one of the States is a CISG state. The answer to scenarios 
like that of Scenario 4 will always be that there is no choice of law.  The Hague 
Commentary avoids interpretation of Article 19 because the scenario itself states that 
the law of State Y regarding battle of forms applies a knock-out rule. 
44   It should be noted that the Hague Commentary quite rightly does not 
interpret Article 19, merely calling attention to the several possible interpretations 
recognized in case law and the literature. 
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of a CISG state as the applicable law. The answer to scenarios like that 
of Scenario 4 will always then be that there is no choice of law 
agreement.  This would simplify analysis using the Commentary’s 
approach because no further analysis is necessary if one party has 
designated a CISG state. 
Finally, by commenting on the interface between the Principles 
and the CISG only with respect to the “battle of forms,” the 
Commentary misses an opportunity to provide a more systematic 
analysis of that interface.  If, for example, the parties are not located in 
different Contracting States, what is the relation of the Hague 
Principles to CISG Article 1(1)(b)? Even within Article 6 of the 
Principles there are questions that might have been addressed. 
Consider the following variation on Scenario 4: 
Party A’s standard terms designate the law of State Z, a non-
CISG State, and Party B’s standard terms neither exclude the CISG 
nor choose an applicable law.  (All other facts remain the same as in 
Scenario 4.) 
Paragraph 1 b) of Article 6 is not relevant–the parties’ standard 
terms have not chosen two different laws—so paragraph 1 a) is the 
relevant rule.  As a similar provision in Article 10 of the Rome I 
Regulation is interpreted,  the law of State Z is the law the two parties 
“purportedly agreed to.”45 In such a case, Professor Kadner argues that 
the domestic contract law of State Z determines whether the choice is 
valid.46  If it is valid, the Principles would conclude that, because the 
CISG is not the law in State Z, the parties had excluded the CISG even 
though Party A and Party B have their places of business in different 
Contracting States.  By contrast, an analysis that applies the CISG 
principles to determine whether the parties have agreed to exclude the 
CISG would look to the statements and acts of both parties rather than 
a “purported agreement” derived from only one of them.  The silence 
of Party B should not be deemed an acceptance of Party A’s term.  This 
is a general principle found in Article 18(1) of the CISG (“Silence . . . 
does not in itself amount to acceptance.”).47  Moreover, given the 
                                                 
45  Council Regulation 593/2008, The Law Applicable to Contractual 
Obligations (Rome I), 2008 O.J. (L 177) 6.  
46   Kadner, supra note 7, at 94-99. 
47   CISG, supra note 5, art. 18(1). 
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widespread adoption of the CISG, Party B’s silence may reflect a 
judgment that there is no need to choose a law when dealing with 
businesses located in other Contracting States because the CISG will 
apply and Party B thinks its provisions satisfactory.  This analysis leads 
to the conclusion that Party A and Party B have not agreed to exclude 
the CISG. 
The Commentary’s relatively straightforward analysis of 
Scenario 4 may leave the impression that all applications of the Hague 
Principles will be equally straightforward. This is not the case. The 
Commentary rightly points to the potential importance of applying the 
Principles to CISG transactions. It is unfortunate—but understandable 
for reasons of space—that the Commentary addresses only one 
scenario.  For informed analysis of additional scenarios, the reader 
must look to Professor Kadner’s separate publication.48 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper I analyze the relation of the Hague Principles on 
the Choice of Law in International Commercial Contracts to the CISG 
when a seller and a buyer exchange different choice-of-law terms in 
their standard terms.  I have done so by studying a scenario (“Scenario 
4”) in the Commentary to Article 6 of the Principles. The thesis of the 
paper is that the solution offered in the Commentary is not the only 
reasonable way to analyze the scenario.  In support of my thesis it is 
not necessary that I demonstrate that my analysis is the only proper 
analysis or even that my analysis is the better one. I merely have to 
show that a rational judge or arbitrator might choose my analysis over 
that offered by the Commentary.  If I am persuasive, adoption of the 
Principles should not be read as endorsing the Commentary solution 
as definitive.49 
 
                                                 
48   Kadner, supra note 7, at 94-99. 
49   The final text of the Commentary adds a final sentence to paragraph 
6.23: “The interpretations of the CISG in this Commentary do not purport to be 
exclusive or authoritative interpretations of the CISG by the Hague Conference or 
its members.” See supra, note 1.  
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AN INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH TO THE 
CREATION OF INNOVATION 
ECOSYSTEMS AND THE ROLE OF LAW 
Toshiyuki Kono* and Kazuaki Kagami** 
INTRODUCTION 
Innovation is considered a source of social development, and 
the promotion of innovation has been encouraged all over the world. 
The methods for which innovation can be achieved, however, have 
not been clearly identified. The concept of an “ecosystem” has recently 
emerged as a tool to illustrate the organizational aspects of innovation, 
but the conditions and mechanisms necessary to create and manage a 
successful innovation ecosystem remain unclear. 
Many countries, including Japan, have been trying to create an 
ecosystem similar to Silicon Valley by inviting and accumulating 
venture companies, research institutions, and universities, and by 
providing special measures for tax reduction, new funding schemes, 
and opening new facilities. However, one important aspect seems to 
have been overlooked: even if each player is innovative, if they do not 
create relationships that lead to innovations, the area as a whole cannot 
function as an innovation ecosystem. When an ecosystem is 
established, the conditions of its autonomous functioning are not 
automatically fulfilled. Hence, we are interested in the role of law, 
which might contribute to the development of these conditions. In 
particular, we will focus on a factor that would lead to the 
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establishment of innovation ecosystems and functions–we1 call it 
“mode,” which we understand as those factors that determine the 
direction of the player’s thinking and activities–and analyze the role of 
law to facilitate the sharing of modes by relevant players. 
To illustrate the goal of this article, let’s have a look at the Ohta 
Ward in Tokyo. In Ohta Ward, many diverse small and midsized 
companies have gathered and countless innovations are continuously 
created. In this area, a number of voluntary interactions among these 
companies take place. Furthermore, networks between these 
companies, research institutes and governmental agencies are well 
established. Importantly, in Ohta Ward, laws and rules have played a 
crucial role in establishing these networks and their management. An 
innovation ecosystem, along with the supporting infrastructure, is 
firmly established in Ohta Ward. The supporting infrastructure 
includes not only measures related to tax and finance, but also 
measures aimed at development and education of human resources, 
the supply of human resources into the ecosystem, support for 
matching players, and the reduction of friction related to the 
establishment of networks and their management. In short, various 
types of support focusing on specificities of the ecosystem are offered 
as institutional bases of this well-functioning ecosystem.2 
I. INNOVATION ECOSYSTEM AND THE ROLE OF LAW 
Many policymakers and other governmental authorities have 
focused on innovation. Various policy measures have been introduced 
and implemented to achieve innovation. Industrial policies, particularly 
centralized industrial policies, are often adopted by developing 
countries to “catch up” with developed countries.  Such policies are 
                                                 
 
1   This refers to the authors of the article and is used throughout this 
article.  
2   Chiiki ni okeru sangyō shūseki no keisei oyobi kaihatsu ni kansuru 
hōritsu shinki jigyō ritchi no sokushin o tsūjite,-tō [Act on Formation and 
Development of Regional Industrial Clusters through Promotion of Establishment 
of New Business Facilities, etc.], Act No. 40 of May 11, 2007 (Japan).  
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inadequate to create new technologies or ideas, or to develop new 
types of market. Instead, open and decentralized systems have recently 
been attracting the attention policymakers. This is the so-called 
“ecosystem.” 
We share the view that an ecosystem is one of the most 
important keys for innovation.3 Although a well-established and widely 
shared definition of the concept of an ecosystem does not yet exist, 
there is one shared understanding of the ecosystem:4 an organization 
or system where continuous and dynamic interactions among various 
players take place. Inherent in this definition is the idea that innovative 
outcomes cannot be obtained solely by a single “genius” individual or 
through a well-controlled and uni-linear evolution process. Rather, it 
is presumed that outcomes can be obtained as a result of multi-layered 
and voluntary interactions among various players.5 
Various policy measures have been implemented to promote 
innovations, including education policies to build the capacity of 
(potential) players in the ecosystem, cultural policies to promote 
innovation-oriented minds, intellectual property (IP) protections and 
tax policies to incentivize players, accumulation policies to raise the 
degree of players’ density, and subsidization policies. If these policy 
measures are successful, we would find a number of successful 
innovation ecosystems. The reality, however, is that despite many 
countries’ efforts to create a second Silicon Valley, their trials often 
yield unsuccessful results. This failure implies that the proper 
                                                 
 
3    See infra, note 6.  
4   Ecosystem is defined as “a multi-faceted and continual interaction 
among many aspects of our economy and society.” COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, 
INNOVATE AMERICA: NATIONAL INNOVATION INITIATIVE SUMMIT AND REPORT 
46 (2005).  
5   Regarding the evolution of the innovation concept, see RICHARD S. 
ROSENBLOOM & W. J. SPENCER, ENGINES OF INNOVATION: U.S. INDUSTRIAL 
RESEARCH AT THE END OF AN ERA (1996); ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL 
ADVANTAGE: CULTURES AND COMPETITION IN SILICON VALLEY AND ROUTE 128 
2-4 (1994) (comparing the independent firm-based system and the regional network-
based system, and asserting that the latter is more suitable). 
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understanding of the conditions and means necessary to create 
innovative ecosystems is still lacking.6 Why is that so? 
Our view is that policy measures have tended to target 
individual players themselves, and have failed to focus on the interaction 
between players. Even if excellent inventors, scholars, and entrepreneurs 
had populated a particular area, that area would not function well as an 
ecosystem if their interactions are ineffective. This idea reflects the 
shortcomings of previous research on ecosystems. It is a widely 
accepted belief that networking, communication, and collaboration are 
crucial, but how to facilitate this remains somewhat unclear. In short, 
the conditions of a well-functioning ecosystem has not been a topic of 
significant research. 
A key factor of a well-functioning ecosystem is the transaction 
costs caused by interactions among players.7 If transaction costs are 
high, interactions stagnate and the ecosystem remains ineffective. 
Further, if transaction costs matter, a law and economics approach 
might contribute to a clarification of the conditions. What can law do 
to promote interactions among players to create successful 
ecosystems? 
II. INNOVATION ECOSYSTEM AND MODE 
A.         Mode of Thinking and Behavior 
1. Generally recognized facts on innovation. – As already mentioned, 
innovations are created through interactions among multiple players 
under specific conditions. Such interactions can be affected by players’ 
internal nature and external environment. Players’ internal nature 
includes their knowledge, technical strength, passion, financial power, 
                                                 
 
6   In this context, see VICTOR W. HWANG & GREG HOROWITT, THE 
RAINFOREST: THE SECRET TO BUILDING THE NEXT SILICON VALLEY 304 (2012). 
7   For a discussion of transaction costs related to communications, see 
KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION (1974); OLIVER E. 
WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES (1975).  
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way of thinking, and behavior. These elements of a players’ internal 
nature might be so player-specific that trying to determine an “average 
type” or “typical features” is unhelpful. In addition, these elements are 
usually formed within each player and become quasi-inherent. 
Therefore, a players’ internal nature is not easily changeable, and any 
change would require significant time and costs. 
A player’s external environment consists of external factors 
that influence his activities and performances, but that cannot be 
directly controlled by the player. Such factors include other players’ 
capabilities, types of players, or the density of players; funding systems; 
legal systems to protect contracts and/or property; the quality and 
quantity of lawyers; the credibility of the judicial system; macro-
economy and industrial structure; and consciousness on invention or 
entrepreneurship in society. 
Recognizing the fact that a number of factors affect 
innovations, we propose to focus on mode and to clarify the role of 
law in relation to mode because mode has been neglected in preceding 
scholarly works and has not been integrated into policy measures. 
2. The concept of mode and its functions. – In this paper, we 
understand mode as those factors that determine the direction of each 
player’s thinking and activities. This understanding of mode considers 
each player’s internal nature, but excludes purely innate factors such as 
IQ. Mode overlaps to some extent with personal character; however, 
mode is not identical to individual personality or philosophy, since 
personality and philosophy remain individual and internal. Instead, 
mode has such aspects that affect performances and outcomes of 
collaborative works with other players. Focus should be placed on such 
factors that can be acquired after birth and that are to some extent 
adjustable, such as language. Even if an individual is honest, 
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industrious and has good sense of humor, he cannot contribute to 
innovation if he does not have a mode to work with others. 
Mode is also closely linked to organizational cultures.8 Schein 
defines organizational cultures as: 
[A] pattern of shared basic assumptions that was 
learned by a group as it solved its problems of external 
adaptation and internal integration, that has worked 
well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to 
be taught to new members as the correct way to 
perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems.9 
This definition is very close to our understanding of mode. 
However, mode in our view has a larger scope than that of 
organizational culture. Analysis of organizational cultures has often 
focused only on a single corporation, where the membership is fixed 
and has to follow the top-down authority. But mode is not limited to 
a single corporation. Mode as specific patterns of thinking and 
activities can apply to several organizations. In addition, even if an 
organization has a fluctuating membership, it could have its own 
mode. In addition, although studies on organizational cultures often 
presume that organizations can stand-alone without being affected by 
the outer world, this presumption seems unrealistic. Organizations 
cannot remain unaffected from interventions from outside, and mode 
is a useful tool to explain such situations. 
The mode of a community or a region may have similarities to 
socio-cultural norms. In preceding discussions on socio-cultural 
norms, socio-cultural norms tend to be understood as unilaterally 
                                                 
 
8   For a discussion of organizational culture, see TERRENCE DEAL & 
ALLAN KENNEDY, CORPORATE CULTURES: THE RITES AND RITUALS OF 
CORPORATE LIFE (1982); EDGAR H. SCHEIN, ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND 
LEADERSHIP (4th. ed. 2010). For an analysis from an economics perspective, see 
David M. Kreps, Corporate Culture and Economic Theory, in PERSPECTIVES ON POSITIVE 
POLITICAL ECONOMY 90-143 (James E. Alt & Kenneth A. Shepsle, eds., 1990). 
9   SCHEIN, supra note 10, at 18. 
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influencing individuals or organizations, while feedback from 
individuals or organizations to such norms tends to be neglected. Even 
if such feedback would be taken into consideration, the self-
organizational nature of society is so emphasized that little attention is 
paid to the laws or powers that would intervene from outside of the 
society.10 In addition, such focus on the self-organizational nature 
might lead to an overlook the fact that societal relationships are more 
complex: such relationships include those between one society and 
other societies, between a society and a supra-society, or between a 
society and a partial society. 
The concept of mode helps us to pay due attention not only to 
each component of a society, i.e., mode of individuals, modes of 
organizations, inter-organizational relationships, and composite 
situations with these components,11 but also to relationships between 
a society and its outer world. 
Each player’s mode can be adapted to his external 
environment. Thus, his mode is influenced by the cultures, values, 
religions, norms, customs, and fashions of society as a whole. 
3. Interactions between different players with different modes result in high 
transaction costs. – If each player’s personal mode and the mode of his 
organization, community, and region (locale) are different, it is 
extremely difficult for such an organization or community to function 
as an ecosystem.12 In other words, members of an organization or 
community must share a specific mode. However, in order to foster 
innovation in an ecosystem, sharing specific modes by members will 
                                                 
 
10   See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS 
SETTLE DISPUTES (1991).  
11   See Robert Sugden, Spontaneous Order, 3 J. ECON. PERSP. 85 (1989); Jon 
Elster, Social Norms and Economic Theory, 3 J. ECON. PERSP. 99 (1989); H. Peyton 
Young, The Economics of Conventions, 10 J. ECON. PERSP. 105 (1996); Randal C. Picker, 
Simple Games in a Complex World: A Generative Approach to the Adoption of Norms, 64 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1225 (1997). 
12   See JOHN P. KOTTER & JAMES L. HESKETT, CORPORATE CULTURE 
AND PERFORMANCE (1992); JIM C. COLLINS & JERRY I. PORRAS, BUILT TO LAST: 
SUCCESSFUL HABITS OF VISIONARY COMPANIES (1994). 
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not suffice. Each member’s mode should be adapted to the external 
environment and should be consistent with the purpose of the 
community. For example, Toyota has not only been trying to let its 
employees share the same modes (organizational modes), irrespective 
of the location of subsidiaries, but has also been creating the modes in 
their supply chains (community modes). In Silicon Valley, there exists 
explicit or implicit modes to conduct business.13 To be noted here is 
the fact that a mode in an organization (e.g., Toyota) or in a region 
(e.g., Silicon Valley) is usually different from other organizations (e.g., 
General Motors) or regions (e.g., Ohta Ward). In other words, each 
ecosystem should have its own mode to function well. 
To create an open innovation ecosystem or meta-national 
ecosystem beyond one organization or one region, several 
communities with different modes or individuals from different 
communities must interact, for example, merger and acquisition 
between private companies; joint venture; collaboration between 
private company and university or private company and government. 
Also, with regard to merger and acquisition between private 
companies, many unconventional collaborations might occur, such as 
collaboration between manufacturer and distributor. This situation, 
however, would lead to constant conflicts of modes. Many failed 
merger and acquisition cases (e.g., Daimler Chrysler14  and AOL-Time 
Warner merger15) imply that, in such conflicted circumstances, no 
innovation ecosystems can be created. 
                                                 
 
13   For a discussion of the history and institutions of Silicon Valley, 
especially functions as ecosystem and relations to external environment, see MARTIN 
KENNEY, UNDERSTANDING SILICON VALLEY: THE ANATOMY OF AN 
ENTREPRENEURIAL REGION (2000).  
14   Roberto A. Weber and Colin F. Camerer, Cultural Conflict and Merger 
Failure: An Experimental Approach, 49 MGMT. SCI. 400 (2003). 
15   Tim Arango, How the AOL-Time Warner Merger Went So Wrong, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 11, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/11/business/media/11merger.html?pagewante
d=all.  
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In a well-functioning innovation ecosystem, innovations are 
expected to occur autonomously and continuously. However, 
integrating (new) players with different modes into an ecosystem with 
its own mode may be difficult, since such integration could inevitably 
cause friction between the new players and the mode of the ecosystem. 
More difficult is the challenge of adjusting each community’s mode 
and non-community-members’ mode, because the mode of a 
community is usually so designed that the community functions well 
as an autonomous mechanism. Integration of such a mode and the 
mode of non-community-members would not occur autonomously. 
Hence, we need external interventions, such as law, to facilitate 
integration of different modes. 
Here, then, is the question we must answer: how should law be 
designed as a useful tool to adjust to conflicts of modes? Roughly 
speaking, there are two possible directions: (1) to introduce a unified 
mode, disregarding players’ different modes; and (2) to select 
appropriate modes on a case-by-case basis, maintaining the difference 
of modes. 
III. ANALYSIS 
A.         Interactions in a Community: Hypothesis 
We assume that players enter into a community voluntarily 
with an aim to do business, but they cannot predict who they will meet 
in the community. We will further assume that diverse players belong 
to the community.  To illustrate this assumption in a simpler form, let 
us assume that two players 1, and 2, belong to the community. Players, 
1 and 2, encounter each other by coincidence and create a relationship. 
The outcome of this relationship will depend on the players’ modes 
and external environment, assuming each player chose his mode prior 
to the encounter and that his mode cannot be changed. 
Innovations occur through players’ voluntary interactions. 
Such successful interactions which can bring about innovations 
requires that the mode of each player matches with others’ modes. If 
players’ modes do not match, their relationships will not function as 
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an ecosystem. In such a case, investment would be wasted without any 
return. Therefore, in Table 1, we assume a negative outcome if players’ 
modes do not match. Even if players’ modes match, benefits are 
smaller if their modes are not consistent with external circumstances. 
In Table 1, it is assumed that modes of two parties are [i] in an 
environment [i], benefits 30 could be produced to each player. If such 
a match occurs in an environment [j], benefits would be only 5. If their 
modes do not match, frictions occur and benefits would be -10. 
Equally, if their modes are [j] in an environment [j], benefits would be 
30, while benefits would be only 5, if their modes are [i]. 
Table 1: The pay-off matrixes of Players 1 and 2. 
  
 
 
 
Strictly speaking, differences of modes are more complex. Let’s 
assume that mode “i” represents a mode which is innovation oriented. 
We use [a] and [b] to illustrate two specific modes as variations of “i”. 
For example, mode [a] puts more emphasis on production process, 
while marketing is more important in mode [b]; even though both 
modes do not hesitate to take risks, mode [a] prefers ex ante 
investigation and planning, while in mode [b] ex post risk management 
is more important; certain types of conflicts of modes are small and 
can be resolved through players’ cooperative negotiations, but other 
types of conflicts of modes are so great that they need organizational 
reforms. In any case, such complexity is reflected in the size of 
transaction costs. 
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B.         The Role of Law in Promoting Innovation 
1. Traditionally recognized functions of law. – Even in a well-
functioning ecosystem where relationships among players are 
autonomously established, law plays a crucial role as an element of the 
external environment. 
First, law can be a tool to enhance each player’s individual 
capacity. In addition, educational and training schemes can be 
introduced from outside of the ecosystem by law. If each player’s 
knowledge, technique, and comprehension can be enhanced by these 
schemes, outcomes such as the figure 30 in Table 2 can be increased 
to fifty or one hundred. 
Second, contracts and properties can be protected by law. To 
achieve the outcomes in Table 2—either thirty or five—contracts and 
property rights must be protected. Some ecosystems can offer 
protective functions by its traditional customs or social norms. 
However, they have a few shortcomings compared to law: it is more 
difficult to enforce these non-law customs and norms than it is to 
enforce law; there is no guarantee that such customs and norms would 
be appropriately designed and applied; and it is more difficult to amend 
or abolish customs and norms than it is to abolish law. 
Third, law is necessary to develop and manage infrastructures, 
including financial systems, information systems, traffic systems, 
distribution systems, production systems, and legal systems, for 
innovations. These infrastructures improve the quality of each player’s 
activities, and the contents and frequency of innovations, by enlarging 
and facilitating players’ interactions. 
 These functions have traditionally been expected as the roles 
of law, and have been integrated into various policy measures. The 
important thing is to understand that the roles of law are not limited 
to these functions. 
2. Autonomous adjustment by ecosystem and its limits. – As stated 
above, conflicts of modes are fatal for innovations. If modes of players 
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do not match, modes can be adjusted by autonomous mechanisms in 
the ecosystem to which they belong. 
The simplest autonomous mechanism is named “cheap talk” 
in economic theory.16 Let’s take Table 1 again and assume that the 
external environment is [i]. If a player adopts mode [i], it is desirable 
that another player would also adopt mode [i]. In other words, both 
players want to cooperate, i.e., choose the same “mode,” if they know 
what the other player’s choice will be, but uncertainty about the other 
player’s choice will make such cooperation fail. Under such 
circumstances, the appropriate action for one player is to inform the 
other player of his choice of mode before the other player chooses his 
mode. Since both players wish to collaborate, they can trust that such 
notice is correct and the other player will take the same mode. 
Therefore, the desirable result, i.e., choice of mode [i] by both players 
in the environment [i], would occur through both parties’ voluntary 
actions. The problem, however, is that this situation does not often 
exist. 
Another useful mechanism to adjust modes is an “evolutionary 
process.” This mechanism assumes that each player will choose his 
“mode,” which might bring about greater benefits. Then the player will 
look at his mode or the mode of other players in a close circle. These 
players would learn a better mode-to bring about more benefits-and 
try to imitate it. Repeating trials to imitate and learn other modes would 
lead to a situation in which the more beneficial mode would become 
dominant in society. This mechanism does not require players to be 
rational or perfect usable information. A number of trials to learn 
others’ modes and imitate them would lead to specific modes 
becoming dominant in the society. 
Conditions of this mechanism, however, are not easy to fulfill. 
First, to learn or imitate a more beneficial mode (mode as objective), 
players should share the same learning mode or imitation mode (mode 
                                                 
 
16   See Joseph Farrell & Matthew Rabin, Cheap Talk, 10 J. ECON. PERSP. 
103 (1996). 
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as method). To observe, understand, obtain, and apply other players’ 
ways of thinking and behavioral patterns (mode) requires complex 
interactions between players on both the learning and teaching sides. 
If learning or imitation of others’ mode is difficult, the entire to-be-
evolutionary process may not evolve. Second, during the evolutionary 
process, the external environment should be stable. If the external 
environment changes, the evolutionary process will lose orientation. 
The external environment of innovations, however, often changes. 
Therefore, even if the evolutionary process evolves, it may not reach a 
desirable goal, i.e., to achieve expected benefits and create an 
ecosystem. 
We cannot simply assume that an ecosystem would 
autonomously function to resolve conflicts of modes among players 
and promote innovations. When conflicts of modes occur, an 
ecosystem may not function and innovations will not occur. We should 
not fully depend on the autonomous adjustment functions of an 
ecosystem, and may have to use mechanisms and powers outside the 
ecosystem. Here, we see the potential utility of law, although preceding 
analysis overlooked this aspect. 
C.         Mode and Law 
As we saw in Section A, there are three functions for which 
law has traditionally been performing in order to support the creation 
of an innovation ecosystem. However, we realized that the mode has 
been neglected and autonomous adjustment mechanism inherent in an 
ecosystem has limits. Here, we see a new role of law, i.e., adjustment 
of modes. This includes the following: First, law might encourage each 
player to change his mode before their encounter, which will prevent 
conflicts of modes in advance. This is unnecessary for players in the 
same region or industry; however, when private companies and 
authorities cooperate for innovations, or when small- or medium-size 
companies want to expand their business in foreign countries, 
adjustment of modes assisted by law might be necessary. In addition, 
when a special economic zone is created to promote innovations, 
modes of players should be adjusted prior to their involvement in the 
zone. Law can play a crucial role in facilitating such an adjustment. 
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Second, when players’ share the same mode [j], although the 
mode of external environment is [i],17 such equilibrium between players 
does not bring about an optimal outcome; however a player will not 
be incentivized to change his mode [j] as long as other players retain 
mode [j], since maintaining mode [j] would be his best choice. To 
depart from such equilibrium is more difficult as the number of players 
gets larger, but a more appropriate mode will be adopted in order to 
achieve more innovations. Law can play a crucial role in facilitating the 
change of mode. To identify a more desirable mode might be costly 
for players, but if the law can identify the mode at a lower cost or more 
effectively, players might be encouraged to change their mode. A good 
example which illustrates the change of mode is the Meiji Restoration 
in Japan at the end of the nineteenth century. After the feudal system, 
begun under Tokugawa Shogunate in the seventeenth century was 
collapsed, the new Meiji Government sought a model of a modern 
State. After a thorough investigation, the Meiji Government decided 
to introduce the system from Prussia, and modeled the Imperial 
Constitution of Japan as well as important basic laws after the Prussian 
system. 
Law can also synchronize the timing as a mode. For example, 
today’s academic calendar in Japan begins in April and ends in March 
of the following year, which we could describe as the April-March 
mode. This was not the case, however, until the early twentieth 
century. In 1886, the academic year of elementary schools was changed 
to follow the State’s fiscal year, which starts in April. The calendar of 
high schools was changed in 1919, and in 1921, when the academic 
calendar of universities was changed, all schools adopted the April-
March mode. This change affected not only the life style of people, but 
also business customs. Thus the April-March mode became the 
standard calendar mode of Japan and it affected various investments. 
                                                 
 
17   This could happen if, due to the change of external environment, the 
optimal match between the mode shared by players and modes of the external 
environment is lost.  
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Third, previous discussions on innovation ecosystem seem to 
only focus on success stories. However, as there are few Silicon Valley 
ecosystems in the world, it is important to also analyze the many failed 
cases. We should look at these cases through the lens of the functions 
of law to adjust different modes of players and environment and 
facilitate the creation of ecosystems. 
D.         Modes Beyond a Community 
Adjustment of modes in one community is relatively simple, 
and it is easier to understand how to solve conflicts of modes in one 
community. However, recent open-innovation and meta-national 
innovations imply interactions beyond one organization, one region, 
or one state. Today, it is necessary to solve conflicts of modes in a 
“beyond-one-community-context.” Law can serve this purpose. 
In an ecosystem, innovations can be achieved when the 
majority of the ecosystem’s members share the same mode. Within an 
ecosystem the unification of modes can be promoted. However, in 
order to develop innovations beyond an organization or a State, we 
will inevitably face various modes of diverse stakeholders and 
environments. Multiple ecosystems with different modes will co-exist. 
A key question for us is how to cultivate mutually beneficial 
interactions among these ecosystems. It is incorrect to assume that 
there is one universal mode to which all ecosystems should be oriented. 
Diversity of mode occurs because, first, an ecosystem tends to 
internalize modes which are adaptable to regional circumstances, and 
support by local policies accelerates this tendency.18 Second, if there 
can be several modes with equal desirability for innovations, the choice 
of mode to be shared in an ecosystem can be determined by 
coincidence. Therefore, two ecosystems facing the same external 
environment may choose different “modes,” and there would be plural 
equilibria. Third, sharing a mode is either path-dependent or history-
                                                 
 
18   This idea was proposed by Charles M. Tiebout. Charles M. Tiebout, A 
Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956). 
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dependent. When a mode has been shared in an ecosystem at a point 
in the past, investments would have been made presuming this mode 
would remain shared in the ecosystem. Through these investments, 
this mode would fit to innovation better. For example, if this mode is 
shared in a community in which individual investors (“angels”)19 
provide money to venture companies, various services to improve this 
mode would be developed, such as services to match angels and 
ventures; services to provide information to angels; services to support 
contracts between angels and ventures; and services to solve problems 
between angels and ventures. When these services are well-established, 
this mode is further strengthened.   
Hence, it should be assumed that the mode shared in one 
ecosystem is usually different from modes of other ecosystems. 
However, as we saw above, how to cope with conflicts of modes is the 
key for innovations. Law can play a crucial role in this context. Ex ante 
adjustment and ex post adjustment are two possible designs of law to 
cope with conflicts of modes. 
E.         Legal System for Ex Ante Adjustment 
Ex ante adjustment is inspired by the concept of uniform law; 
it establishes in advance a widely applicable mode and urges various 
players to adopt it. This approach can be further analyzed in detail: 
each community can retain its mode for internal interactions of players, 
but accept a widely applicable mode (mode [U]) for beyond-one-
community-interactions among players （Table 2）. Or, each 
community can force all players to adopt a universally applicable mode 
(mode [U]) （Table 3）.20 
                                                 
 
19   Individual investors who provide start-ups with capital for their 
business are called as ‘angels’. This term originally stems from those wealthy 
individuals who financially supported theatrical productions in Broadway which 
would have otherwise been shut down. 
20   In Japan, there is a good example of this model, i.e. JIS (Japanese 
Industrial Standards) based on Kōgyōhyōjunkahō [Industrial Standardization Law], 
Act No. 185 of 1949 (Japan). This law was enacted in 1949 with aims at unification 
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Table 2, Uniform-Law Approach I. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3, Uniform-Law Approach II. 
 
In Tables 2 and 3, we assume that benefits brought about by 
the shared mode [U] [12] are smaller than the biggest benefits in Table 
1 [30]. If benefits to be achieved by the mode [U] are bigger than [30], 
each community will voluntarily introduce this mode into their 
ecosystem, and it would be unnecessary to unify modes. However, if 
                                                 
 
of industrial products and related technologies, designs, manufactures and 
managements in Japan. This law established unified modes on industries in Japan 
and facilitated transactions beyond individual organizations or regions and let to the 
improvement of the quality of industrial products. If this model is valid in 
international context or not, is our concern.  
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the mode [U] would bring about less than [5], the introduction of the 
mode [U] would be meaningless. 
Table 3 illustrates that the modes applicable to intra-
community and inter-community interactions mode are clearly 
separable. In reality, however, such clear separation is questionable, 
since an ecosystem usually consists of complex interrelationships of 
various players that include intra-community and inter-community 
interactions. 
Unlike Table 2, Table 3 assumes that even if a policymaker 
forces an ecosystem to abandon its modes[i] or [j] and to apply the new 
mode [U], which does not necessarily match with their external 
environment. It is questionable whether a well-functioning ecosystem 
can easily abandon its original modes. Hence, applying a mode [U] that 
is applicable beyond a community would be difficult to implement. 
In addition, although in these Tables we assume that both 
players would equally obtain benefits [12] by applying a mode U, in 
reality, each player’s benefits are asymmetrical. Designing a mode and 
applying it would become a game among various players. Even if there 
is a mode [U] which could produce greater benefits as a whole, some 
players whose benefits would decrease by the mode [U] would oppose 
the mode. Such a power game would result in significant costs to 
societies, which could otherwise have been spent pursuing 
innovations. 
F.         Legal System for Ex Post Adjustment 
We support the ex post adjustment system as the more 
functional approach. This system would modify modes and external 
environment only after conflicts of modes are recognized and the 
external environment of concerned interactions is investigated（Table 
5）. Whether players’ modes would be modified or there would be an 
intervention into the external environment would be decided ex post. 
Modification of the external environment could also be made by law. 
Different from the ex-ante adjustment system, the ex post 
adjustment system does not aim at the ideal solution. Of particular 
2015 Kono & Kagami 4:1 
 
185 
 
importance is that this system is functional and there are less hurdles 
to overcome when introducing it. First, the ex post adjustment system 
would intervene only in the case of conflicts of modes. If the 
interaction of players is well-functioning, no costs would occur. 
Second, costs to consider all possible scenarios in advance, to negotiate 
with concerned players or communities, to develop a unified desirable 
mode and to disseminate it to related players or communities, would 
not occur. Finally, the ex post adjustment system does not affect already 
shared modes in a relevant ecosystem. 
 
 
Table 4: Ex-post Adjustment approach.  
 
 
  
 
→  
 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
To promote innovation, autonomous ecosystems in which 
various players are organically linked are crucial. Such ecosystems 
presume that specific mechanisms are shared among its closed 
membership. Introducing more open and universal mechanisms would 
hamper the original function of the ecosystem due to the conflicts of 
modes. Law would play a crucial role to adjust conflicts of modes 
between players and the environment, or among players. Under such 
conditions, we propose an ex post adjustment system by law. Such a 
system would enable both the maintenance of the diversity of the 
innovation ecosystem and, at the same time, the adjustment of 
interactions beyond one ecosystem. 
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LIMITS ON PARTY AUTONOMY IN 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION 
Giuditta Cordero-Moss* 
INTRODUCTION 
International contracts are often drafted in a rather 
standardized manner, making use of so-called boilerplate clauses that 
aim at regulating the interpretation and operation of the contract. In 
addition, they often contain an arbitration clause that requires the 
parties to submit all disputes arising out of or relating to the contract 
to arbitration, thus excluding any involvement of national courts. 
Standardised contract terms, including a boilerplate legal 
framework for the contract and arbitration clauses, are elements that 
seem to indicate an intention to render the contract self-sufficient. By 
including a detailed and extensive regulation of the legal relationship 
between the parties, the contract aims at making national law 
dispensable. If national law is not relevant, and the only basis for 
regulating the parties’ legal relationship is the contract, it becomes 
possible and meaningful to standardise contract terms, even when 
contracts are intended to be implemented in a variety of legal systems, 
without the need to adapt them to the legal framework of the specific 
transaction. The impression of self-sufficiency is enhanced by the 
exclusion of national courts and the referral to arbitration instead. A 
                                                 
*   Director of the Department of Private Law, Professor of Law at the 
University of Oslo. I presented the main lines of this article at the International 
Academy of Consumer and Commercial Law in Istanbul, July 2014. The article is 
originally published in the Oslo Law Journal 2014 No. 1, and is reproduced here with 
the consent of the publisher. The article was based on a paper that I presented at the 
Arbitration Forum of the Center for Transnational Litigation, Arbitration and 
Commercial Law, New York University, on February 3, 2014. 
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closed circuit is created, dominated by the will of the parties: the 
relationship is regulated by terms of contract agreed to by the parties, 
and disputes are solved by a private body bound by the contractual 
terms set forth by the parties. External sources, including national law, 
may seem redundant. 
Self-sufficiency may seem a realistic goal as long as the legal 
relationship remains within the borders of the closed circuit. This 
assumes that the legal relationship is, at any time, subject to the terms 
and legal framework agreed between the parties. 
There are, however, situations in which this assumption may 
turn out not to be true. For example, if a difference arises between the 
parties, and the parties disagree on what is the legal framework 
(notwithstanding that they may have agreed in the past, prior to the 
conflict); or if third parties’ interests or public interests are affected, 
and mandatory rules or policies override the parties’ agreement; or if 
the agreed terms or legal framework may be interpreted in more than 
one way or need specification by external sources. In these situations, 
the closed circuit is interrupted and recourse to external sources 
becomes necessary. To a certain extent, guidance may be sought in 
non-national, non-authoritative rules that may permit a uniform, 
transnational solution and thus reinstate the closed circuit. Where such 
a uniform guidance is not available, the closed circuit is interrupted 
again. When a full closed circuit cannot be assumed, party autonomy 
may be limited. 
To assess the limits of party autonomy, it will be necessary to 
analyse the above mentioned situations where interference with the 
closed circuit may occur. Section II will briefly discuss to what extent 
the legal framework provided by the contract and possibly given effect 
to in arbitration may resist control and interference by national law; 
Section III will discuss to what extent the terms of the contract are 
capable of being interpreted in a uniform manner; Section IV will 
discuss to what extent transnational sources may provide a uniform 
legal framework capable of replacing national governing law; Section 
V will investigate to what extent the principle of faithful interpretation 
to the wording of the contract may be a guiding principle for arbitral 
tribunals. 
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I.         EXTERNAL LIMITS TO PARTY AUTONOMY: COURT CONTROL 
The closed circuit described above meets the expectations as 
long as the arbitral tribunal gives effect to the will of the parties as 
embodied in the contract and the award is complied with by the losing 
party or enforced by the courts. The closed circuit fails when an arbitral 
award becomes invalid or unenforceable as a consequence of having 
given effect to the contract terms. 
International arbitration is an alternative method of solving 
contractual disputes that is based on the consent of the parties. If the 
parties agree to submit their disputes to arbitration, then the ordinary 
courts will have to decline jurisdiction on those disputes, and the only 
possible mechanism to solve the dispute will be the arbitration that has 
been chosen by the parties. If, on the contrary, the parties have not 
entered into an arbitration agreement, disputes between them will have 
to be solved by the national court that has jurisdiction. An arbitral 
tribunal, in other words, bases its existence upon the parties’ 
agreement. Moreover, the parties determine the composition of the 
arbitral tribunal, the procedural rules that have to be followed by the 
arbitral tribunal, the scope of the tribunal’s competence and its power. 
The arbitral tribunal is bound to follow the instructions of the parties; 
otherwise, it exceeds the power that the parties have conferred on it. 
If the arbitral tribunal exceeds its power, neither its jurisdiction nor its 
award are founded on the parties’ agreement, and there is, 
consequently, no legal basis for either of the two. These basic elements 
of arbitration are based on the 1958 New York Convention on 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 6, 
1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38, ratified by 155 countries1 and 
are reflected in most national arbitration laws, as well as in the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 
adopted in sixty-nine countries.2 
                                                 
1   For a list of ratifications, see UNCITRAL, Status Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_st
atus.html (last visited on June 19, 2015). 
2   For a list of Model Law countries, see UNCITRAL, Status 
UNCISTRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (1985), with 
amendments as adopted in 2006, 
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Arbitration’s dependence on the parties’ will, which is so 
uniformly recognised, is an important factor strengthening the opinion 
that arbitration is a private matter between the parties, that the arbitral 
tribunal is bound to follow the parties’ instructions, and that national 
courts or state laws have no possibility of interfering with the parties’ 
will. This opinion is certainly confirmed by the observation that the 
vast majority of arbitral awards are complied with voluntarily by the 
losing party. The parties agree to submit the dispute to arbitration, then 
they instruct the arbitral tribunal as to the scope of the dispute, the 
rules to be applied, etc., then the losing party recognizes the 
arbitration’s result and complies voluntarily with the award. In 
situations such as this one, the totality of the arbitration takes place in 
the private sphere of the parties. There is no point of contact between 
the national courts and the arbitration. Consequently, no national 
judge may decide to override the parties’ contract or expectations by 
considering an agreement invalid due to violations of E.U. competition 
law3 or a contract not binding due to one of the parties not having legal 
capacity according to the law to which it is subject.4 The arbitrators 
may or may not decide to apply these rules, but, as long as the losing 
party accepts the result of the arbitration, there will be no possibility 
for any judge to verify the arbitrator’s decision. In these cases, 
therefore, limits to party autonomy are relevant only to the extent that 
the parties request the arbitral tribunal apply state law or the tribunal 
elects to do so on its own motion. When the losing party does not 
voluntarily comply with the award, the courts will intervene. In these 
cases, the closed circuit is interrupted and limitations to party 
autonomy may become relevant. 
The formal framework for arbitration grants it a relative 
autonomy, which actually gives the appearance of an autonomous 
                                                 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/1985Model_arbitr
ation_status.html (last visited June 19, 2015). 
3   Violation of E.U. competition law is, according to a controversial ECJ 
decision, to be deemed as a violation of ordre public and therefore prevents 
enforcement of the award under the New York Convention. Case C-126/97, Eco 
Swiss China Time Ltd. v. Benetton Int’l NV, 1999 E.C.R. I-03055. 
4   That each of the parties’ own law governs their legal capacity, quite 
irrespective of which law the parties chose to govern the contract, is regulated by the 
New York Convention and the UNCITRAL Model Law and was confirmed by the 
Swedish Court of Appeal. Hovrätt (HOVR) (Court of Appeals) 2007-12-17 T3108-
06 (Swed.); see KLUWER ARBITRATION, 6 ITA MONTHLY REPORT, MAY (2008). 
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system. The main instrument upon which arbitration is founded, as 
previously mentioned, is the New York Convention, that binds the 
courts of these countries to recognise arbitration agreements and thus 
dismiss claims that are covered by an arbitration agreement, as well as 
to recognise and enforce arbitral awards without any review of the 
merits or of the application of law – with only a restrictive and 
exhaustive list of grounds to refuse recognition and enforcement. 
UNCITRAL Model Law is also an important instrument, issued in 
1985 and revised in 2006, which has contributed to a considerable 
harmonisation of the areas of arbitration law that are not covered by 
the New York Convention. The UNCITRAL Model Law is, in turn, 
based on the same principles as the New York Convention, which 
means that together these instruments create a harmonised legal 
framework for arbitration. Both instruments give a central role to the 
will of the parties. The power of the arbitral tribunal actually derives 
from the agreement of the parties; therefore, the arbitral tribunal is 
obliged to follow the parties’ instructions in respect of the scope of the 
dispute, the law to be applied, and the remedies to be granted. 
All this confirms, to a large extent, the understanding of 
arbitration as an autonomous system, based on the will of the parties 
and detached from national law. However, both the New York 
Convention and the UNCITRAL Model Law refer to national, non-
harmonised legislation in a number of instances and thus reduce in 
few, but significant, respects the detachment of arbitration from 
national laws. Thus, national law defines what may be subject to 
arbitration, when an award is deemed to conflict with public policy, 
what the criteria are for an arbitration agreement to be binding on the 
parties, what mandatory rules of procedure apply, and when an award 
is valid.5 In these situations, the closed circuit is interrupted. 
For example, a contract between a Norwegian and a Ukrainian 
party was submitted by the parties to Swedish law; after a dispute arose 
and arbitration was initiated, the Ukrainian party maintained that it was 
                                                 
5   For a more extensive analysis, see Luca Radicati di Brozolo, International 
Arbitration and Domestic Law, in INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, 
DIFFERENT FORMS AND THEIR FEATURES 40, 40-57 (Giuditta Cordero-Moss ed., 
2013); see also  Giuditta Cordero-Moss, International Arbitration is Not Only International, 
in INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, DIFFERENT FORMS AND THEIR 
FEATURES 7, 7-39 (2013). 
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not bound by the contract, because its representatives had signed the 
contract in a way that did not meet the formal requirements of 
Ukrainian law; the arbitral tribunal followed the choice of Swedish law 
contained in the contract, considered the contract validly signed 
according to Swedish law and disregarded Ukrainian law as irrelevant. 
The arbitral tribunal, therefore, fulfilled the closed circuit; however, the 
award was set aside by the courts of the country where it was rendered, 
Sweden, because the legal capacity of a party is subject not to the law 
chosen by the parties in the contract, but to the law of each of the 
parties.6 The closed circuit was interrupted, and party autonomy 
restricted. 
In another example, the European Court of Justice found that 
an award would be invalid and unenforceable for violation of public 
policy if it gave effect to a contract that does not comply with 
competition law.7 Had the arbitral tribunal been willing to follow the 
terms of the contract in full, the award would not be valid or 
enforceable; this is, therefore, another limitation to party autonomy. 
Another example is a decision by a Russian court, refusing to 
enforce an award that had given effect to a shareholders agreement 
among the shareholders of a Russian company.8 The shareholders 
agreement regulated the parties’ rights and obligations in a manner that 
did not comply with Russian company law, and the court found that 
enforcing the award would have violated Russian public policy. The 
harmonised framework for arbitration is, therefore, subject to national 
law in several significant respects, and this may have an impact on the 
                                                 
6   Hovrätt (HOVR) (Court of Appeals) 2007-12-17 T3108-06 (Swed.); see 
Kluwer Arbitration, supra note 4. For a more extensive analysis, see Giuditta Cordero-
Moss, Legal Capacity, Arbitration and Private International Law, in CONVERGENCE AND 
DIVERGENCE IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW – LIBER AMICORUM KURT SIEHR 
(Katharina Boele-Woelki et al. eds., 2010).  
7   Eco Swiss China Time Ltd., 1999 E.C.R. I-03055. 
8   [Ruling of the Western-Siberian District Commercial Court on March 
31, 2006], No.F04- 2109/2005(14105-А75-11) (Rus.) (regarding an arbitral award on 
a shareholder agreement between, among others, OAO Telecominvest, Sonera 
Holding BV, Telia International AB, Avenue Ltd, Santel Ltd, Janao Properties Ltd 
and IPOC International Growth Fund Ltd.). 
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enforceability of arbitration agreements and of arbitral awards, which 
in turn restricts the effects of party autonomy.9 
II.         TERMS OF CONTRACT: ABSOLUTE AND UNIFORM 
INTERPRETATION? 
With the exceptions seen in Section 1, the liberal framework 
for arbitration permits to recognise and enforce awards even if the 
award were based on a wrong interpretation of the contract or of the 
evidence, it applied the applicable law wrongly, or it applied the wrong 
law. If the award gives effect to the regulation contained in the 
contract, therefore, it will mostly be recognised and enforced even 
though the contract may have disregarded and violated the applicable 
law. Arbitration, therefore, to a large extent seems to permit relying on 
the assumption of the closed circuit. This, however, does not imply 
that party autonomy is absolute. An absolute party autonomy, not at 
all affected by external elements, assumes that the terms of the contract 
have a uniform meaning flowing from the words, and that they 
therefore may be interpreted equally in all legal systems. 
It is, however, not uncommon that contract terms need to be 
understood in light of assumptions and effects founded on the 
applicable legal framework. Even plain words may acquire different 
meanings, depending on the culture and tradition of the interpreter. 
Take an apparently self-explanatory expression such as “summer 
nights.” If read by an Italian, it will create associations with a dark and 
warm night, possibly with crickets singing and a sky full of stars. If read 
by a Norwegian, it will evoke a bright and chilly night, with the sun as 
the only visible star. If the meaning of plain words is affected by the 
context, even more so it is for terms of a contract, as they refer not to 
a natural phenomenon, but to legal effects that are created and 
supported by legal systems, which in turn use words as the most 
                                                 
9   For a more extensive analysis of the matter, see GIUDITTA CORDERO-
MOSS, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS ch. 5 (2014); see also Giuditta 
Cordero Moss, International Arbitration and the Quest for the Applicable Law, 8 GLOBAL 
JURIST 1 (2008). A research project at the University of Oslo analyses the limits that 
this may impose on party autonomy. See UiO Dep’t of Private Law, The Fac. Of 
Law, Arbitration and Party Autonomy (APA), (Nov. 17, 2009), 
http://www.jus.uio.no/ifp/english/research/projects/choice-of-law/index.html .  
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important means to create and define those legal effects. It then 
becomes even more difficult to separate the legal effects from the 
words used to express them. In this situation, it may be illusionary to 
expect that the terms of a contract have an absolute meaning, fully 
independent of any legal framework or legal tradition. 
National legal systems may differ from each other in many 
respects that are relevant to a contract, even when the systems belong 
to the same legal tradition, so-called legal family. Even more so there 
will be differences across legal families, such as the common law and 
the civil law. Modern comparative law research is inclined to consider 
this divide as overrated and largely overcome by a common core of 
European contract law. The common core reveals a certain synchrony 
between the systems on an abstract level, but it does not necessarily 
lead to harmonised solutions on a specific level. 10 Awareness about a 
common core may show that a certain principle may be recognised and 
a certain result may be achieved in a plurality of legal systems, albeit by 
employing different legal techniques. In a specific case, however, it is 
the particular legal technique employed in the contract that counts, and 
not the abstract possibility of achieving the desired result, if only the 
right legal technique had been adopted. 
A.         The Applicable Law’s Impact on Force Majeure Clauses 
An example of term of contract that may have different legal 
effects depending on the legal framework, is the so-called Force 
Majeure clause. This clause is meant to excuse a party’s non-
performance of its obligation if fulfilment was prevented by an event 
beyond that party’s control that was unforeseeable and could not be 
reasonably overcome. One question is how the requirement of 
“beyond the control” shall be interpreted. Interpretation may be 
                                                 
10   BOILERPLATE CLAUSES, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS 
AND THE APPLICABLE LAW (Giuditta Cordero-Moss ed., 2011). This book is based 
on a research project that I ran at the University of Oslo from 2004 to 2009, and 
shows that the same contract wording may lead to diametrally different legal effects, 
depending on the governing law. See, particularly, part 3 in the book, as well as the 
Conclusion; see also INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS, supra note 9, ch. 
3. 
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influenced by the legal system’s understanding of the assumptions for 
liability. 
An illustration of this situation is when a producer cannot fulfil 
its obligations, because it did not receive raw materials from its 
supplier. The question is whether failure by a party’s supplier may be 
deemed as an event falling outside of that party’s sphere of control. To 
answer this question, it is necessary to understand the purpose of the 
Force Majeure clause. 
There may be several different goals for regulations on 
exemptions from liability for non-performance. In some legal systems, 
the aim is to allocate between the parties the risk for supervening 
unexpected events according to which one of the two parties is closer 
to bear that particular risk. This approach assumes a strict liability, 
triggered irrespective of the conduct of the party that was prevented 
from performing its obligations. 
According to an alternative approach, the risk for unexpected 
events should not be borne by a party, as long as that party has acted 
diligently and cannot be blamed for the occurrence of the impediment 
- even if in an objective allocation of risk that party would be closer to 
bear such risk. 
The legal systems, that follow the criteria of the strict liability 
and the allocation of risk between the parties according to the 
respective spheres of control, would consider the choice of supplier to 
be an event falling within the sphere of control of the seller. Certainly 
this impediment would not fall within the sphere of the buyer and, 
since all risks have to be allocated between the parties, it follows that 
it must fall within the sphere of the seller. That the producer has been 
diligent in selecting its supplier and cannot be blamed for the supplier’s 
failure to deliver is not relevant. This is the approach taken by English 
law.11 
German law has a different approach. According to § 276 
BGB, if the prevented party is to be blamed for the impediment or its 
consequences, it cannot be excused from liability. If, however, the 
                                                 
11   EDWIN PEEL, TREITEL ON THE LAW OF CONTRACT, ¶. 17064 (13th ed. 
Sweet & Maxwell, 2011). 
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prevented party can prove that it has not acted negligently, it will be 
excused from liability. If the seller has operated with diligence in the 
choice of supplier, it would not be considered liable for non-
performance due to failure by the supplier. 
The distinction between Common Law and Civil Law in the 
context of liability for non-performance can be explained with the 
inclination of the English system to privilege predictability, for the sake 
of ensuring that business is carried out smoothly, rather than ensuring 
that an equitable justice is made in the specific case.12 Common Law 
allocates the risk of non-performance between the parties according to 
where it is most likely that the risk should be borne. This objective rule 
is not to be defeated by subjective criteria such as lack of negligence, 
because it would render the system less predictable. Civil Law systems 
privilege (in different degrees) the subjective elements of the specific 
case, in order to ensure that an equitable solution is reached. 
Applied to the example made above, this means that the Force 
Majeure clause may be understood differently under the different 
governing laws. As a result, in a contract containing the same wording, 
a producer who cannot fulfil its supply obligations due to failure by the 
raw materials supplier, is not excused under English law,13 whereas he 
is excluded under, for example, Norwegian law.14 
B.         The Applicable Law’s Impact on Entire Agreement Clauses 
Another example of term of contract that may be interpreted 
differently depending on the legal framework is the so-called Entire 
Agreement clause. This is a recurring clause in contract practice and 
states that the document signed by the parties contains the whole 
agreement and may not be supplemented by evidence of prior 
statements or agreements. 
The purpose of the Entire Agreement clause is to isolate the 
contract from any source or element that may be external to the 
document. This is also often emphasised by referring to the four 
                                                 
12   For a more extensive discussion and references, see INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS, supra note 9, ch. 3. 
13   PEEL, supra note 11.  
14   See infra notes 32-35.  
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corners of the document as the borderline for the interpretation or 
construction of the contract. The parties’ aim is thus to exclude that 
the contract is integrated by terms or obligations that do not appear in 
the document. 
The parties are obviously entitled to regulate their interests and 
to specify the sources of their regulation. However, many legal systems 
provide for ancillary obligations deriving from the contract type,15 a 
general principle of good faith,16 or a principle preventing an abuse of 
rights.17 This means that a contract would always have to be 
understood not only on the basis of the obligations that are spelled out 
in it, but also in combination with the elements that, according to the 
applicable law, integrate it. A contract, therefore, risks having different 
content depending on the governing law: the Entire Agreement clause 
is meant to avoid this uncertainty by barring the possibility of invoking 
extrinsic elements. The Entire Agreement clause creates an illusion of 
exhaustiveness of the written obligations. 
This is, however, only an illusion: first of all, often ancillary 
obligations created by the operation of law may not be excluded by the 
contract.18 Moreover, some legal systems permit bringing evidence that 
                                                 
15   For France, see, Xavier Lagarde et al., The Romanistic Tradition: 
Application of Boilerplate Clauses Under French Law, in BOILERPLATE CLAUSES, 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS AND THE APPLICABLE LAW, supra note 
10, § 2. For Italy, see Art. 1347 C.c. [Civil Code] (It.); Giorgio De Nova, The Romanistic 
Tradition: Application of Boilerplate Clauses Under Italian Law, in BOILERPLATE CLAUSES, 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS AND THE APPLICABLE LAW, supra note 
10, § 1, as well as the general considerations on Art. 1135 of the Civil Code in Section 
1. For Denmark, see Peter Møgelvang-Hansen, The Nordic Tradition: Application of 
Boilerplate Clauses Under Danish Law, in BOILERPLATE CLAUSES, INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS AND THE APPLICABLE LAW, supra note 10, § 1. 
16   See BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], Jan. 2, 2002, § 
242 (Ger.) (for the general principle on good faith in the performance of contracts); 
see Gerhard Dannemann, Common Law Based Contracts Under German Law, 
BOILERPLATE CLAUSES, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS AND THE 
APPLICABLE LAW, supra note 10, §§ 3.2-3.3 (for examples of its application by the 
Courts). 
17   See, for Russia, Ivan Zykin, The East European Tradition: Application of 
Boilerplate Clauses Under Russian Law, in BOILERPLATE CLAUSES, INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS AND THE APPLICABLE LAW, supra note 10, § 1.  
18   See, for France and Italy, supra note 15. For Finnish law, see Gustaf 
Möller, The Nordic Tradition: Application of Boilerplate Clauses Under Finnish Law, in 
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the parties’ agreement creates obligations different from those 
contained in the contract.19 Furthermore, many civilian legal systems 
openly permit the use of pre-contractual material to interpret the terms 
written in the contract.20 Finally, a strict adherence to the clause’s 
wording may, under some circumstances, be looked upon as 
unsatisfactory even under English law, in spite of the formalistic 
interpretation style that English law may employ in respect of other 
clauses.21 
                                                 
BOILERPLATE CLAUSES, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS AND THE 
APPLICABLE LAW, supra note 10, § 2.1. 
19   See, for Germany, BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE] 
§ 309, no. 12 (Ger.), prohibiting clauses which change the burden of proof to the 
disadvantage of the other party; see Ulrich Magnus, The Germanic Tradition: Application 
of Boilerplate Clauses Under German Law, in BOILERPLATE CLAUSES, INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS AND THE APPLICABLE LAW, supra note 10, § 5.1.1.a. Italy, 
on the contrary, does not allow oral evidence that contradicts a written agreement. 
See Giorgio De Nova, The Romanistic Tradition: Application of Boilerplate Clauses Under 
Italian Law, in BOILERPLATE CLAUSES, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS 
AND THE APPLICABLE LAW, supra note 10, § 1.  
20   In addition to Germany, supra note 19, see for France, Xavier Lagarde 
et al., The Romanistic Tradition: Application of Boilerplate Clauses Under French Law, in 
CORDERO-MOSS (ed.), supra note 10, § 2; for Italy, Giorgio De Nova, supra note 
15, § 4; for Denmark, Peter Møgelvang-Hansen, The Nordic Tradition: Application of 
Boilerplate Clauses Under Danish Law, in BOILERPLATE CLAUSES, INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS AND THE APPLICABLE LAW, supra note 10, § 2.1; for 
Norway, Viggo Hagstrøm, The Nordic Tradition: Application of Boilerplate Clauses Under 
Norwegian Law, in BOILERPLATE CLAUSES, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
CONTRACTS AND THE APPLICABLE LAW, supra note 10, § 3.1; for Russia, Ivan Zykin, 
The East European Tradition: Application of Boilerplate Clauses Under Russian Law, in 
BOILERPLATE CLAUSES, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS AND THE 
APPLICABLE LAW, supra note 10, § 2.1. The situation seems to be more uncertain in 
Sweden, see Lars Gorton, The Nordic Tradition: Application of Boilerplate Clauses Under 
Swedish Law, in BOILERPLATE CLAUSES, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS 
AND THE APPLICABLE LAW, supra note 10, § 5.4.2.d, and more restrictive is Finland, 
see Gustaf Möller, The Nordic Tradition: Application of Boilerplate Clauses Under Finnish 
Law, in BOILERPLATE CLAUSES, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS AND 
THE APPLICABLE LAW, supra note 10, § 2.1. 
21   See Edwin Peel, The Common Law Tradition: Application of Boilerplate 
Clauses Under English Law, in BOILERPLATE CLAUSES, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
CONTRACTS AND THE APPLICABLE LAW, supra note 10, § 2.1. 
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The effect of the clause, therefore, does not flow from its 
simple words, but is the result of a combination of the clause and of 
the governing law. 
III.        TRANSNATIONAL LAW: A UNIFORM LEGAL FRAMEWORK? 
We have seen above that contracts’ terms are not capable of 
being interpreted without making reference to the applicable legal 
framework. Even though arbitral tribunals in many situations are 
allowed to consider exclusively the terms of the contract without 
running the risk of triggering invalidity or unenforceability of the 
award, they may find that the terms of the contract are not a sufficient 
basis for the decision and must be integrated by external elements. 
Admittedly, arbitration may (to a certain extent, as was seen in Section 
1) be capable of giving effect to the regulation agreed to by the parties 
in the contract without being obliged to comply with the peculiarities 
of the applicable law. However, the terms of the contract are not self-
explanatory and have to be interpreted in light of the applicable legal 
framework, as was seen in Section 2. That the arbitral tribunal is free 
to interpret the contract and to decide how, if at all, the contract shall 
interact with the applicable law, does not give an answer to the 
question of how to interpret terms that are not self-explanatory. This 
may result in different interpretations of the same contract terms 
depending on the arbitrator’s background and inclination, and thus 
impacts on party autonomy. 
It is worthwhile exploring whether the idea of an absolute party 
autonomy may be reinstated by including a uniform legal framework 
into the closed circuit. It is often proposed that transnational sources 
may give a uniform legal framework for international contracts. 
Transnational sources are concerned with giving effect to commercial 
practice without abiding by the peculiarities of the various legal 
systems; this could be deemed to make national laws redundant. 
The differences among the various national legal systems have 
prompted various initiatives to formulate trans-national sets of rules, 
in part developed spontaneously by business practice and in part 
restated and codified by branch organizations, international 
organisations, academic fora, etc. This complex of sources goes under 
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various names, such as lex mercatoria, transnational law or soft law.22 If 
transnational sources gave an exhaustive and harmonised regime, it 
would be possible to include these sources as the only applicable legal 
framework for the contract and thus reinstate the closed circuit. 
As I argue elsewhere, however, transnational sources are not 
sufficiently precise and systematic to replace national laws23 - not to 
mention the formal circumstance that transnational sources may not, 
as a matter of private international law, govern a contract to the 
exclusion of any state laws.24 Some of the most recognized 
transnational sources – in particular, the UNIDROIT Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts (UPICC) and the Principles of 
European Contract Law (PECL) – are heavily based on a general 
principle of good faith.25 Good faith is a legal standard that needs 
specification and there does not seem to be any generally 
acknowledged legal standard of good faith that is sufficiently precise 
to be applied uniformly, irrespective of the governing law. 
Moreover, these instruments grant the interpreter much room 
for interference regarding the wording of the contract – based on the 
central role given to the principle of good faith. This seems to 
contradict the very intention of standard contracts. International 
contract practice is meant to be exhaustive and self-sufficient, and not 
to be influenced by the interpreter’s legal tradition.26 Any correction by 
principles such as good faith would run counter to the expectations of 
the parties. 
                                                 
22   Literature on the subject matter is very vast. Among the works most 
frequently referred to are FILIP DE LY, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LAW AND LEX 
MERCATORIA (1992); KLAUS PETER BERGER, THE CREEPING CODIFICATION OF 
THE LEX MERCATORIA (2d. ed., 2010), and Ole Lando, The Lex Mercatoria in 
International Commercial Arbitration, 34 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 747, 747-768 (1985). For 
extensive references see ROY GOODE ET AL., TRANSNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LAW 
– TEXTS, CASES AND MATERIALS 24 (Oxford Univ. Press 2007). 
23   For a more extensive discussion, see INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
CONTRACTS, supra note 9, §§ 2.4, 4.2.3. 
24   For a more extensive discussion, see id. § 4.2.3. 
25   For a more extensive discussion, see id. § 2.4.2. 
26   For a more extensive discussion of the ambitions of self-sufficiency in 
contract practice, id. ch. 1. 
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The same applies to the instruments developed so far in the 
ongoing work on a European contract law. The Academic Draft Frame 
of Reference, the Acquis Principles, and the Common European Sales 
Law (CESL), all largely based on the PECL, have a double approach 
to commercial contracts: they extend rules of consumer protection to 
commercial contracts (including an extensive and mandatory principle 
of good faith), and then moderate them by reserving for contrary good 
commercial practice. Reference to good commercial practice as the 
only concretisation of the principle of good faith assumes that the 
interpreter is in a position to define good commercial practice and to 
assess its content. What constitutes good commercial practice, 
however, is not clear. It may be assumed that it coincides with the 
above mentioned spontaneous or academic transnational sources that 
often are deemed to be particularly apt to govern international 
contracts and that go under the name of transnational law or lex 
mercatoria: scholarly works on the convergence of legal systems, general 
principles, restatements, and trade usages. As will be seen, these 
sources are not capable of giving a clear and harmonized picture of the 
transnational law of commercial contracts; hence, they do not give a 
clear picture of what good commercial practice is. Reference to good 
commercial practice, therefore, does not create a concrete standard of 
good faith. 
Transnational sources, thus, do not always provide a uniform 
solution. The arbitrator who is required to interpret contract terms will 
not find a definitive and uniform standard of interpretation in these 
sources, and will need to make recourse to other sources, thus 
interrupting again the closed circuit. 
A.         Interpretation of Force Majeure Clauses under Transnational 
Law 
To test the ability of transnational law to overcome the 
disparity of legal traditions, we can look at the examples made in 
Section 2 above. We saw that the expression “beyond the control” in 
Force Majeure clauses may be interpreted differently depending on the 
governing law. Does the transnational law offer a uniform solution? 
One of the most successful instruments of harmonization of contract 
law is the 1980 Vienna Convention on Contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods (CISG), ratified by over sixty countries and looked 
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upon, especially in some academic circles,27 as embodying principles 
that are generally recognized and reach well beyond the convention’s 
scope of application. 
According to Article 79 of the CISG, a party is not liable for 
failure to perform its obligations if it proves that the failure was due to 
an impediment beyond its control that was unforeseeable and could 
not reasonably have been overcome. 
The CISG does not contain any reference to the diligence of 
the affected party as criterion for exempting it from liability; in another 
context, the convention confirms that diligence is not a criterion for 
excuse: Articles 45(1)(b) and 61(1)(b) regulate that each party may 
exercise contractual remedies for non-performance against the other 
party without having to prove any fault or negligence or lack of good 
faith on that party, nor do they mention that any evidence of diligence 
would relieve the other party from its liability. 
The Secretariat Commentary does not address the question of 
how the criterion of the sphere of control shall be interpreted, whether 
literally, or as a reference to the diligent conduct of the seller.28 Bearing 
in mind that the CISG requires it to be interpreted autonomously, 
without reference to domestic legal systems, it seems appropriate to 
apply the literal interpretation and to see Article 79 as a reference to an 
objective division of the landscape into two spheres, that of the seller 
and that of the buyer, without reference to specific actual possibilities 
to exercise control. This is confirmed by case law and doctrine, which 
affirm that procurement risk falls within the sphere of risk of the seller, 
and that therefore failure by the seller’s supplier is not deemed to fall 
outside of the seller’s sphere of responsibility (unless the relevant good 
has disappeared completely from the international market).29 In the 
                                                 
27   For a thorough analysis of the enormous impact of the CISG on 
scholars, see THE CISG AND ITS IMPACT ON NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS 436 
(Franco Ferrari, ed., Sellier European Law Publishers, 2008). Ferrari also shows, 
however, that the level of awareness about the CISG in the business community and 
among practicing lawyers is strikingly low. Id. at 421. 
28   Commentary On The Draft Convention On Contracts For The 
International Sale Of Goods, Prepared By The Secretariat, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.97/5 (Mar. 1, 1979). 
29   See Dionysios Flambouras, The Doctrines of Impossibility of Performance and 
clausula rebus sic stantibus in the 1980 Vienna Convention on Contracts for the International Sale 
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comment to the second paragraph of article 79 on use of sub-
contractors, the Commentary specifies that this special rule does not 
include suppliers of raw material or of goods to the seller.30 
However, this is not the only way of understanding the 
criterion of “beyond the control.” Article 79 of the CISG may be 
interpreted differently, depending on the interpreter’s legal tradition – 
something that has been defined as “troubling.”31 
Norway implemented the CISG with the Sale of Goods Act. 
The Sale of Goods Act, in Section 27, introduced the concept of 
impediment beyond the control of the prevented party, with a literal 
translation of Article 79 of the CISG.32 By introducing this concept, 
the legislator intended to mitigate the then-existing regime, which was 
based on strict liability.33 
Norwegian legal doctrine interprets the criterion of “beyond 
the control” not as having an abstract understanding of each party’s 
sphere of control, but on the basis of the actual sphere of control of 
each party.34 Only if one party actually has the possibility of influencing 
a certain process are the events caused by that process deemed to be 
within the sphere of control of that party. That a party has started a 
process, in itself, does not mean that any events occurring in the course 
of that process are in the sphere of control of that party. The test must 
be if that party actually had the possibility of influencing the part of 
the process in connection with which those events occurred. Hence, 
in the case of procurement risk, the interpretation of what is “beyond 
                                                 
of Goods and the Principles of European Contract Law: A Comparative Analysis, 13 PACE 
INT’L L. REV. 261, n.20 (2001). See also COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION OF 
THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) art. 79, ¶¶ 11, 18, 37 (Schlechtriem 
& Schwenzer, eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2010) (although ¶ 27 seems to embrace the 
Germanic tradition).  
30   See supra note 28, at 64. 
31   Schlechtriem & Schwenzer, eds., supra note 29, art. 79, ¶ 11, at n.30. 
32   Sale of Goods Act of 13 May 1988 §27 (Nor.).  
33   Ot.prp. nr. 80 (1986–87), pp. 38 et seq. and, extensively on the 
preparatory works in this context, Viggo Hagstrøm, Obligasjonsrett, § 19.4.2. 
(Universitetsforlaget, 2d. ed., 2011). 
34   See Hagstrøm, supra note 33. For a more extensive analysis, see Giuditta 
Cordero-Moss, Lectures on comparative law of contracts, 166 Institutt for privatretts 
stensilserie bd. 151 et. seq. (2004). 
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the control” is opposite to the outcome under the CISG: the producer 
chose its supplier, and this choice is certainly within the producer’s 
sphere of control (it could have chosen another supplier, and then the 
default would not have happened). However, the producer has no 
actual possibility of influencing the performance of the supplier, 
therefore any impediment in connection therewith is to be deemed 
outside of its sphere of control.35 
In conclusion, the CISG does not seem to provide a uniform 
standard for the interpretation of Force Majeure clauses. 
B.         Interpretation of Entire Agreement Clauses under 
Transnational Law 
The other example of contract term with inconsistent legal 
effects made in Section 2 above, is the Entire Agreement clause. 
This clause is recognised in Article 2.1.17 of the UPICC and 
Article 2:105 of the PECL, with some restrictions: the provisions 
specify that prior statements or agreements may be used to interpret 
the contract. This is one of the applications of the general principle of 
good faith; it is, however, unclear how far the principle of good faith 
goes in overriding the clause inserted by the parties. If prior statements 
and agreements may be used to interpret the contract, does this mean 
that more terms may be added to the contract if, for example, the 
parties have discussed certain specifications at length during the 
negotiations and this has created in one of the parties the reasonable 
                                                 
35   Viggo Hagstrøm supra note 33, § 5.3. Hagstrøm’s interpretation is based 
on a Supreme Court decision rendered in 1970, long before the implementation of 
the CISG in the Norwegian system. However, the Supreme Court’s decision is still 
referred to as correctly incorporating Norwegian law after the enactment of the Sales 
of Goods Act, as the reference made by Hagstrøm confirms. See also Anders 
Mikkelsen, HINDRINGSFRITAK 33 (Gyldendal, 2011). A Supreme Court decision 
affirmed that liability is strict when the goods to be delivered are generic. See HR-
2004-00755-A-Rt-2004-675 (Supreme Court, Dom) (Nor.). The test will then be 
whether the defects objectively are within the sphere of control of the seller. In this 
context, therefore, the Supreme Court has rejected the test of actual control and is 
more in line with the regulation contained in the CISG. This approach is consistent 
with the German tradition, that distinguishes between generic obligations (where 
liability is strict) and specific obligations (where the criterion of diligence applies). 
This distinction was abandoned with the 2002 reform of the BGB. 
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expectation that the specifications would be implied in the contract 
even though they were not included in the final contract text? Article 
1.8 of the UPICC would seem to indicate that this would be the 
preferred approach under the UPICC. According to this provision, a 
party may not act in a way inconsistent with reasonable expectations 
that it has created in the other party. This is spelled out in the PECL, 
Article 2:105, Paragraph 4, which states that, “[a] party may by its 
statements or conduct be precluded from asserting a merger clause36 
to the extent that the other party has reasonably relied on them.” 
According to this logic, the detailed discussion during the 
phase of negotiations of certain characteristics for the products may 
create the reasonable expectation that those specifications have 
become part of the agreement even if they were not written in the 
contract; their subsequent exclusion on the basis of the Entire 
Agreement clause may be deemed to be against good faith. 
According to the opposite logic, however, the very fact that the 
parties have excluded from the text of the contract some specifications 
that were discussed during the negotiations, indicates that no 
agreement was reached on those matters. Exclusion of those terms 
from the contract, combined with the Entire Agreement clause, 
strongly indicates the will of the parties not to be bound by those 
specifications. Their subsequent inclusion on the basis of the good 
faith principle would run counter to the parties’ intention. 
The foregoing shows that the application of the UPICC and of 
the PECL requires a specification of the principle of good faith. Is it 
to be intended as an overriding principle, possibly creating, restricting 
or modifying the obligations that flow from the text of the contract? 
Or is it meant to take the text of the contract as a starting point, 
ensuring that the obligations contained therein are enforced accurately 
and precisely as the parties have envisaged them? This represents the 
dichotomy between, on the one hand, the understanding of fairness as 
a principle ensuring balance between the parties notwithstanding the 
regulation on which the parties may have agreed, and, on the other 
hand, the understanding of fairness as a principle ensuring 
                                                 
36   “Merger clause” is another definition of the Entire Agreement clause, 
which may also be called the “Integration clause.” 
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predictability, and leaving it to the parties to evaluate the desirability of 
their contract regulation. This dichotomy characterises the different 
approaches of the common law and the civilian tradition.37 To enhance 
the ability of the UPICC to harmonize contract law, UNIDROIT has 
created in 1992 a data base collecting court decisions and arbitral 
awards on the various provisions of the UPICC. This is, therefore, the 
best source to turn to when inquiring how to interpret the Entire 
Agreement clause under the UPICC. 
As of 2013, the Unilex database contained five decisions on 
Article 2.1.17 of the UPICC. These decisions are not based on a 
consistent understanding of the standard according to which the clause 
shall be applied.38 The Unilex database shows two approaches to 
Article 2.1.17 of the UPICC: one advocating the primacy of the 
contract’s language, and the other assuming that the UPICC provides 
for the primacy of the real intention of the parties, which in turn may 
lead to considerably restricting the effect of the Entire Agreement 
clause. Evidently, this is not sufficient to give guidance as to which 
approach to choose when addressing the conflict between the 
contract’s language and the principle of good faith. This leaves so 
much room to the discretion of the interpreter that it seems unlikely 
for Article 2.1.17 of the UPICC to give a harmonized regulation of its 
subject-matter. The UPICC, therefore, does not contribute 
considerably to a harmonized standard of interpretation. 
IV.         ARBITRAL TRIBUNALS: FAITHFUL TO THE INTENTION OF THE 
PARTIES 
Above we have seen that the arbitral tribunal may, to a large 
(but not unlimited) extent, disregard the governing law without 
consequences for the validity and enforceability of the award; we have 
also seen that this is not a sufficient answer to the question of how to 
interpret terms of the contract that are not self-explanatory; we have 
further seen that it is not always possible to find a uniform standard of 
interpretation in translation sources. A principle that is often invoked 
                                                 
37   For a more extensive discussion, see INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
CONTRACTS, supra note 9, ch. 3. 
38   Id. § 2.4.2.1. 
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in these circumstances is that the arbitral tribunal has a duty to be 
faithful to the will of the parties. 
Does a duty to be faithful to the will of the parties give 
sufficient guidelines? 
The arbitral tribunal may certainly not be inclined to let the 
terms of the contract be overridden by the formalities of the various 
national legal systems, but that does not give an answer to the question 
of how contract terms shall be interpreted. 
We can assume a long-term loan agreement with an Early 
Termination clause permitting immediate termination of the contract 
and consequently the immediate repayment of the whole principal 
upon breach of the obligations contained in a certain clause. 
A literal interpretation of the Early Termination clause permits 
termination even when the breach is insignificant – for example, when 
the borrower has submitted its financial statements to the lender with 
one-day delay.39 The breach may have had no consequences on the 
borrower’s creditworthiness, on its ability to repay the loan, or on the 
lender’s ability to verify these matters; the real reason for the lender to 
terminate the loan may have been that the interest rates had increased 
since the time of signing the loan, and that the lender considered the 
threat of early termination as effective leverage for negotiating a higher 
interest rate. This would not be relevant in a literal interpretation: the 
clause would be considered applicable without regard to the real 
reasons for which it is invoked. 
A purposive interpretation of the clause takes into 
consideration the purpose of the clause and tries to assess whether the 
particular situation may be deemed to fall into the scope of the clause. 
This may lead to considering the clause as not applicable in a situation 
where the reasons for which it is invoked do not correspond to the 
purpose of the clause. 
                                                 
39   The borrower’s obligation to submit its financial statements is usually 
in loan agreements and is generally to be found in the section of the so-called 
covenants. It is meant to make it possible for the lender to control the borrower’s 
continued creditworthiness.  
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What is more faithful to the intention of the parties: a literal 
implementation of the clauses that may permit speculative or abusive 
conduct or an integration of the clauses with considerations of 
business purpose, good faith, and trade usages? There seems to be no 
absolute answer to the question of what interpretation better meets the 
expectations of the parties: a strictly literal interpretation of the terms 
of the contract, or an integration of the contract with principles of 
good faith and commercial sense based on law, trade usages, 
transnational principles or other sources. The former would better 
reflect the parties’ expectations if it is assumed that the parties have 
consciously intended to achieve specific legal effects with each and 
every of the words that they have written in the contract. This, 
however, does not reflect the reality of how contracts are drafted and 
negotiated, as will be seen below. 
A.         The Dynamics of Contract Drafting 
Often, some of the clauses in a contract are inserted without 
the parties having given any particular consideration to their content 
or their effects under the applicable law.40 This practice may be 
surprising, considering the importance that the governing law has for 
the application and even the effectiveness of contract terms, as was 
seen above. However, the practice of negotiating detailed wording 
without regard to the governing law, or even of inserting contract 
clauses without having negotiated them, is not necessarily always 
unreasonable. From a merely legal point of view, it makes little sense, 
but from the overall economic perspective, it is more understandable. 
The gap between the parties’ reliance on the self-sufficiency of the 
contract and the actual legal effects of the contract under the governing 
law does not necessarily derive from the parties’ lack of awareness 
regarding the legal framework surrounding the contract. More 
precisely, the parties may often be aware of the fact that they are 
unaware of the legal framework for the contract. The possibility that 
the wording of the contract is interpreted and applied differently from 
                                                 
40   A more extensive analysis of the practice of contract drafting is made 
in INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS, supra note 9, ch. 1. 
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what a literal application would seem to suggest may be accepted by 
some parties as a calculated risk.41 
Considerations regarding the internal organization of the 
parties are also a part of the assessment of risk. In large multinational 
companies, risk management may require a certain standardization, 
which in turn prevents a high degree of flexibility in drafting the single 
contracts. In balancing the conflicting interests of ensuring internal 
standardization and permitting local adjustment, large organizations 
may prefer to enhance the former.42 It is, in other words, not 
necessarily the result of thoughtlessness if a contract is drafted without 
having regard for the governing law. Neither is it a symptom of a 
refusal of the applicability of national laws. It is the result of a cost–
benefit evaluation, leading to the acceptance of a calculated legal risk. 
The sophisticated party, aware of the implications of adopting contract 
models that are not adjusted to the governing law and consciously 
assessing the connected risk, will identify the clauses that matter the 
most, and concentrate its negotiations on those, leaving the other 
clauses untouched and accepting the corresponding risk. 
A faithful interpretation of the contract assumes an 
understanding of this uneven approach to contract drafting. 
B.         The Need for Predictability 
On the other hand, predictability is extremely important in 
commercial contracts. The parties are interested in enforcing their 
rights, and, for this purpose, they depend on one or more national legal 
systems and their courts. Therefore, once a contract is finalized, parties 
are interested in its enforceability and in the predictability of the 
parameters according to which enforcement may be achieved.43 
                                                 
41   See more extensively David Echenberg, Negotiating International 
Contracts: Does the Process Invite a Review of Standard Contracts from the Point of View of 
National Legal Requirements?, in BOILERPLATE CLAUSES, INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS AND THE APPLICABLE LAW, supra note 10.  
42   See more extensively, Maria Celeste Vettese, Multinational Companies and 
National Contracts, in BOILERPLATE CLAUSES, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
CONTRACTS AND THE APPLICABLE LAW , supra note 10. 
43   See QUEEN MARY UNIVERSITY OF LONDON SCHOOL OF 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, 2010 INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION SURVEY: 
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Litigation lawyers carefully analyse the specific contract and its 
effects under the governing law and try to assess as precisely as possible 
the possibility of winning a case in court or in arbitration on the basis 
of the contract wording, the applicable law and the degree of factual 
background that the governing law allows to bring into the dispute. 
Thus, on the one hand, drafting lawyers, while negotiating a contract, 
may have willingly disregarded the legal effects of some clauses. On 
the other hand, litigation lawyers, while assessing enforceability of the 
same contract, will carefully study its legal effects under the governing 
law.  The varying degree of awareness during negotiations, thus, must 
be considered in light of the need for predictability once a dispute 
arises. 
Furthermore, contracts are often meant to circulate, for 
example, because they are assigned to third parties, are used as security, 
or serve as a basis for calculating insurance premiums. In these 
situations, it is essential that contracts are interpreted strictly in 
accordance with their terms: third parties are not aware of and should 
not be assumed to take into consideration the relationship between the 
original parties to the contract, what the original parties may have 
assumed or intended, or any circumstances that relate to the original 
parties and that may have had an impact on these parties’ interests. It 
is, therefore, expected that a contract is interpreted primarily, if not 
exclusively, in light of its terms – without considering things such as 
what a fair balance between the parties’ interests would be or what one 
party’s expectations might have been. 
C.         How to Square the Circle: The Applicable Law 
The arbitral tribunal is, therefore, expected to understand the 
dynamics of negotiations in order to properly give effect to the 
intention of the parties. Blindly applying the wording of the contract 
without any regard to the principles of the governing law or, to the 
extent that they are determinable and applicable, of transnational law, 
would not necessarily reflect the true intention of the parties if the 
clause that is being applied literally is one of the boilerplate clauses that 
                                                 
CHOICES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: CHOICES IN INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION 13 (2010). See also THE LAW SOCIETY, LAW SOCIETY REPORT: FIRMS’ 
CROSS-BORDER WORK 1, 8 (2010).  For further references, see INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS, supra note 9, § 2.1.  
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the parties did not consider. Integrating or correcting a clause with 
national or transnational principles, on the other hand, might not 
necessarily reflect the parties’ intention either, if the clause that is being 
interpreted is one of the clauses that the parties carefully negotiated. 
Leaving broad discretion to the interpreter, however, runs the 
risk of undermining predictability, if the criteria for exercising such 
discretion are not clearly determinable. As was seen above, 
interpretation of the contract should take into consideration the need 
for predictability. Overriding the terms of the contract in the name of 
principles of good faith or equity, thus, would lead to results that are 
not compatible with the expectations of international business 
practice, if the standards that are applied are not clearly determinable. 
From the overview made in Section 3 above, it seems that the standard 
of good faith is not sufficiently determinable on a transnational level. 
This seems to speak for the advisability of taking into consideration 
the criteria developed in the applicable law. 
D.        Variety of Approaches 
There is no uniform answer to the question of what 
interpretation is the most faithful to the parties’ intentions. A seminar 
organised at the University of Oslo in 201144 discussed the arbitrators’ 
approach to the interpretation of contracts and identified a variety of 
approaches.45 The results of this seminar are summarised below. 
Contracts are not necessarily always applied in strict 
accordance with their terms. There are different degrees of 
interference and the sources of the interference also vary quite 
considerably. There is a scale moving from a strict application of the 
governing law to integrate the contract, via interpretation of the 
contract terms in the context of transnational soft law principles such 
                                                 
44   See Arbitration and Party Autonomy (APA), supra note 9. The 
programme for the seminar, the list of panel participants and the transcript from the 
panel discussions are available at 
http://www.jus.uio.no/ifp/english/research/projects/choice-of-
law/events/2011/2011-arbitration-and-the-not-unlimited-party-autonomy.html. 
45   See INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS, supra note 9, ch. 3, § 
7; see also Giuditta Cordero-Moss, Interpretation of Contracts in International Commercial 
Arbitration: Diversity on More than One Level, 22 EUR. REV. PRIVATE L. 13, 13-36 (2014).  
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as the UPICC and the PECL (which are heavily based on the principle 
of good faith and may give rise to a substantial possibility of interfering 
with the contract language), to interpretation of the contract on the 
basis of its own terms combined with the parties’ interests and trade 
usages, to interpretation of the contract solely on the basis of its own 
terms. There is also a further approach to interpretation of the 
contract, which goes under the label of “splitting the baby.” This 
Solomonic approach consists of rendering an award in the middle 
range between the claims of each of the parties. This is not necessarily 
based on a literal consideration of the contract terms or on an 
integration of the contract with other sources, but simply on the desire 
to accommodate both parties.46 Interestingly, there does not seem to 
be a uniform perception of the frequency of this approach: a recent 
empirical study shows that the parties to arbitration perceive that they 
got a Solomonic award in 18–20% of the cases, whereas the arbitrators 
perceive that they take this kind of equitable decision in only 5% of the 
cases.47 This, therefore, adds a new variable to the equation of the 
interpretation of contracts. Not only is it uncertain whether the 
arbitrators will interpret the contract literally, whether they will use 
sources of law, or whether they will apply transnational principles to 
give a more purposive interpretation, but it is also possible that the 
decision will be influenced by equitable considerations that are not 
based on the contract or on other legal sources. 
CONCLUSION 
Party autonomy is limited in international arbitration, in spite 
of the widespread opinion that contracts are self-sufficient and that, 
together with arbitration, they create a closed circuit that manages to 
leave national law out. 
First of all, the legal framework for arbitration ensures that 
arbitration enjoys a significant autonomy, but this autonomy is not 
unlimited. If the losing party decides not to comply with the arbitral 
                                                 
46   This appears in the 2012 Survey of the School of International 
Arbitration of Queen Mary University of London. QUEEN MARY UNIVERSITY OF 
LONDON AND WHITE & CASE, 2012 INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION SURVEY: 
CURRENT AND PREFERRED PRACTICES IN THE ARBITRAL PROCESS § 7 (2012).  
47   Queen Mary University, supra note 46, at 38. 
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award, courts of law may exercise judicial control. Judicial control on 
arbitration is restricted, but there is room for overriding party 
autonomy in several respects. 
Furthermore, even within the area where no judicial control 
may be exercised and arbitration is autonomous, the necessity may 
arise to integrate contract terms with external sources. Contract terms 
do not always have an absolute meaning with legal effects flowing 
directly from the words, and recourse to a legal framework may be 
required to interpret the terms and to define their legal effects. To the 
extent that transnational sources provide a uniform legal framework, 
they may integrate the contract and reinstate self-sufficiency. Where 
transnational sources are not sufficient, however, the arbitral tribunal 
will have to integrate the contract with external principles and rules, 
primarily stemming from the governing law. 
All the above constitutes limitations to party autonomy in 
arbitration. 
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THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE UGLY 
IN DISTRIBUTION CONTRACTS: 
LIMITATION OF PARTY AUTONOMY IN 
ARBITRATION? 
Pilar Perales Viscasillas 
INTRODUCTION, CONCEPTS AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
Distribution contracts might respond to different kinds of 
modalities in practice. In fact, under some domestic laws, the name 
“distribution contract” is considered a generic category that includes 
specific contracts, such as: agency, franchise, concession, or 
distribution contracts, the latter being a specific kind of contract. The 
aforementioned contract types are considered to be cooperation or 
collaboration commercial contracts since they imply cooperation 
between two businessmen. Depending on the type of contract, 
cooperation may be more or less intense.1 
From a legal perspective, it is clear that distributors and 
franchisees are independent businesspersons who invest and risk their 
                                                 
  Pilar Perales Viscasillas is a Commercial Law Professor at the Carlos III 
University of Madrid. She serves as Counsel at Baker & McKenzie. This paper was 
written under a research project for the Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad.  
(DER2013-48401-P).  
1   On the basis of such cooperation the contracts are classified under the 
STUDY GROUP ON A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN LAW: 
COMMERCIAL AGENCY, FRANCHISE AND DISTRIBUTION CONTRACTS (PEL 
CAFDC) (2006). See also Eleanor Cashin Ritane, The Common Frame of Reference 
(CFR) and the Principles of European Law on Commercial Agency, Franchise and 
Distribution Contracts, ERA Forum, Dec. 2007 at 563. 
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own funds.2 Agents are also legally independent from their principal 
but their status under domestic law might vary and there are some legal 
systems that provide them special treatment under their own labor 
laws.3 
As far as arbitration is concerned, the object of this paper is to 
explore the limitations imposed by certain countries on the freedom 
of the parties to submit their contracts to arbitration and whether this 
approach should be rejected considering that other countries follow 
policies in favor of arbitration. 
A.         Substantive Regulation of Distribution Contracts 
The substantive regulation of these contracts varies depending 
on the kind of contract and the binding force of the instrument at an 
international level. This section sets forth an overview of the three 
major types of contracts. 
1.  Agency Contracts - UNIDROIT approved a Convention on 
Agency in the International Sale of Goods4, which defines an agency 
contract as a contract “where one person, the agent, has authority or 
purports to have authority on behalf of another person, the principal, 
to conclude a contract of sale of goods with a third party.”5 
                                                 
2   See UNIDROIT, GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL MASTER FRANCHISE 
AGREEMENTS (2d ed. 2007) [hereinafter UNIDROIT GUIDE], available at 
http://www.unidroit.org/instruments/franchising/guide/second-edition-2007.  
3   Spain, for example, treats agents differently and affords them special 
treatment. Besides the 1992 Law on Agency Contracts, the so-called “economic 
dependent agents” are considered to be autonomous workers and thus partially 
regulated under a special Labor Law. See Ley del Estatuto del Trabajador Autónomo 
(LETA) (B.O.E. 2007, 20) (Spain). 
4 UNIDROIT, Convention on Agency in the International Sale of Goods, 22 I.L.M. 
249 (opened for signature Feb. 17, 1983). 
5   It has not entered into force yet, as ten ratification instruments are 
required.  So far, it has been ratified by: France, Italy, Mexico, Netherlands, and South 
Africa. See UNIDROIT, Status of the Convention on Agency in the International Sale of Goods 
- Signatures, Ratifications, http://www.unidroit.org/status-agency (last visited Nov. 30, 
2015). 
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European Union law6 has a similar definition, but it is more 
precise as it considers the power to negotiate or to negotiate and 
conclude the contract by the agent. It defines a ‘commercial agent’ as 
one who is a self-employed intermediary who has continuing authority 
to negotiate the sale or the purchase of goods on behalf of another 
person, hereinafter called the ‘principal’, or to negotiate and conclude 
such transactions on behalf of and in the name of that principal.7 
In terms of soft law instruments, there is also the possibility 
for the parties to agree on the UNIDROIT Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts8 (UPICC, 2010). Furthermore, there is also a 
model contract offered by the International Chamber of Commerce 
(ICC).9 
2.  Distribution or Concession Contracts - In many legal systems, 
distribution or concession contracts are atypical contracts, or are only 
partially regulated.10 At an international level, there is no uniform legal 
instrument such as the CISG for distribution contracts, although the 
CISG might apply to specific distribution contracts.11 It is also possible 
that the parties could agree on the application of The UNIDROIT 
                                                 
6   Council Directive 86/653, On Self-Employed Commercial Agents, 
1986 O.J. (L 382) 17 (EC).  
7   Id. art. 1.2. The common law concept of “agent” is in fact to all intents 
and purposes the same as that of the general agent under the civil law systems, 
according to the UNIDROIT Guide. UNIDROIT GUIDE, supra note 2, at 9. 
8   See UNIDROIT, Unidroit Principles of International Commercial Contracts, at 
Preamble, (2010). As explained by Comment 2 to the Preamble: “The Principles do 
not provide any express definition, but the assumption is that the concept of 
“commercial” contracts should be understood in the broadest possible sense, so as 
to include not only trade transactions for the supply or exchange of goods or services, 
but also other types of economic transactions, such as investment and/or concession 
agreements, contracts for professional services, etc.” See id. cmt. 2.  
9   See generally INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ICC MODEL 
CONTRACT: COMMERCIAL AGENCY (2d ed. 2002). 
10   For example, in Spain, although sometimes the Courts have applied by 
analogy some of the substantive provisions of the Agency Law.  
11   See generally María del Pilar Perales Viscasillas, International Distribution 
Contracts and CISG, in ESTUDIOS DE DERECHO MERCANTIL (2013).  
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Principles or the ICC, which also offers a model contract for the 
parties.12 
There is no universal definition of an international distribution 
contract, but a good example to illustrate this type of contract and its 
modalities is found in the Draft Common Frame of Reference 
(DCFR): IV. E. – 5:101 (Scope and definitions), which follows The 
Principles on Agency, Franchise and Distribution Contracts (PEL 
CAFDC)13:: 
(1) This Chapter applies to contracts (distribution 
contracts) under which one party, the supplier, agrees 
to supply the other party, the distributor, with products 
on a continuing basis and the distributor agrees to 
purchase them, or to take and pay for them, and to 
supply them to others in the distributor’s name and on 
the distributor’s behalf. 
(2) An exclusive distribution contract is a distribution 
contract under which the supplier agrees to supply 
products to only one distributor within a certain 
territory or to a certain group of customers. 
(3) A selective distribution contract is a distribution 
contract under which the supplier agrees to supply 
products, either directly or indirectly, only to 
distributors selected on the basis of specified criteria. 
(4) An exclusive purchasing contract is a distribution 
contract under which the distributor agrees to 
purchase, or to take and pay for, products only from 
the supplier or from a party designated by the supplier. 
                                                 
12   See generally INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ICC MODEL 
DISTRIBUTORSHIP DISTRIBUTION CONTRACT (2002). 
13 PRINCIPLES, DEFINITIONS AND MODEL RULES OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE 
LAW: DRAFT COMMON FRAME OF REFERENCE 2435 (Christian von Bar et al. eds., 
2009), avalible at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/contract/files/european-private-
law_en.pdf 
2015 Perales Viscasillas 4:1 
217 
A more succinct example, the UNIDROIT Guide provides: 
The distributor is wholly independently owned and 
financed and buys the products from the supplier by 
whom it has been granted the distribution rights. In 
some jurisdictions these distribution rights may be 
granted also for the supplying of services. In others, 
the distribution agreement is considered to incorporate 
the distributor into the manufacturer’s or supplier’s 
sales organization.14 
3.  Franchising Contracts- In many legal systems, franchising 
contracts are also atypical contracts and therefore there is no special 
regulation for these contracts.  UNIDROIT has, however, developed 
partial regulation guides for these contracts.15 
According to Article 2 of The UNIDROIT Model Franchise 
Disclosure Law (2002): 
[F]ranchise means the rights granted by a party (the 
franchisor) authorizing and requiring another party 
(the franchisee), in exchange for direct or indirect 
financial compensation, to engage in the business of 
selling goods or services on its own behalf under a 
system designated by the franchisor which includes 
know-how and assistance, prescribes in substantial part 
the manner in which the franchised business is to be 
operated, includes significant and continuing 
operational control by the franchisor, and is 
substantially associated with a trademark, service mark, 
trade name or logotype designated by the franchisor. It 
includes:  
(A) the rights granted by a franchisor to a sub-
franchisor under a master franchise agreement; 
                                                 
14   See UNIDROIT Guide, supra at 2. 
15  See UNIDROIT, A MODEL LAW ON PRECONTRACTUAL INFORMATION 
(2002); see also UNIDROIT, A GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL MASTER FRANCHISE 
ARRANGEMENTS (2d ed. 2007). 
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(B) the rights granted by a sub-franchisor to a sub-
franchisee under a sub-franchise agreement; 
(C) the rights granted by a franchisor to a party 
under a development agreement.16 
As considered by the UNIDROIT Guide, in most franchise 
agreements there is an exclusivity clause that provides that the 
franchisee is allowed to market only the products of the franchisor. 
The vendor-purchaser relationship may also be present in a franchise 
relationship, but will typically be a mere feature of the broader 
franchise arrangement, which will also include the licensing of the 
trademark, system of the franchisor, and the providing of certain 
services by the franchisor to the franchisee, such as training and 
continued assistance.17 
B.         International Commercial Arbitration 
As previously mentioned, distribution contracts are based 
upon the cooperation between two parties: the supplier and the 
distributor. In order to minimize transaction costs, the supplier has a 
priority interest to base his relationship with the distributors on the 
same model contract containing the same arbitration clause and 
providing for the same forum.18 Therefore, it is not unusual to find 
arbitration clauses in these contracts because the advantages of 
arbitration in commercial contracts, particularly international 
contracts, also applies to distribution contracts. 
Generally speaking, arbitration laws do not contain specific 
regulations as to distribution contracts and thus general arbitration 
rules apply. In fact, the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law on International 
Commercial Arbitration (MAL) does not contain any specific rules for 
distribution contracts. Yet, within the general definition of what is 
                                                 
16   UNIDROIT, MODEL FRANCHISE DISCLOSURE LAW art. 2 (2002). 
17   See UNIDROIT Guide, supra note 2, at 10.  
18  See generally Stefan Kröll, The “Arbitrability of Disputes Arising from 
Commercial Representation, in ARBITRABILITY: INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVES 317 (2009). 
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considered to be commercial distribution contracts are included, as 
well as agency and other forms of industrial or business cooperation.19 
Some countries do provide specific legislation on this area, 
adopting certain restrictions on arbitration or the applicable law and 
thus limiting party autonomy in arbitration. 
The reasons for adopting such limitations are based upon the 
idea that there is a weaker party and thus an unequal bargaining power 
whereby the principal imposes arbitration clauses on the agent, 
distributor, or franchisee. Such a clause might have the effect of 
depriving the weaker party of the rights afforded by the domestic 
statutes, and shows that there is a need to protect the essential 
conditions of a given market. 
As will be developed in this paper, these limitations primarily 
affect the arbitrability of the dispute (see infra section I). On the other 
hand, other legal regimes have adopted a more liberal approach 
towards arbitration in the area of distribution contracts as a way to 
attract investment and trade (see infra section II). 
There are also other issues in arbitration and distribution 
contracts that are shared by other commercial contracts, which 
includes the extension of the arbitration clause to third parties that 
might have an impact in networking distribution contracts or in 
franchising contracts, particularly if there is a master franchise 
                                                 
19   United Nations Committee on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), 
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration art. 1 ¶ 1, U.N. 
Sales No. E.95.V.18 (1985). This provides:  
   
The term “commercial” should be given a wide interpretation so 
as to cover matters arising from all relationships of a commercial 
nature, whether contractual or not. Relationships of a commercial 
nature include, but are not limited to, the following transactions: 
any trade transaction for the supply or exchange of goods or 
services; distribution agreement; commercial representation or 
agency; factoring; leasing; construction of works; consulting; 
engineering; licensing; investment; financing; banking; insurance; 
exploitation agreement or concession; joint venture and other 
forms of industrial or business cooperation; carriage of goods or 
passengers by air, sea, rail or road. 
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contract;20 the incorporation of arbitration clauses in general terms and 
conditions;21 the delimitation between the mediator, the expert and the 
arbitrator in distribution contracts which might be problematic in the 
automotive sector;22 the power of arbitrators in long-term contracts;23 
the consent to arbitration when an agent is concluding the contract on 
behalf of the principal;24 the impact upon distribution contracts of 
issues where arbitrability might be contentious, for example, when 
intellectual rights or competition issues are linked to the distribution 
contract;25 and the application of the standards of independence and 
impartiality to arbitrators.26 
I.         LIMITATION OF PARTY AUTONOMY IN ARBITRATION 
                                                 
20   BERNARD HANOTIAU, COMPLEX ARBITRATIONS: MULTIPARTY, 
MULTICONTRACT, MULTI-ISSUE AND CLASS ACTIONS 1 (Kluwer International Law, 
2005); Stephen R. Bond, Multi-party Arbitration — The Experience of the ICC International 
Court of Arbitration, in MULTI-PARTY ARBITRATION 39 (INT’L CHAMBER COM., 1991); 
Carmine R. Zarlenga, Defending Against Litigation by Third Parties in the Franchise Context, 
11 FRANCHISE L.J. 1, 19-24 (1991) (examining franchising contracts). 
21   Vera Van Houtte, Consent to Arbitration through Agreement to Printed 
Contracts: The Continental Experience, 16 ARB. INT’L. 1, 1–18 (2000). 
22   LAURENT DU JARDIN ET AL., ARBITRAGE V. EXPERTISE EN DROIT DE 
LA DISTRIBUTION (2006); JOHAN ERAUW ET AL., L’ARBITRAGE ET LA 
DISTRIBUTION COMMERCIALE 159-170 (2005).   
23   Didier Matray, Françoise Vidts, & Baudouin Roels, L’Arbitrage et le 
caractere evolutif des contrats de distribution, in L’ARBITRAGE ET LA DISTRIBUTION 
COMMERCIAL 109 (2005); ERAUW ET AL., supra note 22, at 111-55.  
24   See Stefan  Kröll, El desarrollo del arbitraje en los años 2007-2008, 9 
REVISTA DEL CLUB ESPAÑOL DEL ARBITRAJE 15 (2010). For an overview of German 
Domestic Law and the lack of power by commercial agents to conclude arbitration 
agreements, see HANDELGESETZBUCH [HGB] [COMMERCIAL CODE], May 10, 1987, 
REICHGESETZBLATT [RGBL.] 219, art. 53.2 (Ger.), see also Oberlandesgericht 
München [OLG] [Munich Appellate Court], Aug. 19, 2008, 34 SchH 007/07 (Ger.). 
25 Hans Van Houtte, Distribution Arbitration and European Competition Law, 
in JOHAN ERAUW ET AL., L’ARBITRAGE ET LA DISTRIBUTION COMMERCIALE 97-107 
(Bruylant, 1st ed. 2005); Pilar Perales Viscasillas, Arbitrabilidad de los Derechos de la 
industrial Propiedad Industrial y de la Competencia, 6 ANUARIO DE JUSTICIA 
ALTERNATIVA: DERECHO ARBITRAL 4-43 (2005). 
26   Doak Bishop & Lucy Reed, Practical Guidelines for Interviewing, Selecting 
and Challenging Party-Appointed Arbitrators in International Commercial Distribution, 14 ARB. 
INT’L. 28-32 (1998). 
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THROUGH ARBITRABILITY 
Distribution contracts are commercial contracts. Traditionally, 
commercial contracts might be subject to arbitration without the need 
to impose limitations. The rationale behind this general rule is that in 
commercial contracts, both parties share equal contracting power and 
thus there is no need to impose limitations, like, for example, in 
consumer arbitration.27 
                                                 
27   Jan Kleinheisterkamp, The Impact of Internationally Mandatory Law on the 
Enforceability of Arbitration Agreements 1-2 (LSE LAW, SOC’Y AND ENCON. WORKING 
PAPERS No. 22 2009), available at, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1496923 (See for all 
with special reference to distribution contracts).  
See also Directive 2013/11, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 
2013, On Alternative Dispute Resolution for Consumer Disputes, 2013 O.J. (L 
165/63) (EU). For a further discussion, see Norbert Reich, Party Autonomy and 
Consumer Arbitration in conflict -A “Trojan Horse” in the Access to Justice in the EU ADR-
Directive 2013/11?, 4 PENN. ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 290 (2015).  
 
Following art. 10 of Directive 2013/11, Spanish Consumer Arbitration has been 
recently changed by Modificación del texto refundido de la Ley General para la 
Defensa de los Consumidores y Usuarios y otras leyes complementarias (B.O.E. 
2014, 3) [hereinafter Law 3/2014], art. 57.4 (B.O.E. 2007, 1) [hereinafter Ley 
1/2007]. According to the old system, pre-disputed arbitration clauses in Law 1/2007 
(art. 57.4), as well as agreements to arbitrate contained in general conditions governed 
by Law 1/2007 (art. 90), were binding on consumers if the arbitration system 
provided for was the special consumer arbitration system created by the State and 
regulated under the consumer arbitral system (Sistema Arbitral de Consumo (B.O.E. 
2008, 231) [hereinafter Royal Decree 231/2008]). Now, under the new art. 57.4 as 
modified by Law 3/2014, any arbitration agreement concluded before the dispute 
does not bind the consumer, but it binds the merchant if the consumer later accepts 
it, and when a further condition is met: the arbitration agreement should met the 
conditions required by the applicable laws. Presently, Article 57.4 Law  1/2007 as 
amended by Ley 3/2014 states that:  
No serán vinculantes para los consumidores los convenios 
arbitrales suscritos con un empresario antes de surgir el conflicto. 
La suscripción de dicho convenio, tendrá para el empresario la 
consideración de aceptación del arbitraje para la solución de las 
controversias derivadas de la relación jurídica a la que se refiera, 
siempre que el acuerdo de sometimiento reúna los requisitos 
exigidos por las normas aplicables.  
For further details, see Pilar Perales Viscasillas, Los convenios arbitrales con los 
consumidores (La modificación del art. 57.4 TRLGDCU por la Ley 3/2014 de 27 de 
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Scholars studying arbitrability typically distinguish between 
objective arbitrability (arbitrability rationae materiae, i.e. matters that are 
capable of settlement by arbitration) and subjective arbitrability28 
(authority and capacity of the parties). Objective arbitrability is an issue 
to be decided in accordance with domestic laws on arbitration, which 
defines arbitrability as including both the subject matter of arbitration 
and the need for a dispute to exist. The issue of arbitrability goes beyond 
the scope of an arbitration agreement. It is inherent to the power of States 
to decide what issues are capable of being resolved through arbitration, 
and it is outside the will of the parties. On the other hand, the object of 
an arbitration clause is an issue to be decided by the will of the parties, 
who within the scope of issues that are arbitrable, might exclude some of 
them. The parties cannot, however, agree to submit to arbitration 
disputes that are not arbitrable. 
Generally, domestic laws consider arbitrability under general 
rather than exhaustive provisions. Some national laws provide that all 
rights or matters that the parties “may freely dispose”29 or “property 
issues”30 might be subject to arbitration. Also, many statutes link 
arbitrability with the transaction, and thus the matters that are the object 
of a transaction might be also subject to arbitration.31 These general 
                                                 
marzo), 7 La Ley Mercantil 22 (2014).  
 
 28   See JULIAN D. M. LEW, LOUKAS A. MISTELIS & STEFAN MICHAEL 
KRÖLL, COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION Ch. 9 (Kluwer 
Law International, 2003); see also Kresimir Sajko, Arbitration Agreement and Arbitrability. 
Solutions and Open Issues in Croatian and Comparative Law, 3 CROAT. ARB. Y.B. 43, 44 
(1996) (some authors also refer to arbitrability ratione jurisdictionis); Alan Uzelac, New 
Boundaries of Arbitrability under the Croatian Law on Arbitration, 9 CROAT. ARB. Y.B. 139, 
140, 152, 155 (2002) (referring also to arbitrability ratione institutionis). 
 29   Ley de Arbitraje art. 2.1 (B.O.E. 2003, 60) (Spain); Code Civil [C. CIV.] 
art. 2059 (Fr.); Codice di Procedura Civile [C.p.c.] art. 808, art. 1966.2 (It.); Peru 
Arbitration Act, art. 1 (2008); ORGANIZATION FOR THE HARMONIZATION OF 
BUSINESS LAW IN AFRICA (OHADA), UNIFORM ACT OF ARBITRATION (1999).  
30   LOI FÉDÉRALE SUR LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ [LDIP] [PRIVATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW] Dec. 18, 1987, RO 1776, art. 177.1 (Switz.); 
ZIVILPROZESSSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE] Jan. 30, 1877, 
REICHSGESETZBLATT [RGBL.] art. 1030.1 (Ger.); Lei No. 9.307, de 23 de Setembro 
de 1996, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] (t. 1): de 24.9.1996  (Braz.). 
31   ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CIVIL PROCEDURE STATUTE] 
REICHGESETZBLATT [RGBL] No. 113/1895 (Austria); Finnish Arbitration Law, art. 2, 
(Oct. 23 1992); Chūsai-hō [Arbitration Law], Law No. 138 of 2003, art. 13.1 (Japan); 
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clauses require significant specification and interpretation in order to 
assess which of the specific issues related to distribution contracts are 
arbitrable. 
Arbitrability will vary from country to country, and even within 
a given country it will vary since it is a concept that has changed with 
time. Despite this, however, one clear principle applies to arbitrability, 
particularly in international commercial arbitration: the principle of 
favour arbitris. The application of this principle to arbitrability means, 
first, there is a general presumption in favour of the arbitrability of 
commercial disputes (policy favouring arbitrability);32  and second, there 
is a tendency to expand the scope of the subject-matter of arbitration. 
Despite this modern approach to arbitrability, some countries 
adopt limitations to party autonomy by restricting objective arbitrability 
of the dispute, either by excluding arbitration before the dispute has 
arisen (see infra section I.A) or by excluding it through the imposition of 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the State Courts (see infra I.B). 
A.         Invalidity of the Pre-Disputed Arbitration Clauses: United 
States 
The idea of the protecting the weaker party in distribution 
contracts, i.e., the agent, distributor or franchisee, as if they were 
consumers is the impetus for certain laws. These laws are intended to 
restrict arbitration from hindering an agreement before a dispute has 
arisen. 
An example of this is The Motor Vehicle Franchise Contract 
Arbitration Fairness Act (2002) (United States).33 This act would have 
                                                 
1a § LAG OM SKILJEFÖRFARANDE (Svensk författningssamling [SFS] 1999:116) 
(Swed.).  
32   María Fernanda Vasquez Palma, 2 IUS ET PRAXIS 407-410 (2012) 
(reviewing MARTA DE GONZALO QUIROGA, ORDEN PÚBLICO Y ARBITRAJE 
INTERNACIONAL ARBITRAJE INTERNACIONAL EN EL MARCO DE LA GLOBALIZACIÓN 
COMERCIAL GLOBALIZACIÓN COMERCIAL ARBITRABILIDAD Y DERECHO APLICABLE 
DERECHO APLICABLE AL FONDO DE LA CONTROVERSIA INTERNACIONAL (2003)). 
33   S. REP. NO. 107-266, at 2 (2002): 
 
This legislation would allow motor vehicle dealers the option of 
either going to arbitration or utilizing procedures and remedies 
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applied to Business to Business transactions, i.e., to contracts whereby 
“a motor vehicle manufacturer, importer or distributor sells motor 
vehicles to any other person for resale to an ultimate purchaser and 
authorizes such other person to repair and authorizes such other 
person to repair and service manufacturer´s motor vehicles.”34 Leaving 
aside the confusion between distribution and franchise contracts, this 
act would have considered arbitration valid only if agreed to by the 
parties after the controversy arises.35 
                                                 
available under State law such as those involving State-established 
administrative boards specifically created and uniquely equipped 
to resolve disputes between motor vehicle dealers and 
manufacturers. This legislation is intended to ensure that motor 
vehicle dealers are not required to forfeit important rights and 
remedies afforded by State law as a condition of obtaining or 
renewing a motor vehicle franchise contract. 
 
The report of the Senate refers also extensively to the unequal 
bargaining power between the parties and the fact that arbitration 
agreements are included in standard terms or conditions on a 
“take it or leave it” basis, which converts those clauses in 
“mandatory binding arbitration” with the effect of making null or 
void the substantive protective rights afforded by the Statute. 
34   Id. 
35   Id. at 17 (2002) (discussing motor vehicle franchise contracts):  
(a) For purposes of this section, the term (2) ‘‘motor vehicle 
franchise contract’’ means a contract under which a motor vehicle 
manufacturer, importer, or distributor sells motor vehicles to any 
other person for resale to an ultimate purchaser and authorizes 
such other person to repair and service the manufacturer’s motor 
vehicles. 
(b) Whenever a motor vehicle franchise contract provides for the 
use of arbitration to resolve a controversy arising out of or relating 
to the contract, arbitration may be used to settle such controversy 
only if after such controversy arises both parties consent in writing 
to use arbitration to settle such controversy. 
(c) Whenever arbitration is elected to settle a dispute under a 
motor vehicle franchise contract, the arbitrator shall provide the 
parties to the contract with a written explanation of the factual 
and legal basis for the award. 
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An identical solution is found in the Draft Arbitration Fairness 
Act (2013) in relation to consumer, labor and competition issues. 
Franchising contracts were included in previous drafts.36 
B.         Exclusive Jurisdiction of State Courts: Panama 
A more restrictive view towards arbitration has been adopted by 
certain legal systems that consider both pre and post-dispute arbitration 
clauses to be invalid, because in these jurisdictions only the state courts 
are considered competent to hear a dispute. Therefore, arbitration as a 
means to solve disputes is preempted by imposing the exclusive 
jurisdiction of state courts. An example is the recent Code of Private 
International Law of the Republic of Panama.37 
According to this Code, commercial contracts follow a 
presumption that contracts are concluded among equal parties.38 
However, a special regulation is provided for distribution contracts when 
the commissioner is rendering the services in Panama. According to the 
Law, these contracts are considered to be unequal contracts or adhesive 
contracts39 and are under the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts in 
                                                 
36 See Kröll, supra note 18 § 16-30, 16-32. 
37 Code of Private International Law of the Republic of Panama (May 8, 
2014). 
38  Id. art. 88. 
39 Id. art. 89. (Unequal contracts are also considered those whereby the 
weaker party has not capacity to negotiate the essential elements of the contract; 
those are considered to be: price, clauses for the performance of the contract, and 
the settlement of disputes). 
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Panama if the contract is performed within Panamanian borders.40 The 
same limitation applies to labor and consumer contracts.41 
At the same time, when the contract is an international 
commercial representation or franchising contract, the Code establishes 
certain limitations to the general principle of freedom of contract in 
relation to the applicable law to the indemnification for breach of the 
contract or unilateral termination. . In this situation, the commissioner or 
the franchisee has the only option to choose between the application of 
the law applicable to the performance of the contract or the law that 
provides the highest standard of protection. 
Belgium is another example of a jurisdiction where legislation 
provides for the exclusive jurisdiction of the state courts, as well as for 
the mandatory application of state law for certain distribution contracts 
and agency contracts. Belgian case law tends to apply Article II(3) of the 
1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards and, thus, Belgian courts have found that 
arbitration agreements are null and void because of the exclusive 
competence of state courts.42 
                                                 
40   Id. art 90, 91. (These limitations both in regard to arbitration and to the 
choice of law do not encompass some other well advanced provisions. To this regard, 
Panama has an arbitration Law that follows very closely The United Nations 
Committee on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), UNCITRAL Model Law on 
International Commercial Arbitration, U.N. Sales No. E.08.V.4 (2008) as modified 
in 2006. See Arbitration Law of Panama (Dec. 31, 2013). Arbitrability of the subject 
matter of the dispute is seen under the general rule of the free disposition of the 
parties in art. 4, and in terms of applicable law, due regard is to be given by the 
arbitrators to the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts, 
since in all cases the arbitrators will have to take into account the provisions of the 
contract, the usages of trade as well as the UNIDROIT Principles when the contract 
is international, as required by art. 56.3.   
Identical conclusions in regard to the Code of Private International Law of the 
Republic of Panama, supra note 37, that recognizes the principle of pacta sunt servanda 
in art.72, and also recognizes the agreement of the parties to apply the UNIDROIT 
Principles as a secondary source to the applicable Law or as a mean to interpret an 
international commercial contract by the judge or the arbitrator in art.86. 
41   Code of Private International Law of the Republic of Panama, supra 
note 37, art. 90. 
42   See Kleinheisterkamp, supra note 27, at 1 et seq.; Kröll, supra note 17, at 
16-33 et seq.; Pilar Perales Viscasillas, Contratos de internacional Distribución Internacional 
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The overriding effect of domestic laws upon arbitration, even 
with regard to other substantive laws, including those that are based 
upon European Union (EU) Law, is seen when analyzing the Unamar 
case, ECJ 17 October 2013.43 In Unamar, the court states the 
important consequences for agency contracts within the EU, but does 
not consider arbitration in its analysis. 
In Unamar, the parties were an agent from Belgium and a 
principal from Bulgaria, the applicable law in the contract was 
Bulgarian Law, and there was also an arbitration clause that provided 
for an arbitral seat and institution in Bulgaria (Bulgaria Chamber of 
Commerce). Article 27 of the Belgium Law on commercial agency 
contracts provides that: 
Without prejudice to the application of international 
conventions to which Belgium is a party, any activity 
of a commercial agent whose principal place of 
business is in Belgium shall be governed by Belgian law 
and shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the Belgian 
courts. 
The Hof van Cassatie (Court of Cassation), considering art. 
II(3) NYC, held that it had jurisdiction,44 thereby considering the lex 
fori in its analysis,45 but submitted the question of the applicable law to 
a preliminary ruling. The ECJ in the UNAMAR Case had to consider 
                                                 
y Arbitraje, in DISTRIBUCIÓN COMERCIAL Y DERECHO DE LA COMPETENCIA 45-102 
(Jorge Viera González & Joseba Aitor Echevarría Sáenz eds., 2011).   
43   C-184/12, United Antwerp Martime Agencies (Unamar) NV v. 
Navigation Maritime Bulgare, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX Lexis 4306 (Oct. 17, 2013). 
See also Hilda Grieder Aguilar, La Intervención de las “Leyes De Policía” Como Límite al 
Principio de la Autonomía de la Voluntad de las Partes en los Contratos de Agencia Comercial: 
Un Nuevo Paso en la Comprensión del Sistema, DIARIO LA LEY No. 8234 (2014). 
44   See Hof van Cassatie [Cass.] [Court of Cassation], May 4, 2012, N-
20120405-2, http://www.cass.be (Belg.) (where the parties agree to arbitration in 
Quebec (Canada) and the arbitration clause was considered to be null and void; as 
usual in Belgian Law a comparison is drawn between the applicable law chosen by 
the parties and Belgian Law, being the one agreed less protective to the agent.).  
45   Pilar Perales Viscasillas, Contratos de Distribucion Internacional 77 et seq., 
in DISTRIBUCION COMERCIAL Y DERECHO DE LA COMPETENCIA (La Ley Grupo 
Wolters Kluwer, 2011) (an analysis that has been very much subject to criticism 
because it ought to have been in accordance to the lex contractus, see further details). 
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whether the Agency Law of Belgium was or was not part of the 
international public policy, within the meaning of Article 7 of the 
Rome Convention.46 
According to the facts of the case, Bulgaria correctly 
implemented the Agency Directive into its domestic law, which is a 
minimum harmonization directive. However, it did so in less 
protective terms when compared to Belgium Agency Law. Therefore, 
the question was whether Articles 3 and 7(2) of the Rome Convention 
might authorize the Belgium courts (law of the forum) to disregard the 
application of the law chosen by the parties (Bulgarian Law) in favor 
of the mandatory laws of the forum (Belgium Law on Agency 
Contracts), despite the fact that the law chosen (Bulgarian Law) meets 
the requirement of Directive 86/653. 
The answer to this question was that Bulgarian Law could be 
disregarded by the Belgian Court owing to the mandatory nature, in 
the legal order of Belgium, of the rules governing the situation of self-
employed commercial agents. 
These rules are mandatory only when the court before 
which the case has been brought finds, on the basis of 
a detailed assessment, that, in the course of that 
transposition, the legislature of the forum state (Belgium) 
found it to be crucial, in the legal order concerned, to grant the 
commercial agent protection going beyond that 
provided for by the directive. In that regard, the 
                                                 
46   Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, art. 7 
1980 OJ (L 266) (EC) [hereinafter Rome Convention]: 
1. When applying under this Convention the law of a country, 
effect may be given to the mandatory rules of the law of another 
country with which the situation has a close connection, if and in 
so far as, under the law of the latter country, those rules must be 
applied whatever the law applicable to the contract. In considering 
whether to give effect to these mandatory rules, regard shall be 
had to their nature and purpose and to the consequences of their 
application or non-application  
2. Nothing in this Regulation shall restrict the application of the 
provisions of the law of the forum in a situation where they are 
mandatory irrespective of the law otherwise applicable to the non-
contractual obligation. 
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legislature of the forum state must also take into 
account the nature and of the objective of such 
mandatory provisions.47 
Therefore: 
it is thus for the national court, in the course of its 
assessment of whether the national law which it 
proposes to substitute for that expressly chosen by the 
parties to the contract is a ‘mandatory rule’, to take 
account not only of the exact terms of that law, but 
also of its general structure and of all the circumstances 
in which that law was adopted in order to determine 
whether it is mandatory in nature in so far as it appears 
that the legislature adopted it in order to protect an 
interest judged to be essential by the Member State 
concerned. As the Commission pointed out, such a 
case might be one where the transposition in the 
Member State of the forum, by extending the scope of 
a directive or by choosing to make wider use of the 
discretion afforded by that directive, offers greater 
protection to commercial agents by virtue of the 
particular interest which the Member State pays to that 
category of nationals” (pfo.50). 
C.         The Mandatory Character of Substantive Rules for the 
Protection of the Weaker Party and its Impact on Arbitration: 
Agency Contracts in Europe 
As we have considered in the two previous sections, arbitration 
agreements might be totally or partially affected by an express rule 
limiting arbitrability of the dispute. A third approach to limit the 
freedom of the parties to submit disputes to arbitration is somewhat 
indirect because it is derived from the idea that there is a fraud of law 
by one of the parties (the party with more contracting power) when 
imposing arbitration with a foreign seat and with a foreign law. This 
implies that the principal is trying to escape from the mandatory laws 
protecting the agent, distributor, or franchisee. In fact, this 
                                                 
47 See Unamar, supra note 43.  
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consideration is also behind those laws that expressly prohibit 
arbitration.48 
A typical example of forum shopping in this area is found in 
real cases: a Californian principal, with a commercial agent in Europe, 
elects for arbitration proceedings in California, under Californian law. 
Interestingly, California law does not recognize a possible 
indemnification to the commercial agent after the termination of the 
contract, contrary to the 1986 Agency Directive49. In this regard, art. 
17 of the Agency Directive is considered a mandatory rule within the 
European Union that cannot be evaded by the simple expedient of a 
choice of law clause50 and/or arbitration clause.51 Hence, the disputes 
are non-arbitrable if the applicable law is the law of a non-European 
country.52 
II.         A POLICY FAVORING ARBITRATION IN THE AREA OF 
DISTRIBUTION CONTRACTS 
Contrary to the approach undertaken by several countries, other 
legal systems do not constrain the principle of freedom of the parties to 
submit their disputes to arbitration in the framework of distribution 
contracts; on the contrary they have followed a policy in favor of 
arbitration. 
                                                 
48   See supra Sections I.1, I.2. 
49   Council Directive 86/653, On Self-Employed Commercial Agents, art. 
17 1986 O.J. (L 382) 17 (EC). 
50   C-381/98, Ingmar v. Eaton, 2000 E.C.R. I-09305 (in the case, the agent 
had his place of business in the United Kingdom, and there was no forum or 
arbitration clause agreed. In terms of applicable law, as we have mentioned, it is not 
only that the law of the third country might be disregarded but also, as the UNAMAR 
Case shows, the law of EU country in favor of the mandatory law of the forum). 
51   As interpreted by German Courts when facing art. 89b HGB 
(HANDELSGESETZBUCH, CCo), i.e., Art.17 of the Agency Directive. See Kröll, supra, 
note 18, at 16-55. 
52   For further details, see Kröll, supra note 17, at 16-55 et seq; see also 
Kleinheisterkamp, supra note 26, at 10. This doctrine does not extend to distribution 
contracts. See Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court] Jan. 27, 2010, docket 
No. 7 Ob 255/09i (Austria) (principal in USA, arbitration in California, distributor 
in Austria). 
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A.         Agency Contracts under Spanish Law 
Spanish law bases its agency contract law on the EU Directive 
of 1986.53 This law establishes that the competence to hear disputes 
related to agency contracts belongs to the judge of the agent´s domicile, 
making null any contrary agreement of the parties.54 This imperative 
provision55 could have been interpreted as a rule that provides for the 
exclusion of arbitration. However, the majority of scholars and the case 
law agree that this provision does not provide for an exclusive 
jurisdiction of State Courts,56 but only a territorial competence among 
State Courts,57 and thus it does not exclude arbitration even if it has a seat 
in a foreign country.58 
                                                 
53   Ley Sobre Contrato de Agencia (B.O.E. 1992, 12) (Spain). See also 
Council Directive 86/653, On Self-Employed Commercial Agents, 1986 O.J. (L 382) 
17 (EC). 
54   Id. “La competencia para el conocimiento de las acciones derivadas del 
contrato de agencia corresponderá al Juez del domicilio del agente, siendo nulo cualquier 
pacto en contrario 
55   Id. In general, most of the rules contained in the Agency Contract Law 
are imperative, see Article 3.1. 
56   Pilar Jiménez Blanco, Nota al Auto AP Barcelona (sección 17ª) 28 mayo 
2009, 1 ARBITRAJE: REVISTA DE ARBITRAJE COMERCIAL Y DE INVERSIONES 270 
(2010); Alejandro López Ortiz, Interferencias y desajustes entre competencia judicial internacional 
y competencia territorial en los tribunales civiles españoles: la disposición adicional de lay Desajustes 
Entre Competencia Judicial Internacional y Competencia Territorial en los Tribunales Civiles 
Españoles: La Disposición Adicional de la Ley 12/1992, del contrato de agencia del Contrato de 
Agencia, 14/157 DERECHO DE NEGOCIOS 17 (2003); Pilar Perales Viscasillas, Algunos 
Problemas en Torno a la Arbitrabilidad: Insolvencia y Contrato de Agencia, 5 FORO DE 
DERECHO MERCANTIL 7-29 (2004). 
57   See S.T.S.J. Murcia, Apr. 16, 2014 (R.O.J., 1035/2014) for a recent 
domestic agency contract (decision of The High Superior Court of Justice of Murcia). 
58   See Pilar Jimenez Blanco, Nota al Auto AP Barcelona (sección 17ª) 28 mayo 
2009, 1 ARBITRAJE: REVISTA DE ARBITRAJE COMERCIAL Y DE INVERSIONES 266-272 
(2010) (in relation with an international agency contract (Arbitration in Finland, 
Finnish principal, Spanish agent)); see also S.A.P. Barcelona, June 1, 2004 (R.O.J., 
7108/2004); S.A.P. Barcelona, Feb. 7, 2006 (R.O.J., 14828/2006), S.A.P., Nov. 6, 
2000 (R.O.J., 13153/2000) and S.A.P. Barcelona, Nov. 19, 2002 (R.O.J. 
11552/2002); see also S.A.A.P. Lleida 28 Jan. 2009 (R.O.J. 98/2009). 
Impliedly also, S.T.S., July 3, 2002 (R.O.J. 4928/2002); S.A.P. Barcelona, Nov. 6, 
2000 (R.O.J. 13153/2000) considering the second look doctrine; and S.A.P. 
Córdoba, July 23, 2001 (R.O.J. 1013/2001). But see contrary stating that the arbitral 
agreement is null: Auto AP Alicante, May 28, 2008 (R.O.J. 76/2008). 
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In this regard, Spanish arbitration legislation follows a policy that 
favors arbitration and arbitrability of the disputes.59 An example of this 
is that arbitration is provided for by the legislator even when the agent 
has a special protection as a special worker.60 
B.         Distribution Contracts under DR-CAFTA 
The Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade 
Agreement (DR-CAFTA) is the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between 
the United States and Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic. As with other FTAs, such as 
NAFTA (United States, Canada and Mexico), the idea is to facilitate 
                                                 
59  Pilar Perales Viscasillas, Arbitration in Spain, in WORLD ARBITRATION 
REPORTER (WAR) 1-53 (Loukas A. Mistelis, Laurence Shore & Hans Smite eds., 2d ed., 
2012). In regard to international distribution contracts, see considering enforceable 
arbitration agreements with a foreign seat, see S.A.P. Barcelona, Feb. 27, 2012 (R.O.J. 
709/2012); see also ICC Arbitration in Düsseldorf. Also an international distribution 
contract with an exclusive licensing agreement: arbitration in a foreign country with an 
applicable foreign law (California) and included into the general terms and conditions 
was considered a valid agreement during the exequatur proceedings, see S.T.S.J. 
Cataluña, Mar. 25, 2013 (R.O.J. 184/2013). See also considering the equal bargaining 
power in international distribution contracts and the agreement to arbitrate included 
in general terms and conditions: S.T.S.J. Cataluña, Nov. 17, 2011 (R.O.J. 525/2011) 
also examining this question during the enforcement proceedings under The New 
York Convention. For a valid agreement in international distribution contracts of the 
option for arbitration or state Courts, Juz. de lo Mercantil, nº11 of Madrid, May 4, 
2011 (R.O.J. 3738/2014), confirmed by S.A.P. Madrid, Oct. 18, 2013 (R.O.J. 
1988/2011). 
Also considering that franchising contracts are negotiated contracts between the 
parties as derived from the mandatory pre-contractual information and thus 
considering the arbitration valid as no proof of the non-negotiated agreement was 
duly provided: S.A.P. Zaragoza, Dec. 19, 2011 (R.O.J. 3211/2011). Contrary 
considering the arbitration clause null as was included in general terms and 
conditions: S.A.P. Barcelona, Sep. 28, 2012 (R.O.J. 7296/2012), that it is however a 
wrong decision based upon art. 63 Code of Civil Procedure that does not apply to 
arbitration. 
60   Ley del Estatuto del Trabajador Autónomo (LETA) (B.O.E. 20/2007) 
(Spain) (applies to commercial agents when they are considered economically 
dependant from the principal. Art.17 LETA establishes the competence of Labor 
courts but also in accordance with Art.18.4 LETA parties may submit their disputes 
to arbitration.).  
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trade and investment to foster regional integration and 
harmonization.61 
DR-CAFTA is different than other FTAs in that it deals, 
among other issues, with distribution contracts (substantive rules), as 
well as arbitration in relation to these contracts. The more recent FTAs 
focus on arbitration as the ideal, efficient and fair method for resolving 
commercial disputes, and they are considered the best way to promote 
investment and trade.62 
                                                 
61   David A., Gantz, Symposium: CAFTA and Commercial Law Reform in the 
Americas: International Legal Development: The Complex Problem of Customs Law and 
Administrative Reform in Central America, 12 Americas, SW. J.L. & TRADE AM. 215, 220 
(2006) (U.S.) (The agreement entered into force for the United States and El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua during 2006. For the Dominican 
Republic on Mar. 1, 2007, and for Costa Rica on Jan. 1, 2009.) (U.S.). 
62   José A. Muñoz, Symposium: CAFTA and Commercial Law Reform in the 
Americas: Dealing with Shadow Economy: Comments and Reflections, Southwestern, 12 SW. J.L. 
& TRADE AM. 373, 378 (2006); Omar García Bolivar, Symposium: CAFTA and 
Commercial Law Reform in the Americas: Dispute Resolution Process and Enforcing the Rule of 
Law: Is Arbitration a Viable Alternative to Solving Disputes in Central America, 12 SW. J.L. 
& TRADE AM. 380, 381 et seq. (2006); Jeffrey Talpis, Symposium: CAFTA and 
Commercial Law Reform in the Americas: Comments on Dispute Resolution Process and Enforcing 
the Rule of Law, 12 SW. J.L. & TRADE AM. 409 et seq. (2006); Pilar Perales Viscasillas 
et al., Derecho Uniforme del Comercio Internacional y Tratados de Libre Comercio en América, 
in EL DERECHO MERCANTIL EN EL UMBRAL DEL SIGLO XXI: LIBRO HOMENAJE AL 
PROF. DR. CARLOS FERNÁNDEZ-NÓVOA EN SU OCTOGÉSIMO CUMPLEAÑOS 63-76 
(J. A. Gómez Segade and A. Garci ́a, Marcial Pons eds., 2010). 
See also for example, Agreement between the United States of America and the 
Socialist Republic of Vietnam on Trade Relations, U.S.-Viet., art. 7, July 13, 2000, 
Hein’s No. KAV 5968, available at 
http://photos.state.gov/libraries/vietnam/8621/pdf-forms/bta.pdf (commercial 
Disputes, which means a dispute between parties to a commercial transaction which 
arises out of that transaction): 
2. The parties encourage the adoption of arbitration for the 
settlement of disputes arising out of commercial transactions 
concluded between nationals or companies of the United States 
of America and nationals or companies of the Socialist Republic 
of Vietnam. Such arbitration may be provided for by agreements 
in contracts between such nationals and companies, or in a 
separate written agreement between them.  
3. The parties to such transactions may provide for arbitration 
under any internationally recognized arbitration rules, including 
the UNCITRAL Rules of December 15, 1976, and any 
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Before DR-CAFTA, legislation in Central-American countries 
was imperative and very protective of the distributor, agent and 
franchisee.63 Furthermore, arbitration was prohibited because the 
legislation provided for the exclusive jurisdiction of State courts to 
resolve disputes in the area of distribution contracts. However, those 
barriers to the principle of freedom of contract and arbitration were 
                                                 
modifications thereto, in which case the parties should designate 
an Appointing Authority under said rules in a country other than 
USA or Vietnam. 
4. The parties to the dispute, unless otherwise agreed between 
them, should specify as the place of arbitration a country other 
than USA or Vietnam that is a party to the New York Convention.  
5. Nothing in this Article shall be construed to prevent, and the 
parties shall not prohibit, the parties from agreeing upon any other 
form of arbitration or on the law to be applied in such arbitration, 
or other form of dispute settlement which they mutually prefer 
and agree best suits their particular needs. 
6. Each party shall ensure that an effective means exists within its 
territory for the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards.”  
63   See the Preamble to the Law No. 173, the Protection of the Importers 
Agents of Goods and Products of 6th April 1966 (Dominican Republic) that was 
considered a Public Order Law (art. 8):  
CONSIDERANDO que el Estado Dominicano no puede 
permanecer indiferente al creciente número de casos en que 
personas físicas o morales del exterior, sin causas justificada, 
eliminen sus concesionarios agentes tan pronto como estos han 
creado un mercado favorable en la República, y sin tener en cuenta 
sus intereses legítimos.  
CONSIDERANDO que se hace necesaria la adecuada protección 
de las personas físicas o morales que se dediquen en la República 
Dominicana a promover y gestionar la importación, la 
distribución, la venta, el alquiler o cualquier otra forma de 
explotación de mercaderías o productos procedentes del 
extranjero o cuando los mismos sean fabricados en el país, 
actuando como agentes, o bajo cualquiera otra denominación 
contra los perjuicios que puedan irrogarles la resolución injusta de 
las relaciones en virtud de las cuales ejerzan tales actividades, por 
la acción unilateral de las personas o entidades a quienes 
representan o por cuya cuenta o interés actúan, a fin de asegurarles 
la reparación equitativa y completa de todas las pérdidas que hayan 
sufrido, así como de las ganancias legítimas percibibles de que 
sean privados. 
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considered by the contracting parties as contrary to the objectives of 
DR-CAFTA, i.e., among others, to: 
CONTRIBUTE to the harmonious development and 
expansion of world trade and provide a catalyst to 
broader international cooperation; 
CREATE an expanded and secure market for the 
goods and services produced  in their territories while 
recognizing the differences in their levels of 
development and the size of their economies; 
AVOID distortions to their reciprocal trade; 
ESTABLISH clear and mutually advantageous rules 
governing their trade; 
ENSURE a predictable commercial framework for 
business planning and investment; 
FOSTER creativity and innovation, and promote trade 
in goods and services that are the subject of 
intellectual property rights (. . .). 
As a consequence, the Central American countries (and the 
Dominican Republic) needed to assume several specific commitments 
in order to reduce the impact of mandatory rules,64 as well as, to 
promote arbitration both in general terms65 and particularly in relation 
                                                 
64   For the main characteristic of this legislation, see Cecilia Barrero, 
Distribution Contracts in the Dominican Republic, 2001 COMP. LAW Y.B. INT’L BUS. 27-32; 
Salvador Juncadella, Agency, Distribution and Representation Contracts in Central America 
and Panama, 6 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 35, 36(1974) (with references to 
Honduras, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua and Panama). 
65   Central American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-D.R., art. 20.22, Aug. 5, 
2004, 43 I.L.M. 514: 
1. Each Party shall, to the maximum extent possible, encourage 
and facilitate the use of arbitration and other means of alternative 
dispute resolution for the settlement of international commercial 
disputes between private parties in the free trade area. 2. To this 
end, each Party shall provide appropriate procedures to ensure 
observance of agreements to arbitrate and for the recognition and 
enforcement of arbitral awards in such disputes. 3. A Party shall 
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to distribution contracts by eliminating the exclusive jurisdiction of 
State Courts. Taking the example of Costa Rica, which assumed the 
following commitments in Annex 11.3 revolved around the principle 
of party autonomy and promotion of arbitration: 
“1. Costa Rica shall repeal articles 2 and 9 of Law No. 
6209, entitled Ley de Protección al Representante de 
Casas Extranjeras , dated 9 March 1978, and its 
regulation, and item b) of article 361 of the Código de 
Comercio, Law No. 3284 of 24 April 1964, effective 
on the date of entry into force of this Agreement. 
2. Subject to paragraph 1, Costa Rica shall enact a new 
legal regime that shall become applicable to contracts 
of representation, distribution, or production, and: 
(a) Shall apply principles of general contract law to 
such contracts; 
(b) Shall be consistent with the obligations of this 
Agreement and the principle of Freedom of 
contract; 
(c) Shall treat such contracts as establishing an 
exclusive relationship only if the Contract explicitly 
states that the relationship is exclusive; 
(d) shall provide that the termination of such 
contracts either on their termination dates or in 
the circumstances described in subparagraph (e) is 
just cause for a goods or service supplier of 
another Party to terminate the contract or allow 
the contract to expire without renewal; and 
                                                 
be deemed to be in compliance with paragraph 2 if it is a party to 
and is in compliance with the 1958 United Nations Convention 
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 
or the 1975 Inter-American Convention on International 
Commercial Arbitration [. . .]. 
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(e) Will allow contracts with no termination date to 
be terminated by any of the parties by giving ten 
months advance termination notice. 
3. The absence of an express provision for settlement 
of disputes in a contract of representation, distribution, 
or production shall give rise to a presumption that the 
parties intended to settle any disputes through binding 
arbitration. Such arbitration may take place in Costa 
Rica. However, the presumption of an intent to submit 
to arbitration shall not apply where any of the parties 
objects to arbitration. 
4. The United States and Costa Rica shall encourage 
parties to existing contracts of representation, 
distribution, or production to renegotiate such 
contracts so as to make them subject to the new legal 
regime enacted in accordance with paragraph 2. 
5. In any case, the repeal of articles 2 and 9 of Law No. 
6209 shall not impair any vested right, when applicable, 
derived from that legislation and recognized under 
Article 34 of the Constitución Política de la República 
de Costa Rica. 
6. Costa Rica shall, to the maximum extent possible, 
encourage and facilitate the use of arbitration for the 
settlement of disputes in contracts of representation, 
distribution, or production. To this end, Costa Rica 
shall endeavor to facilitate the operation of arbitration 
centers and other effective means of alternative 
resolution of claims arising pursuant to Law No. 6209 
or the new legal regime enacted in accordance with 
paragraph 2, and shall encourage the development of 
rules for such arbitrations that provide, to the greatest 
extent possible, for the prompt, low-cost, and fair 
resolution of such claims. 
7. For purposes of this Section: 
2015 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 4:1 
238 
(a) Contract of representation, distribution, or 
production has the same meaning as under Law 
No. 6209; and 
(b) Termination date means the date provided in 
the contract for the  contract to end, or the end of 
a contract extension period agreed upon by the 
parties to the contract. 
Costa Rica fulfilled those commitments by modifying Art.7 of 
Law nº6209 de Protección al Representante de Casas Extranjeras.66 In 
the old Art.7, the exclusive competence of Costa Rican courts was 
established in addition to the imperative character of the substantive 
rules relating to distribution contracts. According to the new provision, 
arbitration is allowed despite the fact that the substantive rules that 
govern distribution contracts are imperative. Thereby recognizing an 
important principle in arbitration: the imperative character of the rules 
is not an obstacle for the settlement of disputes through arbitration.67 
CONCLUSION: NO NEED TO LIMIT PARTY AUTONOMY IN 
                                                 
66   The modification took place by Modificación De La Ley De Protección 
Al Representante De Casas Extranjeras, Nº 6209, Y Derogación Del Inciso B) Del 
Artículo 361 Del Código De Comercio, Ley Nº 3284, Ley No. 8629, Nov. 11, 2007 
(Costa Rica), available at http://www.crecex.com/asesoria-juridica/legislacion-
consulta/repre-casas-ext/Ley8629.pdf. 
67   Modificación De La Ley De Protección Al Representante De Casas 
Extranjeras, Nº 6209, Y Derogación Del Inciso B) Del Artículo 361 Del Código De 
Comercio, Ley Nº 3284, Ley No. 8629, Art.7 Law nº6209 Nov. 11, 2007 (Costa Rica)  
states that:  
Los derechos del representante, distribuidor o fabricante, por 
virtud de esta Ley, serán irrenunciables. La ausencia de una 
disposición expresa en un contrato de representación, 
distribución o fabricación para la solución de disputas, presumirá 
que las partes tuvieron la intención de dirimir cualquier disputa 
por medio de arbitraje vinculante. Dicho arbitraje podrá 
desarrollarse en Costa Rica. No obstante, la presunción de la 
intención de someter una disputa a arbitraje no se aplicará cuando 
una de las partes objete el arbitraje. 
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ARBITRATION 
The comparison of the different approaches to deal with 
arbitration in relation to distribution contracts shows that the 
protection of a weaker party is the basis for limiting party autonomy in 
arbitration. However, such a general principle ought to be scrutinized 
against the different types of distribution contracts and even against 
each and any of the individual contracts since it is clear that not all, or 
even many, of the distribution contracts show an unequal bargaining 
power. Furthermore, if one were to consider that the principle of 
protection of the weaker party is the basis for limiting party autonomy 
in arbitration, then such a justification ought to be applied to any 
commercial contract in which such a disparity is to be observed. 
However, such an unbearable extension of this principle would raise 
more problems than it would tend to solve, among others, the need to 
specify the scope of its application. 
It is true that certain pathologies might exist in few cases by 
the abuse of one of the contracting parties, but general rules on 
arbitration and contract law are enough to solve this problem without 
the need to adopt excessive rules prohibiting arbitration or limiting 
arbitrability of the dispute. 
On the contrary, arbitration is considered an important factor 
in the development of investment and trade. The more the restrictions 
to party autonomy, the less attractive a country is for trade and 
investment. 
The application of international mandatory rules is not enough 
to exclude arbitrability as shown by Spanish or Costa Rican Laws. In 
fact, even if the contract is silent, Costa Rica, when assuming an 
implied arbitration agreement, reinforces the value of arbitration as 
being contractual in nature and the normal way to solve commercial 
disputes.68 
                                                 
68   See Pilar Perales Viscasillas, Contratos de distribución internacional y arbitraje, 
in DISTRIBUCIÓN COMERCIAL Y DERECHO DE LA COMPETENCIA 70 et seq. (Jorge 
Viera González & Joseba Aitor Echevarría Sáenz eds., 2011); Pilar Perales Viscasillas, 
La presunción legal de sometimiento al arbitraje, in TRATADO DE DERECHO ARBITRAL, 
TOMO II EL CONVENIO ARBITRAL 145-164 (Carlos Alberto Soto ed., 2011);Pilar 
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Traditionally, it was held that matters subject to national 
mandatory rules of law were non-arbitrable. Unlike the field of 
commercial contracts where the will of the parties prevails as a general 
rule, in the area of distribution contracts certain rules are considered to 
be mandatory. This traditional position has been rejected in favour of a 
modern view of arbitrability. In modern arbitration practice, it is clear 
that even if a matter is subject to mandatory rules, it might be subject to 
arbitration. 
As far as public policy and its relation to arbitrability is 
concerned, some arbitration laws consider that public policy issues 
cannot be subject to arbitration.69 But even in those systems, new trends 
are also applicable: public order is no longer considered a limitation to 
arbitrability, but rules of that character have to be respected by the 
arbitrators in order to have an enforceable award.70 Public policy, 
however, in certain situations can operate as a limit to arbitrability. 
Whether the public order impedes the submission of a dispute to 
arbitration is usually a question to be decided by the law. 
The well-known second look doctrine in arbitration will 
provide for the appropriate remedy: the arbitrators should respect 
mandatory provisions of the relevant country –when they are to be 
considered as relevant and truly international71 and not extravagant 
                                                 
Perales Viscasillas & David Ramos Muñoz, CISG & Arbitration, 10 SPANISH ARB. 
REV. 63-84 (2011); PRIVATE LAW: NATIONAL - GLOBAL - COMPARATIVE: 
FESTSCHRIFT FOR INGEBORG SCHWENZER ON THE OCCASION OF HER 60TH 
BIRTHDAY 1355-1374. (Andrea Büchler; Markus Müller-Chen ed., 2011). 
69   CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 2059, 2060 (Fr.). 
70   See, e.g., Pilar Perales Viscasillas, Arbitrabilidad de los Derechos de la 
Propiedad Industrial y de la Competencia, 6 ANUARIO DE JUSTICIA ALTERNATIVA, 
DERECHO ARBITRAL 11-76 (2005) (for further references in the area of competition 
law).   
71   See HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATONAL LAW (HCCH), 
THE DRAFT HAGUE PRINCIPLES ON CHOICE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL art. 11 (2014),  available at 
http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/gap2014pd06rev_en.pdf (Overriding 
mandatory rules and public policy (ordre public)): 
 
1. These Principles shall not prevent a court from applying 
overriding mandatory provisions of the law of the forum which 
apply irrespective of the law chosen by the parties.  
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rules72 and thus the Courts will assess at the post-award stage if 
mandatory rules were respected by the arbitrators.73 
 
                                                 
2. The law of the forum determines when a court may or must 
apply or take into account overriding mandatory provisions of 
another law. 
3. A court may exclude application of a provision of the law 
chosen by the parties only if and to the extent that the result of 
such application would be manifestly incompatible with 
fundamental notions of public policy (ordre public) of the forum. 
4. The law of the forum determines when a court may or must 
apply or take into account the public policy (ordre public) of a 
State the law of which would be applicable in the absence of a 
choice of law. 
5. These Principles shall not prevent an arbitral tribunal from 
applying or taking into account public policy (ordre public), or 
from applying or taking into account overriding mandatory 
provisions of a law other than the law chosen by the parties, if the 
arbitral tribunal is required or entitled to do so. 
72   See Kleinheisterkamp, supra note 26, at 11 et seq.; see also Kröll, supra 
note 18, at 16-63, 16-63, 16-77, 16-79.  
73   Peter Schlosser, Arbitration and the European Public Policy, in L’ARBITRAGE 
ET LE DROIT EUROPÉEN 87, (Bruylant, 1997); Fabio Bortolotti, International Commercial 
Agency Agreements and ICC Arbitration, 10 INT’L COURT ARB. BULLETIN 48, 53-55, 59 
(2001); Patrick M. Baron & Stefan Liniger, A Second Look at Arbitrability, 19 ARB. 
INT’L. 27–54 (2003); Case C-126/97, Eco Swiss v. Benetton, 1999 E.C.R I-1. 
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ABSTRACT 
The momentum behind development of global online fast track low value high volume dispute 
resolution (hereafter ODR) continues to accelerate.  Consumer and business groups around the 
world are promoting fair, proportionate, effective, online, fast track redress for low value high 
volume cross border e-commerce disputes.  As a result, there will continue to be increasing demand 
for a variety of effective ODR systems design and procedural rules. Best practices developed by 
entities like eBay and lessons learned from the work of UNCITRAL Working Group III can 
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be helpful in developing framework models for fast track low value high volume e-commerce ODR 
systems. 
E-commerce ODR systems like eBay’s provide a marketplace for e-commerce as well as an 
electronic system for fast track resolution of disputes which arise on their e-commerce marketplace. 
Ordinary ODR systems do not provide an e-commerce marketplace but only provide for 
resolution of disputes. Accordingly, best practices developed by eBay’s e-commerce ODR system 
discussed in this article are generally applicable and needed by e-commerce ODR systems, but 
generally inapplicable and not needed by ordinary ODR systems.  This article addresses 
development by eBay of its highly successful fast track low value high volume e-commerce ODR 
system by application of the following four best practices: 
(i) Low Value Parameters: 
Adoption of a generally applicable de facto low value workable monetary “standard” (for 
example, the Purchase Price “Money Back Guarantee” discussed infra) rather than a “numeric” 
(i.e. $15,000) monetary description for disputes which are eligible for resolution on the providers’ 
platforms facilitates global development of fast track low value high volume ODR systems.  A 
$15,000, $10,000 or $5,000 monetary ceiling  for low value disputes might constitute low value 
in a developed economy.  It will not in an underdeveloped economy.  Hence the need for a 
low value workable monetary “standard” rather than an unworkable 
“numeric” monetary description. As indicated, the eBay Purchase Price “Money Back 
Guarantee” cap on the amount of a permissible claim provides a workable standard in developed 
and underdeveloped economies. *** 
(ii) Limitation of Types of Claims: 
Leaving resolution of disputes involving high value and complicated legal issues to other forums, 
                                                 
*** The eBay system combines general use of a “monetary standard” with a “numeric 
description” of low value for specific categories of goods.  This article also notes the flexibility of 
eBay’s system in responding to market developments by creating actual numeric ceilings for disputes 
pertaining to equipment and vehicle categories of purchases which also are deemed to be suitable and 
therefore eligible for resolution on eBay’s ODR platform.  Adjusting to market developments 
since the launch of its original dispute resolution system, eBay has added resolution 
platforms specifically dedicated to categories of purchases, including the (Vehicle 
Purchase Protection [hereinafter  VPP] and Business Equipment Purchases 
Protection [hereinafter BEPP] programs which require vehicle claims to be more 
than $100 and less than $50,000 and equipment claims to be more than $1000 and 
less than $20,000. Based on the eBay Fast Track Low Value experience, therefore, 
an ODR Best Practice is to build the basic low value system (i.e, “Money Back 
Guarantee”) as needed, and as market conditions mandate, customize resolution and 
protection programs specifically designed to address individual categories of 
disputes.  For more on eBay’s VPP and BEPP programs, see Purchase Protection 
Systems For Specific Categories of Goods – Maximum and Minimum Purchase Price 
Limits on the Amount in Controversy (discussion at Section II.3, infra). 
General Electric’s Oil and Gas Division has experimented with online resolutions 
for commercial conflicts, as detailed in Vanessa O’Connoll, At GE, Robo-Lawyers, 
WALL ST. J., 
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eBay’s fast track ODR eligibility requirements also limit the complexity and scope of permissible 
claims (i.e. claims eligible for resolution on its platform) by giving buyers a “Money  Back 
Guarantee,” which, as noted supra, caps the amount a buyer may claim to recovery of purchase 
price paid, and also limits the types of claims to “Items not received” or “Items not as described.” 
These limitations on the amount and types of claims permitted facilitate fast track and fair 
resolution of disputes and enables eBay to handle 60,000,000 e-commerce disputes annually 
averaging $70-$100 in value. 
(iii) Buyers’ On-Demand Access to Automated Trustmark 
Evaluation/Feedback Information Needed to Identify Reliable Sellers: 
Vital to facilitating e-commerce between buyers and sellers, often in different parts of the world 
and speaking different languages, is developing trust between buyers and sellers to give them the 
confidence they need to enter into electronic transactions.  eBay’s solution to developing this trust 
between buyers and sellers is the Automated Trustmark Evaluation/Feedback System.  This 
system enables buyers involved in electronically purchasing low value high-volume items to quickly 
identify on demand a reliable seller without doing extensive research.  Buyers seeking to make 
purchases using the eBay platform are able to assess the reliability of sellers with whom they 
anticipate doing business based on ratings and feedback derived from performance data supplied 
electronically by previous buyers after each transaction they completed on the eBay platform. 
(iv) Private Enforcement 
After discussing (i) Low Value Parameters, (ii) Limitation of Types of Claims, 
and (iii) Buyers’ On Demand Access to Automated Trustmark 
Evaluation/Feedback Information Needed to Identify Reliable Sellers, we 
address (iv) Private Enforcement measures available to enforce settled claims and rulings 
of neutrals to successfully implement fast track low value high volume e-commerce systems. 
  
                                                 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203633104576620902874155940
. This program focuses on disputes for less than 50,000 Euros.  
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I.         ACHIEVING “LOW VALUE” PARAMATERS 
A.         eBay’s De Facto “Low Value” 
Among privately created online dispute resolution systems, the 
eBay Resolution Center stands alone. EBay’s process has resolved 
more disputes over a longer period of time than any other online 
dispute resolution process in the world.  Launched in 1995, eBay was 
designed to be the largest global online marketplace, evolving from its 
roots in consumer-to-consumer (C2C) auctions into Business-to-
Business and Business-to-Consumer (B2C) verticals.  After it acquired 
PayPal in 2002, eBay set about building a robust, end-to-end Trust and 
Safety infrastructure. A core tenet of that infrastructure is the 
Resolution Center, an online redress process provided to every eBay 
and PayPal user in the world, customized to address most of the 
dispute volume that arises between buyers and sellers that utilize eBay’s 
services around the world.1 
eBay is an e-commerce company which has developed a robust 
online marketplace facilitating low value high volume consumer to 
consumer, business to consumer, and business to business electronic 
commerce2, and also providing a fast-track low value high volume 
ODR system for resolving disputes arising from e-commerce 
transactions on its market place. The low value requirement for 
disputes eligible for resolution on its platform is needed for ODR 
systems like eBay which provide an online marketplace coupled with 
an ODR system for resolution of disputes which arise from e-
commerce on its marketplace. The low value requirement generally is 
not needed for systems that only provide an ODR system for resolving 
disputes but do not provide an electronic market place, unless the 
provider is resolving low value high volume disputes arising from 
transactions conducted outside of its platform. 
                                                 
1   See  ARNO R. LODDER & JOHN ZELEZNIKOW, ENHANCED DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION THROUGH THE USE OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 8 (2010).   
2   See We are one company; EBAY INC., 
http://www.ebayinc.com/who_we_are/one_company (last visited Jan. 14, 2015). 
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Since its creation in 1995, eBay has expanded internationally at 
an increasing rate.3 EBay’s international growth continues with 
increased revenues and expansion into new countries abroad.4  
Currently, eBay has 149 million active buyers worldwide and 700 
million total listings.5  In 2013, eBay’s worldwide revenues were $8.3 
billion and its Gross Merchandise Volume was $77 billion.6 
eBay’s Resolution Center was created with the aim of 
addressing the typical disputes arising out of purchases within eBay’s 
marketplaces, which usually average about $70-$100 in value.7  The 
eBay platform currently handles over 60 million e-commerce disputes 
annually through a process that enables parties to resolve their 
problems amicably through direct communication.  The number of 
disputes being resolved through eBay’s online platform is expanding 
steadily as the transaction volume on the site increases at about 13% 
per year.8 
Since the launch of its original dispute resolution system, which 
focused only on letting buyers report “fraud alerts,” eBay has expanded 
to support dispute resolution in a variety of other problem types, such 
as “item not received,” and “item not as described” disputes (where 
the buyer is the complainant), or “unpaid item”9 disputes (where the 
                                                 
3   Trefis Team, eBay: The Year 2013 in Review, FORBES (Dec. 26, 2013), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2013/12/26/ebay-the-year-2013-
in-review/.  
4   Id.; see Corporate Fact Sheet: Q4 2010, EBAY INC., (2010) (on file with 
author) (eBay.com identifies the following countries and Hong Kong as countries 
for which it has a website: Argentina, Austria, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, 
China, Czech Republic, Denmark,  Finland,  France,  Germany,  Greece,  Hungary, 
India,  Ireland,  Italy,  Korea,  Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, and Vietnam). 
5   Q2 Fast Facts, EBAY, INC., 
http://www.ebayinc.com/sites/default/files/ebay-q2-fast-facts.pdf (on file with 
Journal).  
6   Id. 
7   See Corporate Fact Sheet: Q4 2010, supra note 4. 
8   Id.  
9   In the eBay system, buyers are required to pay for the item before the 
seller ships it. In cases of direct sales rather than auction sales, sellers are required to 
be paid prior to the shipment of the item. The seller is therefore unpaid only in the 
auction sale cases where a buyer who is the successful bidder does not forward the 
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seller is the complainant).10 EBay has also added resolution platforms 
dedicated specifically to several categories of purchases, including the 
Vehicle Purchase Protection (VPP) and Business Equipment Purchase 
Protection (BEPP) programs, each with specific minimum and 
maximum price limitations.11 These developments have enhanced 
eBay’s initial programs focused on low value, high volume, B2C 
transactions, with more in-depth specialized claims processes relating 
to higher dollar value purchases.12 
The eBay ODR system, from the outset, has had a de facto 
low-value framework because it has been packaged as a kind of money-
back guarantee – recovery is limited to the purchase price for the buyer, and 
reimbursement for the seller.13  This necessarily excludes an award of 
consequential damages. Higher dollar value purchases, however, 
require different kinds of protection and resolution.  EBay’s 
specialized procedures for vehicles and equipment disputes, for 
instance, require equipment claims to involve more than $1,000 and 
less than $20,000, and vehicle claims to be more than $100 and less 
than $50,000.14  Only disputes involving vehicles or equipment that fall 
within the minimum and maximum requirements are eligible to be 
handled by these special ODR processes. 
For example, in a traditional sale conducted through eBay’s 
platform for a cell phone, Buyer pays through one of eBay’s approved 
payment methods (such as PayPal), and Seller ships the phone and it 
                                                 
bid amount to the seller.  In this situation eBay allows the seller to recover for the 
“unpaid item” fee (This is a “Final Value Fee,” usually 1 to 2% of the purchase price) 
paid by the seller to eBay for the use of the eBay platform.  See discussion infra note 
24. 
10 eBay Money Back Guarantee, EBAY 
INC.,http://pages.ebay.com/help/policies/money-back-guarantee.html (last visited 
Jan. 15, 2015) [hereinafter “eBay Money Back Guarantee Policy”]. 
11 eBay Vehicle Purchase Protection, EBAY INC., 
http://pages.motors.ebay.com/buy/purchase-protection/index.html (last visited 
Jan. 15, 2015) [hereinafter VPP Policy]; Business Equipment Purchase Protection, EBAY 
INC., http://pages.ebay.com/help/buy/business-protection.html (last visited Jan. 
15, 2015) [hereinafter BEPP Policy].  
12   See id.  
13   For more information on limitations on the amount recoverable by the 
seller to the “Final Value Fee,” see are discussion infra note 24. 
14   See VPP Policy, supra note 11; BEPP Policy, supra note 11. 
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arrives in the stated amount of time.  However, due to a malfunction 
stemming from a defect in the cell phone battery, the phone causes a 
fire in Buyer’s home and also results in serious burns to Buyer, his wife, 
and two children. Though this damage directly results from the 
deficiency of the item exchanged in the eBay sale, Buyer will have no 
recourse through the eBay ODR platform for consequential damages.  
Though Buyer can claim that the phone did not arrive as described – 
i.e. fully functional - the eBay Money Back Guarantee inherently limits 
recovery to the price of the item. Thus, although Buyer may seek to 
recover the consequential damages in a judicial proceeding or other 
fora, recovery of consequential damages is excluded from the ODR 
process. EBay has learned from extensive experience that this level of 
protection is adequate to reassure most eBay buyers that they will be 
protected. 
The eBay system can serve as an example of best practices in 
limiting the types of claims and amount of recovery to place 
parameters to create a low-value framework to facilitate fast-track, fair, 
and low-cost ODR.  We include in our discussion infra the differences 
in procedural details of resolving disputes of different types of 
products covered by the basic, equipment and vehicle protection 
programs. 
II.         LIMITING TYPES OF CLAIMS15 
In the basic eBay resolution system, administered in 
conjunction with PayPal, eBay provides both buyers and sellers a 
guided process for resolving disputes over purchases made through its 
site.  In the initial step, eBay asks buyers to diagnose the specifics of 
their complaint, and to suggest a preferred resolution. EBay then 
encourages the buyers and sellers to negotiate directly through its 
messaging platform. If the matter cannot be resolved through 
negotiation, the dispute then can be escalated to the Resolution 
Services team within Customer Support. Unless a settlement 
                                                 
15   This section describes the ODR system from the perspective of both 
the buyer and the seller. This description is based on the information provided for 
the benefit of customers on the eBay website. See eBay Money Back Guarantee Policy, 
supra note 10. This section is citing to that source of authority, unless indicated 
otherwise.  
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agreement is reached, Resolution Services will evaluate the buyer’s 
claim and make a ruling about who is right and who is wrong. While 
this ruling does not have res judicata effect,16 the parties will generally 
voluntarily satisfy the Resolution Services ruling, and, in the absence 
of such voluntary compliance, the ruling is enforceable by use of 
applicable private enforcement procedures including chargeback on 
credit cards, deprivation of trustmarks, and access to escrow accounts. 
The eBay Money Back Guarantee is outlined in a policy found 
on the eBay website that lists the types of claims that are and are not 
covered.17 This policy again confines claims to situations where the 
item never arrived or the item was not as described in the seller’s 
listing. Then, the policy places certain procedural restrictions on 
claims, such as: (1) the case must be opened no later than thirty days 
after the actual or latest estimated delivery date; (2) the purchase must 
have been made with the “Pay Now” option or an eBay invoice; (3) 
the buyer must have used one of the five designated payment 
methods18; and (4) the item must have been paid for in a single 
payment. The Money Back Guarantee specifically does not cover 
certain categories of sales and sales through eBay’s affiliate sites, such 
                                                 
16   As a practical matter, once the eBay neutral decides the dispute, the 
buyer can proceed to seek private enforcement remedies. Alternatively, either the 
buyer or the seller can go to court to prove their case or contest the private remedy.  
However, in most cases it is not economically feasible to seek a judicial remedy.  As 
discussed supra in the defective cell phone example, an eBay ruling also has no res 
judicata effect on other claims arising out of a transaction. 
17   See eBay Money Back Guarantee Policy, supra note 10.  
18   These five payment methods are those available to the buyer through 
the eBay platform They include 1) PayPal; 2) ProPay; 3) Skrill; 4) Credit or debit card; 
and 5) Bill Me Later. PayPal, ProPay and Skrill are digital payment services that allow 
users to send and receive money without revealing personal financial details. See 
About Skrill, SKRILL, https://www.skrill.com/en-us/about-us/ (last visited Apr. 29, 
2014); Company History, PROPAY, http://www.propay.com/propay-
company/company-history/ (last visited Apr. 29, 2014); About PayPal, PAYPAL, 
https://www.paypal-media.com/about (last visited Apr. 29, 2014). Bill Me Later, a 
PayPal subsidiary, is also a digital payment option, however, it is a service that extends 
the user a line of credit. See About Bill Me Later, BILL ME LATER, 
https://www.billmelater.com/about/index.xhtml (last visited, Apr. 29, 2014).  
PayPal is owned by eBay, and Bill Me Later is a service provided by PayPal. ProPay 
and Skrill are third party, private online payment services. Credit or debit cards (such 
as Visa, MasterCard, and American Express) are payment systems administered by 
banks. 
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as half.com.19 In addition, this guarantee prohibits duplication of 
claims through other dispute resolution methods, such as the PayPal 
Purchase Protection programs or requesting a chargeback from the 
payment provider. 
A.         Buyers’ Claims – “Item Not Received,” “Item Not as 
Described” 
The current Resolution Center web page leads buyers and 
sellers through the process via a series of questions that: (i) set different 
claims on different tracks, and (ii) prevent the furtherance of claims 
that are outside the coverage of eBay’s policy.  The initial screening still 
adheres to the two primary bases for buyer claims: that the item did 
not arrive, or that the item did not match seller’s description.  The 
website then presents options for how to proceed, after the claimant 
has been funneled into a particular category of claims.  Throughout the 
process, there are links to eBay’s general policy, which outlines what 
claims are and are not qualified. 
The Money Back Guarantee also limits the applicable disputes 
through specific exclusions from coverage, as listed in its policy: 
 “Buyer’s remorse or any reason other than not receiving an 
item or receiving an item that isn’t as described in the 
listing.” 
 “Duplicate claims through other resolution methods.” 
 “Items shipped to another address after original delivery.” 
 Vehicles (instead, must be pursued through the eBay 
Vehicle Protection Program) 
 Real Estate, Business & Websites for Sale, Classified Ads, 
services 
                                                 
19   An eBay subsidiary, half.com, specializes in the sale of books, 
textbooks, music, movies and games for fixed prices set by sellers, as opposed to 
eBay’s bidding system.  
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 Some business equipment categories (instead, must be 
pursued through the eBay Business Equipment Purchase 
Protection Program) 
 “Items purchased on half.com, eBay Wholesale Deals, or 
eBay Classifieds”20 
Buyers have thirty days from the actual or estimated delivery 
date to make direct contact with the seller through the eBay platform.21  
If this direct contact does not resolve the problem within three 
business days of the buyer’s initial communication to the seller, the 
buyer can choose to escalate the case to eBay.22  If the buyer escalates 
the case to the Resolution Center, eBay will review the case and contact 
                                                 
20   These parameters for applicable disputes under the basic eBay ODR 
policy have evolved as eBay gained experience with using the process. Previously, 
eBay provided more examples to guide the interpretation of “item not delivered” or 
“item not matching seller’s description in the listing.” In a version of the policy dating 
back to approximately 2010, the restrictions were phrased in checklist form as 
follows:  
1. The buyer did not receive the items within the estimated delivery date; or  
2. The item received was wrong, damaged, or different from the seller’s 
description. For example: 
i. Buyer received a completely different item; 
ii. The condition of the item is not as described; 
iii. The item is missing parts or components; 
iv. The item is defective during the first use; 
v. The item is a different version or edition from the one displayed 
in the listing; 
vi. The item was described as authentic but is not; 
vii. The item is missing major parts or features, and this was not 
described in the listing; 
viii. The item was damaged during shipment, or; 
ix. The buyer received the incorrect amount of items. 
This version of the policy was addressed in Louis Del Duca, Colin Rule, & Zbynek 
Loebl, Facilitating Expansion of Cross-Border E-Commerce – Developing a Global Online 
Dispute Resolution System (Lessons Derived from Existing ODR Systems – Work of the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law), 1 PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L AFFAIRS 59, 65 
(2012) (citing Unpaid Item Policy, EBAY 
INC., http://pages.ebay.com/help/policies/unpaid-item.html (last visited Mar. 9, 
2015)). 
21   eBay Money-back Guarantee, How to Help, EBAY INC., 
http://pages.ebay.com/ebay-money-back-guarantee/how-to-help.html (last visited 
Mar. 9, 2015).  
22   Id. 
2015 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 4:1 
254 
the buyer within 48 hours with a determination of whether the case 
qualifies for a refund of the full purchase price plus original shipping.23 
B.         Sellers’ Claims – “Final Value Fee” 
Sellers’ claims are handled somewhat differently than buyers’ 
claims. Like the buyer resolution process, new disputes are reported 
through the Resolution Center. However, pre-transaction exposure is 
significantly smaller for sellers than for buyers. If a buyer has a dispute, 
they have likely already paid the seller the full purchase price for the 
item, which averages around $75 for non-receipt cases and $100 for 
not-as-described cases.24 The buyer is concerned that they will not get 
their purchase price back, so their exposure is significant. 
Sellers, on the other hand, are clearly instructed to not ship the 
item in question before payment is received from the buyer.  So if a 
buyer wins an auction and does not follow through with payment, the 
seller is only out the “Final Value Fee” paid to eBay as part of the sale 
(usually less than 1-2% of the purchase price).  For sellers, disputes are 
part of doing business on eBay (Unpaid auction bids are not 
uncommon), but they are more of a nuisance than a source of major 
risk exposure. 
Once an auction bid is reported as unpaid, Buyer is contacted 
and given several response options: 
1) pay for the auction bid 
2) prove the auction bid is already paid for, or 
3) request that the transaction be cancelled. 
Once the buyer responds, the seller and buyer can 
communicate to attempt to resolve the issue through mutual 
agreement. However, if the buyer does not respond, or the seller is not 
satisfied, the seller has the unilateral right to give the buyer an “Unpaid 
                                                 
23   Id. 
24   See eBay Money Back Guarantee, supra note 10. 
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Item Strike.”25 If a buyer receives too many Unpaid Item Strikes in too 
short a period of time, the buyer’s account on eBay will be suspended. 
This process, which handles tens of millions of disputes every 
year, is entirely automated through technology, with no human 
involvement. The only human involvement that enters into the Unpaid 
Item resolution process is when the buyer decides to appeal an Unpaid 
Item (i.e. auction bid) Strike they have received. If it is the buyer’s first 
appeal of an Unpaid Item Strike, the appeal is automatically granted 
(and the vast majority of appeals are first appeals). However, if the 
appeal is for a second or later strike, an eBay Customer Service 
Representative will manually review the case to make a determination. 
In this fashion, an ODR system delivering tens of millions of 
resolutions per year requires only tens of thousands of human 
interventions to keep operating in a trusted and effective fashion. 
C.         Maximum and Minimum Purchase Price Limits for Certain 
Categories of  Goods 
As eBay’s Basic Money Back Guarantee program specifically 
prohibits claims relating to sales of certain categories of products – 
usually either intangibles or higher-cost items such as vehicles, real 
estate, and business equipment – this form of online dispute resolution 
is somewhat incomplete, or at least does not match the breadth of sales 
transactions taking place on eBay’s platform.  In addition to the more 
                                                 
25   EBay provides information through its feedback system to facilitate 
identification of reliable sellers and buyers and keep market participants honest. EBay 
assigns parties a “star” based on how many positive reviews they have received. The 
feedback system, like the dispute resolution system, treats buyers and sellers 
differently. Buyers can leave positive, neutral or negative ratings, while sellers can 
only leave short comments and positive ratings. EBay is very clear that feedback 
extortion and manipulation is not allowed. Sellers can report buyers in violation of 
the buying practices policy, especially when successful auction bids are not paid by 
the buyer. This report can result in a “strike” against the buyer. See Del Duca, Rule, 
& Loebl, supra note 20, at 64-65 (citing How do I leave Feedback?, EBAY INC.,, 
http://pages/ebay.com/help/feedback/questions/leave.html (last visited Apr. 4, 
2012). EBay’s “Unpaid Item Policy,” detailing Unpaid Item Strikes (sometimes called 
“unpaid item violations” or “excessive unpaid items”) is detailed 
at http://pages.ebay.com/help/policies/unpaid-item.html. As the policy page 
states, “eBay may record the unpaid item on the buyer’s account . . . excessive unpaid 
items on a buyer’s account may result in a range of consequences, including limits on 
or loss of buying privileges.” 
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basic ODR system provided as part of the Money Back Guarantee, 
eBay has developed two category-specific ODR systems to expand 
dispute resolution options for those using its services. These new 
systems include the Vehicle Purchase Protection (VPP) and the 
Business Equipment Purchase Protection (BEPP) programs. The VPP 
serves as the dispute resolution forum for the sale of vehicles priced at 
more than $100 and less than $50,000, and purchased through certain 
designated categories within eBay’s site.  The BEPP applies to sales 
with a final price of at least $1,000 but no more than $20,000, again 
through certain designated categories (such as Business and Industrial) 
within eBay’s website. 
Just as with the traditional eBay Money Back Guarantee, the 
VPP and BEPP both limit the types of claims that are covered – i.e. 
the claims that can be pursued through their ODR process.  However, 
due to the higher price of the items involved, eBay’s policies defining 
those claims are much more detailed than the simple choice between 
an item never being delivered or not being as described in the seller’s 
listing.  The following chart details the limitation of claims in both the 
VPP and BEPP systems: 
 
EBay’s Vehicle Purchase Protection (VPP) and Business Equipment 
Purchase Protection (BEPP) Programs Chart 
 Vehicle Purchase Protection26 
Business Equipment Purchase 
Protection27 
Situations 
Covered 
 You pay for a vehicle and 
never receive it. 
 You send a refundable 
deposit for a vehicle and 
never receive it. 
 You pay for a vehicle and 
receive it but suffer losses 
because: 
 Paying for an eligible 
item and never receiving 
it. 
 Sending a deposit for an 
eligible item and never 
receiving the item. 
 Paying for and receiving 
an eligible item the buyer 
                                                 
26   The information in this column was quoted from the VPP Policy, supra 
note 11.  
27   The information in this column was quoted from the BEPP Policy, 
supra note 11. 
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 Vehicle Purchase Protection26 
Business Equipment Purchase 
Protection27 
o The vehicle was 
determined by a law 
enforcement agency 
to have been stolen at 
the time of the end of 
the listing. 
o The vehicle has an 
undisclosed or 
unknown lien against 
its title. 
o The vehicle make, 
model or year is 
different than what 
was described in the 
seller’s listing at the 
time you placed your 
bid or offer. 
o A title is required for 
the vehicle by your 
state and the seller’s 
state but you did not 
receive a title from 
the seller and it is not 
possible to obtain a 
title from the 
appropriate DMV. 
o The vehicle has a title 
with an undisclosed 
salvage, 
rebuilt/rebuildable, 
unrebuildable, 
reconstructed, 
scrapped/destroyed, 
junk, lemon, 
manufacturer 
buyback, or water 
damage brand at the 
can’t legally own because: 
o It’s stolen property 
o It’s subject to an 
undisclosed or 
unknown lien 
 Paying for and receiving 
an eligible item that’s a 
different type, make, or 
model than what was 
described in the listing, 
provided the amount of 
devaluation to the item 
due to the 
misrepresentation 
exceeds $1,500. 
 Paying for and receiving 
an eligible item with 
undisclosed damage, 
provided the cost of 
necessary repairs exceeds 
$1,500 and the item was 
advertised as being less 
than 10 years old. The 
program covers only 
defects and damages that 
prevent the equipment 
from functioning, not 
defects or damage that 
are cosmetic or not 
critical to operate the 
equipment. 
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 Vehicle Purchase Protection26 
Business Equipment Purchase 
Protection27 
time of the end of the 
listing. (This 
protection is not 
available for vehicles 
listed in the Dune 
Buggies, Race Cars or 
Trailers categories.) 
o The vehicle is less 
than 20 years old and 
has more than a 5,000 
mile odometer 
discrepancy from the 
mileage as stated in 
the seller’s listing. 
(This protection is 
only available for 
vehicles listed in the 
Cars & Trucks and 
RVs & Campers 
categories.) 
o In addition, the VPP 
also provides 
protection against 
certain undisclosed 
damage for vehicles 
that are less than 10 
years old (10 year 
threshold is based on 
model year): The 
vehicle had 
undisclosed engine, 
body, transmission, 
and/or frame damage 
at the time of 
purchase that will cost 
more than $1,000 to 
repair. The cost of 
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 Vehicle Purchase Protection26 
Business Equipment Purchase 
Protection27 
repair to any one of 
those components 
must exceed $1,000. 
For vehicles in the 
Boats (engine and hull 
only), Buses, 
Commercial Trucks, 
and RVs & Campers 
categories, the cost of 
the undisclosed 
engine, body, 
transmission, or 
frame damage must 
exceed $1,500. Race 
Cars are not eligible 
for this protection. 
Vehicles that are 
subject to a recall for 
this type of damage 
are not eligible for 
VPP.  
Situations 
Not 
Covered 
Vehicle Condition 
 Any damage on vehicles 
10 years old or older (10 
year threshold is based 
on model year) 
 Regular maintenance and 
fluid levels. 
 Normal wear and tear, 
including but not limited 
to belts, hoses, tires, 
brakes, bushings, joints, 
spark plugs and wires, 
interior features, minor 
dents, paint chips and 
scratches. 
 Any damage on an item 
that’s more than 10 years 
old.  If the model year is 
not specified in the eBay 
listing, then the item isn’t 
eligible for any 
undisclosed damage. 
 Regular maintenance   
 Normal wear and tear, 
including but not limited 
to rust, dents, and 
scratches, or cosmetic 
damage that doesn’t 
impair the item   
 Sending a non-refundable 
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 Vehicle Purchase Protection26 
Business Equipment Purchase 
Protection27 
 Certain components - 
Damage to any 
component other than 
the engine, transmission, 
frame or body, including 
but not limited to the 
vehicle’s interior, exhaust, 
air conditioner, electrical, 
suspension, cooling 
system, turbo charger, 
fuel system, differential, 
clutch/torque converter, 
and/or pollution control 
devices. 
 Damage threshold - 
Damage to an eligible 
component that does not 
exceed $1,000 (or $1,500 
for boats, buses, 
commercial trucks, RVs 
and campers). 
 Damage after purchase-
Damage or loss arising 
during shipping or 
otherwise after purchase. 
 Cosmetic damage, such 
as paint or external 
surface rust. 
 Unverifiable damage. 
Deposit issues 
Sending a non-refundable 
deposit for a vehicle and not 
receiving the vehicle, or a 
refund, because you chose to 
not complete the transaction 
or pay the remaining balance 
for any reason. 
deposit and not receiving 
the item or a refund, 
because the buyer 
chooses to not complete 
the transaction or to not 
pay the remaining 
balance   
 Any damage or defect 
that was explained to or 
noticed by the buyer 
prior to purchase, or (if 
the buyer picked up the 
item from the seller in 
person) that could have 
been noticed upon 
reasonable inspection by 
the buyer 
 Items not listed on eBay 
Business in one of the 
capital equipment 
categories 
 Items purchased for less 
than $1,000 
 Items damaged or lost in 
shipping 
 Inspection costs, 
warranty fees, and other 
related expenses 
 Buyer’s remorse 
 Any repairs or alterations 
made to the item after 
the listing end date, that 
were not authorized by 
the third-party provider 
of the Business 
Equipment Purchase 
Protection program 
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 Vehicle Purchase Protection26 
Business Equipment Purchase 
Protection27 
Ancillary losses 
Punitive claims, lost profits, 
loss of work, travel expenses, 
or restocking costs. 
Title / ownership issues 
 Failure to disclose a title 
brand if another title 
brand was disclosed in 
the listing, or if the title 
was described in the 
listing as anything but 
“clear”. 
 Failure to receive a 
certificate of title for a 
vehicle that was listed 
with a title brand or with 
the title being described 
as anything but “clear”. 
 Receiving a title that is 
not signed, is improperly 
assigned, or receiving a 
title but not being able to 
register the  vehicle. 
 Any damage on a vehicle 
that was listed with a title 
brand or with the title 
being described as 
anything but “clear.” 
 Losses based on a vehicle 
classified as “theft 
recovery” or “previously 
stolen” but recovered by 
a law enforcement agency 
prior to being listed on 
eBay. 
Other 
 Differences in sub-
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 Vehicle Purchase Protection26 
Business Equipment Purchase 
Protection27 
model, trim packages, 
special editions, or 
options if you have 
received the year, make, 
and model described in 
the listing. 
 Buyer’s remorse. 
 Any damage or listing 
discrepancies that were 
disclosed to you prior to 
acceptance of the vehicle. 
 Any damage that could 
have been discovered 
upon a reasonable 
inspection before you 
paid for and picked up 
 the vehicle in person. 
 Any damage that does 
not impact the safety or 
operability of the vehicle. 
 Repairs or alterations 
made by you to the 
vehicle without the 
consent of the VPP 
Administrator. 
 Inspection costs, 
warranty fees, taxes paid, 
or any other fees or 
expenses that are not 
expressly covered under 
these Terms and 
Conditions. 
 Transactions occurring 
directly between the 
parties (i.e. phone, email, 
mail, in person, by 
overnight messenger, etc 
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 Vehicle Purchase Protection26 
Business Equipment Purchase 
Protection27 
. . .) and/or on another 
website rather than 
through the eBay website. 
 
This extensive detailed list of types of permissible claims 
actually limits the types of claims that eBay will handle under these two 
new programs.  In addition, for these Vehicle (VPP) and Equipment 
(BEPP) programs, only claims that are within the specified minimal 
and maximum permissible amounts are handled by eBay.  While both 
the VPP and BEPP place limits on the permissible amount of a claim 
($50,000 maximum and $100 minimum for the VPP, and $20,000 
maximum and $1,000 minimal for the BEPP), the “Money Back 
Guarantee” further limits the amount of the permissible claim to the 
amount of the purchase price of the item(s) involved. 
For example, a dispute involving a vehicle sold for $30,000 falls 
within the $50,000 maximum/$100 minimum requirement and, 
therefore, would be handled by eBay, with application of the “Money 
Back Guarantee” policy limiting the amount of the claim actually 
recoverable to the $30,000 purchase price. A dispute involving a 
vehicle sold for $150,000 would not be handled by eBay because the 
vehicle’s price exceeds the $50,000 maximum. 
In a BEPP case, a dispute involving sale of equipment for 
$10,000 would fall within the $20,000 maximum and $1,000 minimum 
requirement and would be handled by eBay. A dispute involving 
equipment which was sold for $40,000 would not be handled by eBay 
because it exceeded the $20,000 maximum. 
The eBay money-back guarantee, i.e. purchase money return 
guarantee, effectively limits the amount in controversy.  The BEPP and 
VPP programs are in recognition by eBay, as the platform 
administrator, that the marketing practices within the dollar limits 
provided for the vehicle and equipment categories can be effectively 
administered by the eBay ODR low-value high volume system. EBay 
also concludes that disputed involving purchase prices not within the 
indicated parameters cannot be effectively and efficiently handled 
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within the fast-track low-value high volume ODR system. The 
decision as to the practicability and desirability of creating such special 
platforms, which can successfully operate within the framework of its 
low-value high volume ODR system, is a judgment which the platform 
administrator is best able to make. 
III.        FACILITATING FAST TRACK RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES – 
COMBINING USE OF LOW VALUE PARAMETERS & LIMITING 
TYPES OF CLAIMS. 
A.         Lists of “Item Not Received” and “Item Not as Described” 
Claims 
1. EBay Explicit Limitation of Types of Claims and List of Specific 
Claims – Consequential Damages Excluded by “Money Back Guarantee” – 
While eBay’s explicit limitation of types of claims has already been 
addressed, the “Money Back Guarantee” is discussed further here..28 
The “Money Back Guarantee” purchase price limited remedy, with its 
built-in exclusion of consequential damages, produces a de facto low 
value framework for all three eBay dispute resolution programs.  This 
approach facilitates fast track, fair, and low-cost online dispute 
resolution of low value claims across the board for ODR systems 
generally, including the “negotiation—facilitated negotiation” and the 
“negotiation—facilitated negotiation—mandatory arbitration” two-
track model considered by the UNCITRAL ODR Working Group 
III.29 
EBay’s VPP program achieves the equivalent of this “Money 
Back Guarantee” by its explicit exclusion of claims relating to 
                                                 
28   See discussion supra note 20. 
29   At the twenty-sixth session, November 5-9, 2012, Working Group III 
identified the need for a two-track system to accommodate differences in the 
substantive law of jurisdictions in which pre-dispute arbitration agreements are valid 
and binding in business to consumer (B2C) contracts, and the substantive law of 
jurisdictions in which pre-dispute arbitration agreements in business to consumer 
(B2C) contracts are invalid and not binding.Under the two-track system, Track I 
provided an online negotiation stage between the parties, followed by a facilitated 
negotiation stage in which a neutral is added to the deliberations, and a third 
arbitration phase if the dispute is not resolved in phase one or two.  
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“ancillary losses,” such as “punitive claims, lost profits, loss of work, 
travel expenses, or restocking costs.”30 The equivalent of the “Money 
Back Guarantee” is achieved in eBay’s BEPP eBay program by 
explicitly permitting recovery “only up to the devaluation or repair 
amount of the item or the final purchase price, whichever is lower.”31 
The “Money Back Guarantee” purchase price limited remedy 
and its VPP and BEPP equivalents also will self-adjust with the 
fluctuation in the value of currencies in the marketplace over time, as 
well as between developed, developing, and underdeveloped 
economies at any single point in time. EBay sets the coverage 
thresholds specifically in policies so that all buyers and sellers 
understand the coverage eligibility guidelines and maximum refunds 
prior to engaging in any purchase in the first place. There are slight 
differences in the coverage and eligibility levels by broad geographic 
region, but the levels change very rarely and are intended to cover 95% 
of transactions within a given geography and category. 
B.         Comparison of Selected eBay Best Practices and the 
UNCITRAL Draft 
The UNCITRAL Draft Rules explicitly limited types of 
permissible claims by providing that: 
“These rules shall only (emphasis applied) apply to 
claims: 
[“(a) that goods sold or services rendered were not 
delivered, not timely delivered, not properly charged or 
debited, and/or not provided in conformity with the 
agreement made at the time of the transaction; or 
                                                 
  The proposed Track II involved comparable negotiation and facilitated 
negotiation phases, but did not require arbitration in the event the dispute did not 
resolve in the negotiation or facilitated negotiation phases. UNCITRAL, Mar. 24-28, 
2014, Online Dispute Resolution for Cross-Border Electronic Commerce Transactions: Draft 
Procedural Rules: Note by the Secretariat, 2 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.127 (Jan. 
17, 2014) [hereinafter Secretariat Note]. 
30   VPP Policy, supra note 11.  
31   BEPP Policy, supra note 11. 
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“(b) that full payment was not received for goods or 
services provided.]”32 
This language in Article 1(2) incorporated the eBay basic ‘item 
not received’ and ‘item received but not as described’ types of claims 
for buyers and a full payment remedy for sellers, and also allows, unlike 
eBay for recovery for services. While this is not the forum to discuss 
in detail the similarities and differences between the eBay and 
UNCITRAL Draft types of claims covered, we note in passing that the 
UNCITRAL Draft, in addition to permitting claims arising from the 
sale of goods types of claims permitted by eBay, also permitted claims 
pertaining to rendition of services.33  Service related disputes are much 
more complicated to resolve, because (i) a return of the goods in 
question is not an option, and (ii) the evaluation of item condition or 
service quality is often opinion based and difficult to evaluate. The 
eBay platform does not provide for sale of services, consequently, 
services are not a type of transaction included in its ODR system. 
Unlike the eBay program, which at the outset clearly limits 
recovery to the Money Back Guarantee for buyers, the UNCITRAL 
Draft did not clearly set forth this limited remedy.34 
                                                 
32   See Secretariat Note, supra note 29, at 7. EBay’s specific “seller unpaid” 
and “unpaid item fee” remedy is not incorporated into the UNCITRAL draft.  See 
discussion of eBay “unpaid item” supra at note 24. The UNCITRAL draft also did 
not incorporate and auction type of transaction into its program. 
33   Secretariat Note, supra note 29, art. 1 ¶ 2. 
34   Under the eBay policies, as described above and infra, consequential 
damages are not specifically excluded or included, but are clearly excluded by the 
limited Money Back Guarantee. Similarly, for example, the Mexican Consumer 
Protection Code provides: “At their choice, consumers shall be entitled to the 
substitution of the product or the return of the amount paid against the delivery of 
the product acquired . . .”  Ley Federal de Protección al Consumidor [LFPC] [Federal 
Consumer Protection Act], Diario Oficial de la Federación el 24 de diciembre de 
1992 (Mex.), available at 
http://www.profeco.gob.mx/juridico/pdf/l_lfpc_06062006_ingles.pdf (English 
translation). 
  The Mexican platform Concilianet, which is the Mexican agency 
handling its ODR system also advises the public that no recovery is possible for 
consequential damages and informs the public of the consumer’s right to recover 
such damages in court. What is it?, CONCILIANET, 
2015 Del Duca, Rule, & Cressman 4:1 
267 
The detailed list of specific claims of ‘item not received’ or 
‘items received but not as described by seller,’ comparable to detailed 
eBay lists discussed supra35 had not been developed and incorporated 
into the Drafts or elsewhere, perhaps in the document on Substantive 
Legal Principles36 envisaged by the text of the Preamble. 
The Preamble to the Draft Rules reads as follows: 
“1. The UNCITRAL online dispute resolution rules 
(“the Rules”) are intended for use in the context of 
disputes arising out of cross-border, low-value 
transactions conducted by means of electronic 
communication. 
“2. The Rules are intended for use in conjunction with 
an online dispute resolution framework that consists of 
the following documents [which are attached to the 
Rules as an Appendix]: 
[“(a) Guidelines and minimum requirements for 
online dispute resolution 
providers/platforms/administrators;] 
[“(b) Guidelines and minimum requirements for 
neutrals;] 
[“(c) Substantive legal principles for resolving 
disputes;] 
[“(d) Cross-border enforcement mechanism;] 
[“. . .];”37 
                                                 
http://concilianet.profeco.gob.mx/concilianet/faces/que_es.jsp (last visited Sept. 
19, 2011). 
35   See eBay lists, supra note 20, for vehicles see note 26, supra and 
accompanying text, for equipment see note 27, supra and accompanying text. 
36   See Secretariat Note, supra note 29, at 6. 
37   Secretariat Note, supra note 29, at 5-6  
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These four documents envisaged by the Preamble38 had not 
been drafted by the Working Group at the time UNCITRAL 
instructed the Working Group to prepare a non-binding descriptive 
document on elements of the ODR process on which the Working 
Group had reached consensus. 
Documents one and two were to provided “guidelines and 
minimum requirements” for (a) dispute resolution 
providers/platforms/administrators39 and (b) neutrals.  Documents 
three and four were to provide (c) substantive legal principles for 
resolving disputes and (d) cross-border enforcement mechanisms 
(presumably private and public).40 Whether these documents would be 
merely persuasive in implementing the Draft, or annexed as legally part 
of the Draft, had also not yet been determined by the Working 
Group.41 
                                                 
38   In earlier drafts, the “documents” were referred to as annexes. See 
UNCITRAL, Mar. 24-8, 2014, Online Dispute Resolution For Cross-Border Electronic 
Commerce Transactions: Draft Procedural Rules: Note by the Secretariat, 2 U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.128, (Jan. 22, 2014). 
39   At its March 24 – 28, 2014 New York meeting, UNCITRAL ODR 
Working Group III agreed that the term “ODR provider” and all references thereto 
would be deleted from its Rules.  The following definitions of “ODR Administrator 
“ and “ODR Platform” would replace earlier definitions in the Rules: 
“ODR ‘Administrator’ means the entity that administers and 
coordinates ODR proceedings under these Rules, including where 
appropriate, by administrating an ODR platform, and which is 
specified in the dispute resolution clause.” 
 
 “ODR ‘Platform’ means a system for generating, sending, 
receiving, storing, exchanging or otherwise processing 
communications under these Rules.” 
The Secretariat’s official report of this meeting is pending at the time this article is 
printed. 
40   Secretariat Note, supra note 29.  
41   The Secretariat recently indicated that it might be advisable not to 
annex guidelines to the Rules. The Secretariat had suggested to the working group 
that it might wish to consider “(i) the purpose of guidelines that address various 
stakeholders in the online dispute resolution process, and bearing in mind that 
purpose, (ii) the relationship of the guidelines with the Rules.”  He further noted the 
suggestion in Document A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.114 that guidelines ought to set out 
best practices for ODR providers and neutrals, while the Rules aim to establish a 
procedure for online dispute resolution.  He also might be advised not to annex 
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IV.         LESSONS AND BEST PRACTICES REGARDING DE FACTO 
PURCHASE PRICE “MONEY BACK GUARANTEE” LOW VALUE 
& LIMITATION OF TYPES OF CLAIMS PERMITTED. 
The momentum behind global ODR continues to increase.  
Consumer and business groups around the world are unanimous in 
promoting fair, proportionate, effective, online, cross-border redress 
for low value cross-border disputes.  As a result, there will continue to 
be increasing demand for effective ODR systems design and 
procedural rules. 
It is vital for the continued expansion of e-commerce that 
consumers and small-to-medium size businesses have access to fast 
and fair resolution processes.  Because of this commercial imperative, 
the private sector is stepping in to provide manifold solutions to this 
problem. On balance, market-based approaches facilitate the 
development of optional solutions for the problem of online redress.  
This was the experience in the eBay marketplace. Market-based 
approaches require a lot of experimentation and evolution to get right, 
and eBay was always tweaking and evolving their ODR systems to 
account for lessons learned. As such, any ODR systems design should 
not be too prescriptive, because this may hinder the innovation 
required to effectively solve this problem over the longer term. 
EBay has generally managed to limit the complexity and scope 
of claims through categorization of claims limiting the types of 
permissible claims and providing a list of specific claims, coupled with 
its purchase price “Money Back Guarantee.”  However, as previously 
noted, for “vehicle” (VPP) and “equipment” (BEPP) sales, it also 
imposes the additional condition that the dispute will not be handled 
by the eBay ODR system if the purchase price of the vehicle is more 
than $50,000 or less than $100, or in the case of equipment if the 
purchase prices is more than $20,000 or less than $1000. This 
maximum and minimum purchase price limitation on “vehicle” and 
“equipment” cases handled by the eBay system ensures its efficient 
operation as a low-value dispute resolution process. It allows eBay, in 
                                                 
guideline to the Rules, as the legal nature and addressees of Rules and guidelines 
differ.  See UNCITRAL, May 21-25, 2012, Proposal on Principles Applicable to Online 
Dispute Resolution Providers and Neutrals, ¶ 28 U.N. Doc.  A/CN.9/WG.111/WP.127. 
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responding to market conditions, to design specific resolution 
processes and rules for special categories of such goods. It also permits 
eBay to exclude from the special categories the sales of such goods 
involving a high value purchase price, which it deems inappropriate for 
resolution in the fast-track low-cost high-volume eBay system. 
In both the basic and specialized “Money Back Guarantee” 
cases, purchase price will adjust as changes in currency values occur 
from time to time and adjust around the world to differences in the 
value of currencies in advanced, advancing, and underdeveloped 
economies at any given time. It also removes a major source of 
complexity and controversy in the eventual deliberative resolution 
process, because the law and jurisdiction to which the parties have 
agreed is specifically addressed and resolved in the governing policy 
adopted by the parties in their agreement to utilize the procedural rules. 
ODR administrators, marketplaces, and payment providers 
need the flexibility to design, build, and deploy both non-binding and 
binding ODR systems. EBay learned this lesson through extensive 
interactions with the global community of millions of sellers and 
merchants: each seller must have the flexibility to design their own 
resolution processes and policies, which are backed up by a 
standardized escalation process.  This is the only way to enable ODR 
designs to adjust to the many different types of potential disputes and 
resolutions around the world, while also providing final, definitive 
resolutions in all cases. 
The eBay experience makes very clear that ODR systems 
designs should avoid specific requirements that constrain the flexibility 
of disputants and administrators to evolve ODR systems that best 
meet the needs of various dispute types, marketplaces, and consumer 
communities.  Where possible, ODR rules should articulate higher-
level process requirements and values (e.g. due process, transparency, 
impartiality) as opposed to detailed procedural requirements (e.g. three 
neutrals per case, seven days to respond). 
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V.         BUYERS’ ON DEMAND ACCESS TO INFORMATION NEEDED 
TO IDENTIFY RELIABLE SELLERS 
A.         Evaluation of Sellers and Ratings – Building Trust 
A buyer conducting a search for a product to purchase on eBay 
can obtain information about the reliability of a seller from the Best 
Match search results page. If a seller has achieved a Top Rated Seller 
Status (discussed infra), under the Evaluation System hereafter 
discussed, this is displayed in its listing on the Best Match search results 
page. A lesser trustmark, the PowerSeller status (discussed infra), is also 
available on eBay, however it is not visible from the Best Match search 
results page.  In this way the eBay system provides a reward for the 
most reputable sellers, the Top Rated Sellers. 
A buyer who selects Best Match search results for an item is 
taken to a page listing that. On this page, a seller’s information is 
conspicuously gathered in the upper right hand corner of the listing 
page for buyers to consult. From here, a buyer can clearly determine 
whether a Top Rated Seller badge or PowerSeller insignia is displayed. 
Additionally, eBay provides two feedback performance metrics on the 
listing page, the seller’s Feedback Score (discussed infra) and Feedback 
Percentage (discussed infra). From the listing page a buyer can begin to 
determine the reputation of sellers that do not qualify for Top Rated 
Seller status. 
Additionally, from the listing page, a buyer can click on the 
Feedback Score and is hyperlinked to the seller’s feedback profile. The 
seller’s feedback profile lists both eBay’s feedback performance 
metrics, including the Feedback Score, feedback percentage, detailed 
seller ratings, Top Rated Seller status, and also subjective ratings in the 
form of comments left by former buyers of products offered by the 
seller. Feedback Comments are listed in reverse chronological order, 
thus a buyer is prompted to read the most recent Feedback Comments 
first. 
Finally, the seller’s feedback profile also lists the number of 
revised feedbacks the seller has been given. A revised feedback occurs 
when a buyer first left a negative or neutral feedback and then, after 
having the issues remedied by the seller, revises the feedback left to 
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positive. Thus, the buyer can get a feeling for the customer service a 
seller provides if a buyer is unhappy with a transaction. 
After a buyer successfully wins an auction or purchases an item 
they must pay for the item on eBay.42  Payment under the eBay system 
is usually by credit card. However, payment may also be made through 
the eBay approved escrow service (www.Escrow.com). Under this 
procedure, the parties may agree that the buyer place the price in the 
escrow fund by either wire transfers or through credit card payments 
(i.e. American Express, MasterCard, Visa, PayPal), United States 
drawn money orders, United States drawn personal or company 
checks, or United States drawn cashier’s checks. The buyer controls 
the time of payment from the escrow fund to the seller and will not 
release the payment from the escrow fund to the seller until he is 
satisfied that the goods “have been delivered and are as described.”43  
Thereafter, the item is required to be shipped in accordance with the 
listing details by the seller.  Under a non-escrow transaction, once the 
item is received, the transaction is complete. After a transaction, a 
buyer or seller may voluntarily leave feedback; however, a seller may 
only leave positive feedback for a buyer. A buyer, on the other hand 
may leave negative, neutral, or positive feedback for a seller. If a buyer 
hasn’t left timely feedback, the seller is permitted to e-mail the buyer a 
limited number of times to request that the buyer do so. 
VI.         THE EBAY AUTOMATED TRUSTMARK 
EVALUATION/FEEDBACK SYSTEM 
A.         Importance of Making Seller Evaluations and Ratings 
Available to Foster Trust Between Buyers and Sellers and 
                                                 
42   Alibaba has a similar escrow system.  For example, Alibaba Secure 
Payment, a service offered by Alibaba akin to eBay’s Paypal, is an escrow 
service.  The steps are as follows: 1) a buyer places an order online; 2) a buyer makes 
payment to Alibaba Secure Payment; 3) supplier ships the order; 4) buyer receives 
the order and confirms the order online (matches description, not damaged, etc.); 
and then 5) Alibaba Secure Payment releases payment to the supplier. Secure Payment, 
ALIBABA.COM, http://activities.alibaba.com/alibaba/secure-
payment.php?tracelog=beacon_payment_150114 (last visited Mar. 9, 2015). 
43  See Escrow Services for Vehicle Purchases, EBAY INC., 
http://pages.ebay.com/help/pay/escrow.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2015).  
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Facilitate Private Enforcement 
The eBay evaluation system is limited to transactions on the 
eBay site between a buyer and seller. In other words, the eBay 
evaluation system is tied to the eBay site, and a buyer can only rate a 
seller, or vice versa, regarding a specific transaction between the two 
users. Following a transaction on eBay, buyers and sellers can choose 
to leave feedback about the transaction.44 As previously indicated, 
whereas buyers can leave positive, neutral, or negative feedback, or no 
feedback at all, sellers can only leave positive feedback or opt to not 
leave feedback.45 
By allowing buyers to choose between positive, neutral, or 
negative evaluation, eBay transforms a qualitative judgment into one 
of three specified categories. In doing so, eBay can now easily quantify 
an inherently qualitative judgment: whether a user’s experience was 
good, indifferent, or bad. The effect of quantifying a buyer’s 
experience is to create an objective metric with which a future buyer 
can evaluate a prospective seller. Thus, evaluations are transformed 
into numerical data, easily interpreted by a buyer regardless of the 
language they speak. 
EBay additionally provides for a user to leave comments along 
with an evaluation. By allowing a user to leave a detailed comment, a 
future buyer has access to a purely qualitative evaluation component 
regarding a seller’s prior transactions. Therefore, the qualitative aspect 
of a positive, neutral, or negative experience is preserved. 
Through a combination of analytical data and express 
comments provided by former buyers, a current buyer can verify the 
trustworthiness of a seller that they have never met, and perhaps 
couldn’t communicate with, or have any other way to facilitate the trust 
a buyer needs to transact with the seller.  We next discuss the eBay 
trustmark system in detail, with an eye to a best practices model in 
facilitating trust in international commercial transactions. 
                                                 
44 How it works, EBAY INC., 
http://pages.ebay.com/help/feedback/howitworks.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2015). 
45   Id. 
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B.         “Percentage”, “Score”, and “Comment Feedback” 
As indicated supra, a seller’s Feedback Rating can be positive, 
neutral, or negative.  A user’s Feedback Percentage is the ratio of 
positive Feedback Ratings received out of all of the ratings received, in 
other words the percentage of positive ratings. The higher a user’s 
feedback percentage, generally speaking, the more trustworthy an eBay 
member is.46 However, it is important to note that a high feedback 
percentage does not dictate that a user has a significant track record on 
eBay. For example, User A may have had ten transactions all with 
positive feedback, therefore resulting in a feedback percentage of 
100%. Now consider a second user, User B may have had 1,000 
transactions with 980 positive feedbacks given, thereby having a 
feedback percentage of 98%.  As you can see, User A has a higher 
feedback percentage, but User B is a much more experienced seller.  
Whereas eBay’s other feedback system components require a number 
of transactions, the feedback percentage system applies to initial users.  
The feedback percentage, therefore is an important representation of 
trustworthiness for a user that has not yet had enough transactions to 
achieve a Feedback Score warranting a star rating, or other trustmarks, 
discussed below. 
A user’s Feedback Score is measured by subtracting the total 
number of negative ratings from unique trading partners from the total 
number of positive ratings from unique trading partners.47  For 
example, if Seller A had ten transactions with ten different buyers that 
resulted in seven positive and three negative feedbacks being left than 
Seller A’s Feedback Score would be four (7-3=4).  Now consider if 
Seller A had ten transactions, again with seven positive ratings and 
three negative, however three of the positive ratings were left by the 
same buyer.  In this case, the duplicative positive ratings left by the 
                                                 
46   The feedback system is linked only to transactions where users actually 
leave feedback. Many completed transactions result in a buyer simply not leaving 
feedback for a seller. These transactions are not encompassed in the feedback 
evaluation system. 
47 eBay Buying Feedback Quick Guide, EBAY INC., 
http://ebay.about.com/od/buyingeffectivel1/a/be_feedquick.htm (last visited Jan. 
14, 2015). 
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buyer would be excluded from Seller A’s Feedback Score. Thus, Seller 
A’s Feedback Score would be two (5-3=2). 
By limiting the Feedback Score to ratings from unique trading 
partners the eBay system has a built-in safeguard against 
disproportionate Feedback Ratings on the basis of repeat buyers,48 
both positive and negative, skewing a user’s score. Besides 
trustworthiness, a user’s Feedback Score measures their experience.  
The higher a seller’s score, the more transactions with unique trading 
partners that seller has had. A user’s Feedback Score is displayed in 
parenthesis whenever a member ID or member name is displayed in 
the eBay site. The score is also accompanied by a corresponding star 
rating, giving a buyer a visual representation matching the score.49 
                                                 
48   EBay additionally has specific policies against Feedback Extortion, a 
buyer threatening poor feedback to extort something that wasn’t part of the listing 
or a seller demanding positive feedback from buyers; Feedback Manipulation, 
exchanging feedback for the purpose of inflating Feedback Scores, gaining eBay 
privileges, or enhancing reputation, or trying to damage a seller’s feedback through a 
series of repeat purchases; and Feedback in Seller Terms and Conditions, a seller 
cannot include terms and conditions limiting a buyer’s right to leave feedback.  
Feedback Policies, EBAY INC., http://pages.ebay.com/help/policies/feedback-
ov.html#basics (last visited Jan. 14, 2015).  
49   Below is an example of a user profile with Feedback Score and star 
rating, followed by an infographic description of the star ratings. 
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Buyers are more likely to transact with established sellers. The 
Feedback Score performance metric provides buyers with a statistic 
speaking to a seller’s track record as a merchant.  Since the rating is 
numerically based, many linguistic issues arising from transacting with 
buyers and sellers worldwide are avoided. 
As part of the eBay feedback system, every Feedback Rating 
must be accompanied by a user comment.50 A comment is required 
regardless of whether the feedback left is positive, neutral, or 
negative.51 A Feedback Comment is the first instance where a buyer 
can leave a qualitative evaluation of a transaction with a seller. As a 
result, a Feedback Comment is often where a seller can learn a buyer’s 
dissatisfaction with a transaction. If sellers receive a negative feedback 
eBay allows the seller an opportunity to remedy the buyer’s grievance.52  
If a seller resolves an issue they can also request a feedback revision 
from the formerly aggrieved buyer.53 
C.         “Description”, “Communication”, and “Shipment”, - 
Detailed Seller Ratings 
EBay allows buyers to rate specific aspects of their transaction 
experience via a detailed seller rating.54 Detailed Seller Ratings are only 
viewable by buyers for sellers with ten or more detailed seller ratings 
by buyers within the last year. Buyers rate sellers according to four 
                                                 
eBay Feedback Points, EBAY INC., http://www.ebay.com/gds/eBay-Feedback-Points-
/10000000176715987/g.html  (last visited Mar. 9 2015). It is unclear to me how 
effective the star rating is as a quick-look reference to a user’s Feedback Score. The 
effectiveness of the star rating is directly tied to a user’s understanding of what each 
star means.  Without the above chart, or an understanding thereof, I suspect the star-
system is of minimal import in garnering the trust of a user to facilitate a transaction. 
50 Feedback, EBAY INC., 
http://pages.ebay.com/services/forum/feedback.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2015). 
51   Id. 
52 Revising Feedback, EBAY.COM, 
http://pages.ebay.com/help/feedback/revise-feedback.html (last visited Jan. 14, 
2015). 
53   Id. 
54 Detailed Seller Ratings, EBAY.COM, 
http://pages.ebay.com/help/feedback/detailed-seller-ratings.html (last visited Mar. 
9, 2015). 
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categories55 as follows, from a rating of five stars (highest) to one star 
(lowest): 
 Accuracy of item description; 
 Satisfaction with communication; 
 Expediency of shipping; and 
 Reasonableness of shipping and handling charges. 
Buyers are requested to evaluate the sellers for the adherence 
to the four categories through a series of specific tips for rating as 
indicated in the chart that follows. 
What you rate Tips for rating 
How accurate was the 
item description? 
 Review the item title, description, and 
condition to see if they match the 
item you received. 
How satisfied were 
you with the seller’s 
communication? 
 Recall whether the seller addressed 
any questions or concerns that you 
had, and did so in a professional 
manner. 
 Consider only business days when 
evaluating the timeliness of the seller’s 
communication (sellers might not 
check email on weekends and 
holidays). 
 If the seller meets specific 
requirements, we give the seller a 5-
star communication detailed seller 
rating automatically, and you won’t be 
able to change the rating. 
How quickly did the 
seller ship the item? 
 Rate the seller only on the time it 
took to mail the item, not the time it 
took you to receive the item. 
                                                 
55   Id. Certain transactions aren’t rated according to all four categories.  
For example, Motor Vehicle transactions are not rated on shipping time and shipping 
and handling charges.   
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 Don’t hold sellers responsible for 
delays in mail services, international 
custom delays, or for the time it takes 
for your payment to clear. If you 
picked up the item locally, you won’t 
be able to provide a rating for this 
category. 
 If the seller met specific shipping time 
requirements, we give the seller a 5-
star shipping time detailed seller 
rating automatically, and you won’t be 
able to change the rating. 
 If we determine at a later date that the 
seller met the requirements for an 
automatic 5-star shipping time rating, 
we may adjust the rating to 5 stars.  
How reasonable were 
the shipping and 
handling charges? 
 Remember that sellers can charge for 
the cost of the actual packaging 
materials, along with a reasonable 
handling fee to cover their time and 
direct costs associated with shipping. 
 If the seller provided free shipping, 
we give the seller a 5-star shipping 
and handling charges detailed seller 
rating automatically, and you won’t be 
able to change the rating. 
 For international transactions, you as 
a buyer are expected to pay duties, 
taxes, and customs clearance fees as 
required by country laws. 
 If you picked up the item locally, you 
won’t be able to provide a rating for 
this category.56 
 
                                                 
56   Detailed Seller Ratings, supra note 47. 
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D.        Transaction Defect Rate 
Starting with the August 20, 2014 monthly seller evaluation, 
eBay instituted an additional metric to evaluate seller performance.57  
The new metric, the transaction defect rate (hereinafter “defect rate”) 
is measured as a percentage of a seller’s successful transactions that 
have one of a specified number of defects.58  These defects, according 
to eBay, are the top predictors that a buyer will either leave eBay all 
together or buy less on the marketplace.59  The specified defects are as 
follows: 
 Detailed seller rating of 1, 2, or 3 for item as described; 
 Detailed seller rating of 1 for shipping time; 
 Negative or neutral feedback; 
 Return initiated for a reason that indicates the item was not 
as described; 
 eBay Money Back Guarantee or PayPal Purchase 
Protection case opened for an item not received or an item 
not as described; and 
 Seller-cancelled transactions.60 
The new defect rate policy mandated changes in the eBay Seller 
Ratings system.  Following the update, to qualify as a Top Rated Seller 
a defect rate of up to 2% is tolerated.61 For purposes of Seller Ratings, 
however, only transactions with US buyers count towards the defect 
                                                 
57 Seller Standards, EBAY INC., 
http://pages.ebay.com/sellerinformation/news/springupdate2014/sellerstandards.
html (last visited Jan. 14, 2015).  
58   Id. 
59   Id. 
60   Id. 
61   Id. 
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rate.62 Buyers cannot see a seller’s defect rate, however a seller with a 
high defect rate will not show favorably in Best Match search results.63 
VII.        AWARDING OF EBAY’S AUTOMATED TRUSTMARKS USING 
THE EVALUATION/FEEDBACK SYSTEM 
As indicated, supra, eBay employs a Top Rated Seller 
automated Trustmark, granted only for highest-level performances, 
and a PowerSeller Trustmark granted for quality performance but not 
of the top level.  We first discuss the PowerSeller Trustmark and 
subsequently the Top Rated Seller. 
A.         PowerSeller Designation - Requirements and Benefits 
The PowerSeller designation is handed out on the basis of 
volume of sales and customer service requirements.  As a PowerSeller, 
the seller must: 
 be registered with eBay for at least 90 days and have an 
account in good standing;64 
 follow all eBay policies;65 
 may have no more than three tenths of one percent of 
transactions result in Money Back Guarantee or PayPal 
Purchase Protection cases closed without seller 
resolution;66 and 
 have a minimum of 100 transactions and $3,000 in sales 
with US buyers over the past 12 months.67 
                                                 
62   Id.  
63   Id. 
64 Powersellers, EBAY.COM, http://pages.ebay.com/help/sell/sell-
powersellers.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2015).  
65   Id. 
66   Id. 
67   Id.   
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Further, the PowerSeller System is linked to Detailed Seller 
Ratings in two ways, as follows: 
 the seller must have an average of at least 4.60 from US 
buyers across all four detailed seller rating categories;68 and 
 a seller must have no more than 1% of their transactions 
with low DSRs (1 or 2 ratings) on the category “item as 
described,” and no more than 2% of transactions with low 
DSRs in the “communication,” “shipping time,” and 
“shipping and handling cost” categories.69 
The above listed requirements qualifies a seller as a “Bronze” 
level PowerSeller.70  Depending on the volume of sales, in either 
number of items or in dollar amount, a seller may improve their 
PowerSeller level above Bronze to either Silver, Gold, Platinum or 
Titanium levels.71 EBay has a designated insignia for PowerSellers 
across the various levels.  Pictured below, the insignia only changes by 
reference to the appropriate PowerSeller level. 
 
Notably, a user may advertise their PowerSeller status, 
however, whether a user is a PowerSeller or not is not apparent from 
search results, whereas a Top Ratedseller status is visible in a search 
listing.72 If a user looks at a particular seller’s eBay store they can find 
                                                 
68  Id.; seeeBay Buying Feedback Guide, supra note 47, eBay Feedback Policies, 
supra note 48, ebay Feedback Points, supra note 49, and eBay Feedback, supra note 50.  
69  Powersellers, supra note 64. 
70   Id. 
71   Id. 
72   For example, search any major product, such as an iPad, on eBay.com. 
iPad, EBAY.COM, 
http://www.ebay.com/sch/i.html?_from=R40&_trksid=p2050601.m570.l1313.TR
0.TRC0.H0.Xipad&_nkw=ipad&_sacat=0 (last visited Mar. 9, 2015). . 
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a seller’s PowerSeller insignia located there.73 From a practical 
perspective, the PowerSeller status requires more search time from a 
buyer and, thus, is less accessible than the Top Rated insignia. For this 
reason, a PowerSeller insignia is a less efficient trustmark than the Top 
Rated insignia. 
Similar to the Top Rated Seller system, the PowerSeller rating 
includes discounted shipping, including United States Postal Service 
Savings Program and United Parcel Service rate discounts.74  A 
PowerSeller also gains access to eBay protection for unpaid items,75 
receives promotional offers and opportunities to participate in 
research,76  and gains access to resources from eBay that regular 
members cannot access.77  These resources include a separate, more 
easily accessible customer service team for PowerSellers and access to 
marketing and sales tools directly from eBay.78  Finally, the PowerSeller 
status is a step toward Top RatedTop Rated Seller status and the 
benefits discussed infra associated with the Top RatedTop Rated Seller 
status.79 
B.         Top-Rated Seller Badge Designation - Requirements and 
Benefits 
A Top-Rated Seller is a PowerSeller that has maintained high 
performance and customer service standards.80 The PowerSeller 
designation then is a precursor to a Top-Rated Seller designation.  
Thus, the Top-Rated Seller badge can be viewed as a more significant 
trustmark than the PowerSeller status. In order to qualify as a Top-
Rated Seller, an eBay user must meet several requirements related to 
customer service. For example, if a seller offers one-day or same day 
handling, the seller must upload tracking information in at least 90% 
                                                 
73   For example, see Titanium Powerseller Status, EBAY.COM, 
http://stores.ebay.com/irecrafts/Titanium-PowerSeller-Status.html (last visited 
Mar. 9, 2015). 
74   Id. 
75   Id. 
76   Id. 
77   Powersellers, supra note 64. 
78   Id. 
79   Id. 
80 Glossary of Terms – Top Rated Seller, EBAY INC., 
http://pages.ebay.com/help/account/glossary.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2015).  
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of their transactions in the prescribed time according to the relevant 
eBay policies.81 Additionally, a seller must meet the eBay Money Back 
Guarantee promise and PayPal Purchase Protection requirements.82 
The case requirements under these programs state that at most three 
tenths of a percent of cases brought by a buyer may be closed without 
seller resolution.83 In terms of feedback requirements, to meet Top 
Rated Seller requirements, a seller can only have a transaction defect 
rate of 2% at most.84 
EBay offers a second status of Top Rated Seller seals, the Top 
Rated Plus Seal.85 In order to garner a Top Rated Plus Seal, a Top Rated 
Seller must offer listings that provide a 14-day or longer money-back 
return policy and provide same-day or one business day handling 
time.86 Further, listings meeting the Top Rated Plus requirements must 
include extended holiday returns on listings.87 
Currently, a user can become a Top Rated Seller in the United 
States, United Kingdom, and Germany.88  The U.S. Top Rated Seller 
system, discussed infra, is based only on sales through eBay.com.89  A 
seller can become a Top Rated Seller in the United Kingdom or 
Germany through their associated eBay sites, http://www.ebay.co.uk/ 
and http://www.ebay.de/, respectively.90  The Top Rated Seller 
designation in those countries is based only on transactions with 
buyers in those countries.91  A seller need not be from the United 
States, United Kingdom, or Germany to qualify as a Top Rated Seller 
in that country.  For example, a United States seller may become a Top 
Rated Seller in the United Kingdom if they meet the requirements of 
                                                 
81   Top Rated Seller, EBAY INC., http://pages.ebay.com/help/sell/top-
rated.html#what (last visited Mar. 9, 2015).  
82   Id. 
83   Id. 
84   Id. 
85   Id.  
86   Id. 
87   Id. 
88   Id.  
89   Id. 
90   Id. 
91   Id. 
2015 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 4:1 
284 
the U.K. Top Rated Seller Program.92  For associated eBay sites in 
countries other than the U.K. and Germany, a U.S. seller can become 
a Top Rated Seller in that country based on the eBay global seller 
performance standards.93  Unlike the United States, United Kingdom 
and Germany Top Rated Seller systems, the Top Rated Seller 
designation in all other countries is based on transactions with buyers 
in all countries and not just native buyers.94 
Once a seller qualifies as a Top Rated Seller they receive a 20% 
discount on final value fees charged by eBay and access to United 
States Postal Service Commercial Plus Pricing on shipping.95 As soon 
as a seller qualifies, sometimes immediately but at most in a matter of 
hours,96 a seal is displayed on any of the seller’s listings which offer 
same-day or 1-day handling and extended holiday returns identifying 
them as a Top Rated Seller.97 Additionally, a seller receives preferential 
search results, or in eBay’s terms, improved search standing in eBay’s 
Best Match search results.98 The Top Rated Seller and Top Rated Plus 
seal, pictured below, appear both in eBay search results and in an 
individual item’s listing page.99 
                                                 
92  Id.; For the United Kingdom requirements, see Top Rated Seller, 
EBAY.UK http://pages.ebay.co.uk/help/sell/top-rated.html (Mar. 9, 2015).  
93   Top Rated Seller, supra note 81; for global seller performance standards, 
see Global Seller Performance, EBAY.COM, 
http://pages.ebay.com/help/policies/global-seller-performance.html (last visited 
Mar. 9, 2015).  Even though a U.S. buyer can become a Top Rated Seller in the 
United Kingdom and Germany they do not qualify for discounts through those sites.  
Likewise, only U.S. and Canadian sellers are eligible for the 20% final value fee 
discount on eBay.com.   
94   Top Rated Seller, supra note 81. 
95   Id. 
96   Id. 
97 Build your Business, EBAY.COM, 
http://pages.ebay.com/sellerinformation/build-your-business-online/status-
standards/top-rated-seller.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2015). 
98   Id.  
99   For an example of search results, see eBay “iPad” search, supra note 72; 
for an example of a listing page, see: Apple iPad Mini, EBAY 
http://www.ebay.com/itm/NEW-Apple-iPad-Mini-16GB-Wi-Fi-7-9-Tablet-
White-MD531LL-A-or-Gray-MF432LL-A-
/181511708378?pt=US_Tablets&var=&hash=item2a42f0deda (last visited Mar. 9, 
2015).  
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C.         Comparison of eBay Evaluation System with Other 
Evaluation Systems 
There are two important observations to be made regarding 
the exclusivity of the eBay system.  First, the eBay feedback system is 
a closed system, that is, the system is tied only to transactions 
conducted on the eBay website.  Second, a trustmark earned through 
transactions on eBay cannot be used by a merchant outside of the eBay 
website.  Each of these observations has important implications 
regarding the practical use of such a system universally for 
international transactions. 
Since its inception, eBay has developed and refined its 
feedback system.  Thereby engendering trust in transactions on its 
platform and facilitating trade. In doing so, eBay has gained a 
reputation as a safe and secure global marketplace. There are clear 
incentives for eBay to protect their investment in the feedback system.  
It comes as no surprise then that eBay’s system remains closed. Thus, 
eBay does not allow their feedback system to be outsourced to 
transactions occurring off the eBay site. As an added level of 
protection, ensuring sellers continue using eBay, the trustmarks earned 
through the eBay feedback system cannot be utilized by a seller on 
another platform. Thus, an eBay seller may not advertise their 
reputation on eBay elsewhere. 
As an e-commerce site, the eBay feedback system provides 
evaluations of buyers and sellers for transactions on its platform. Each 
feedback left is tied to a particular transaction, for a particular item, 
between a particular buyer and seller. EBay’s system then provides 
objective scores, based on observable and quantifiable elements as 
provided by the parties to a transaction to evaluate buyers and sellers 
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in the aggregate of all of their transactions.100 From a perspective of 
reliability in collecting data and enforcement of the rules and 
regulations related to the feedback system, a closed system, that is a 
system tied to a particular platform, is the only practical option. 
Under the open system model, in comparison to the closed 
system model the seller conducts transactions on more than one 
platform rather than a single platform. However, the evaluation system 
and its feedback and ratings are, hosted on a single platform.  Another 
difference is that the open system model has to rely on subjective 
feedback as opposed to the quantitative feedback of the eBay closed 
system. 
There are relatively few open systems on the market.  However 
earlier research uncovered iKarma, which regrettably is no longer in 
operation and its website is no longer in existence. However, we can 
nevertheless use the iKarma system to illustrate the open system 
model. An iKarma user first created an iKarma account, and then they 
were awarded an iKarma seal. The user placed this seal on their 
website, in emails, etc. that linked to their iKarma profile. The user’s 
iKarma profile contained ratings and comments from previous buyers 
of their goods or services. At its core, the iKarma site was more or less 
just a place to host reviews. This stands in stark contrast to eBay’s 
platform driven, empirical evaluation and trustmark system.  IKarma 
was essentially a place to evaluate a seller’s reputation, the seal acted 
less as a trustmark than as an access point to see what, if anything, 
other people had said about a seller. A seller could advertise their 
iKarma profile and ratings, but again the site acted more as a place to 
host reviews and less as a trustmark.Because sites like iKarma are not 
tied to specific platforms or even to specific types of transactions, i.e. 
a lawyer and a company selling electronics can both have an iKarma 
type profile, the open system does not lend itself to objective 
evaluations. Thus, because evaluations are based largely on subjective, 
qualitative comments, there is not objective data to base metrics off or 
                                                 
100  EBay’s use of numerical rather than verbal ratings reduces 
misunderstandings and improves communication regarding ratings, particularly in 
cross-border transactions involving use of different languages by parties to the 
transaction. 
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to base an automated trustmark on. The automation and efficiency of 
the eBay closed system is therefore lost in the iKarma open system. 
The SquareTrade seal provides evaluation and feedback of past 
transactions and also gives guarantees as to performance obligations 
regarding a current listing. The SquareTrade system also verifies a 
seller’s identity, requires the seller to commit to the SquareTrade 
dispute resolution process, and generates info pages to provide a buyer 
with information regarding a seller’s past transactions.101 Therefore, the 
SquareTrade seal provides a retrospective trustmark, similar to the 
eBay system. SquareTrade centrally monitors a user’s compliance with 
its trustmark and can remove the trustmark from a seller’s site or 
auction listings.102 The SquareTrade seal is not linked to one site or 
platform, and seems to be a middle ground from the eBay completely 
closed system to the open systems such as iKarma. 
VIII.        LESSONS & BEST PRACTICES REGARDING EBAY’S 
AUTOMATED TRUSTMARK SYSTEM & PRIVATE 
ENFORCEMENT 
A.         eBay’s Automated Trustmark System and Private 
Enforcement of Settled Claims and Rulings of Neutrals 
Through Voluntary Compliance, Termination of Trustmark 
Status, Use of Chargebacks, and Access to Escrow Accounts 
The eBay “Automated Electronic Trustmark System” enables 
buyers on demand to obtain evaluations and performance ratings of 
sellers from whom they anticipate making purchases. These ratings are 
obtained electronically and cumulatively from the reports supplied by 
prior buyers after each purchase they made on the eBay platform.103 
                                                 
101 SquareTrade Criteria for Trusted Business Seal Membership, 
SQUARETRADE, https://www.squaretrade.com/htm/pop/popup_busCriteria.html 
(last visited Mar. 9, 2015).  
102 SquareTrade Standards, SQUARETRADE, 
https://www.squaretrade.com/htm/pop/popup_ST_standards.html (last visited 
Mar. 9, 2015).  
103   EBay’s use of numerical rather than verbal ratings reduces 
misunderstandings and improves communication regarding ratings, particularly in 
cross-border transactions involving use of different languages by parties to the 
transaction.  
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The eBay automated system is efficient and cost-effective and does not 
depend on cumbersome and costly third-party evaluations to 
determine who is or is not entitled to trustmark status. 
Under the eBay Trustmark Evaluation/Feedback System 
sellers’ desire to obtain favorable performance evaluations in order to 
establish their reputation and reliability, and increase their sales, 
motivates them to perform their contract obligations well, facilitate fair 
resolution of disputes, and voluntarily satisfy the rulings of neutrals 
following unsuccessful negotiations and facilitated negotiations. In 
most cases voluntary private satisfaction and enforcement of settled 
claims and rulings of neutrals will occur.  In the absence of such 
voluntary compliance, use of private enforcement procedures 
including chargebacks on credit card payment, access to escrow 
accounts, and termination of trustmark status are available to achieve 
private enforcement of rulings.  As noted the rulings of neutrals do not 
have res judicata effect but are enforceable by use of applicable private 
enforcement procedures.104 
CONCLUSION 
Development of fast-track low-value high-volume ODR 
systems which provide a marketplace for e-commerce, as well as an 
ODR system for fast-track resolution of disputes arising from e-
commerce on its electronic marketplace is facilitated by application of 
the following four best practices used by eBay in creating its highly 
successful system: 
                                                 
104   Much discussion has occurred in UNCITRAL Working Group III 
sessions on the subject of whether the ruling made by the neutral at the end of the 
facilitated negotiation second stage of the resolution process should be termed a 
“recommendation,” “decision,” “ruling” or some other yet to be discovered term. 
Proponents of the “recommendation” term are concerned that the neutral’s ruling 
does not have res judicata effect and therefore are not comfortable with using the 
term “decision.” Proponents of the term “decision” are concerned that the term 
“recommendation” could be interpreted to mean that the ruling has no legal effect. 
These concerns can be addressed by clarifying the definition of whatever term is used 
in the definition section of the Preliminary Rules by specifying that the “[term] does 
not have res judicata effect, but is enforceable by use of applicable private 
enforcement procedures.”   
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1) Using a de facto purchase price “Money Back Guarantee” 
definition of low value to limit the amount of each 
permitted claim;105 
2) Limiting the Types of Permitted Claims to “item not 
received” and “item not as described”;106 
3) Making Available to Buyers’ On-Demand Access to 
Automated Trustmark Evaluation/Feedback Information 
Needed to Identify Reliable Sellers;107 and 
4) Providing For Private Enforcement of Settled Claims and 
Rulings of Neutrals through facilitation of voluntary 
compliance, termination of trustmark status, and using 
charge backs on credit card payments and access to escrow 
funds  to satisfy claims and rulings of neutrals in the 
absence of voluntary compliance.108 
 
                                                 
105   See discussion at supra note 10.  
106   See discussion at supra note 15.  
107   See discussion at supra note 43, 41 (read in stated order). 
108   See text at note 103, supra.  
Penn State 
Journal of Law & International Affairs 
2015 VOLUME 4 NO. 1 
PARTY AUTONOMY AND CONSUMER 
ARBITRATION IN CONFLICT: A “TROJAN 
HORSE” IN THE ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN 
THE E.U. ADR-DIRECTIVE 2013/11? 
Norbert Reich† 
ABSTRACT 
Arbitration clauses in consumer contracts have been subject to controversy in many jurisdictions; 
recent U.S. and Canadian Supreme Court case law have been used as examples. European 
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INTRODUCTION 
This paper discusses an important new development in conflict 
regulation between consumers and businesses in the E.U.—a subject 
matter which has kept me busy for some time. This paper will address 
the question of how a regime of extra-legal conflict management by 
ADR mechanisms, which are based on voluntary cooperation between 
consumers and traders, supplements, but does not replace, judicial 
court proceedings. This paper argues that a more intrusive regime to 
solve consumer complaints by binding arbitration will become 
increasingly popular. Justice will be more or less privatized under an 
efficiency rhetoric, which criticizes lengthy, costly, and highly 
discretionary court proceedings that exist in many Member States to 
the detriment of consumers and the working of justice in general. For 
many legal scholars, binding arbitration based on contractual 
agreements is regarded as an alternative; however, it is not always clear 
what the legal and consumer policy costs of an extension of ADR 
mechanisms are, and whether there is a fair balance between the 
supposed efficiency gains on the one hand and the requirements of 
effective legal protection on the other. 
The paper will proceed as follows. First, it will give an overview 
of liberal and mixed regimes concerning the promotion of binding 
consumer arbitration, namely in the United States (Section I) and 
Canada (Section II) where the legitimacy and limits of consumer 
arbitration have been subject to controversial Supreme Court 
judgments. These judgments show the complexity of this issue and 
provide insight into future E.U. developments of ADR mechanisms in 
E.U. countries. Section III will analyze new trends in E.U. law 
provoked by the recently adopted ADR Directive 2013/11/EU,1 
                                                 
1   Directive 2013/11, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
21 May 2013 on Alternative Dispute Resolution for Consumer Disputes 2013, 2014 
O.J. (L 165/63) [hereinafter Directive 2013/11]. See Horst Eidenmüller & Martin 
Engel, Die Schlichtungsfalle: Verbraucherrechtsdurchsetzung nach der ADR-Richtlinie und 
ODR-Verordnung der EU, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT  1704 (2013) for a 
critical appreciation of those who are not concerned with consumer arbitration 
specifically, but who fear not without justification a de facto denial of justice to 
consumers even if they take proceedings with a non-binding outcome; it is unrealistic 
to expect consumers to pursue their claim if rejected by the ADR-entity before courts 
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where consumer arbitration has found a place of its own in regulating 
ADR-entities “imposing solutions” on consumers. Section IV 
concerns the scope of application of Dir. 2013/11. Section V examines 
prior E.U. law in the form of two important, and in the opinion of this 
author, still valid precedents set by the Court of Justice of the E.U. 
(CJEU, then called ECJ), namely Claro2 and Asturcom.3 Sections VI 
through X propose some standards on valid consumer arbitration by 
reference to Dir. 2013/11 and other E.U. law instruments. These 
standards are then measured under a fundamental rights perspective 
contained in Article 47 of the E.U. Charter and Article 19(1)(a) Treaty 
of the European Union (TEU), namely the principle of effective 
judicial protection of rights granted to consumers under E.U. law.4 
Then, Section XI argues that these standards limit party-autonomy 
with regard to binding arbitration clauses in consumer contracts and 
require the adoption of additional mechanisms to curb an eventual 
abuse of arbitration clauses by traders or trade associations. Finally, 
Sections XII through XVII examine E.U. countries that must adapt 
their arbitration legislation to new E.U. standards. Some preliminary 
conclusions will follow. 
                                                 
of law. The authors also question the legal basis of Article 114 of the Directive, 
although such discussion is beyond the scope of this paper. 
2   Case C-168/05, E.M.M. Claro v. Centro Movil Milenium, 2006 E.C.R. 
I-10421; see also Reich, More clarity after “Claro”?, supra note 1, at 41. 
3   Case C-40/08, Asturcom Telecommunicaciones v. Rodrígues Noguera, 
2009 E.C.R. I-9579 ¶ 54-55. See Jules Stuyck, Note to Pannon and Asturcom, 47 
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 879 (2010); Christopher Hodges, Consumer Protection and 
Procedural Justice, in LANDMARK CASES OF EU CONSUMER LAW: IN HONOUR OF 
JULES STUYCK 615 (Evelyn Terryn et al. ed. 2013); Chantal Mak, Judgment of the Court 
(First Chamber) of 6 October 2009, Asturcom Telecomunicaciones SL v Cristina Rodríguez 
Nogueira, Case C-40/08, Commentary, 6 EUR. REV. CONTRACT L. 437 (2010); Martin 
Ebers, ECJ (First Chamber) 6 October 2009, Case C-40/08, Asturcom Telecomunicaciones 
SL v. Cristina Rodríguez Nogueira – From Océano to Asturcom: Mandatory Consumer Law, 
Ex Officio Application of European Union Law and Res Judicata 18 EUR. REV. PRIVATE. L. 
823 (2010). See also ALEXANDER J. BĚLOHLÁVEK, B2C ARBITRATION: CONSUMER 
PROTECTION IN ARBITRATION 7, 117, 133 (2012). 
4   See NORBERT REICH, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EU CIVIL LAW ch. IV 
(2014). 
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I. A LIBERAL APPROACH: ADR IN THE UNITED STATES 
In the words of the Supreme Court in Southland Corp. v. Keating, 
the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)5 “declared a national policy favoring 
arbitration and withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial 
forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed 
to resolve by arbitration.”6 U.S. law generally takes a very liberal view 
toward arbitration clauses without making a distinction between 
commercial and consumer arbitration.7 This view was confirmed in the 
Court’s controversial decision of Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph.8  
In Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, Larketta Randolph signed a 
financing agreement for the purchase of a mobile home with Green 
Tree Financial. The agreement bound any disputes arising from the 
agreement to arbitration. When Randolf sued Green Tree for violating 
the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), the district court compelled 
arbitration. However, on appeal the Eleventh Circuit overturned the 
district court’s decision, finding that the arbitration agreement was 
unenforceable because the steep arbitration costs would negatively 
affect Randolph’s ability to vindicate her statutory rights. The Supreme 
Court disagreed and held that consumers bear the burden to prove that 
the arbitral forum is financially inaccessible to them.9 This opinion was 
challenged by a strong dissent by Justices Ginsburg, Stevens, Souter, 
and Breyer (in part), who argued that, “as a repeat player in the 
arbitration required by its form contract, Green Tree has superior 
information about the costs to consumers of pursuing arbitration.”10 
This approach by the Supreme Court means that ADR mechanisms in 
favor of consumers can easily be avoided by arbitration clauses entered 
into by standard form contracts with consumers as in Green Tree. 
Recent state court cases, however, show a somewhat more 
nuanced approach toward arbitration clauses. For example, Comb v. 
                                                 
5   The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2014) [hereinafter FAA]. 
6   Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984). 
7  LARS WEIHE, DER SCHUTZ DER VERBRAUCHER IM RECHT DER 
SCHIEDSGERICHTSBARKEIT 116, 205-06 (2005) (for a critique from a consumer 
policy point of view with regard to “informed consent”). 
8   Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000). 
9   Id. at 92. 
10   Id. at 96. 
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Paypal11 concerned a class action against an electronic disbursement 
service alleging illegal removal of funds.12 The defendant, Paypal, 
argued that the case should have been submitted to arbitration because 
the contract contained an arbitration clause.13 The District Court held 
that, despite its wide use and recognition in relevant California law, the 
arbitration clause was substantively unconscionable for several 
reasons.14 First, there was a lack of mutuality whereby arbitration was 
imposed on the weaker party while the stronger party was allowed the 
choice of forum.15 Second, the clause contained a prohibition against 
consolidation of claims.16 Third, the costs of arbitration and venue 
were unconscionable because the “place or manner” in which 
arbitration was to occur unreasonably took into account “the 
respective circumstances of the parties.”17 
Cruz v. PacifiCare Health Systems18 concerned an action for false 
advertising and deceptive business practices of the defendant 
PacifiCare for inducing persons to subscribe to health plans.19 
PacifiCare claimed that the plaintiff, who obtained health coverage 
through his employer, was required to arbitrate his claim because of 
the subscriber agreement between PacifiCare and the plaintiff’s 
employer.20 The California Supreme Court held that the arbitration 
clause was unenforceable.21 The Court’s reasoning was similar to the 
decision in Comb, at least insofar as injunctive relief is concerned, but 
not with regard to restitution and unjust enrichment. Therefore, in 
California, claims for unjust enrichment are arbitrable, while claims for 
injunctions against deceptive advertising practices are not arbitrable 
because they are undertaken “in the public benefit.” 
                                                 
11   Comb v. Paypal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (N.D. Cal. 2002). 
12   Id. at 1166. 
13   Id. at 1169-70. 
14   Id. at 1172. 
15   Id. at 1173-75. 
16   Id. at 1175-76. 
17   Id. at 1177 (quoting Bolter v. Superior Court, 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 888, 
894-95 (Ct. App. 2001)). 
18   Cruz v. PacifiCare Health Sys., Inc., 66 P.3d 1157 (Cal. 2003). 
19   Id. at 1159. 
20   Id. at 1160. 
21   See generally id. 
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The Supreme Court in Buckeye Check Cashing Corp. v. Cardegna 
seemed unconcerned by attempts to limit the effects of arbitration 
clauses in consumer contracts.22 The litigation in Cardegna concerned a 
class action suit brought against usurious terms in a consumer credit 
agreement containing a broad arbitration clause.23 The case was an 
appeal from a decision by the Florida Supreme Court, which set aside 
the arbitration clause.24 The Florida Supreme Court reasoned that to 
enforce an agreement to arbitrate in a contract challenged as unlawful 
“could breathe life into a contract that not only violates state law, but 
is criminal in nature  . . .”25 The U.S. Supreme Court, per Justice Scalia, 
reversed the Florida Supreme Court and distinguished two causes in 
which arbitration clauses can be challenged in court: 
1) The arbitration clause is unlawful as such; and 
2) The entire contract from which the arbitration 
clause cannot be severed is invalid, which was not 
the case in a usurious credit agreement. 
The Supreme Court held that, “regardless of whether the challenge is 
brought in federal or state court, a challenge to the validity of the 
contract as a whole, and not specifically to the arbitration clause, must 
go to the arbitrator.”26 
Consumer protection depends on the willingness of arbitrators 
to apply and enforce consumer protection provisions in particular of 
state law. Arbitration awards, however, are not published, and 
therefore are not subject to critical public and academic debate. It 
seems that there is no remedy under U.S. law against an arbitration 
award disregarding mandatory consumer protection provisions, unless 
the consumer can prove the existence of the narrow defenses 
                                                 
22   See generally Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 
(2006). 
23   Id. at 442-43. 
24   Cardegna v. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc., 894 So. 2d 860, 862 (Fla. 
2005). 
25   Id. (quoting Party Yards, Inc. v. Templeton, 751 So. 2d 121, 123 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2000). 
26   Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc., 546 U.S. at 449. 
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enumerated in the 1958 New York Convention.27 Arbitration clauses 
have become a prominent and popular instrument to avoid the 
application of consumer protection provisions, at least in contract 
litigation between business and consumers, and particularly in class 
action suits. 
An arbitration clause may be considered “substantially 
unconscionable,” as in the Pennsylvania case of Bragg v. Linden 
Research,28 if an arbitration clause is either one-sided or non-
transparent, or if there are additional costs to the consumer to 
arbitrate. 
In AT&T v. Concepcion, the Supreme Court addressed the 
relationship between arbitration clauses in cellular telephone contracts 
between respondents (the Concepcions) and petitioner (AT&T) and 
the prohibition of classwide arbitration.29 After the Concepcions were 
charged sales taxes on the retail value of phones provided free under 
their service contract, they sued AT&T in the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of California. Their suit was 
consolidated with a class action alleging, inter alia, that AT&T had 
engaged in false advertising and fraud by charging sales tax on “free 
phones”. The Supreme Court in rejecting the consolidation claim took 
the opposite view of the California Supreme Court,30 which had ruled 
that consumers must have the right to proceed with a class action and 
shall not be forced into arbitration. Justice Scalia, writing for the 
majority, framed AT&T as a clash of two policies, namely, the policy 
                                                 
27   Defenses under the convention include: lack of proper notice, 
arbitration decision contrary to public policy of the forum country, manifest 
disregard of the law. United Nations Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter New York Convention], 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention.ht
ml. 
28   Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593 (E.D. Pa. 2007). 
See GREG LASTOWKA, VIRTUAL JUSTICE: THE NEW LAWS OF THE ONLINE WORLDS 
95 (2010) for a discussion of U.S. practice on enforcing contractual provisions 
containing an arbitration clause where the Bragg decision was found to be “rather 
surprising (to many legal commentators) and presume that other courts looking at 
the contracts of other virtual words will be more likely to find them enforceable.”. 
29   See generally AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011). 
30   Discover Bank v Superior Ct., 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005). 
2015 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 4:1 
298 
of California courts favoring consumers’ decision to opt for class 
actions, and the policy of the FAA favoring arbitration. The Supreme 
Court held that the FAA preempts the state court class action rule, so 
the dispute must be submitted to arbitration and shall not proceed as 
a class action.31 In his dissent, Justice Breyer insisted that, due to the 
small amount of the individual claim ($30.22), a denial of class actions 
practically means a denial of justice. This argument was rejected by the 
majority, who reasoned that class actions in arbitration proceedings are 
not useful and manageable remedies. As Justice Scalia said: “Requiring 
the availability of classwide arbitration interferes with fundamental 
attributes of arbitration and thus creates a scheme inconsistent with 
the FAA.” 
American Express Co. v. Italian Colors, decided by the Supreme 
Court on June 20, 2013, concerned an arbitration clause that 
disallowed anti-trust claims to be brought by a class.32 Again, the 
Court’s majority reiterated its liberal view favoring arbitration as a 
“matter of contract,” even against mandatory provisions of federal 
anti-trust laws. Justice Kagan’s dissent, in my opinion, correctly insists 
on the “effective vindication” rule established in prior case law, which 
limits arbitration clauses where they effectively prevent enforcement 
of “congressionally created rights.”33 This is accomplished by 
arbitration clauses that de facto prevent compensation of anti-trust 
claims and undermine the deterrent effect of compensation for anti-
trust infringements. 
The case law of the Supreme Court limits effective consumer 
protection as provided by federal (anti-trust) and state law (the 
California Discover Bank rule34). The Court also seems to contradict 
the plain meaning of section 2 of the FAA, which reads: 
[a] written provision in any . . . contract evidencing a 
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration 
a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or 
transaction, . . . shall be valid, irrevocable and 
                                                 
31   Id. at 1750-51. 
32   Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2308 (2013).  
33   Id. at 2313. 
34   Discover Bank, 113 P.3d 1100. 
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enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or 
equity for the revocation of any contract.35 
Therefore, the FAA would seem to allow limits to arbitration 
in consumer (and commercial) matters based on defenses such as 
fraud, duress, unconscionability, and mandatory (federal and/or state) 
law, which was in part developed by state courts but had been regarded 
with hostility by the Supreme Court majority. This practice creates, as 
the dissent in American Express pointed out, areas of de facto 
immunity from law: “[the FAA] reflects a federal policy favoring actual 
arbitration—that is, arbitration as a streamlined ‘method of revolving 
disputes,’ not as a foolproof way of killing off valid claims.”36 However, 
the Supreme Court’s message in American Express is unequivocal: 
courts are required to enforce arbitration agreements, including class 
action waivers, in accordance with their terms. 
Legal practitioners and scholars have criticized the Supreme 
Court’s liberal view on arbitration as an “excessive use” of arbitration 
clauses in consumer contracts.37 The disadvantages of excessive use of 
arbitration for consumers seem to outweigh the advantages of 
arbitration for service and goods providers, namely: 
 no possibility of a rational decision for or against 
arbitration before the dispute arises; 
                                                 
35   FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2014). 
36   Am. Express Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2315. 
37   See WEIHE, supra note 8, at 43-45; Richard M. Alderman, The Future of 
Consumer Law in the United States – Hello Arbitration, Bye-Bye Courts, So-Long Consumer 
Protection (Univ. Hous. L. Ctr., Working Paper No. 2008-A-09, 2007); Richard M. 
Alderman, Consumer Arbitration: The Destruction of the Common Law, 2 J. AM. ARB. 1 
(2003); Gerhard Wagner, Dispute Resolution as a Product: Competition between Civil Justice 
Systems, in REGULATORY COMPETITION IN CONTRACT LAW AND DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION 347, 394 (Horst Eidenmüller ed. 2013). With regard to then existing 
smalls claims procedures, see NORBERT REICH, STAATLICHE REGULIERUNG 
ZWISCHEN MARKTVERSAGEN UND POLITIKVERSAGEN 129 (1988). See also GRALF-
PETER CALLIESS, GRENZÜBERSCHREITENDE VERBRAUCHERVERTRÄGE 308-14 
(2006) (providing a critical view (without citing the harsh case law of the U.S. 
Supreme Court)). 
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 the trader can always amend the arbitration clause 
unilaterally; 
 no legal representation, no class actions, limited 
possibilities for bringing evidence, no legal dispute 
insurance; 
 arbitrators cannot be formally obliged to apply 
state consumer protection legislation;38 
 only limited access to documents (which are 
usually in the hand of the trader), no pre-trial 
discovery procedure; 
 no jury, only limited appeal possibilities; 
 frequently excessive costs, compared with existing 
small claims procedures; and 
 the place of arbitration may be geographically 
distant from residence of consumer. 
II. A MIXED APPROACH: ADR IN CANADA 
In terms of Canadian law on arbitration, a lively discussion 
existed among scholars in Canada on whether pre-contractual 
arbitration clauses could be enforced in consumer contracts, and 
whether they could eventually be used to avoid class actions similar to 
the United States.39 
                                                 
38   The American Arbitration Association (AAA) Consumer Due Process 
Protocol contains such an obligation, while the rules of the ICC (International 
Chamber of Commerce) are silent on that point. CALLIESS, supra note 39, at 359. 
39   See Shelley McGill, The Conflict between Consumer Class Actions and 
Contractual Arbitration Clauses, 43 CAN. BUS. L.J. 359 (2006); Jonnette Watson 
Hamilton, Pre-Dispute Consumer Arbitration Clauses: Denying Access to Justice?, 51 MCGILL 
L.J. 693 (2006). But see David T. Neave & Jennifer M. Spencer, Class Proceedings: The 
New Way to Trump Mandatory Arbitration Clauses?, 63 THE ADVOCATE 495 (2005) 
(favoring of the use of arbitration clauses in consumer contracts, according to the 
U.S. model which is said to strike the “right balance”). 
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In Dell Computer Corp. v. Union des Consommateurs, the Canadian 
Supreme Court held that arbitration clauses in an electronic consumer 
contract for the purchase of computers from a U.S. company by a 
citizen of Quebec were also enforceable40 against a class action brought 
by the Quebec “Union des consommateurs”. The Court reasoned that 
the consumer had access to the arbitration clause via a hyperlink on 
the website of the company, and that he agreed to be bound by the 
clause when he clicked on the link.41 The Court also reasoned that “the 
clause was no more difficult for the consumer to access than would 
have been the case had he or she been given a paper copy of the entire 
contract on which the terms and conditions of sale appeared on the 
back of the first page.”42 Further, the Court stated that any challenge 
to the arbitration agreement must be resolved first by the arbitrator 
who has Kompetenz-Kompetenz under international agreements and 
Canadian law.43 This doctrine is a traditional doctrine in (commercial) 
arbitration under which the arbitrator, and not a court of law, has the 
“competence-competence,” or the final say over the legality of 
arbitration proceedings, including the choice of the arbitrator.44  
The dissenting judges disagreed with the majority, arguing that 
the arbitration and jurisdiction clauses, which are, according the 
Quebec law, forbidden, are similar if they refer the consumer case to a 
non-Quebec authority. This is the case with the reference to the U.S. 
arbitrator as foreseen in the contract clause; the arbitration clause is 
therefore unenforceable. 
A more recent case decided by the Canadian Supreme Court, 
Seidel v. TELUS, seems to take a more critical view on arbitration 
clauses in consumer contracts aimed at excluding class action 
proceedings against the supplier of cellular telephone services.45 In 
                                                 
40   Dell Computer Corp. v. Union des Consommateurs, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 
801 (Can.). 
41   Id. 
42   Id. 
43   Id. 
    44 Case C-190/89, Marc Rich & Co. AG v. Societa Italiana Impianti PA, 
1991 E.C.R. I-3855 (expressly finding that the arbitrator had this authority); see 
Norbert Reich, Zur Wirksamkeit von Schiedsklauseln in Grenzüberschreitenden 
Börsentermingeschäften, 12 Z. Eur. Pro. 981 (1996). 
45  Seidel v. TELUS Commc'ns Inc., [2011] 1 S.C.R. 531 (Can.); Shelley 
McGill, Consumer Arbitration After Seidel v. TELUS, 51(2) CAN. BUS. L.J. 187 (2011). 
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Seidel, the contract contained a clause with the supplier referring 
disputes to “private and confidential arbitration,” as well as a waiver 
by the consumer of the right to pursue a class action claim.46 Among 
the questions before the Supreme Court were whether this clause was 
unconscionable under the British Columbia Business Practices and 
Consumer Protection Act (BPCPA), and whether the waiver was in 
conformity with section 3 of the BPCPA, which provides: “Any waiver 
or release by a person of the person’s rights, benefits or protections 
under this Act is void except to the extent that the waiver or release is 
expressly permitted by this Act.”47 
One of the questions before the Court was whether this 
prohibition had to be enforced by the arbitrator under the Canadian 
(and U.S.) Kompetenz-Kompetenz rule, or whether it could also be 
enforced by a court of law. The majority relied on section 172 of the 
BPCPA, which allows any person without “a special interest” to bring 
a class action for injunctive and declaratory relief.48 The plaintiff in 
Seidel relied on this provision for her action against TELUS to avoid 
the arbitration clause and class action waiver. In interpreting the scope 
of section 172, the majority—against a strong dissenting opinion 
defending traditional principles of arbitration law—relied on the 
objective of the BPCPA, which is to confer consumer protection and 
enhance consumers’ access to justice.49 This objective implicitly limits 
the Kompetenz-Kompetenz principle at least with regard to declaratory and 
injunctive relief. Therefore, the Court held that the class action waiver 
was dependent on the (annulled) arbitration clause; it could not be 
separated from it and could not exist without a valid arbitration 
clause.50 The decision, however, made no reference to compensation 
or restitution where section 172 (3) is applicable only to a much more 
limited extent.  
                                                 
46   Id. ¶ 44. 
47  Business Practices and Consumer Protection Act, S.B.C. 2004, c. 2 
(Can.). 
48  Id. § 172. The BPCPA also seems to contain broad standing provisions 
not dependent on the violated rights.  
49   Seidel, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 531. 
50    Id. ¶ 46. 
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III. TO “PROPOSE” OR “IMPOSE” A SOLUTION: THE QUESTION OF 
E.U. LAW 
EU Dir. 2013/11 provides for a two-tier mechanism for the 
out-of-court settlement of consumer disputes, which are described in 
Art. 2(1): 
This Directive shall apply to procedures for the out-of-
court resolution of domestic and cross-border disputes 
concerning contractual obligations stemming from 
sales contracts and service contracts between a trader 
established in the Union and a consumer resident in 
the Union through the intervention of an ADR-entity 
which proposes or imposes a solution or brings the 
parties together with the aim of facilitating an amicable 
solution.51 
“Propose” and “impose” are nearly identical terms, so they 
likely went nearly unnoticed in the (scant) debate of the Commission 
proposal of 20 November 2011 on the Directive,52 which was adopted 
in the record time of little more than one and a half years. Both 
elements of the proposal and the final Directive were based on the 
internal market provision of Article 11453 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The question of the 
correct legal basis will be further discussed in Section XII. 
However, to “propose” a solution is quite different than to 
“impose” a solution. “Proposing” a solution is in line with the earlier 
initiatives by the Commission, which were based on 
Recommendations 98/257/EC of 30 March 1998 and 2001/310/EC 
                                                 
51    Directive 2013/11, art. 2(1) (emphasis added). 
52  Commission Proposal for a Directive on Alternative Dispute 
Resolution for Consumer Disputes, COM (2011) 793 final (Nov. 20, 2011). 
53   Art. 114 (1) TFEU gives the European Union jurisdiction “to adopt 
measures for the approximation of the provisions laid down by law, regulation or 
administrative action in Member States which have as their object the establishment 
or functioning of the internal market.” Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union art. 114 (1), May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47 
[hereinafter TFEU]. 
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of 4 April 2001.54 These Recommendations were not applicable to 
entities who tried to “impose” a solution on consumers, e.g., binding 
consumer arbitration. In contrast, arbitration, including consumer 
arbitration, was expressly excluded from the scope of E.U. instruments 
concerning jurisdiction (Art. 1(2)(d) Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 and 
now Art. 1(2)(d) of Regulation (EU) No. 1215/2012.55 and applicable 
law (Art. 1(2)(e) of the Rome I-Regulation (EU) No. 593/2008).56 
These Regulations, however, were not based on the internal market 
competence of the E.U., but on its provisions of judicial cooperation 
in civil matters, which are limited to cross-border disputes under now 
Art. 81(2) of the TFEU.57 The same is true of the Regulation (EC) No. 
861/2007 of 11 July 2007 on a European Small Claims Procedure.58 
Why this sudden extension of ADR procedures to consumer 
arbitration? How does this extension relate to the seemingly 
contradictory statement in Article 2(4) of Directive 2013/11, which 
reads: “This Directive acknowledges the competence of Member 
States to determine whether ADR entities established on their 
territories are to have power to impose a solution.”?59 An additional 
reservation is made in Recital (20) whereby an “out-of-court procedure 
which is created on an ad hoc basis for a single dispute between a 
consumer and a trader should not be considered as an ADR 
procedure.”60 This excludes the commercial practice of setting up 
                                                 
54   Commission Recommendation 98/257, of 30 March 1998 on the 
Principles Applicable to the Bodies Responsible for Out-of-Court Settlement of 
Consumer Disputes 1998 O.J. (L 115) 31; Reich, supra note 1, ¶ 8.19, 8.22. 
55   Commission Regulation 1215/2012, of the European Parliament and 
the Council of 12 December 2012 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 2012 O.J. (L 351) 1; 
Council Regulation 44/2001, of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 2001 
O.J. (L 12) 1 (EC).  
56   Regulation 593/2008, of the European Parliament and the Council of 
17 June 2008 on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (“Rome I”), 2008 
O.J. (L 176) 6. 
57   TFEU art. 81(2). 
58   Council Regulation 861/2007, of 11 July 2007 on a European Small 
Claims Procedure, 2007 O.J. (L 199) 1. 
59   Directive 2013/11, art. 2(4).  
60   Id. at Preamble Directive 20. 
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special arbitration panels for more complex individual disputes as an 
option for consumer arbitration falling under Directive 2013/11. 
IV. A FIRST ATTEMPT TO SOLVE THE CONUNDRUM ON 
CONSUMER ARBITRATION CREATED BY DIRECTIVE 2013/11 
Dir. 2013/11 shows a certain contradiction concerning 
consumer arbitration: Member States are free to set it up, to continue 
existing instruments, or to completely abstain from doing so. If, 
however, Member States take an active view toward consumer 
arbitration, they are bound by the requirements of Directive 2013/11 
in general, and Articles 10 and 11 in particular, which will be discussed 
in greater detail later in Sections VII and IX. 
Article 10 and 11 only apply in cases where the plaintiff 
consumer is bound by an arbitration agreement, not if the trader 
himself initiates a claim in arbitration.61 According to Article 2(1) and 
(2)(c) it is limited to actions in contract (with the exception of non-
economic services of general interest), and excludes actions in tort and 
restitution with some doubts concerning borderline cases not to be 
discussed here. Injunctions against illegal behavior of traders sought 
by consumer associations are also excluded; they come under other 
E.U. law instruments, in particular Directive 2009/22/EU on 
injunctions.62 
The principles contained in Directive 2013/11 are obviously 
minimum requirements under Art. 2(3). Within these limits, Member 
States are free to regulate consumer arbitration, e.g., regarding 
competence, costs, choice of arbitrators, etc. This is part of Member 
States’ so-called “procedural autonomy,” which has been recognized 
by the CJEU as a general principle of E.U. law.63 On the other hand, 
                                                 
61   If the trader initiates a claim in arbitration, Directive 2013/11 is not 
applicable.   See Directive 2013/11, art. 2(2)(g). 
62   Directive 2009/22, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
23 April 2009 on Injunctions for the Protection of Consumers’ Interests (recast), 
2009 O.J. (L 110) 30. 
63   For an overview see REICH, supra note 5, ¶ 4.4; Norbert Reich, Hans-
W. Micklitz, Peter Rott and Klaus Tonner, Negotiation and Adjudication – Class Actions 
and Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Contracts, in EUROPEAN CONSUMER LAW ¶ 8.3 (2d 
ed. 2014). 
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Member States must respect the principles of effectiveness and 
equivalence, which are now part of Article 47 of the E.U. Charter of 
Fundamental Rights—a subject matter to be discussed in Section XI.  
V. THE LIMITS OF CONSUMER ARBITRATION: CLARO AND 
ASTURCOM 
In Claro,64 the CJEU goes quite far in the degree to which the 
national court of an E.U. Member State must engage in investigations 
on its own motion in arbitration proceedings.65 When the consumer 
has agreed to an arbitration clause—the unfairness of which must be 
determined by national law, as could be seen from clause 1(q) of the 
Annex of the Unfair Terms Directive 93/1366—the consumer still 
cannot be drawn into arbitration against his will if this clause may be 
regarded as unfair. Annex 1 reads:  
Terms that may be regarded as unfair . . . 
(q) excluding or hindering the consumer’s right to take 
legal action or exercise any other legal remedy, 
particularly by requiring the consumer to take disputes 
exclusively to arbitration not covered by legal 
provisions, unduly restricting the evidence available to 
him or imposing on him a burden of proof which, 
according to the applicable law, should lie with another 
party to the contract.67 
The unfairness may also be invoked against traditional principle of the 
law of arbitration on the Kompetenz-Kompetenz of the arbitrator and not 
the national court having jurisdiction to determine the unfairness. 
                                                 
64   Case C-168/05, E.M.M. Claro v. Centro Movil Milenium, 2006 E.C.R. 
I-10421.  
65   Hans-W. Micklitz & Norbert Reich, The Court and the Sleeping Beauty – 
The Revival of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive (UCTD), 51 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 771 
(2014). 
66   Council Directive 93/13, of 5 April 1993 on Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts, 1993 O.J. (L 095) 29 (EC). 
67   Id.  
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In Asturcom, the CJEU quite adroitly used the principle of 
“equivalence” to guarantee a sort of “last resort” protection to the 
consumer: if national law allows the reopening of arbitration 
proceedings on the basis of public policy, the judge must consider the 
defenses available under E.U. consumer protection provisions which 
take the place of public policy.68 Advocate General Trstenjak, who is 
in line with the Hungarian and the Spanish Governments69 as well as 
the European Commission,70 went even further in arguing that 
effective consumer protection requires the removal of res judicata in 
execution proceedings.71 
The facts in Claro and Asturcom are somewhat different, as the 
consumer was drawn into arbitration proceedings by the trader that 
contained arbitration clauses. Directive 2013/11 expressly excludes 
this situation where the trader, not the consumer, takes his case to an 
entity that administers ADR. However, it seems that the principles 
developed in Claro and Asturcom can be generalized, especially 
concerning their challenges to the Kompetenz-Kompetenz doctrine.  
Such a situation could arise under Directive 2013/11 where the 
consumer takes his complaint to a court of law, and the trader invokes 
the arbitration clause as a defense72 to compel arbitration, provided the 
arbitration clause meets the requirements of Article 10 after the 
implementation of the Directive. The situation in Asturcom where a 
final arbitration award against a consumer can be challenged only 
under the limited requirements of the public policy (ordre public) 
                                                 
68   Case C-40/08, Asturcom Telecommunicaciones v. Rodrígues Noguera, 
2009 E.C.R. I-9579. The extension of the public policy concept to “mere” mandatory 
law has remained controversial in doctrine. See the skeptical remarks by Vanessa 
Mak, Harmonisation through “Directive Related” Case Law: the Role of the ECJ in the 
Development of European Consumer Law 136-37 (Tilburg Inst. of Comparative & 
Transnational Law, Working Paper No. 2008/8, 2008); Mak, supra note 4, at 446. See 
also BĚLOHLÁVEK, supra note 4, at 32 (insisting on the difference between “public 
policy” and “public interest”: “consumer protection is associated with public interest; 
it is not subject to public policy). This distinction between public interest and public 
policy seems artificial and cannot be maintained under E.U. law autonomous 
interpretation principles. 
69   See Hungarian and Spanish Gov’t. Br. in Asturcom (on file with author).  
70   See European Com. Br. in Asturcom (on file with author).  
71   Advocate Gen.  Trstenjak in Asturcom, supra note 4, at 58 et seq. 
72   “Schiedseinrede” in German. See Section XII, infra. 
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provision must be reshaped under the effectiveness test and not merely 
under the equivalence principle. This discussion illustrates that 
Directive 2013/11 does not address the real problems of consumer 
arbitration, and that the gaps left by E.U.-legislation must therefore be 
amended by recourse to general principles of E.U. law, namely the 
principle of effective legal protection.73 
VI. WHAT ABOUT CONSUMER PROTECTION UNDER THE 
BRUSSELS MECHANISM OF JURISDICTION? 
A consumer who wishes to have his claim against a trader 
located in another E.U. country arbitrated cannot rely on the 
jurisdiction of his home country, as would be the case under the 
Brussels regime. Directive 2013/11 does not contain rules on 
jurisdiction in cross-border conflicts, nor does it refer to the Brussels 
regime in a similar way as Art. 11 to the consumer protective 
provisions of Art. 6 of the Rome I-Regulation 593/2008 (see Section 
IX, infra). 
Art. 7(1)(a) only requires ADR-entities to “make publicly 
available on their websites . . . clear and easily understandable 
information on . . . their contact details, including postal address and 
e-mail address.”74 This provision—including the submission of claims 
online75—may be acceptable for optional complaint handling, but not 
for arbitration which may “impose solutions” to consumers. The 
impact of the risk to the consumer to lose his case is much more far-
reaching because of the binding nature of the (non-)award by the 
arbitrator. 
Article 15(1) lit c) of Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 (Article 
17(1) lit c) Regulation 1215/2012) provides that the consumer may sue 
the trader either at the trader’s place of domicile or at the business seat 
if “the contract has been concluded with a person who pursues 
commercial or professional activities in the Member State of the 
consumer’s domicile or, by any means, directs such activities to that 
                                                 
73   For further discussion of the principle of effective legal protection, see 
Section XI, infra. 
74   Council Directive 2013/11, art. 7(1)(a). 
75   Council Directive 2013/11, art. 5(2)(a). 
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Member State or several States including that Member State.”76 There 
has been intense debate concerning this provision due to the issues 
raised by e-commerce, since the provision may be interpreted in such 
a way that the mere accessibility of the website of a company situated 
in one Member State by a consumer domiciled in another Member 
State may give such consumer the right to sue the company in the 
consumer’s domicile—a result which makes marketing by e-commerce 
subject to different and divergent jurisdictions. Therefore, the CJEU 
in Pammer distinguished between the mere accessibility of a website, 
which does not qualify as “directing activities,” and a non-exclusive list 
of criteria for determining “directing activities” where such a 
qualification is possible and must be established by competent national 
courts.77 The trader may avoid being subject to multiple jurisdictions 
by making clear his intention to market his product or service only in 
certain countries to the exclusion of others, or by not making available 
his website in those excluded countries. 
Jurisdiction clauses are regulated by Article 17 of Regulation 
44/2001 resp. Article 19 of Regulation 1215/2012.78 The rationale 
behind this provision is that such clauses in consumer contracts cannot 
be enforced before the litigation has commenced. A consumer does 
not lose privileged access to courts under Articles 15 and 16 by the 
jurisdiction clause.79 This is in contrast to the general rule in Article 23 
(Article 25 of Regulation 1215/2012), which allows jurisdiction clauses 
to be enforced if entered into in writing or by electronic means.80 
However, Article 23 is not applicable to consumer arbitration. 
                                                 
76   Council Regulation 44/2001, of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and 
the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters 
art. 15(1)(c), 2000 O.J. (L 012) 1 (EC). 
77   Joined Cases C-585/08 and C-144/09, Peter Pammer et al. v. Reederei 
Karl Schlüter et al., 2010 E.C.R. I-12527; Eva-Maria Kieninger, Grenzenloser 
Verbraucherschutz?, in LIBER AMICORUM U. MAGNUS 449, 455 (2014) (interpreting 
“direct activities” as “activity directed at a certain objective” (“Zielgerichtete Tätigkeit”)). 
78   Council Regulation 44/2001, of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and 
the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 
art. 17, 2001 O.J. (L 012) 1 (EC). 
79    Id. art. 15-16. 
80  Id. art. 23; see also Case C-322/14, Jaouad El Majdoub v 
CarsOntheWeb.Deutschland GmbH, [2015] W.L.R.(D) 222.   
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The gap left by the—insufficient—provisions on consumer 
arbitration in Directive 2013/11 must be filled by reference to the 
general fairness standards as developed under Directive 93/13, which 
will be discussed in Section IX. In my opinion, no difference should 
be made whether the action is brought by the consumer or the trader, 
or whether the two are joined in a single case. 
VII. THE “SPECIFIC ACCEPTANCE” OF THE ARBITRATION 
AGREEMENT BY THE CONSUMER 
The most important provision for consumer protection in 
Directive 2013/11 follows the classical paradigm of the “informed EU 
consumer.”81 Article 10 explicitly requires specific acceptance by the 
consumer for arbitration clauses in consumer to business (C2B) 
disputes, which may be extended by Member States both horizontally 
to a business to consumer (B2C) conflict and vertically by imposing 
additional requirements on this specific acceptance. Article 10 reads: 
(1) Member States shall ensure that an agreement 
between a consumer and a trader to submit complaints 
to an ADR entity is not binding on the consumer if it 
was concluded before the dispute has materialised and 
if it has the effect of depriving the consumer of his 
right to bring an action before the courts for the 
settlement of the dispute. 
Member States shall ensure that in ADR procedures 
which aim at resolving a dispute by imposing a solution 
the solution imposed may be binding on the parties 
only if they were informed of its binding nature in 
advance and specifically accepted this. Specific 
acceptance by the trader is not required if national rules 
provide that solution are binding on traders.82 
                                                 
81   See STEPHEN WEATHERILL, EU CONSUMER LAW AND POLICY 92 (2d 
ed. 2013); HANS W. MICKLITZ ET AL., UNDERSTANDING EU CONSUMER LAW ¶ 1.35 
(2d ed. 2013). 
82   Directive 2013/11, art. 10. 
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It seems as though the intention of the E.U.-legislator was to 
exclude pre-dispute arbitration clauses, which are common in the 
U.S.83 The wording of Art. 10(1) refers to a “dispute” having 
“materialised.”84 Before that event, the clause would not be binding on 
the consumer. Can the same strict interpretation of this concept of 
non-binding be applied similar to Article 6 of the Unfair Terms in 
Consumer Contracts Directive (UTCC) 93/13 where, according to 
case law of the CJEU, the court must ex officio disapply the unfair 
contract term?85 This will have to be decided by the CJEU, but such 
analogy seems reasonable given the similarity of the formulation in 
Article 6 of the UTCC and Directive 2013/11. 
Under a strict literal construction of Article 10, there is no 
“dispute” to be resolved before the conclusion of a contract. This is 
only the case once consumer complaints arise during contract 
execution. Consumer arbitration clauses therefore only operate once a 
specific dispute has arisen between the trader and the consumer. Both 
parties may have good reasons to take their conflict to arbitration, e.g., 
because of the speed or lower costs of getting a (binding) decision, but 
the consumer should not be forced to do so before a “dispute has 
materialised.”86 
What does “specific acceptance” mean? Recital 4387 does not 
provide an answer. A similar provision, however, is contained in 
Article 8(2) of the Draft Regulation of a Common European Sales Law 
(CESL), which requires an “explicit statement which is separate from 
the statement indicating the agreement to conclude a contract.”88 This 
statement may be concluded in electronic form, but the trader must 
notify the consumer of its binding nature on a durable medium, e.g., a 
                                                 
83   According to BĚLOHLÁVEK, supra note 4, at 385, this was not the case 
with EU law before Dir. 2013/11. 
84   Directive 2013/11, art. 10(1). 
85   See Micklitz & Reich, supra note 66 at 780.  
86   Directive 2013/11, art. 10(1). 
87   Recital 43 of the Preamble to Directive 2013/11.  
88   Comission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and 
mof the Council on a Common European Sales Law, COM (2011) 635 final, art. 8(2), 
(Oct. 22, 2011); Hans-W. Micklitz & Norbert Reich, The Commission Proposal for a 
Regulation on a Common European Sales Law (CESL) – Too Broad or not Broad Enough?  29 
(LAW, EUI Working Papers No. 4, 2012). 
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mere hyperlink would not be enough.89 On the other hand, the 
statement must be clearly separated from the contract terms, even if it 
is contained in a “term not . . . individually negotiated” according to 
Article 3(2) of Directive 93/13.90 A mere button solution, or so called 
“click-wrap clauses,”91 which are popular in U.S. licensing agreements, 
are not acceptable in E.U. law, which in Article 10(2) of Directive 
2013/11 has set a minimum standard not to be undermined by 
Member States’ law. 
“Specific acceptance” has imposed an E.U. standard, subject 
to CJEU’s interpretation. However, under Guy Denuit, an arbitration 
panel or ADR-entity authorized to “impose” solutions cannot make 
reference to the CJEU under Article 267 of the TFEU.92 This 
paradoxical result warrants a critical assessment of the traditional rule 
of (commercial) arbitration that the arbitrator, not the court, has 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz concerning the validity of the arbitration 
agreement, at least in consumer matters, to be scrutinized under 
fundamental rights aspects later discussed in Section XII. 
Since the requirements for “specific acceptance” in Article 3(2) 
of Directive 2013/11 are minimal, Member States can increase these 
requirements, e.g., by requiring written form or signature requirements, 
or can limit the scope of arbitration clauses, e.g., by prohibiting them 
for certain risky financial transactions93 or imposing a financial cap on 
                                                 
89   Case C-49/11, Content Services Ltd. v. Bundesarbeitskammer, 2011 
EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 660 (Feb. 3, 2011). 
90   Council Directive 93/13, of 5 April 1993 on Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts, art. 3(2) 1993 O.J. (L 095) 29 (EC). 
91   Click-wrap clauses are defined as “another form of creating an 
electronic agreement, except that the license is included on the computer screen 
before installation rather than on the box. By clicking on a button that says “I agree” 
or “I accept,” the licensee agrees to the terms of use of the contract. An important 
difference between click-wrap agreements and shrink-wrap agreements is the fact 
that the user actually has an opportunity to read the contract before using or installing 
the program.” See Reich, A ‘Trojan Horse’ in the access to Justice? – Party Autonomy and 
cOnusmer Arbitration in Conflict in the ADR-Directive 2013/11/EU? supra note 1, and 
now Case C-322/14 Jaoud El Majdoub v CarsOntheWeb.Deutschland GmbH, 
[2015] W.L.R.(D) 222.. 
92   Case C-125/04, Guy Denuit et al v. Transorient voyages et Culture SA 
2005 E.C.R. I-925. 
93   This was done in Germany. See the discussion infra Section XII. 
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their use.94 Member States can also introduce rules on territorial or 
local jurisdiction, which are not precluded by the Brussels regime not 
applicable to arbitration. 
VIII. E.U. STANDARDS BEYOND “SPECIFIC ACCEPTANCE” 
The above-mentioned Claro and Asturcom cases did not 
concern the validity of the arbitration agreement, but left this issue to 
applicable Member States. This will change once Directive 2013/11 is 
implemented by Member States into their national law, which should 
occur by July 9, 2015. Can E.U. unfair terms legislation be applied 
beyond the mere information model95 of Directive 2013/11? Would a 
national court be required to control ex officio under the unfairness test 
arbitration clauses, which impose substantial inconveniences on the 
consumer since arbitration is likely to result in excessive costs or will 
force the consumer to take the case to an ADR-entity far away from 
his residence (similar to the Bragg case)? It is well-known that E.U. law 
is strict in banning jurisdiction clauses which force the consumer to 
take his case to a court away from his habitual residence resulting in a 
de facto denial of access to justice.96 On the other hand, the trader may 
have an efficiency interest to concentrate arbitration proceedings at his 
place of business. 
Article 3(1)97 is not clear on how a possible relationship 
between Directive 2013/11 and Directive 93/13 can be reconciled. 
The provision is only concerned with “conflicts,” not with additional 
requirements imposed by national law under the minimum protection 
clause,98 even if based on CJEU practice obliging Member States’ 
courts to control ex officio the fairness of pre-formulated contract terms. 
If the “specific acceptance” is contained in such a pre-formulated (yet 
separate) term, it is therefore subject to the ex officio control doctrine of 
the CJEU. Much will depend on the circumstances of the arbitration 
                                                 
94   This was done by the U.K. See the discussion infra Section XV. 
95   See Reich et al, supra note 65, ¶ 1.11.  
96  See Case C-137/08, VB Pénzügyi Lízing Zrt. V. Ferenc Schneider 2010 
E.C.R. I-847; Wulf-Henning Roth, Case 137/08 VB Pénzügyi Lizing Zrt v Ferenc 
Schneider,7 Eur. Rev. Contract L. 425 (2011); Micklitz & Reich, supra note 66, at 789. 
97   See Directive 2013/11.  
98  Council Directive 93/13, of 5 April 1993 on Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts, art. 8 1993 O.J. (L 095) 29 (EC).  
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agreement. The main issue will always be whether the agreement makes 
the enforcement of consumer rights easier and less burdensome, which 
is the very objective of Directive 2013/11 under Article 1. In other 
words, the issue is whether such agreement puts additional constraints 
on the consumer’s enforcement of his rights under E.U. and national 
law that contradict the fairness criteria of Article 3 of Directive 93/13. 
It cannot be presumed that Article 3(1) Directive 2013/11 intended to 
preclude the unfairness test as a general standard of E.U. civil law. 
An open question remains as to how cross-border arbitration 
clauses can be controlled under the unfairness concept. As a general 
rule, arbitration is exempted from the applicability of Regulation 
44/2001, Article 1(2) lit d). On the other hand, the effect of jurisdiction 
clauses in consumer contracts has been severely limited by the 
Regulation. Should these principles be applied per analogiam under the 
unfairness standard to arbitration clauses, which may have a similar 
effect on the consumer’s right to have his case heard in his home 
jurisdiction if the conditions of Article 17 of Regulation 44/2001(in 
the future: Article 19 Regulation 1215/2012) are met? There is indeed 
no reason to argue against such analogy because, for the consumer, it 
does not make any difference whether the denial of his home 
jurisdiction before litigation is effected through a jurisdiction or 
arbitration clause.99 The exemption of arbitration from the scope of 
application of the Brussels instruments is intended to privilege 
commercial arbitration, but not to deprive the consumer of his right 
to a defense and a fair hearing. This reasoning limits the use of 
arbitration clauses in cross-border contracting. 
IX. APPLICABLE LAW: (LIMITED) FREE CHOICE BY ARBITRATORS 
OR RESERVATION OF MANDATORY PROVISIONS? 
Under traditional arbitration law, in particular in commercial 
matters, the parties are free to determine the applicable law, including 
commercial usages or principles of equity. Article 7(1)(i) of the 
Directive 2013/11 put this problem under the heading of 
“transparency” for all ADR entities, including consumer arbitration: 
                                                 
99 Reich, More clarity after “Claro”?, supra note 1, at 45. 
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Member States shall ensure that ADR entities make 
publicly available on their websites, on a durable 
medium . . ., and by any other means they consider 
appropriate, clear and easily understandable 
information on . . . the types of rules the ADR entity 
may use as a basis for the dispute resolution (for 
example legal provisions, considerations of equity, 
codes of conduct).100 
In addition, Article 6(1)(a) provides that the arbitrator need not 
be a lawyer or a person trained in law, but should at least have a 
“general understanding of law.”101 These are minimum standards, 
which can be enhanced by Member State laws on consumer 
arbitration, e.g., by restricting the reference to equity or codes of 
conduct or by demanding that arbitrators have legal training. The 
application of mandatory provisions of consumer law is regulated by 
provisions on “legality” in Article 11. Article 11 concerns two 
situations: (a) purely internal situations where mandatory consumer 
law provisions must be applied, even if parties expressly opted out in 
the contract; and (b) cross-border disputes where the rules on 
applicable law in Regulation 593/2008102 are normally excluded for 
arbitration agreements. Article 11 (1)(a)-(b) provides: 
Member States shall ensure that in ADR procedures 
which aim at resolving the dispute by imposing a 
solution on the consumer: (a) in a situation where there 
is no conflict of laws, the solution imposed shall not 
result in the consumer being deprived of the protection 
afforded to him by the provisions that cannot be 
derogated from by agreement by virtue of the law of 
the Member State where the consumer and the trader 
are habitually resident, (b) in a situation involving 
conflict of laws, where the law applicable to the sales 
or service contract is determined in accordance with 
Article 6(1) and (2) of Regulation (EC) No 593/2008, 
the solution imposed by the ADR entity shall not result 
                                                 
100   Directive 2013/11, art. 7(1)(i). 
101   Id. art. 6(1)(a). 
102  Commission Regulation 593/2008, 2008 O.J. (L 177) 6 (providing 
regulations on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I)). 
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in the consumer being deprived of the protection 
afforded to him by the provisions that cannot be 
derogated from by agreement by virtue of the law of 
the Member State in which he is habitually resident.103 
This provision will be welcomed by E.U. lawyers if compared 
with the traditional arbitration principles contained in U.S. law where 
the arbitrator can be exempted from applying mandatory provisions, 
and where legality control is only possible in final recognition 
proceedings under a narrow ordre public and related concepts.104 
Although the CJEU has tried to extend this concept to mandatory E.U. 
law both in commercial105 and consumer106 disputes, case law has 
remained unsettled and may not cover the entire scope of mandatory 
E.U. consumer law. It also comes late after the entire arbitration 
proceedings have been terminated, and it requires additional activity 
(and costs!) by the consumer. 
In my opinion, the legality requirement of consumer 
arbitration can only be fulfilled if Member States grant a remedy to the 
consumer to challenge an incorrect application of mandatory 
provisions by the arbitrator. The following situations may arise: 
 The consumer (or a group of consumers) brings a claim 
against the trader before a court of law, but the trader 
falsely invokes the arbitration agreement (the so-called 
Schiedseinrede). 
 The claim of the consumer is rejected (or reduced) by the 
arbitrator based on a false application of mandatory 
consumer law against Article 11 of Directive 2013/11; the 
consumer wants to challenge this rejection before a court 
of law, which may be impossible under existing arbitration 
legislation. 
                                                 
103   Citation to the quoted provision. 
104   See discussion of U.S. law supra Section I. 
105   See Case C-126/97, Eco Swiss China Time Ltd. v. Benetton Int’l N.V., 
1999 E.C.R. I-3055.  
106   See Case C-40/08, Asturcom Telecomm. v. Rodrígues Noguera, 2009 
E.C.R. I-9579.  
2015 Reich 4:1 
317 
In practice, the most frequent situation is concerned with the 
trader—particularly in a long-term contract—using the arbitration 
mechanism to adjudicate his claims, as in Claro and Asturcom. These 
situations, however, are not covered by Directive 2013/11. 
A fundamental rights analysis will help to resolve these 
situations to avoid the fact that arbitration clauses are sometimes 
abused, as in the U.S., by traders to restrict consumers’ access to class 
claims for their individual claims. Section XI will provide a further 
discussion of the fundamental rights analysis. 
X. “SOFT” LEGAL PROTECTION 
Article 8 of Directive 2013/11 also contains some protective 
provisions. However, Article 8 does not have the force of law, and 
instead provides standards for good ADR practice subject to the 
monitoring and reporting requirements in Article 20: 
the ADR procedure is free of charge or available at a 
nominal fee for consumers, lit (c); and 
the outcome of the ADR procedure is made available 
within a period of ninety calendar days from the date 
of which the ADR entity received the complete 
complaint file. In the case of highly complex disputes, 
the ADR entity in charge may, at its own discretion, 
extend the ninety calendar day time period. The parties 
shall be informed of any extension of that period and 
of the expected length of time that will be needed for 
the conclusion of the dispute.107 
These standards are standards flexible formulations applicable 
to consumer arbitration. Member States have discretion as to whether 
and how they implement them. Article 20 contains basic rules for 
sound ADR systems as an alternative to going to court and provide for 
inexpensive and quick adjudication. If practice in one Member State 
shows that this objective cannot be obtained by the existing consumer 
arbitration mechanism, it would be unfair to force the consumer to 
                                                 
107  Directive 2013/11, art. 20. 
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refer his claims to such arbitration even if the standards of “specific 
acceptance” under Article 10(2) of Directive 2013/11 are met. Of 
course, the requirements in Article 20 can be used as recommendations 
on how to interpret Member State law implementing E.U. law under 
the Grimaldi doctrine.108 
XI. THE CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION: DIRECTIVE 2013/11 
ARTICLE 47 CHARTER 
The constitutional dimension of ADR proceedings has been 
expressly included in Recital 61 of Directive 2013/11, which reads: 
“[t]his Directive respects fundamental rights and observes the 
principles recognised in particular by the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union and specifically Articles 7, 8, 38 and 47 
thereof.” 
Recital 45 refers to Article 47 concerning access to courts of 
law—a principle reiterated in Article 12(1) of Directive 2013/11.109 
This conforms to Alassini, which concerns a requirement in Italian law 
for consumer complaints against telecommunication operators to first 
make use of ADR/ODR proceedings, as foreseen in Directive 
2002/22,110 before going to court.111 The Court discussed this 
requirement, considering both the equivalence and the effectiveness 
principle, but did not find a violation of either principle. At the same 
time, the CJEU insisted on the consumer’s right to take his case to 
court: 
Nor do the principles of equivalence and effectiveness or the 
principle of effective judicial protection preclude national legislation 
which imposes, in respect of such disputes, prior implementation of 
an out-of-court settlement procedure, provided that that procedure 
does not result in a decision which is binding on the parties, that it 
does not cause a substantial delay for the purposes of bringing legal 
                                                 
108  Case C-322/88, Grimaldi v. Fonds des Maladies Professionnelles, 1989 
E.C.R. I-4497. This case involves the indirect relevance of Commission 
recommendations in interpreting E.U. or national law.  
109   Id. at recital 45, art. 12(1). 
110  Directive 2002/22, Universal Service Directive, 2002 O.J. (L 108) 51 
(EC). 
111   Case C-317/08, Alassini v. Telecom Italia, 2009 E.C.R. I-2214. 
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proceedings, that it suspends the period for the time-barring of claims 
and that it does not give rise to costs – or gives rise to very low costs 
– for the parties, and only if electronic means is not the only means by 
which the settlement procedure may be accessed and interim measures 
are possible in exceptional cases where the urgency of the situation so 
requires.112 
Alassini concerned ADR proceedings, which could only 
“propose,” not “impose,” solutions on the consumer. The wording of 
the decision, however, certainly shows hostility against ADR 
proceedings resulting in unreviewable and binding decisions. This 
wording—even though not discussed in detail in the judgment itself—
is inconsistent with the traditional principles of arbitration under the 
New York Convention, namely that the arbitrator has the Kompetenz-
Kompetenz to decide whether he has adjudicatory authority over the 
case, and that an award can usually only be refused recognition on the 
very narrow ground of “public policy (ordre public),” excluding the non-
observance of mandatory rules of procedure or substantive consumer 
protection. 
Can these traditional principles of arbitration law be upheld 
under the rules of consumer arbitration as provided by Directive 
2013/11, particularly Articles 10 and 11? I do not think so. This 
directive is also concerned with a specific aspect of the 
constitutionalization of civil law, namely, the principle of effectiveness 
of Article 47 of the E.U. Charter, which provides: “[e]veryone whose 
rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated 
has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance 
with the conditions laid down in this Article.”113 
Article 19(1) of the TEU puts the responsibility for “providing 
remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the fields 
covered by Union law” on Member States through the status of their 
courts of law as “Union courts.”114 The agreement to arbitrate, as a 
private matter decided by parties, cannot waive the constitutional 
                                                 
112   Id. ¶ 67. 
113   Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 47, Dec. 
18, 2000, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1.  
114   Treaty on the European Union, Dec. 7, 2007, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 1 
[hereinafter TEU]. 
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requirements of effective legal protection by access to national courts 
of law. The remedies, which are provided indirectly by arbitration 
concerning the Kompetenz-Kompetenz of the arbitrator, do not suffice to 
fulfill these constitutional requirements of E.U. law. The consumer 
must always have the possibility to challenge a decision of the 
arbitrator even if he has in principle agreed to the arbitration 
proceedings by respecting Article 10(2) of Directive 2013/11 or an 
equivalent national provision. Agreement by “specific acceptance” 
does not mean a total preclusion of the right to effective legal 
protection, which the national judge must guarantee under the ex-officio 
doctrine. Under the “remedial function” of Article 47 of the E.U. 
Charter and Article 19(1)(2) of the TEU,115 Member States must 
establish remedies protecting the legitimate interests of the consumer 
that ensure that the mandatory requirements of consumer arbitration 
are met.116 The freedom of Member States to regulate consumer 
arbitration under Article 2(4) of Directive 2013/11 should be limited 
by the fundamental rights protected by E.U. law. Therefore, it is 
reasonable to conclude that: 
 The validity of an arbitration agreement both from a formal 
and a substantive view is ultimately a matter to be decided 
by courts, not the arbitrator. 
 In consumer arbitration, the Kompetenz-Kompetenz belongs to 
the competent court, not the arbitrator. 
 Decisions of the arbitrator to reject or limit a claim of the 
consumer under Directive 2013/11 can be challenged 
before courts of law, in particular in case of breach or non-
observance of mandatory provisions. 
 The national judge hearing a case involving consumer 
arbitration must ex officio apply the mandatory provisions of 
E.U. and national law, even if not raised by the consumer. 
                                                 
115   See REICH, supra note 5, at 4-10. 
116   Id. (this seems to be recognized by the Court in Claro and Asturcom, 
even though not based on Article 47 of the E.U. Charter or Article 19 of the TEU, 
which were not in force at the time of decisions, but rather the traditional principles 
of effectiveness and equivalence). 
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 The scope of Article 47 of the E.U. Charter and Article 
19(1)(2) of the TEU is not limited to arbitration under 
Directive 2013/11, but can be extended to any consumer 
arbitration, in particular in cases brought by the trader 
against the consumer before an arbitrator (B2C—the 
Claro/Asturcom situations). 
XII. IMPACT OF DIRECTIVE 2013/11 ON MEMBER STATE LAW ON 
CONSUMER ARBITRATION IN GERMANY 
The German law on arbitration clauses in consumer 
contracts117 begins with a “form model” of consumer protection.118 
Sections 1029 and 1031 of the Zivilprozessordnung (ZPO, Code on Civil 
Procedure), as amended in 1997, allow arbitration clauses if they have 
been documented sufficiently well. Arbitration agreements which 
involve consumers “must be contained in a document signed by the 
parties themselves.”119 The signature of an agent is not enough.120 The 
written form can be substituted by the electronic form according to 
Section 126a of the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB, Civil Code), as 
amended.121 The written or electronic document may not contain any 
other contractual clauses. Germany has not made any reservation 
under the New York Convention of 1958 to exclude consumer 
contracts. Therefore, the legal regime for arbitration in Germany is the 
                                                 
117   See generally CHRISTOPHER HODGES, IRIS BENÖHR & NAOMI 
CREUTZFELDT-BANDA, CONSUMER ADR IN EUROPE: CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEMS 73 
(2012) (explaining the German “arbitration” system, but is more concerned with 
conciliation and mediation (Schlichtung in German), not with binding arbitration as 
understood here); Norbert Reich, Consumer ADR in Europe: Civil Justice Systems, 50 
Common Mkt. L. Rev. 913 (2013) (reviewing CHRISTOPHER HODGES, IRIS BENÖHR, 
& NAOMI CREUTZFELDT-BANDA, CONSUMER ADR IN EUROPE: CIVIL JUSTICE 
SYSTEMS (2012)).  
118   WEIHE, supra note 8, at 155-58. 
119   ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE], Jan. 
30, 1877, REICHSGESETZBLATT [RGBL.] 83, as amended, § 1031(5) (Ger.) 
[hereinafter ZPO]. 
120   Id. 
121  BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], Aug. 18, 1896, 
REICHSGESETZBLATT [RGBL.] 195, as amended, § 126a (Ger.). 
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same whether or not a consumer is part of an arbitration agreement 
meeting the form requirements.122 
The provision in Section 1031(5) of the ZPO is similar to 
Article 10(2) of Directive 2013/11,123 although the latter does not 
require signature or an electronic equivalent. However, Article 2(3) of 
Directive 2013/11 allows Member States to impose more stringent 
provisions on consumer arbitration,124 including a requirement that the 
document should only contain clauses concerning the arbitration 
agreement as such. German law does not use the term “specific 
acceptance,” but it seems that this is exactly what is meant by the 
German legislature in an E.U.-conforming interpretation. It is obvious 
that the arbitration agreement must be separated from other contract 
clauses; however, there is no prior notification requirement which 
must be included in the arbitration document. 
Concerning the Kompetenz-Kompetenz of the arbitrator, German 
law contains a compromise solution somewhat different from 
Directive 2013/11. Under Section 1032(1) of the ZPO, the arbitration 
agreement precludes any action before a court of law (Schiedseinrede in 
German), unless it is “void, ineffective or inoperative” (nichtig, 
unwirksam oder undurchführbar).125 However, this “Schiedseinrede” must 
be expressly raised by the defendant before oral proceedings in court. 
This provision is not in line with the case law of the CJEU, which 
requires an ex officio intervention of the court who does not have to 
wait for an action of the consumer.126 
On the other hand, Section 37h of the WpHG 
(Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, law on securities transactions), as amended, 
restricts arbitration clauses concluded before litigation to persons 
acting in commerce (“Kaufleute”) and legal persons of public law, thus 
excluding consumer transactions in investment services from 
                                                 
122   Jürgen Samtleben, Zur Wirksamkeit von Schiedsklauseln bei 
grenzüberschreitenden Börsentermingeschäften, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR EUROPÄISCHES 
PRIVATRECHT [ZEUP] 974, 975 (1999) (Ger.). 
123   ZPO, § 1031(5).  
124   Directive 2013/11, art. 2(3). 
125   ZPO, ¶ 1032(1). 
126   REICH, supra note 5, ¶¶ 4, 16. 
2015 Reich 4:1 
323 
arbitration clauses.127 Its legislative rationale is controversial128 and 
beyond the scope of this paper. According to an earlier opinion of 
Samtleben,129 the WpHG’s international sphere of application is 
determined by the normal place of residence of the private investor. If 
the place of residence is Germany, the arbitration clause is not 
effective, and the consumer will be able to take his claim to the courts 
of his country of residence according to Articles 15 and 16 of 
Regulation 44/2001 (Article 17 and 18 of Regulation 1215/2012). The 
arbitration clause prohibition contained in Section 37h of the WpHG 
is consistent with the general power of Member States to regulate 
consumer arbitration in Article 2(4) of Directive 2013/11, including 
prohibiting it with regard to certain transactions (investment services). 
This prohibition is also enforceable against a foreign arbitration 
agreement, which need not be respected by the German judex a quo 
under the provision concerning the application of “overriding 
mandatory provisions” under Article 9 of Rome I-Reg.130 
This rather liberal and generous approach to arbitration clauses 
in consumer contracts (with the exception of investment services) 
taken by the ZPO was confirmed by the German Bundesgerichtshof 
(BGH) with regard to the admissibility arbitration clauses under the 
special legislation on unfair contract terms, now included in the 
                                                 
127   Wertpapierhandelsgesetz [WpHG] [Law on Securities Transactions], 
Sep. 9, 1998, REICHSGESETZBLATT [RGBL.] 1842, as amended, § 37h (Ger.). 
128   For different views on German legal literature, see Rolf Sethe, § 37h 
WpHG (Schiedsabreden), in WERTPAPIERHANDELSGESETZ (WPHG) ¶ 7, (Heinz-Dieter 
Assmann & Uwe H.Schneider eds., 6th ed. 2012) (examining “excessive investor 
protection”); Rainer Hausmann, Schiedsvereinbaraungen, in INTERNATIONALES 
VERTRAGSRECHT ¶ 3469 (Christoph Reithmann & Dieter Martiny eds., 7th Ed. 
2014); Jürgen Samtleben, Das Börsentermingeschäft ist tot – es lebe das Finanztermingeschäft?, 
15 Zeitschrift für Bank- und Börsenrecht  69, 76 (2003)  (taking a more neutral 
approach). Compare WEIHE, supra note 8, at 141 (arguing that § 37h WpHG expresses 
a general principle of consumer protection), with Klaus Peter Berger, 
Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit und Finanztermingeschäfte – Der “Schutz” der Anleger vor der 
Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit durch § 37h WpHG, 15 Zeitschrift für Bank- und Börsenrecht 77, 
85 (2003) (taking a more liberal approach). The author agrees with Weihe because of 
the particular risks of transactions for the consumer covered by this provision, which 
may not be adequately addressed by the arbitrator. 
129   WEIHE, supra note 8, at 77. 
130  See generally Case C-184/12, United Antwerp Martime Agencies 
(Unamar) NV v. Navigation Maritime Bulgare, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX Lexis 4306 
(Oct. 17, 2013) (interpreting Rome I-Reg). 
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BGB.131 According to the BGH, an arbitration clause cannot impose 
an unfair disadvantage on the consumer.132 The consumer is protected 
by the form requirement of Section 1031(5) of the ZPO, which should 
warn him against the risk of an arbitration clause.133 It is, in the opinion 
of the BGH, not necessary that the user of the arbitration clause shows 
a special interest in it. Unlike jurisdiction clauses, arbitration clauses in 
consumer contracts may be concluded before the dispute arises. The 
BGH also refers to Point 1(q) of the indicative list of the Annex of 
Directive 93/13,134 where arbitration clauses are only condemned if 
they concern disputes taken to arbitration “not covered by legal 
provisions;” the rules of the ZPO, in the opinion of the BGH, must 
be regarded as such provisions.135 The BGH also insists that the 
arbitration clause regulates access to arbitration in a fair and impartial 
manner.136 
Even if in the case before the BGH the arbitration clause may 
not have been unfair (the litigation concerned disputes involving losses 
out of a speculative investment scheme of about 125.000 euro), the 
judgment should not be generalized as allowing arbitration clauses in 
any type of consumer dispute if the mere form requirements of Section 
1031(5) of the ZPO are met. This is particularly true if the costs of 
arbitration are substantial in relation to the sum in litigation and 
amount to a de facto denial of justice. The same is true with regard to 
the choice of the arbitrator, which gives an unfair advantage to one 
party against the consumer.137 These questions will now have to be 
measured against the requirements set up in Articles 10 and 11 of 
Directive 2013/11 in the interpretation advanced in this paper (supra 
VII/VIII). The BGH may have to reconsider its liberal opinion 
towards arbitration clauses in future cases. 
                                                 
131   Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice], Jan. 10, 2005, 
NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSHRIFT [NJW] 1125, 2005 (Ger.); WEIHE, supra note 8, 
at 278. 
132   See id. 
133   WEIHE, supra note 8, at 187 (regarding existing German practices).  
134   Id. at 1127.  
135   Id. at 1127. 
136   Id. 
137   Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf (OLGDü) [Higher Regional Court of 
Düsseldorf] June 1, 1995, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSHRIFT [NJW] 400, 1996 
(Ger.). 
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XIII. THE SPANISH APPROACH 
As Claro shows, arbitration clauses in consumer contracts may 
be declared void by Member States according to the so-called 
indicative list,138 even though there is no formal obligation to do so.139 
This has been done in Spain. However, arbitration clauses in pre-
formulated consumer contracts are always possible where the dispute 
is referred to “arbitration bodies established by statutory provision in 
respect of a specific sector or circumstances.”140 Spanish Law has 
established a “Sistema Arbitral de Consumo” in Article 31 of the 
Consumer Protection Law of 1984, implemented by the Real Decreto 
636/1993, modified by Decreto 60/2003.141 It provides for arbitration 
panels (colegio arbitral) to be established by national and regional 
“Juntas Arbitrales de Consumo.”142 These panels are composed of a 
President (representing the competent administration), a consumer 
representative, and a business association representative. Hence, 
Spanish law prioritizes certain recognized consumer arbitration 
bodies143 to which the arbitrator “agreed to” by Ms. Claro in her 
dispute with a mobile telephone company did not belong. 
The Spanish system was modified by Real Decreto 231/2008, 
which defines the functions, composition, competences, and 
procedures of consumer arbitration boards.144 The use of the 
arbitration system is voluntary for the parties. First, an arbitration 
                                                 
138   Council Directive 93/13, of 5 April 1993 on Unfair Terms in 
Consumer Contracts, Annex 1 lit. q, 1993 O.J. (L 095) 29 (EC). 
139   See Case C-478/99, Comm’n v. Sweden 2002 E.C.R. I-4147 ¶ 20. 
140   See Case C-184/12, United Antwerp Martime Agencies (Unamar) NV 
v. Navigation Maritime Bulgare, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 4306 (Oct. 17, 
2013).   
141   See MANUEL-ANGEL LOPEZ SANCHEZ ET AL., SERVICIOS 
FINANCIEROS, PROTECCION DEL CONSUMIDOR Y SISTEMAS EXTRAJUDICIALES DE 
RESOLUCION DE CONFLICTOS IN ESPAÑA 119-170 (1995); see also WEIHE, supra note 
8, at 119; Cavier Favre-Bulle, Arbitrage et règlement alternatif des litiges (ADR): une autre 
justice pour les consommateurs?, in DROIT DE LA CONSOMMATION, LIBER AMICORUM 
BERND STAUDER 95, 113 (2006). 
142   LOPEZ-SANCHEZ, supra note 142, at 142-48. 
143   See Ewoud Hondius, Towards a European Small Claims Procedure?, in 
LIBER AMICORUM BERND STAUDER, 135 fn 36 (Luc Thévenoz & Norbert Reich, 
eds. 2006). 
144   HODGES ET AL., supra note 118, at 213. 
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request form must be filled out by a consumer, his lawyer, or a 
consumer association. This form requirement conforms to Article 
10(2) of Directive 2013/11. Usually the arbitration board correlates to 
the consumer’s residence. The use of arbitration is free of charge for 
both consumers and businesses, with the exception of discovery, and 
procedures usually do not take longer than six months. As with a court 
judgment, the parties can appeal an arbitration decision within two 
months. In addition, appeals can be brought based on decisions by the 
Junta Arbitral del Consumo to accept or reject requests for arbitration 
of consumer disputes. As an overall principle, Spanish law does not 
recognize the Kompetenz-Kompetenz of the arbitrator, and therefore is 
consistent with the approach advanced in this paper based on Article 
47 of the E.U. Charter and Article 19 of the TEU. 
The Spanish consumer arbitration system has created a second 
tier of legal protection for consumers and is similar to a court system, 
including the necessary guarantees of legality and effective legal 
protection. It could serve as a model for other E.U. countries wanting 
to implement the consumer arbitration provisions of Directive 
2013/11 in a way suggested in this paper. 
XIV. A REGULATED APPROACH: FRANCE 
According to French law, an arbitration clause (clause 
compromissoire) in a consumer contract is invalid and cannot be enforced 
against the consumer. This is derived from Article 2061 of the French 
Civil Code, modified by Law of 15.5.2001, whereby “la clause 
compromissoire est valable dans les contrats conclus à raison d’une 
activité professionelle.”145 However, in cross-border transactions 
Article 2061 is not applicable, so the French Cour de Cassation146 has 
taken a more liberal approach. French scholars criticize this approach 
as “paradoxale” because the consumer enjoys less protection in cross-
border relations even though such relations are more dangerous. 
French scholars also refer to legislation on unfair contract terms, 
                                                 
145   HENRI TEMPLE & JEAN CALAIS-AULOY, DROIT DE LA 
CONSOMMATION ¶ 497 (9th ed., 2015) (“the arbitration clause is valid in a contract 
concluded because of a professional activity”). 
146   Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., 
Jan. 5, 1999, Bull. Civ. I, no. 31 (Fr.). 
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namely to the above mentioned Point 1(q) of the indicative list of the 
Annex of Directive 93/13; this is interpreted as a blacklist, even though 
the French legislature formally did not go so far.147 This argument, 
however, was not considered by the ECJ in Claro.148 
It unclear whether and how French law will be modified in 
implementing Directive 2013/11. However, the prohibition of the 
arbitration clause in B2C contracts can be maintained according to 
Article 2(4) of Directive. 2013/11 since “[t]his Directive acknowledges 
the competence of Member States to determine whether ADR entities 
established on their territories are to have the power to impose a 
solution.”  
XV. A COMPROMISE: U.K. LAW 
U.K. law takes a nuanced approach to arbitration clauses in 
consumer contracts. The Arbitration Acts of 1996 permit only a 
limited right of appeal from an arbitrator’s decision to courts of law.149 
In particular, clauses binding consumers in advance to arbitration for 
sums less than £5,000 are not allowed.150 The original provision under 
the Consumer Arbitration Agreements Act of 1988 exempted “non 
domestic arbitration agreements” from the requirements of this rule; 
however, the Court of Appeal extended it to consumers from other 
E.C. countries to avoid a discrimination based on nationality.151 
Arbitration has been frequently included in Codes of Practice 
as a low cost dispute resolution scheme, but abuses of arbitration led 
to the 1996 Spanish arbitration law amendments, which imposed a cap 
on pre-formulated arbitration clauses. Therefore, ombudsmen 
                                                 
147   TEMPLE & CALAIS-AULOY, supra note 146, at 72. 
148   See generally Reich, More clarity after “Claro”?, supra note 1. 
149   GERAINT G. HOWELLS & STEPHEN WEATHERILL, CONSUMER 
PROTECTION LAW ¶ 14.7.1 (2d ed. 2005). 
150 Id. ¶ 13.9.5.2. (iv). 
151 Norbert Reich, Zur Wirksamkeit von Schiedsklauseln bei grenzüberschreitenden 
Börsentermingeschäften, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR EUROPÄISCHES PRIVATRECHT [ZEUP] 981, ¶ 
14.6 (1998) (Ger.). 
2015 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 4:1 
328 
schemes152 are preferred because they are binding only on businesses 
and not on consumers.153 
The Association of British Travel Agents (ABTA) has initiated 
a separate arbitration scheme,154 which is administered by CEDR-
solve.155 The arbitrator’s award is issued in writing and provides a 
summary of the facts, conclusions, and reasons for the decision. The 
arbitrator’s decision is legally binding on both parties and is 
enforceable directly through the courts. Any party can ask for a review 
of the arbitrator’s decision, on paying a non-reimbursable £ 350 review 
fee, although there are limited grounds on which this can be 
challenged.156 
XVI. STATE MONITORED ADR SYSTEMS WITHOUT BINDING 
ARBITRATION: SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES 
Most Scandinavian countries have taken a specific approach 
concerning the handling of consumer disputes, namely, by instituting 
state complaint boards in which business and consumer associations 
participate. This makes arbitration an out-of-court instrument of 
dispute settlement more or less superfluous. 
The institution of the Danish consumer complaint boards157 
may serve as a model. Article 8(3) of the Danish Lov om 
Forbrugerklagenoevnet of 1974/1988158 provides for a priority of 
proceedings before the complaint board—even if the matter is already 
in arbitration—if the consumer wants to take his complaint before the 
board. The consumer can take his complaint before the board at any 
                                                 
152   An ombudsman scheme is a voluntary ADR system set up by the 
industry and approved by the government.  
153   Howells & Weatherill, supra note 150, ¶ 14.6. 
154   See HODGES ET AL., supra note 118, at 328. 
155   Dispute Resolution Services, CEDR, 
http://www.cedr.com/solve/dispute-resolution-services/ (last visited Dec. 6, 2015).   
156   HODGES ET AL., supra note 118, at 331. 
157 Danish consumer complaint boards have been analyzed in detail by 
Jens M. Scherpe, Außergerichtliche Streitbeilegung, in VERBRAUCHERSACHEN (2002); the 
German translation of the law is at pages 285-289.  
158 Art. 8(3) Lov om Forbrugerklagenævnet (Lovebehendtgoerelse Nr. 282 
of 10.5.1988) (Den.). 
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time during the complaint proceedings; there is no time limit or other 
formal requirement. In this case, the arbitration proceedings will be 
staid until the board has handled the matter. This rule implies that 
arbitration clauses in consumer contracts are not void as such, but also 
do not preempt proceedings before the complaint board and thus 
avoid the limited remedies for the consumer against arbitration clauses 
in the above-mentioned “Einredesituation” under Article II(3) of the 
New York Convention of 1958 as a defense against an arbitration 
clause. 
A similar situation in Sweden concerning the Allmänna 
Reklamtionsnämnden (ARM) has been described in some detail in a study 
by this author on financial regulation in the E.U.159 As a result of the 
procedure, the ARM issues a written proposal for the settlement 
(beslut), which in most cases will be accepted by the parties. If the 
parties do not agree, they can take the case to court. 
The Scandinavian system is said to work well both in the 
interests of consumers and of business. It avoids lengthy court 
proceedings and reaches a high rate of successful settlements. 
XVII. A SEEMINGLY UNKNOWN EXPERIENCE: POLAND 
Poland has established—mostly before becoming member of 
the E.U. in 2004—a detailed arbitration system. Nevertheless, if we 
consider a recent paper of Polish scholar Kinga Flaga-Gieruszynska, 
“the awareness of [the arbitration system’s] existence still reaches very 
few consumers.”160 There is a general scheme that “imposes” solutions 
upon traders and consumers alike. This scheme, which is administered 
by the State Trade Inspection, which has general jurisdiction in all 
consumer matters except those which are specifically excluded and 
must be submitted to specialized institutions. These excluded 
consumer matters are: 
                                                 
159 INSTITUTIONELLE FINANZMARKTAUFSICHT UND 
VERBRAUCHERSCHUTZ (INSTITUTIONAL SUPERVISION OF FINANCIAL MARKETS 
AND CONSUMER PROTECTION) 165 (Keßler, Micklitz, Reich eds. 2010). 
160   Kinga Flaga-Gieruszynska, The Model of Consumer Arbitration Courts in 
Poland, INT. J. ON CONSUMER L.  & PRAC., 28, 39 (2013). 
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 Permanent arbitration courts with the President of the 
Office of Electronic Communications concerning claims 
against telecom and postal operators. 
 The Arbitration Court at the Insurance Ombudsman 
handling disputes concerning insurance contracts and 
occupational pension schemes. 
 Consumer Banking Arbitration at the Polish Banking 
Association (the Banking Arbitrator) whose decisions are 
binding on banks, but not on consumers. 
There is no obligation for consumers to take their disputes to 
arbitration, unless a binding agreement has been concluded. This is 
determined by the general provisions of the Polish Civil Code (Article 
385(1), which has implemented the E.U. Directive 93/13 on Unfair 
Terms in Consumer Contracts.161 As Flaga-Gieruszynska writes: 
Thus, the status of consumer arbitration courts is 
determined on the one hand by the decision making 
act of a public authority . . . which is a unique situation 
with regard to arbitration, and on the other hand—the 
act of will of the parties, which is the foundation of the 
creation of arbitration courts (the arbitration clause). 
Without the latter, it is impossible to speak of the 
existence of forms of dispute resolution of a voluntary 
nature.162 
CONCLUSIONS 
Arbitration clauses in consumer contracts have been subject to 
controversy in many jurisdictions. U.S. law has strongly favored 
arbitration clauses in consumer contracts. Even among law and 
economics scholars there is no disagreement that “indeed arbitration 
restricts access to lawsuits and recovery”. This is justified by law and 
economics scholarship because “it removes the disproportionate 
benefit (to the ‘sophisticated elite’) and thus eliminates a regressive 
                                                 
161   Id. at 30. 
162   Id. at 31. 
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cross-subsidy.”163 It remains however an open question whether this 
supposed redistributive effect suffices to impose binding arbitration 
clauses on consumers. In my opinion this is not the case because denial 
of individual access to justice cannot be justified be overall efficiency 
arguments. 
As the overview of the law on consumer arbitration clauses in 
some (not all!) E.U. Member countries has shown, the situation is quite 
different; one may call it even rather “chaotic”. It ranges from a simple 
prohibition of such clauses (France) to their permission under certain 
procedural (Germany, Spain, Poland) or substantive limitations (UK), 
to state monitored ADR systems (Scandinavian countries) which are 
not formally binding on the consumer but have similar effects in 
practice. 
Directive 2013/11, if implemented by Member State legislation 
before 9 July 2015 (which does not seem to be the case anyhow!), has 
not brought about any consistent E.U. practice, unlike the U.S. Federal 
Arbitration Act. Following a more “access to justice” approach, E.U. 
law has taken a mixed and to some extent limited approach in including 
ADR entities that “impose” a solution in its recent ADR Directive 
2013/11. There seems to be an indirect encouragement to develop 
consumer arbitration schemes in Member States as a second route of 
access to justice. It is too early to evaluate this new and somewhat 
clandestine policy of the E.U. 
This paper therefore has insisted on some additional 
procedural guarantees should consumer arbitration schemes become 
more popular among E.U. Member countries, even though Directive 
2013/11 already contains some “minimum protection” provisions on 
“specific acceptance” and applicable law. The basic reference for such 
additional protection seems to be Article 47 of the E.U. Charter of 
Fundamental Rights in conjunction with Article 19(1) paragraph 2 of 
the TEU whereby Member States must “provide remedies sufficient 
to ensure effective legal protection” of E.U. consumers.164 At the time 
of writing, Member States must wait to implement measures 
                                                 
163  Omri Ben-Shahar, Arbitration and Access to Court: Economic Analysis, in 
REGULATORY COMPETITION IN CONTRACT LAW AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION 447, 
458 (Horst Eidenmüller ed., 2013).  
164   TEU, art. 19(1) ¶ 2. 
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concerning Directive 2013/11 and to make any final judgments as to 
their E.U.-law conformity and efficiency. This paper sought to provide 
some guidelines for this upcoming debate. 
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CREDITOR’S RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS 
Anna Veneziano 
INTRODUCTION 
The need to provide sound and clear rules regarding the 
enforcement of a secured creditor’s rights upon the debtor’s default is 
expressly recognized in the most recent international instruments 
dealing with secured transactions. Such instruments all contain a well-
developed and specific regulation of enforcement measures, applicable 
(also) outside insolvency proceedings. While additional steps may be 
required to exercise said rights when qualified third parties are involved 
(e.g., perfection requirements), or other rules may have to be applied 
to determine the outcome of conflicts among holders of conflicting 
proprietary interests on the same collateral, the existence of a security 
agreement is generally sufficient to trigger the application of the rules 
on enforcement. 
In this paper, I will look at uniform law texts regarding this 
topic, with a view to assess whether it is possible to detect common 
directions and to understand the reasons for any divergent approach. 
The term ‘uniform law’ is used here to refer to a variety of instruments, 
be they hard law or soft law as well as global or regional. In particular, 
I will focus on three well-known examples that are representative of 
                                                 
 The Author is Professor of Comparative Law at the University of Teramo 
(Italy) and Professor of European Property Law at the University of Amsterdam. She 
is currently serving as Deputy Secretary-General of the International Institute for the 
Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT). The opinions expressed in the present 
paper do not purport to reflect an official position of UNIDROIT. 
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such a variety: (a) the Cape Town Convention on International 
Interests in Mobile Equipment1 and its Aircraft Protocol2 (as an 
example of a highly successful3 hard law text with global application 
but in a very specialized sector,4 which creates an autonomous 
international interest recognized and enforceable in contracting 
States);5 (b) the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Secured 
                                                 
1   Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment, Nov. 16, 
2001, 2307 U.N.T.S. 285 [hereinafter Cape Town Convention]. The text of the 
Convention in English is available at http:// 
http://www.unidroit.org/instruments/security-interests/cape-town-convention. 
2 Protocol to the Convention on International Interests in Mobile 
Equipment on Matters Specific to Aircraft Equipment (Nov. 16, 2001), available in 
English at http://www.unidroit.org/english/conventions/c-main.htm [hereinafter 
Aircraft Protocol] 
3   Until now as many as sixty-nine States around the world have ratified 
or otherwise acceded to the Cape Town Convention, while sixty-one States have 
adhered to the Aircraft Protocol (the Protocol entered into force in 2006). 
UNIDROIT, Status - Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment (Cape Town, 
2001) (December 3, 2015), http://www.unidroit.org/status-2001capetown; 
UNIDROIT, Status – Protocol to the Convention on International Interests in Mobile 
Equipment on Matters Specific to Aircraft Equipment (December 3, 2015), 
http://www.unidroit.org/status-2001capetown-aircraft. The European Union has 
also acceded to the Convention and the Aircraft Protocol as a Regional Economic 
Integration Organization, thus permitting (but not imposing) ratification by Member 
States. See ROY GOODE, CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS IN MOBILE 
EQUIPMENT AND PROTOCOL THERETO ON MATTERS SPECIFIC TO AIRCRAFT 
EQUIPMENT, OFFICIAL COMMENTARY 142 et seq. (3d ed. UNIDROIT, 2013). 
Furthermore, the International Registry for Aircraft Equipment (operated under the 
supervision of International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) by Aviareto  has 
reached more than 500,000 entries since its establishment in 2006. SITA, Aircraft 
Equipment Registry Passes Half Million Milestone (Oct. 9, 2014), 
http://www.sita.aero/content/Aircraft-equiment-registry-passes-half-million-
milestone. 
4   Two additional Protocols to the Cape Town Convention, the 2007 
Luxembourg Protocol to the Convention on International Interests in Mobile 
Equipment on Matters Specific to Railway Rolling Stock (Rail Protocol) and the 2012 
Protocol on Matters Specific to Space Assets (Space Protocol) were approved but 
have not yet entered into force. 
5   The Cape Town Convention and the Aircraft Protocol were jointly 
approved by UNIDROIT and ICAO on the basis of a project drafted within 
UNIDROIT. See GOODE, supra note 3, at 13 et seq. (describing the nature and purpose 
of the Convention system). 
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Transactions6 (as an example of a policy-oriented soft law instrument 
with global scope of application, primarily addressed to national 
legislators considering a reform of their general domestic secured 
transaction laws);7 (c) Book IX of the Draft Common Frame of 
Reference on a European Private Law (DCFR)8 (as an example of a 
regional soft law instrument on secured transactions in general, 
developed within the DCFR European academic project, which 
creates an autonomous European security right with cross-border 
enforceability).9 
There are other examples of uniform law texts concerning 
secured transactions that emphasize the importance of enforcement 
measures, but they will not be specifically analyzed here.10 
I.  COMMON TRENDS IN THE RULES ON ENFORCEMENT OF 
                                                 
6   U.N. COMM. ON INT’L TRADE LAW, UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE 
ON SECURED TRANSACTIONS, U.N. Sales No. E.09.V.12 (2010) [hereinafter 
UNCITRAL Legislative Guide]. 
7   On the nature and purpose of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, see 
Spiradon V. Bazinas, The utility and efficacy of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Secured 
Transactions, in AVAILABILITY OF CREDIT AND SECURED TRANSACTIONS IN A TIME 
OF CRISIS 133 et seq. (Orkun Akseli ed., 2012). 
8   Book IX - Proprietary Security in Movable Assets, in PRINCIPLES, 
DEFINITIONS AND MODEL RULES OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW: DRAFT COMMON 
FRAME OF REFERENCE (DCFR), 5389 et seq. (Christian von Bar et al., eds. 2009) 
[hereinafter Book IX DCFR]. Book IX DCFR was prepared by a team led by U. 
Drobnig and was subsequently approved within the DCFR project by the Study 
Group on a European Civil Code and the Research Group on EC Private Law 
(Acquis Group). 
9   On the nature and purpose of the DCFR, see Introduction, in PRINCIPLES, 
DEFINITIONS AND MODEL RULES OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW, DRAFT COMMON 
FRAME OF REFERENCE (DCFR), 1 et seq. (Christian von Bar et al., eds. 2009). 
10   For an additional example, see the Model Law on Secured Transactions 
(1994 and 2004) of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD), which provides a basic framework for domestic legal reform tailored to 
transition economies: “The Model allows the person taking security to enforce the 
charge immediately after a failure to pay the secured debt. . . It is vital that 
appropriate provisions on enforcement be included. Without a clear right to enforce, 
the charge-holder is deprived of his remedy and a charge becomes valueless.” 
MODEL LAW ON SECURED TRANSACTIONS: PART IV – ENFORCEMENT AND 
TERMINATION, EBRD, at art. 22-30 (1994, 2004) [hereinafter EBRD Model Law].  
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SECURED CREDITORS’ RIGHTS 
Not surprisingly, due to the different nature, purpose, and 
particularly the different scope of application of the international 
instruments that are considered, the legal regime of enforcement that 
they provide cannot be the same. I believe, however, that it is possible 
to find a number of elements that are common and point to a 
convergence in the international approach to the topic. In line with the 
general theme of the International Academy of Commercial and 
Consumer Law (IACCL) conference, the analysis will center on the 
role played by party autonomy and the mechanisms used to control it. 
Thus, I will not offer a systematic description of the respective legal 
regimes of enforcement, but will specifically focus on examples of 
common trends (and any divergences) that relate to the scope of 
parties’ self-regulation and its limitations. 
By way of a more general observation, each of the above-
mentioned texts begins with the assumption that clear and predictable 
rules regarding secured creditors’ enforcement rights are advantageous 
for all parties involved, and that an easy, less costly, and speedy 
implementation of such rights is a key element for a well-functioning 
secured transactions system.11 It may facilitate (cross-border) financing 
with better conditions, since the likelihood of obtaining recovery in 
case of default may well be one of the factors influencing creditor’s 
decisions in this respect. Furthermore, the backdrop of an efficient, 
rapid, and cost-effective system of recovery will also be important to 
shape parties’ willingness to avoid formal insolvency proceedings 
through cooperation by entering into out-of-court arrangements 
                                                 
11   “The availability of adequate and readily enforceable default remedies 
is of crucial importance to the creditor, who must be able to predict with confidence 
its ability to exercise a default remedy expeditiously.” GOODE, supra note 3, at 58. 
Similarly, the efficient enforcement of secured creditors’ rights is listed among the 
key objectives of a modern secured transactions regime in the UNCITRAL 
Legislative Guide: “A security right will . . . have little value to a secured creditor 
unless it can be enforced effectively and efficiently. A modern secured transactions 
regime will include procedures that precisely describe the rights and obligations of 
grantors and secured creditors upon enforcement.” UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, 
supra note 6, at § 56. The need for speedy and cost-effective enforcement is also the 
underpinning principle of Chapter 7 of Book IX DCFR and its preference towards 
extra-judicial enforcement. Book IX DCFR, supra note 8, at 5618. 
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(which are often considered an advantageous alternative, especially in 
the case of cross-border transactions). 
The enhancement of parties’ self-regulation is one of the 
mechanisms that is put into place to achieve the result of ensuring a 
rapid and less costly enforcement of creditors’ rights. Strengthening 
the role of parties’ autonomy is indeed one of the most evident traits 
in all three instruments that are considered here. At the same time, 
there is still the need to find a good balance between party autonomy 
on the one hand, and the protection of various interests, those of the 
debtor but also of third parties, on the other hand. It is in the balance 
of such different interests that the three instruments diverge, which in 
my view (at least partly) is justified in light of the difference in their 
respective scope of application. 
A.         The Enhancement of Party Autonomy and its Role(s) 
Parties’ self-regulation is reinforced by limiting the impact of 
mandatory formal proceedings (such as the need for a court decision 
before enforcement or the imposition of a formal procedure like a 
public sale). Thus, all three instruments favor extra-judicial 
enforcement, which is considered an option that should always be 
available to the creditor12 if agreed upon in the contract or at some 
other point in time,13 or unless otherwise provided by the parties.14 
Moreover, the creditor, if all required conditions are met, can exercise 
a wide array of out-of-court measures, including using the value of the 
collateral other than by selling it and being satisfied with the proceeds 
(e.g., lease the collateral or collect or receive any income of profits 
                                                 
12  See UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, supra note 6, at 283-84, 
recommendation 142. “[I]n order to maximize flexibility in enforcement and thereby 
to obtain the highest possible price upon disposition, creditors should have the 
option of proceeding either judicially or extra judicially when enforcing their security 
rights.” 
13  See Cape Town Convention, supra note 1, at art. 8(1); GOODE, supra note 
3, at 278. For the additional layers of complexity of the Cape Town Convention 
system that derive from the interplay between main Convention, asset-specific 
Protocols, States’ power to issue declarations, and market incentives; see infra p. 10. 
14  See Book IX DCFR, supra note 8, at Art. IX-7:103(1). “Unless otherwise 
agreed, the secured creditor may carry out extra-judicial enforcement of the security 
right”. Chapter 7:217 makes it clear that the creditor retains the option to make 
recourse to judicial enforcement. 
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arising from the management of the encumbered asset).15 
Furthermore, even within court proceedings there is a preference for 
speedy relief measures,16 though this point is not emphasized in the 
same way in each text due to their different nature and scope of 
application.17 Therefore, there is a degree of uniformity at least in the 
general approach chosen by all three instruments. 
If we turn from the general to the particular, however, we must 
take a series of additional factors into account. We will focus here on 
some factors that show that the role played by party autonomy is more 
complex than may appear at first sight. 
The first important element to be considered is that a decision 
on the default rule (i.e., the rule applicable “unless otherwise agreed”) 
may change the purpose of allowing a contrary agreement between the 
parties. Book IX DCFR can be used as a good example in this respect, 
since party autonomy is present in several provisions but does not 
always play the same role. The principle underlying the whole Chapter 
on enforcement is that its rules are mandatory, unless otherwise 
provided within the text.18 Several provisions allow for an express 
derogation by the parties, but said derogation fulfills different 
purposes. For instance, as mentioned above, the commercial creditor 
may generally exercise extra-judicial enforcement, unless exclusive 
                                                 
15  Cape Town Convention, supra note 1, at art. 8(1); UNCITRAL 
Legislative Guide, supra note 6, at 312, recommendation 141; Book IX DCFR, supra 
note 8, at Art. IX-7:207. 
16  See UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, supra note 6, at 311, 
recommendation 138. The possibility to obtain, in particular, advance speedy relief by 
courts pending final determination of a dispute is one of the cornerstones of the 
Cape Town Convention and Aircraft Protocol’s enforcement system, as provided in 
Art. 13 Convention and Art. X Protocol. See supra, Cape Town Convention, note 1, 
and Aircraft Protocol, supra note 2.  
17   In particular, Chapter 7 of Book IX DCFR expressly focuses on extra-
judicial enforcement, leaving court enforcement proceedings to national law. See Book 
IX DCFR, supra note 8, at Cmt. A to Art.IX-7:101. Thus, Book IX does not attempt 
to lay down rules for judicial enforcement. It does, however, stress the need for an 
expeditious court decision on a recourse against an enforcement measure or against 
resistance to an enforcement measure. Id. at 7:104. The same approach regarding 
judicial supervision of enforcement when a conflict arises is found in the 
UNCITRAL Legislative Guide. UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, supra note 6, at 280, 
§ 19, and recommendation 137. 
18   Book IX DCFR, supra note 8, at Art.IX-7:102. 
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recourse to a court or other competent authority is agreed in the 
contract.19 On the other hand, a private sale by the creditor is only 
admitted if parties stipulate otherwise (or if a published market price 
for the collateral exists).20 
In these two examples, party autonomy serves divergent 
purposes. In the first case, a higher degree of formality in the 
proceedings may be imposed by modifying the default rule; in the 
second instance, the contrary agreement allows the creditor to exercise 
an additional remedy.21 Failing such an agreement, the default rule does 
not allow that particular remedy (or it does so only if specific 
requirements are met). It must be pointed out that bargaining to 
exclude a default rule presupposes that the debtor be in a position to 
accept, or reject, the contrary agreement. The situation is clearly 
different where the instrument applies in a highly specialized and 
professionalized market (as in the case of aircraft financing, for 
example) or more generally (thus, in Book IX DCFR consumers are 
always entitled to court proceedings, unless they agree to extra-judicial 
enforcement after default, and are subject to additional safeguards, see 
Section III, infra). 
Another element that should be mentioned is the degree of 
formality that is required of the “contrary agreement” between the 
parties. For example, parties’ agreement on the exercise of extra-
judicial remedies under the Cape Town Convention need not be in 
writing, nor should it refer specifically to the Convention’s provisions 
or specific remedies.22 On the other hand, a pre-default agreement on 
appropriation of encumbered assets by the creditor under Article IX.-
7:105 DCFR will need to be more formal since parties are obliged to 
indicate a method which allows for a ready determination of a 
reasonable market price. Failing such an indication, the agreement is 
                                                 
19   Id. at Art.IX-7:103(1). 
20   See id. at Art.IX-7:211(2). 
21   In particular, when a published market price for the collateral exists, see 
id. at Art. IX-7:211(2). 
22   GOODE, supra note 3, at 280 (“an agreement in general terms, for 
example, ‘all remedies under the Convention,’ suffices. . . . [S]uch terms would cover 
remedies under the Protocol as well as under the Convention.”). 
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void, unless the collateral is a fungible asset that is traded on a 
recognized market with published prices.23 
The different nature of the instrument gives rise to interesting 
additional layers of complexity in the case of the Cape Town 
Convention system, that is, a multilateral treaty approved in a 
diplomatic Conference24 with participation of States’ representatives 
and later subject to ratification by States. Following a widely used 
technique, in order to reach international consensus within the formal 
setting of the diplomatic Conference, the possibility for contracting 
States to opt out of specified provisions through a declaration25 was 
introduced. With particular regard to enforcement, according to the 
main Convention contracting States must make a declaration for or 
against extra-judicial enforcement as default rule,26 and may make 
additional declarations in relation to the applicability of specific 
enforcement measures.27 
This balance was already modified by the Aircraft Protocol28 
where some of the Convention rules on enforcement were displaced, 
                                                 
23   Book IX DCFR, supra note 8, at Art.IX.-7:105(1) and (2). 
24   Or better said, diplomatic Conferences, since the Aircraft Protocol was 
approved together with the main Convention in Cape Town in 2001 whilst the other 
two Protocols, Rail and Space, were separately approved, respectively, in 
Luxembourg in 2007 and in Berlin in 2012. 
25   The Cape Town Convention does not contain the classical 
“reservations,” but introduced “declarations” that allow for more flexibility and 
choices regarding their content. See generally ROY GOODE, HERBERT KRONKE, EWAN 
MCKENDRICK, TRANSNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LAW  418-419 (2d ed. 2015). 
26   Article 54(2) requires a contracting State to declare whether or not any 
remedy, which under the Convention does not require application to the court, is to 
be exercisable only with leave of the court. It is a mandatory declaration.. Cape Town 
Convention, supra note 1, at art. 54(2).  
27   For example, lease of collateral is permitted unless a contracting State 
declared that the charge (debtor) shall not grant a lease of the object while it is 
situated within or controlled from that State’s territory. Id. at art. 8(1)(b), 54(1). 
28   For the enforcement provisions in the Rail and Space Protocols, see 
ROY GOODE, CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS IN MOBILE 
EQUIPMENT AND LUXEMBOURG PROTOCOL THERETO ON MATTERS SPECIFIC TO 
RAILWAY ROLLING STOCK, OFFICIAL COMMENTARY 71 et seq. (2d ed., UNIDROIT, 
2014); ROY GOODE, CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS IN MOBILE 
EQUIPMENT AND PROTOCOL THERETO ON MATTERS SPECIFIC TO SPACE ASSETS, 
OFFICIAL COMMENTARY 189 et seq. (UNIDROIT, 2013). 
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additional specific remedies were introduced (in particular, 
deregistration and export and physical transfer of the aircraft object 
from the territory where it is situated) and a mechanism of opting in 
specific provisions was chosen.29 The modification went in the 
direction of allowing increased predictability and a greater scope for 
parties’ self-regulation both outside and within court proceedings. 
The evolution of the system, however, did not stop with the 
approval of the treaties but was further influenced by the relevant 
credit market. Under the Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) Aircraft Sector Understanding,30 a reduced 
fee or interest rate for export credit may be applied if a contracting 
State to both the Convention and the Aircraft Protocol has made so-
called “qualifying declarations,” among which the declarations with 
respect to enforcement measures are counted. In particular, a State 
may qualify if it either adheres to the default provision on extra-judicial 
enforcement or it opts in to the Aircraft Protocol rules regarding 
advance relief measures during court proceedings. This development 
shows that, when a uniform law text applies to a specialized, highly 
sophisticated, and integrated market and has the potential to trigger 
economic benefits for both creditors and debtors, subsequent market 
incentives may indirectly influence contracting States’ decisions and as 
a consequence the international regulation in the field. 
B.         A Shift from Traditional Control Mechanisms to Ex-Post 
Evaluation and Transparency Rules  
As noted earlier, while all three instruments considered give 
more weight to party autonomy, rules protecting the debtor and/or 
other parties are not abandoned. The tendency, however, is to reduce 
the impact of certain traditional remedies that are perceived to be 
inefficient or unnecessary. The shift towards out-of-court enforcement 
as opposed to mandatory formal proceedings was already mentioned. 
Additionally, control mechanisms that work ex ante through the 
                                                 
29   For a detailed overview of the enforcement provisions in the Aircraft 
Protocol and their relation to the main Convention, see GOODE, supra note 3, at 447 
et seq. 
30   Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 
Aircraft Sector Understanding on Export Credits for Civil Aircraft, 
TAD/ASU(2011)1 (Aug. 31, 2011). 
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sanction of invalidity of parties’ agreement are restricted in their 
application. This is true, for example, if we look at the well-known 
prohibition of pactum commissorium (typically found in civil law 
jurisdictions).31 Such a development is hardly surprising in light of the 
fact that even the most traditionally oriented national laws in this 
respect show a clear tendency to move away from a strict interpretation 
of this requirement, and this appears not only in very specialized areas, 
such as financial collateral,32 but even generally.33 
It is probably more relevant to see how the need to balance 
competing interests (with particular regard to interests of third parties) 
is pursued through alternative and more modern means. The 
mechanisms that can be found in all three instruments are fourfold: (1) 
reliance on parties’ agreement (as noted above, the exercise of specific 
remedies may be subject to the contract expressly allowing them and 
sometimes to additional limitations and conditions); (2) use of ex-post 
evaluation of the exercise of all enforcement rights; (3) transparency 
provisions introducing information duties; and (4) upholding of the 
traditional principle of avoiding creditor’s enrichment. 
As to the shift to ex-post evaluation, all three instruments 
expressly refer to the parameter of ‘commercial reasonableness’ (or 
other general standard) to achieve a fair realization value when self-
help measures are executed. The Cape Town Convention states that 
                                                 
31   See Book IX DCFR, supra note 8, at Art. IX.-7:105, according to which 
a pre-default agreement on appropriation of encumbered assets is void, unless the 
encumbered asset is a fungible asset that has a published price or parties agree in 
advance on some method to ensure objectivity of evaluation. For a brief justification 
of this rule, see Book IX, supra note 8, at 5622. According to the Cape Town 
Convention, however, an agreement whereby ownership is vested in the creditor 
cannot be made in advance of default, but only after default and at the conditions set 
forth in Article 9 Convention. GOODE, supra note 3, at 283. Article 11 Convention, 
however, leaves the parties free to determine what constitutes “default” under their 
agreement. Those rules do not apply to retention of title devices. See infra at section 
II(C). 
32   For E.U. member States, this results from the implementation of the 
Financial Collateral Directive. See Council Directive 2002/47, 2002 OJ (L 168) 43 
(EC) as amended by Council Directive 2009/44, art. 4, 2009 OJ (L 146) 37 (EC).   
33   See CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 2348 (Fr.) as modified by the 2006 French 
secured transactions’ law reform, which considers such agreements valid. For 
commentary, see LAURENT AYNES & PIERRE CROCQ, DROIT CIVIL: LES SURETES, LA 
PUBLICITE FONCIERE 239 et seq. (4th ed. 2009).  
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any out-of-court remedy of a secured creditor “shall be exercised in a 
commercially reasonable manner.”34 The UNCITRAL Legislative 
Guide recommends that national legislators “provide that a person 
must enforce its rights and perform its obligations under the 
provisions on enforcement in good faith and in a commercially 
reasonable manner.”35 According to Article IX.–7:103(4) DCFR, 
“enforcement must be undertaken by the secured creditor in a 
commercially reasonable way.” Once again, however, the different role 
played by party autonomy bears an influence on how the same 
principle is concretely applied. Thus, according to the Cape Town 
Convention, a remedy exercised in conformity with the security 
agreement will be deemed commercially reasonable unless the 
contractual provision is “manifestly unreasonable.” The benchmark 
for the standard of conduct is therefore parties’ self-regulation, 
interpreted against the background of international practice.36 On the 
other hand, according to the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, the 
recommended general standard of conduct should be mandatory and 
not subject to unilateral waiver or contrary agreement at any time,37 
while Book IX DCFR puts more emphasis on good faith by requiring 
that creditors exercise enforcement measures, as far as possible, in 
cooperation with the security provider and any third party. 
With regard to transparency, there is a tendency to introduce 
information duties of the secured creditor toward the debtor and 
specific third parties (particularly, other secured creditors).38 It should 
                                                 
34   Cape Town Convention, supra note 1, at art. 8(3). 
35   UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, supra note 6, at 310. 
36   “The phrase ‘manifestly unreasonable’ is a signal to courts that they 
should not lightly disturb the bargain made by the parties. Established commercial 
practice is relevant to whether a provision in a security agreement is ‘manifestly 
unreasonable’. A provision that is in line with accepted international practice will 
normally be regarded as not manifestly unreasonable”: GOODE, supra note 3, at 280. 
37   UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, supra note 6, at 311. 
38   See e.g., Cape Town Convention, supra note 1, at art. 8(4) (reasonable 
prior notice in writing to specified interested persons); UNCITRAL Legislative 
Guide, supra note 6, at recommendation 149 (on the creditor’s duty to give notice of 
its intention to exercise extra-judicial sale, granting of lease or license or other 
disposal of the collateral); Book IX DCFR, supra note 8 at Arts. IX.–7:208 to 7:210 
(notices of extra-judicial disposition). A brief overview of the rules on notices in 
Book IX is provided in Comment A to Art. IX.–7:107. Book IX DCFR, supra note 
8, cmt. A to Art. IX.-7:107.  
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be noted that the cost-effectiveness of such rules will depend on the 
degree of the formalities that are imposed for the notice.39 In this 
respect, the Cape Town Convention’s language (“reasonable prior 
notice in writing”) is less exacting than the regime suggested in the 
UNCITRAL Legislative Guide or envisaged in Book IX DCFR, both 
of which impose more precise time, content, and language 
constraints.40 
Another element worth considering is that the functionality of 
the notice system is strictly related to the existence of a public 
electronic registry based on a notice-filing approach (according to 
which a statement containing select information as to creditor, debtor 
and collateral should be filed in a publicly accessible registry for the 
purpose of ensuring that the security right is effective as against other 
secured creditors, execution creditors, and the administrator of 
debtor’s insolvency). Such a general policy choice is made in all three 
instruments41 and permits a clearer identification of the most relevant 
third parties to which the notice should be given.42 
Another protection mechanism is the avoidance of 
enrichment. The question is whether, should there be any surplus from 
the sale or alternative use of the value of the collateral, it should return 
to (other lower ranking creditors and finally to) the debtor. All three 
instruments clearly retain this solution.43 A different regime is 
introduced, however, for those transactions that are based on retention 
                                                 
39   “The law should provide rules ensuring that the notice . . . can be given 
in an efficient, timely and reliable way so as to protect the grantor or other interested 
parties, while, at the same time, avoiding having a negative effect on the secured 
creditor’s remedies and the potential net realization value of the encumbered assets.” 
UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, supra note 6, at recommendation 150.  
40   See id. at recommendation 151(b); Book IX DCFR, supra note 8, at Art. 
IX.–7:210. 
41   Cape Town Convention, supra note 1, at Chapter IV; UNCITRAL 
Legislative Guide, supra note 6, at 110 et seq.; Book IX DCFR, supra note 8, at ch. 3. 
42   Interestingly, the EBRD Model Law provides that the enforcement 
notice to the debtor (which has to contain specific information) must be registered 
in the Charges Registry as supplementary information to be effective. See EBRD 
Model Law, supra note 10, at arts. 22.2, 22.4, and 33. 
43   See Cape Town Convention, supra note 1, at arts. 8(5) and (6); 
UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, supra note 6, at recommendation 152 (distribution of 
proceeds of disposition of an encumbered asset); Book IX DCFR, supra note 8, at 
Art. IX.–7:215 (distribution of proceeds of extra-judicial enforcement). 
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of title instead of consisting in the creation of a limited security right 
or the transfer of collateral by way of security, which topic will be now 
discussed. 
C.         A Differentiated Regime for Enforcement of Retention of 
Title Devices 
In all the international instruments considered, the policy 
decision was taken to include within their general scope of application 
not only security rights on movables granted by the debtor to the 
creditor, but also transactions where title to the collateral is retained by 
the financier (e.g., a conditional sale or a leasing agreement). In 
principle, such transactions are subject to the same basic legal 
framework that governs the more traditional limited rights in rem.44 In 
relation to a few specific issues, however, different rules (may) apply. 
An exception shared by all three instruments is found in 
enforcement. The creditor (seller or lessor) is not accountable for any 
surplus and may terminate the agreement upon debtor’s default and 
take possession or control of the collateral as a full owner, without 
being subject to all conditions and limits that are envisaged for a 
secured creditor in general45 
                                                 
44   For the Cape Town Convention, see GOODE, supra note 3, at 267 
(“Most of the . . . provisions of the Convention apply to all three forms of agreement 
[security agreement, conditional sale and lease].”). The UNCITRAL Legislative 
Guide recommends an integrated scheme, giving national legislators the option 
between a unitary and non-unitary approach to acquisition financing. UNCITRAL 
Legislative Guide, supra note 6, 57 et seq., § 111 et seq. Even under the latter 
approach, however, most of the rules applicable to security rights are extended to 
retention of title devices. Finally, see Art. IX. – 1:104 DCFR and Comment A, Book 
IX DCFR, supra note 8, at 5401 (“the regime of retention of ownership devices, while 
partly autonomous, is in most respects identical with that for security rights.”). 
45   See Cape Town Convention, supra note 1, at art. 10; See also Art. IX.-
7:301 DCFR. Concerning the Cape Town Convention, it must be noted that the 
qualification of an agreement as “retention of title” or “lease” for the purposes of 
Article 10 is left to the applicable domestic law, so that in those legal systems where 
such devices (or specific types of such devices) are qualified as security rights Article 
10 would not apply. GOODE, supra note 3, at 267 et seq. The UNCITRAL Legislative 
Guide, on the other hand, suggests that acquisition finance devices (a functional 
category including retention of title devices) be subject to the same regime that is 
applied to non-acquisition finance devices, but allows for deviations “to the extent 
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It is interesting to note that this specific derogation from the 
general rules is not justified on the basis of the economic function of 
the device as acquisition financing tool (otherwise it would apply to all 
agreements pursuing the same function regardless of which party holds 
title in the collateral).46 It expressly relies on the formal structure of the 
agreement.47 While this solution may have had the purpose of making 
the inclusion of retention of title less objectionable in the eyes of 
European jurists and/or governmental representatives, it raises doubts 
as to whether the justification for a different treatment based on the 
formal structure of the transaction only is sufficiently well founded. 
This all the more so because recent reforms in national secured 
transaction laws opted for the application of a functional approach in 
this respect.48 
II.         CONSUMER PROTECTION AND PARTY AUTONOMY 
Another interesting issue with regard to the role of party 
autonomy in the enforcement of creditor’s rights arises when one of 
                                                 
necessary to preserve the coherence of the regime applicable to sale and lease” 
(UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, supra note 6, 380-381, recommendation 200).  
46   Which is what is envisaged for another important exception to the 
general rules contained in both the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide and in Book IX 
DCFR is the special priority (so-called “super-priority”) as against previously 
registered security rights on the same collateral, granted to all acquisition finance 
devices regardless of their formal structure. See UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, supra 
note 6, at 377, recommendations 187-188; Art. IX. – 4:102 DCFR. 
47   For the Cape Town Convention, see GOODE, supra note 3, at 66 (“The 
provisions are much simpler because in contrast with the chargee, who has merely a 
security interest, the conditional seller or lessor retains full rights in the equipment.”). 
See also Book IX DCFR, supra note 8, at 5664, cmt. A to Art. IX. – 7:301 DCFR 
(“The chief reason why the special features of retention of ownership become 
relevant in this area is that, since the seller, supplier or lessor as secured creditor had 
retained ownership, it had remained the owner of the supplied assets.”). A more 
thorough treatment of this issue is found in the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, supra 
note 6, at 367 et seq., §§ 188-196, where the respective merits of a unitary and non-
unitary approach to retention of title devices , as well as the need to preserve a 
functionally integrated approach whichever choice is made are discussed with 
specific regard to enforcement. 
48   For the 2013 reform in Belgium, see ERIC DIRIX, LA RÉFORME DES 
SÛRETÉS RÉELLES MOBILIÈRES 11 et seq. (2013) (in relation to both sales with 
retention of title and leasing). See also CODE CIVIL [C. CIV] art. 2371(2) (Fr.); AYNÈS 
& CROCQ, supra note 31, at 375 et seq.  
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the parties is a consumer, or is more generally qualified as a “weaker” 
party entitled to a stronger protection. The question is here to what 
extent general rules favorable to a wider application of parties’ self-
regulation should be modified to take this situation into account. It 
must be pointed out that for two of the instruments that we considered 
this question is either irrelevant or has only marginal importance. It 
goes without saying that the scope of application of the Cape Town 
Convention implies a high level of sophistication of all professional 
parties involved. As to the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, although it 
includes many forms of consumer transaction, it is not intended to 
override consumer-protection laws or to elaborate consumer-
protection policies, and defers to national law on this matter.49 
On the other hand, the scope of application of Book IX DCFR 
is not limited to professional parties but extends to consumers. In this 
regard, however, the drafters expressly downplayed the importance of 
specific consumer protection in the field of secured transactions as 
opposed to that of personal security. In fact, there are only a few 
special rules on consumers in the whole Book.50 If we look at 
enforcement, the most interesting aspect is that parties’ autonomy is 
not entirely excluded but still plays a relevant role. Thus, a security right 
over an asset of a consumer can only be enforced by a court or another 
competent authority, but after default the consumer security provider 
can agree to extra-judicial enforcement.51 Further, a pre-default 
agreement on appropriation would be void even if the parties agreed 
in advance on an objective evaluation method, but it is still possible 
when the encumbered asset is a fungible asset traded on a recognized 
market with published prices.52 All other rules of the Chapter apply to 
                                                 
49   “To the extent that a rule of the regime envisaged in the Guide conflicts 
with consumer protection law, the Guide defers to consumer protection law. States 
that do not have a body of law for the protection of consumers may wish to consider 
whether the enactment of a law based on the recommendations of the Guide would 
affect the rights of consumers and would thus require the introduction of consumer 
protection legislation.” UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, supra note 6, at 34, § 11. See 
also id. at recommendation 2(b). 
50   See Book IX DCFR, supra note 8, Comments to Art. IX.–2:107. 
51   Id. at Art. IX.–7:103(2). 
52   Id. at Art. IX.–7:105 (1)-(3). 
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consumers with no differentiation, except for a more stringent 
provision on advance notice of enforcement.53 
 CONCLUSIONS 
When looking at the above-mentioned general common 
tendencies in uniform law as regards enforcement measures, one 
should consider that the rules on enforcement contained in 
international instruments are embedded in a more general unitary 
architecture that simplifies and rationalizes the entire regulation of 
secured transactions. In other words, in each of the three examples 
such rules form part of a coherent reform strategy that strives towards 
both greater clarity and efficiency. The trend towards a simplification 
and rationalization of enforcement proceedings for security rights is, 
however, convincing in its own right, also independently of a more 
general reform of secured transactions law, and should be welcomed. 
A look at the most recent legislative interventions in Europe seems to 
confirm that the availability of a more predictable system, and less 
costly and swifter extra-judicial enforcement measures as well as of 
alternative mechanisms for the creditor to realize the value of the 
collateral is perceived as an important element of any well-functioning 
secured transactions regime, however structured. 
But consider that the effectiveness on any enforcement 
measure in a given jurisdiction should be strongly linked to the rules 
of general procedural law and the administration of justice. It may also 
be connected to the role played by, and the effect given to, extra-
judicial settlements and/or alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. 
It would not be realistic, nor even appropriate, to try to reach full 
harmonization through an instrument concerning secured 
transactions. I would surmise that the more specialized and 
circumscribed the regulation, the easier it is to accept rules that 
introduce changes not only to enforcement proceedings in general, but 
also to judicial proceedings (such as advance relief remedies for the 
creditor) in particular, provided that a cost-benefit analysis gives a 
positive result. In devising a general regime with wider application, the 
approach should be more cautious (as shown by the different solutions 
that are found in the examples of Cape Town Convention and Aircraft 
                                                 
53   Id. at Art. IX.–7:107. 
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Protocol on the one hand, and the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide and 
Book IX DCFR on the other hand). 
Furthermore, I believe that more thought should be given to 
the question of how to treat retention of title devices in enforcement, 
and especially as to whether a differentiated regime would be 
appropriate. If retention of title devices were to be included in an 
instrument on secured transactions, a differentiated treatment solely 
on the basis of the formal structure of the agreement would not, in my 
opinion, be sufficiently justified. 
I would finally suggest that the question of whether, and to 
what extent, consumer transactions should be subject to a special 
regime, as regards enforcement, deserves thorough consideration. 
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JUSTIFICATIONS FOR UCC ARTICLE 9’S 
TREATMENT OF DEPOSIT ACCOUNTS: A 
COMPARATIVE NOTE 
Catherine Walsh* 
INTRODUCTION 
Debtor-creditor and insolvency laws in western legal traditions 
generally treat a defaulting debtor’s assets as subject to liquidation by 
its creditors or their insolvency representative, with the proceeds then 
distributed among them in proportion to their claims. Secured 
creditors seek to escape this baseline principle by bargaining in advance 
for the right to have assets of their debtors in which they have 
contracted for security preferentially appropriated to the payment of 
their debts. Thus, a contract for security has been described as a private 
bargain “between A and B that C take nothing”1 with C representing 
the collectivity of the collateral-giver’s other creditors. 
In view of the distributional consequences, legal systems 
traditionally have found it necessary to impose certain limitations on 
party autonomy in security agreements. In recent decades, these 
constraints have been increasingly dismantled for creditors who take 
security in what is popularly referred to as “cash collateral” — meaning 
not just cash in the strict sense of hard currency but also intangible 
rights that are highly liquid in the sense that the secured creditor can 
almost immediately acquire their cash value. 
This article focuses on cash collateral in the form of a right to 
payment of money credited to an account with a bank or other 
                                                 
* Professor, Faculty of Law, McGill University. 
1 Lynn M. LoPucki, The Politics of Article 9: The Unsecured Creditor’s Bargain, 80 
VA. L. REV. 1887, 1899 (1994).   
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financial institution (deposit account). Secured transactions regimes in 
effect in the Canadian provinces and territories traditionally have 
subjected deposit accounts to the same public notice and temporal 
priority rules that apply to security agreements covering other 
intangible assets in the form of a monetary obligation owed to the 
debtor. In contrast, deposit accounts under Article 9 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code in the United States are governed by a special set of 
rules organized around the concept of “control.” 
The Article 9 deposit account regime is increasingly promoted 
internationally. The UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Secured 
Transactions is particularly notable.2 It represents the first attempt at 
the international law level to articulate a comprehensive regime of 
security for movable assets. The close affinity between U.C.C. Article 
9 and the Guide’s recommendations is such that, in the words of 
Tomáš Richter, it “could be called the ‘New York/ Vienna 
consensus.’”3  Certainly, with respect to the treatment of deposit 
accounts,4 the recommendations of the Guide replicate almost 
completely the Article 9 rules.5 
Reforms aimed at aligning the treatment of deposit accounts 
in Canadian secured transactions law with the Article 9 (and 
UNCITRAL) control approach have recently been proposed. As will 
                                                 
2   See UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON SECURED TRANSACTIONS, 
U.N. Sales No. E.09.V.12 (2010), available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/security-lg/e/09-82670_Ebook-
Guide_09-04-10English.pdf (hereinafter UNICITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE). For 
ease of reference, the terminology and recommendations of the Guide are published 
in a separate publication: UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON SECURED 
TRANSACTIONS: TERMINOLOGY AND RECOMMENDATIONS, U.N. Sales No. 
E.09.V.13 (2010), available at  
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/security-lg/e/Terminology-and-
Recs.18-1-10.pdf (hereinafter UNCITRAL TERMINOLOGY AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS).  
3   Tomáš Richter, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Credit: A 
Minskian Sequel 4 (Oct. 1, 2013) (unpublished article), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2390013. 
4   Instead of “deposit account,” the UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE 
uses the conceptually more accurate, but also more cumbersome, term “right to 
payment of funds credited to a deposit account.” For an explanation of this term, see 
UNCITRAL TERMINOLOGY AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2. 
5   Id. at 49, 103-04, 125-26, 173-75. 
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be seen, adoption of the control approach will in effect exempt secured 
creditors who obtain control of a deposit account from the public 
notice and temporal priority rules that until now have applied to 
security rights in all types of monetary obligations. It will also result in 
a departure from the basic premise of secured creditor equality implicit 
in the traditional temporal priority rule by privileging the depository 
bank over other secured credit providers. 
The principal aim of this article is to explore the justification 
for the exceptional treatment of deposit accounts under the Article 9 
control approach.  Parts I and II summarize the current Canadian rules 
and compares them with the Article 9 regime. Part III reviews the 
official justifications for the Article 9 approach and finds them less 
than persuasive. Part IV explores the relatively recent push to import 
the Article 9 treatment of deposit accounts into Canadian secured 
transactions law and locates the reform pressure in the desire to 
facilitate the use of cash collateral in the form of deposit accounts by 
financial actors, notably in the derivatives and securities lending 
markets. In light of that finding, Part V concludes by asking whether 
privileging the extension of credit to the financial sector represents 
wise policy if it comes at the potential expense of reducing the 
availability of and increasing the cost of credit to the real economy. 
I.         THE TRADITIONAL CANADIAN APPROACH TO THE 
TREATMENT OF DEPOSIT ACCOUNTS IN SECURED
TRANSACTIONS LAW 
Funds deposited to a bank account are not set aside as 
belonging to the customer.  Rather, they become the property of the 
bank and are replaced by the obligation of the bank to pay the 
equivalent amount to the customer.  Thus, in general property law, a 
deposit account has come to be characterized simply as a debt owed 
by the bank to its customer. It constitutes a sub-species of pure 
intangible property since its value is not reified in any tangible 
document capable of being negotiated, such as a cheque or a 
certificated investment security.6 
                                                 
6   See, e.g., Benjamin Geva, Rights in Bank Deposits and Account Balances in 
Common Law Canada, 28 BANKING FIN. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (2012); Clayton Bangsund, The 
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Consistent with this general conceptualization, the secured 
transactions regimes in effect in the Canadian provinces and territories7 
traditionally have subjected deposit accounts to the same general rules 
that apply to other intangible assets that take the form of a monetary 
obligation owed to the grantor. Thus, a security right in a deposit 
account must be “perfected” by public registration of a notice of the 
security right to take effect against third parties8 and priority among 
secured creditors is ordered temporally according to the order of 
registration. 9 On the debtor’s default, the secured creditor is entitled 
to collect payment of the value of the deposit account directly from 
the bank with whom the deposit account is held and may then apply 
the proceeds of collection in satisfaction of the obligation secured by 
its security interest.10 
If the bank with whom the deposit account is held wishes to 
take a security interest in its customer’s account to secure an obligation 
owing to it by the customer, it does not enjoy any special exemption 
from these rules. Thus, the bank must register notice of its security 
right and its priority against outside secured creditors who have 
previously acquired a perfected security interest in the deposit account 
generally will be subject to the first-to-register priority rule. The 
application of that rule is subject, however, to the bank’s right, in its 
capacity as the debtor on the deposit account, to set-off any obligations 
owing to it by its customer that arise before it receives notice of a 
                                                 
Deposit Account & Chose in Action at Common Law & Under the PPSA: A Historical Review, 
30 BANKING FIN. L. REV. 1, 22-23 (2014); Bruce A. Markell, From Property to Contract 
and Back: An Examination of Deposit Accounts and Revised Article 9, 74 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 963, 966-67 (1999). 
7   In the province of Quebec where the civil law tradition prevails, secured 
transactions law is primarily found in the Civil Code rules governing hypothecary 
security. See Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64, bk. 6 (Can.). While the common 
law tradition prevails in the  other nine provinces and the three territories, secured 
transactions law is primarily found in the Personal Property Security Acts (PPSAs) 
proclaimed in force between 1976 and 2001.See, e.g., Ontario Personal Property 
Security Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.10 (Can.) [hereinafter Ontario PPSA]. See generally 
R.C.C. CUMING, CATHERINE WALSH & RODERICK WOOD, PERSONAL PROPERTY 
SECURITY LAW (2d ed. 2012). 
8 See, e.g., Ontario PPSA, supra note 7, at §§ 19, 20, 23. 
9 Id. at § 30(1)(1). 
10 Id. at § 61(1). 
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security right that otherwise would have priority.11 The bank’s set-off 
right, whether arising by operation of law or contractually, may be 
exercised regardless of whether or not it concurrently holds a security 
interest in the deposit account.12 
II.         THE ARTICLE 9 “CONTROL” REGIME 
Under Article 9, the concept of control by a secured creditor 
plays a key role in the rules governing the perfection and priority of a 
security right in a deposit account. Control is not a unitary concept—
its meaning varies according to whether the secured creditor is the 
bank with whom the grantor maintains the deposit account or an 
outside creditor.13 If the bank is the secured creditor, it automatically 
has control upon its customer’s grant of security to it.14 If the secured 
creditor is an outside creditor, it can obtain control either by becoming 
the bank’s customer with respect to its debtor’s deposit account or by 
entering into a control agreement with the bank and the debtor under 
which the bank agrees that it will comply with instructions originated 
by the secured creditor directing disposition of the funds in the deposit 
account without further consent by the debtor.15 
Obtaining control is an alternative to registration as a mode of 
perfecting a security interest in deposit accounts. This is so even 
though control does not give public notice of the potential existence 
of the security right to creditors and other potential competing 
claimants.  The secured creditor’s control need not be exclusive: a 
secured creditor has control even if the debtor retains the right to 
direct the disposition of funds from the deposit account as if it were 
unencumbered.16 Outside parties cannot require the bank to disclose 
whether a security right exists in the deposit account: a bank that has 
entered into a control agreement is not required to confirm the 
existence of the agreement to another person unless requested to do 
                                                 
11   CUMING, WALSH & WOOD, supra note 7, at 664. 
12   Id. at 666-67. And see infra, Section IV, for the distinction between a 
mere set-off right and a set-off right that, when combined with other terms, amounts 
to a security interest in substance. 
13   U.C.C. § 9-104(a) (2014). 
14   Id. at § 9-104(a)(1).  
15   Id. at § 9-104(a)(2)-(3). 
16   Id. at § 9-104(b). 
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so by its customer.17 The result is a “secret lien,” the very mischief that 
the general requirement for perfection was intended to alleviate.18 
A secured creditor who obtains control of a deposit account 
has priority over a secured creditor who perfects its security right by 
registration even if registration preceded the obtaining of control.19 
The privileged status accorded to security rights perfected by control 
at the level of priority carries over to enforcement on default. If the 
secured creditor has control by virtue of its status as the depository 
bank, it may simply apply the funds credited to the deposit account to 
the obligation secured by the deposit account.20 If the secured creditor 
is an outside creditor who has obtained control by virtue of a control 
agreement or because it has become the bank’s customer on the 
account, it may instruct the bank to pay the balance on deposit.21 If, 
however, the secured creditor is relying on perfection by registration 
as opposed to control, it may enforce its security right only by 
obtaining a court order under other law compelling the bank to pay 
the funds to it.22 The secured creditor has no right to demand payment 
simply on notification to the bank. In contrast, the depository bank, in 
its capacity as secured creditor with automatic control, is entitled to 
simply pay itself out of the funds in the account, and outside secured 
                                                 
17   Id. at § 9-342. 
18   Lynn M. LoPucki, Arvin I. Abraham & Bernd P. Delahaye, Optimizing 
English and American Security Interests, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1785, 1800 (2013); 
Jonathan C. Lipson, Secrets and Liens: The End of Notice in Commercial Finance Law, 21 
EMORY  BANKR.  DEV.  J. 421, 426 (2005). 
19   Under Article 9, control is the only method available for perfecting a 
security right in a deposit account as original collateral: U.C.C. § 9-312(b)(1) (2014). 
However, a security right in a deposit account perfected by control may come into 
conflict with one perfected by registration where the deposit account is claimed as 
proceeds of collateral perfected by public registration pursuant to U.C.C. § 9-315(c) 
and (d). In that event, the security interest perfected by control has priority under 
U.C.C. § 9-327(1). Under the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, while a security right 
in a deposit account may be made effective against third parties by registration even 
when the deposit account is original collateral (recommendation 49), the secured 
creditor who has obtained control has priority even against a prior registered secured 
creditor (recommendation 103). See UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 2. 
20   U.C.C. § 9-607(a)(4) (2014).  
21   Id. at § 9-607(a)(5). 
22   Id. at § 9-607, cmt. 7.  
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creditors who have obtained control are likewise entitled to self-help 
collection rights without the need for judicial intervention. 
As between the depository bank and outside secured creditors 
who seek to perfect a security right in a deposit account by control, the 
control regime privileges the depository bank. The depository bank is 
not obligated to enter into a control agreement with an outside secured 
creditor, even if its customer so requests, and even if it does not itself 
hold a security right in the account.23  If the bank does agree to enter 
into a control agreement, any security right the bank obtains in the 
deposit account has priority even if the control agreement was 
concluded before the bank acquired its security right.24  So in practice 
the outside secured creditor will also need to obtain the agreement of 
the depository bank to waive its priority. 
In theory, an outside secured creditor can be assured of priority 
over the depository bank by relying on the alternative method of 
control: becoming the bank’s customer with respect to the deposit 
account.25 This method of control gives it priority over any security 
interest acquired by the bank26 and terminates the bank’s set-off right 
for any claims it has against the debtor.27 However, this method of 
control requires the cooperation of the bank, so in practice the bank’s 
consent to waive its priority is needed.28 Nor is this method of control 
a feasible one for operating accounts to which the debtor needs regular 
access.29 
III.        OFFICIAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR SPECIAL CONTROL RULES 
The official justifications for the Article 9 control rules are not 
particularly convincing. With respect to the priority enjoyed by control 
secured creditors over those who have perfected by registration, the 
                                                 
23   Id. at § 9-342. 
24   Id. at § 9-327(3). 
25   Id. at § 9-104(a)(3). 
26   Id. at § 9-327(4). 
27   Id. at § 9-340(c).  
28   See, e.g., Willa E. Gibson, Banks Reign Supreme Under Revised Article 9 
Deposit Account Rules, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 819, 844 (2005). 
29   Markell, supra note 6, at 987; see also G.R. Warner, Deposit Accounts as 
Collateral under Revised Article 9, AM. BANKR. INST. J. 18 (Aug. 2000).  
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Official Comment states that secured creditors “for whom the deposit 
account is an integral part of the credit decision will, at a minimum, 
insist upon the right to immediate access to the deposit account upon 
the debtor’s default (i.e., control)” whereas those “for whom the 
deposit account is less essential will not take control.”30 The 
implication here seems to be that a secured creditor who demonstrates 
special reliance by taking the extra steps needed to obtain control 
should be rewarded for its efforts by a special priority.31 But this 
justification is predicated on circular reasoning, since a secured creditor 
would not have to take these extra steps if priority were instead 
predicated on the basis of the order of registration of the security 
rights. 
With respect to the priority generally enjoyed by the bank over 
outside secured creditors, the Official Comment explains that a “rule 
of this kind enables banks to extend credit to their depositors without 
the need to examine either the public record or their own records to 
determine whether another party might have a security interest in the 
deposit account.”32  But this is a conclusory statement, not a 
justification.  After all, all secured creditors would wish to be assured 
of receiving an automatic super-priority over prior-perfected secured 
creditors. Why privilege depository banks over other suppliers of 
secured credit? 
With respect to the automatic control enjoyed by the 
depository bank by virtue of its status, the official comment states that 
public notice is unnecessary since all actual and potential creditors are 
always on notice that the bank may assert a claim by virtue of its set-
off rights against the deposit account.33 The implication here is that 
awarding automatic control and a special priority to a depository 
bank’s security right does not put third parties in a more 
                                                 
30   U.C.C. § 9-327, cmt. 3 (2014). 
31   For an argument suggesting that this is the justification for control 
super-priority, see Randal C. Picker, Perfection Hierarchies and Nontemporal Priority Rules 
74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1157 (1999).  
32   U.C.C. § 9-327, cmt. 4 (2014). 
33   Id. at § 9‐ 104, cmt. 3 (“No other form of public notice is necessary; 
all actual and potential creditors of the debtor are always on notice that the bank with 
which the debtor’s deposit account is maintained may assert a claim against the 
deposit account.”). 
2015 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 4:1 
358 
disadvantageous position than they already occupy.  It is true that set-
off is not a security interest and as such is not subject to any public 
registration or other public notice requirement. However, a bank can 
only set-off obligations already owing to it by its customer at the time 
it receives notice of a competing claim.34 The concept of automatic 
control, combined with the special priority accorded to the depository 
bank’s security right, dispenses with the need for the bank to first 
ascertain whether notice has been received before extending credit and 
eliminates the potential for litigation concerning the relative timing of 
the receipt of notice and the extension of credit.35  It follows that the 
concept of automatic control without the need for public notice 
cannot be explained simply as a neutral and logical application of the 
consequences of set off.  Rather, it enhances the bank’s position 
relative to the set-off rights of other obligors. 
With respect to the right of the bank to refuse to disclose 
whether control has been obtained by an outside secured creditor, the 
Official Comment explains that this protects banks “from the need to 
respond to inquiries from persons other than their customers.”36  But 
requiring outside secured creditors to register notice of their security 
rights would equally relieve the bank from that burden while also 
serving to ensure public notice to competing creditors and other 
claimants. 
IV.         JUSTIFICATIONS FOR IMPORTING THE ARTICLE 9 CONTROL 
REGIME INTO CANADIAN LAW 
Writing in 2000, some Canadian commentators concluded that 
there was no justification for importing the Article 9 regime for deposit 
accounts into Canadian law.37 Why, they asked, should depository 
institutions be exempt from the general registration requirements and 
first-to-register priority rules applicable to the holders of security rights 
in other intangible obligations? And why should they enjoy what 
                                                 
34   See, e.g., CUMING, WALSH & WOOD, supra note 7, at 664.   
35   See UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 2, at 139, ¶ 144. 
36   U.C.C. § 9‐ 342, cmt 2 (2014). 
37   Ronald C.C. Cuming & Catherine Walsh, Revised Article 9 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code: Implications for the Canadian Personal Property Security Acts, 16 BANKING 
FIN. L. REV. 339, 364-68 (2001). 
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amounts in effect to a veto over the ability of a debtor to give an 
effective security interest in its deposit account to an outside creditor 
when the existing law, including the depository bank’s rights of set-off, 
would seem to offer it adequate protection against interference with 
ordinary banking practices? 
In recent years, the tide of opinion in Canada has swung 
heavily in favor of adoption of the Article 9 control approach.38 
Indeed, the province of Quebec already has introduced legislation to 
that end, and reforms are pending in the other provinces and 
territories.39 
A significant catalyst for the pending reforms was the 2009 
decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Caisse populaire Desjardins 
de l’Est de Drummond v. Canada.40 In that case, a customer had deposited 
$200,000 with a credit union subject to contractual terms that 
prevented the customer from withdrawing the deposit before the 
expiry of a five-year term and entitled the credit union to set-off any 
obligations owing under the line of credit it had extended to the 
customer and to refuse repayment of the deposit for the duration of 
the line of credit agreement.41 
The Supreme Court of Canada concluded that, while a mere 
contractual set-off right without more is not a security interest, the 
arrangement must be characterized as a security agreement in 
substance when a contractual set-off right is combined with other 
contractual terms designed to prevent the customer from withdrawing 
or otherwise dealing with the funds in its account until its own 
                                                 
38   See Ontario Bar Association, Perfecting Security Interests in Cash Collateral 
(Feb. 6, 2012), available at  
https://www.oba.org/CMSPages/GetFile.aspx?guid=c020380c-6c0a-496f-b4b1-
b44d6ac07eb5. 
39 See Michel Deschamps, Mathieu Dubord & Mary Jeanne Phelan, New 
Regime in Quebec for Security on Bank Deposits and Other Monetary Claims, MCCARTHY 
TETRAULT (May 15, 2015), http:// 
http://www.mccarthy.ca/article_detail.aspx?id=7105. See also ONTARIO MINISTRY 
OF GOVERNMENT AND CONSUMER SERVICES, BUSINESS LAW AGENDA: PRIORITY 
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS REPORT 9 (2015).  
40   Caisse populaire Desjardins de l’Est de Drummond v. Canada, [2009] 
2 S.C.R. 94 (Can.). 
41   Id. 
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obligations to the bank are satisfied.42 Although the decision related to 
the concept of security for the purposes of income tax legislation, it 
was widely seen as jeopardizing the use of “cash collateral” in the form 
of a customer’s right to the payment of money credited to a deposit 
account in the context of derivatives and securities lending 
transactions.43 Participants in these markets had thought they might 
protect their priority in “cash collateral” transactions by relying on 
“flawed asset” contractual arrangements under which the customer 
agrees that money deposited by the customer is not repayable until the 
occurrence of specified events. If these arrangements, as the Drummond 
case correctly implied,44 are characterized as giving rise to a security 
right in substance, it follows that they are required to be perfected by 
registration, and will be subordinated to any prior-registered 
competing security right unless the secured creditor obtains a 
subordination agreement.45 In contrast, adoption of an Article 9 
control approach would enable secured creditors and particularly 
banks to obtain a first ranking security right to deposit accounts in cash 
collateral transactions without the need to register and without any risk 
of subordination to prior-registered secured creditors. Consequently, 
in the wake of the Drummond decision, the financial industry stepped 
up its lobbying efforts to import the Article 9 treatment of deposit 
accounts into Canadian law46 with success now imminent. 
  
                                                 
42   Id. 
43   See, e.g., Anthony Duggan, The Australian PPSA From a Canadian 
Perspective: Some Comparative Reflections 11-13 (U. Toronto Law, Working Paper No. 
2014-03, 2014), available at 
http://www.law.utoronto.ca/utfl_file/count/documents/Duggan/WPS%202014-
3.pdf. 
44   CUMING, WALSH & WOOD, supra note 7, at 667, 143-46. 
45   Duggan, supra note 43, at 12. 
46   See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES ASSOCIATION 
(ISDA), ISDA LETTER TO ALBERTA AND ONTARIO GOVERNMENTS RE PROPOSAL 
FOR AMENDMENTS TO THE TREATMENT OF DEPOSIT ACCOUNTS UNDER THE PPSA 
(Apr. 13, 2010), available at http://www2.isda.org/regions/canada/page/3. 
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CONCLUSION 
Whatever the official explanation for the Article 9 control 
approach, the recent Canadian experience suggests that its primary 
purpose is to facilitate the use of deposit accounts in cash collateral 
transactions in derivatives and other financial markets. Dispensing 
with the public registration requirements and registration based 
temporal priority rules that traditionally have informed Canadian 
secured transactions law will come at a cost to creditors in the real 
economy. For example, secured creditors who finance a commercial 
debtor’s operating costs, including its acquisition of inventory, will no 
longer be able to rely on registration to give them an enforceable 
security right in the debtor’s deposit account. They will need to 
undergo the additional expense and effort of obtaining control, 
including negotiating the agreement of the bank with which the 
account is maintained to waive its own priority. Unsecured creditors 
are also disadvantaged. At present, they can determine whether it is 
worth their time and expense to obtain a judgment and garnish their 
debtors’ deposit accounts by searching the registry to verify whether 
any security rights have been granted in those accounts. While these 
creditors still would be subject to any set off rights enjoyed by the 
bank, they would at least know that those set off rights would be 
limited to the credit extended to the bank at the time of enforcement 
against the bank. 
Recent scholarship argues that, while facilitating the extension 
of secured credit has a positive impact on economic growth when it is 
directed to the real economy, its effect when channeled to the financial 
economy may be destructive, generating price bubbles and subsequent 
debt deflation.47 If that argument is correct, we may yet come to regret 
dismantling the general requirements of secured transactions law in 
order to facilitate the extension of credit based on deposit account 
collateral in financial markets48 while increasing the cost of and thereby 
                                                 
47   For an analysis of the scholarship, see Richter, supra note 3. 
48   Id. at 10-11 (discussing the Financial Collateral Directive in the 
European Union, which, in a similar vein to the Article 9 control regime, seeks to 
exempt financial collateral from most of the formal requirements traditionally 
imposed on security arrangements).  
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diminishing the extension of credit to financers of real economy 
services and products.49  
 
                                                 
49   This is not to reject altogether the proposition that some protection of 
the finality of ‘cash collateral’ transactions in financial markets may be justified to 
contain systemic risk. Rather, it is a plea for a more nuanced and targeted modality. 
In this respect, consider, for example, the amendments effected to the Canadian 
Payment Clearing and Settlement Act (S.C. 1996, c. 6, Sch.) in 2012 to add a provision (s. 
8(1)(c)) to protect the finality of payments made or property delivered or transferred 
“in accordance with the settlement rules of designated clearing and settlement 
systems” notwithstanding anything in any Canadian or provincial statute (including 
provincial secured transactions statutes). 
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INTRODUCTION 
In order to ease the study of the science of commercial law, 
the subject has been classified in four large universes: (1) persons, (2) 
objects of commerce, (3) legal instruments derived from business 
relations, and (4) administrative and jurisdictional procedures. The 
administrative procedures are held in front of administrative courts 
and the jurisdictional procedures in front of judicial courts. 
Within the universe of commercial relations, where persons 
and objects converge, all legal instruments are, and operate as, a 
support for commercial exchanges. An example of this is commercial 
contracts, which due to their nature are known in this universe as 
atypical contracts1. 
In the large world of business transactions, the central aspect 
that stands out is the commercial enterprise, that is, the “juridical 
person.” To ensure that enterprises may conduct their activity they 
require a “juridical personality,” which allows for the exercise of rights 
and fulfillment of obligations that lead us to the study of legitimation. 
The legal instruments most widely used by corporations are the 
atypical contracts. These legal instruments lead us to analyze the 
juridical person, taking into consideration that it implies another 
extensive field of study known as the “delimitation of competence of 
the parties” who participate in the contract, as generating entities of 
rights and duties, that revolves around legitimation of personality, 
which, at the same time, could be a point of dispute in business 
transactions. 
The problem about the legitimation of personality, 
notwithstanding that apparently accepted the terms juridical person 
and juridical personality, the scope of legal consequences for both, 
provoke incalculable and diverse conflicts (the lack of legitimation for 
act in name of a company, when the legal representative acts without 
authorization of the part involved) not only at domestic level, but also 
                                                 
1   Atypical contracts are those whose content has no control or the 
discipline does not exist in the legislation regarding to the relationship in private law 
between individuals who contract 
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at regional and global levels. This can be positive, in that it can enrich 
the rules of the International Chamber of Commerce and improve 
model laws that provide cross-border judicial support. However, this 
can also have a negative impact, giving rise  to large and spiraling 
expenses, when one of the parties must ask for consultant support 
because they do not know the language (procedural rules and 
regulations of the proceedings), in the administrative or judicial 
proceedings. 
To analyze the subject matter of this study, the “juridical 
person,” which has been a topic for discussion since the 19th century 
up to the 21st century, a consultation among authors including 
Bonnecase, Carnelutti, Savigny, Hans Kelsen, Nicolai Hartman, 
Ferrara, De Benito, Garcia Maynez, Rudolph Von Ihering, has been a 
strict scientific commitment, concluding with the personal 
contribution provided by Arcelia Quintana, has been updated. 
I.         PERSON 
A person is juridically classified in two groups: natural persons 
and juridical persons.2 The first group refers to a human being, who is 
an individual being capable of assuming obligations and capable of 
holding rights. The second group refers to those entities endowed with 
juridical personality who are usually known as a collective person,3 
social person,4 or legal entity. In this paper, the term “entity” will be 
often used when referring to this second group. 
II.         GENERAL CONCEPT 
                                                 
2   ARCELIA QUINTANA, COMMERCIAL LAW SCIENCE 270 (2d ed. 2004). 
3   The term collective legal entity is used by Francisco Carnelutti and it 
has been the subject of studies in various areas of general law. See FRANCISCO 
CARNELUTTI, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW 153 (1955). 
4   See JOSE L. DE BENITO, THE LEGAL PERSONHOOD OF COMPANIES 
AND 32 (1955).  
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A.         Etymology. 
Beginning with an etymological understanding of “person,” we 
must reconcile the juridical fiction with what the law defines as a 
juridical person. 
The word “person” has multiple meanings.5 From an 
etymological sense this word is derived from personare,6 a term that 
denotes larva histrionalis, meaning “mask.” In this manner, the person 
acted as the mask covering the face of an actor who recited verses 
during a scene in a play because the purpose of the mask was to make 
the actor’s voice resonant and loud. Later, people used the term 
“person” in reference to the masked actor himself. In view of the 
above, it is quite understandable to associate the person as a natural 
being of the human species.7 
B.         Doctrine. 
The term “person” has been an important concept in the 
general scope of law, in civil matters. 
In order to determine what should be understood by “person,” 
diverse legal scholars have created varied studies attempting to clarify 
its origin. 
These studies described below express and analyze diverse 
positions developed by different legal scholars8 whose ideas have 
served as a model to identify the different trends of thought explaining 
the juridical person. In the intelligence that we exclusively expect to 
establish for science of commercial law effect, the relevant items that 
                                                 
5   See EDUARDO G. MAYNEZ, INTRODUCTION TO LAW 273 (Porrúa 31st 
ed. 1980). 
6   See id. (Aulo Gelio quoted by Garcia Maynez, determined through their 
glossological research that the origins of the word “person” are unclear but most 
likely derives from the word “pesonare”). 
7   ROYAL SPANISH ACADEMY, DICTIONARY OF SPANISH LANGUAGE, 
voice, person (Espasa, 1593). 
8   Among the authors who have devoted themselves to the study of the 
“person” are Francisco Ferrara, Hans Kelsen, Francisco Carnelutti, M.F.C. de 
Savigny, Joseph L. Benito, and Eduardo Garcia Maynez, whose works are reviewed 
in this paper. 
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allow us to specify on the commercial matter what we should 
understand by “legal entity” or “juridical person” as an entity capable 
of having obligations and rights. 
Francisco Carnelutti9 understands “person” in a triangular 
sense. He views the subject as the vertex in which the personal interest 
(economic element) and the subjective right (legal element) coincide in 
a legal relationship. 
 
For Carnelutti, the person is the “meeting point of these two 
elements, that is, the crux of the matter where both converge.”10 
Carnelutti clarifies that the juridical person is not only the man 
considered in his individuality. Instead, Carnelutti affirms that where 
collective interest exists, i.e. leading several men as one, unity is allowed 
to emerge, and personality as a unit will be acquired. 
The collective juridical person, as Carnelutti expresses, is 
created when the economic element and the juridical element of the 
relationship is the meeting point of more than one man, which is the 
fundamental principle of this unification of the collective interest. 
For Carnelutti, a juridical person is a natural or individual 
person as well as a collective or compound person,11 and both hold a 
common characteristic: they are the meeting point of the economic 
and juridical element. The latter differs from the fact that it is not a 
single individual in that position, instead it is two or more individuals 
who are united by a collective interest. 
                                                 
9   See FRANCISCO CARNELUTTI, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW 149 (1955). 
10   Id. 
11   Id. at 143. 
Legal subject 
(person) 
Personal Interest 
(economic element) 
Substantive Law 
(legal element) 
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Julien Bonnecase12 on the other hand, defines the juridical 
personality law as a set of rules and institutions that apply to the person 
itself, in its individuation and its power of action. For him, the 
personality law is classified in three parts: 
1. The existence and individuation of persons, which means 
the set of elements that allow on one hand social 
distinction of the person, and on the other hand, a 
determination of juridical effect. The elements that allow 
for further distinction are its name, its legal status, and its 
address. 
2. The legal capacity of natural persons and their variations: 
on one hand the guidelines of the organization in regard to 
capacity of natural persons and their variations (capacity to 
enjoy and exercise capacity with their limits), and on the 
other hand the study of the legal bodies which substitute 
for the incapacity of natural persons. 
3. The existence, individuation, and capacity of legal entities 
or juridical persons, which is the subject matter of this 
paper. 
M.F.C. de Savigny13 is the strongest proponent of the 
traditional theory, better known as the theory of fiction. 
From the analysis of Savigny’s proposed theories, it is 
understood that the legal entity is an artificially-created being, capable 
of having a patrimony, but distinguished by its lack of will. Savigny 
concludes that a “person” is any entity capable of having obligations 
and rights because the juridical persons are legal fictions, therefore they 
do not have free will and are not subjects of law. According to this 
trend of thought, the term “person” applies only to the human being 
                                                 
12   See 1 JULIEN BONNECASE, ELEMENTS OF CIVIL LAW 281 (Jose M. 
Cajica trans.,  1945). 
13   His book, Modern Roman Law System, elaborated on the foundations of 
his theory of fiction, which dominated from the mid-nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. See M.F.C. SAVIGNY, MODERN ROMAN LAW SYSTEM 304 (Jacinto Mesía 
& Manuel Poley trans., 2009). 
2015 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 4:1 
370 
because it holds the will to acquire rights and duties, and for the same 
reason, becomes a subject of law. 
Hans Kelsen14 argues that according to the traditional theory, 
a “subject of law” refers to the object of a legal obligation or subjective 
right. This is known as the juridical power to claim an action for the 
enforcement of an obligation. In view of this juridical power, the 
subject participates in the production of the court judgement 
considered as an individual norm that will rule on the enforcement of 
the penalty derived from that default. 
In sum, for Kelsen15 the natural person and the juridical person 
are merely a set of rights and obligations which, when taken together, 
are metaphorically expressed as the concept of “person.” In this way, 
the natural or juridical person as a holder has legal obligations and 
subjective rights which are metaphorically expressed in the concept of 
person, which is nothing more than the personification of that unity. 
Garcia Maynez16 defines a “person” as “any being capable of 
having powers and duties.” He maintains that juridical persons are 
classified as either natural persons or legal entities. While the first 
group refers to human beings as a subject of rights and obligations, the 
second group focuses on those associations endowed with personality 
such as unions or commercial corporations. Maynez prefers to 
distinguish between the two groups by using the terms “individual 
juridical person” and “collective juridical person”17 with the purpose 
of distinguish them.” In a moral or ethical sense, a “person” is a subject 
endowed with free will and reason, capable of establishing its own 
purposes freely as well as finding means to complete them. 
Maynez affirms from an ethical point of view, and in 
accordance with the thesis of the German philosopher Nicolai 
Hartmann,18 that a “person” is the subject whose conduct is able to 
                                                 
14   See HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 178 (Robert J. Vernengo 
trans., 2000). 
15   Id. at 183. 
16   See EDUARDO G. MAYNEZ, INTRODUCTION TO LAW 21 (31st ed., 
1980). 
17   Id. 
18   Id. at 274-275. 
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express moral values. He clarifies that those values do not necessarily 
determine its conduct, in such a manner that ethically speaking, free 
will is one of the essential attributions of personality. 
The juridical meaning of a natural person is related with 
determination if the juridical personality is the necessary consequence 
of its quality as a human being; in a sense that the juridical personality 
of the individual does not derive from his human existence. 
In respect to the concept of legal entity, Maynez states that it 
should be viewed through the “theories of juridical personality of 
collective beings.”19 
 Theory of Fiction (Savigny). Savigny sustains that a person 
is any being capable of obligations and rights, and rights 
are only for beings who are endowed with will, therefore, 
the juridical subjectivity of collective persons is a result of 
this fiction, since such beings do not have a free will.20 
 Theory of Rights without Subject (Brinz). Brinz classifies 
the patrimony in two categories: personal and non-
personal, also known as patrimonies attached to a 
destination or purpose. In the first category they belong to 
a subject, while in the second category they do not have an 
owner, but their destination is addressed by a particular 
purpose and enjoys special legal guarantees. Here, although 
the rights exist, they do not belong to anyone but to 
something.21 
 Realist Theories. The realist theories affirm that private 
and public juridical persons are realities, therefore, the 
concept of subject of law is not limited to man, and does 
                                                 
19   Id. at 278-94. 
20   Id. at 278. 
21   Id. at 282–83 (stating that, “[t]he rights and obligations of collective 
persons are not, according to the Brinz thesis, the obligations and rights of a subject, 
but of its assets. The acts carried out by the former’s agents are not exactly those of 
the legal person but rather those of the agents that carry out the objectives and reach 
the goal toward which the assets are dedicated.  Despite this, all rights are, a fortiori, 
the legal power of someone and any obligation necessarily implies the existence of 
an obligee.”).  
2015 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 4:1 
372 
not exclusively refer to beings endowed with will. These 
theories also include the “organicism,”22 the collective soul 
theory,23 and the thesis of the social organism.24 
 Theory of Francisco Ferrara. For this author, the word 
“person” has three meanings: a biological sense, which is 
equal to a man; a philosophical sense, which is identified 
with a rational being capable of proposing and carrying out 
purposes; and the juridical sense which understands the 
person as a subject with rights and obligations.25 
Specifically for this juridical sense Ferrara states that it is a 
way things are, because behind the person there is not any 
other thing but associations and corporate organizations.26 
Maynez27 expressed a critique to Ferrara’s ideas, stating that the 
recognition of juridical personality by the substantive law does not 
have constitutive effectiveness. That is to say, the juridical person is 
not born at the discretion of the legislator, the only thing the legislator 
does is to recognize its existence. 
The diversity of the approaches around the concept of person 
make it necessary to contemplate the following comparative table to 
clearly understand the concept: 
                                                 
22   Id. at 287 (organicism is based on the notion that “collective entities 
are real entities compared to the human individual.”). 
23   According to this school of thought, in every society there exists a soul 
or collective spirit that is different than the individual souls of those who make up 
the group, which is why it is not problematic that collective legal entities coexist 
alongside physical persons. 
24   Id. at 287 (The chief proponent of the theory of social organism is Otto 
Gierke, who says that “the collective person is not like a third party compared to its 
members, it is the organic link that binds them together, from which stems the 
possibility of connecting the rights of the unit and the whole. The corporative person 
is undoubtedly above, but not separate from, the collective group of persons who 
make it up; . . . it is an entity that is both unique and collective.”). 
25   Id. at 288. 
26   See FRANCISCO FERRARA, THEORY OF LEGAL PERSONS 342 (Eduardo 
Shepherd & Maury trans., 1929). 
27   See EDUARDO G. MAYNEZ, INTRODUCTION TO LAW 294 (31st ed. 
1980). 
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Person Doctrinal Concept 
FRANCISCO 
CARNELUTTI 
Is the meeting point between the economic 
element and the juridical element. 
M.F.C. DE 
SAVIGNY 
Person is any being capable of obligations 
and rights, who is endowed with will. 
HANS KELSEN The object of a legal obligation or 
subjective right. 
EDUARDO 
GARCÍA 
MÁYNEZ 
Any being capable of having powers and 
duties. 
EDUARDO 
GARCÍA 
MÁYNEZ 
As a subject with rights and obligations. 
 
In this study, the first authors are from the classical theory and 
the last authors are from modern theory, demonstrating that the theory 
itself has not changed. Thus, the comparative analysis of classical 
theory and modern theory becomes more explicit. 
III.        ELEMENTS THAT SHAPE THE LEGAL ENTITY 
As the concept of “person” has been analyzed in its 
etymological sense and by the main exponents of the doctrine, it is 
now necessary to study the elements that contribute to the juridical 
person. 
A.         Doctrine 
As mentioned, for Kelsen both natural persons and legal 
entities hold physical rights and obligations. In principle, only the 
human being is considered a person, because it is exactly its conduct 
that may infer a right, comply with or fail an obligation. Both natural 
and juridical persons express conduct which is understood as the 
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content of juridical obligations and subjective rights that conform to 
this unity. 
In reference to the duties of the juridical person, its bylaws, as 
internal regulations, determine or constrain the conduct of the 
individual who-as a body of the same-fulfills or violates the obligation. 
This circumstance of non-fulfilment in the juridical person is known 
as the “fictitious attribution”28 which allows for the consideration of 
the legal entity as capable of being bound by obligations. 
As to the subjective rights of the juridical person, Kelsen 
believes that they are exercised by a body of administration contained 
in the bylaws, and shall be conferred to the legal entity according to 
the bylaws.29 According to this author, the bylaws acquire validity by 
means of a juridical transaction determined by state order. 
Finally, Kelsen30 defines the juridical personality of the legal 
entity, which means that the legal order provides obligations and rights 
and their content is the conduct of human beings who are the bodies 
or members of the corporation organized by its bylaws and may be 
described with advantages by means of a personification of the 
corporation´s charter. 
The elements of the legal entity deduced from the theory of 
Kelsen are the following: 
 The being or artificial person; 
 Conduct; 
 Legal capacity; 
 Subjective rights; 
 Obligations; 
                                                 
28   See HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 196 (Robert J. Vernengo 
trans., 2000). 
29   Id. at 191. 
30   Id. at 199. 
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 The will; and 
 Juridical personality. 
José L. De Benito,31 from his point of view, sets forth the 
following as “conditions” for the existence of a juridical or corporate 
person: 
 Plurality of individuals; 
 Cooperation; 
 Organization; 
 Exclusive patrimonial capacity; and 
 Corporate purpose. 
The elements of a juridical person defined by Carnelutti are as 
follows: 
 Legal capacity; 
 Juridical personality; 
 Economic element; and 
 Juridical element. 
B.         Personal opinion of the author 
 The elements that contribute to the formation of a legal 
person are the following: 
 Existence of a being or subject: A subject of law is any 
being capable to act as holder of powers, or liable with 
                                                 
31   Professor of the National Academy of Legislation and Jurisprudence 
of the National Association of Historians of the Spanish Science. De Benito refers 
to the personality not as an element of the legal person, but as the result of a 
combination of the five elements. For him, that personality is the recognition the 
person expresses in front of the public.  
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obligations in a juridical relationship. The term subject of 
law or juridical being alludes to an unspecified person in 
terms of strict law. 
 Will of the subject or being. The action of a subject with 
the intention of producing certain legal effects, and should 
be highlighted its importance for the law, since this will 
should be also expressed in an appropriate manner to 
produce legal consequences. 
 Subjective rights. This refers to the power of the juridical 
norms which is granted to express or omit certain conduct 
that ensures the judicial protection. 
 Juridical personality. This section requires a study to be 
discussed separately. 
 Obligations. The obligation is understood as the existing 
juridical bond between the demand of a subjective right by 
its holder and the duty to fulfill the conduct based on the 
norm that is imposed on the other subject who belongs to 
the relationship. 
 Economic interests. 
C.         Juridical personality. 
In the juridical field, the word personality has several meanings. 
It is often used to indicate the quality of a person to be considered as 
a center of juridical norms or as a subject of rights and obligations. 
For the purpose of taking part of juridical relationships, the 
legal entity needs the so-called personality as an element that 
individualizes the entity. It is helpful to distinguish the legal entity from 
a different subject of law with a will that may be found in a similar 
factual circumstance. 
1. Theories of personality - This study analyzes the most 
emblematic theories of personality that intended to explain personality 
in relation to business corporations, such as the patrimony 
appropriation theory, the theory of the apparent subject, the atomistic 
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theory of the state, the theory of fiction, the theory of the legal act, and 
the controversial theory of veil. 
We have mentioned that, except for the theory of the legal act 
which establishes the difference between “person” and “personality,” 
none of these theories explains what personality is, but analyze the 
juridical person in general. Even so, these theories have been described 
by authors such as Garcia Maynez32 and Cervantes Ahumad, among 
others, as “theories of personality” even when considering the juridical 
person itself rather than its personality. 
Finally, we should emphasize the exposure of the reference 
theories can be viewed through Franciscos Ferrara33 in his work 
“Theory of Legal Persons.” This author developed, in an objective and 
systematic way, the study of the doctrinal ideas now discussed, which 
in turn have been studied by several authors such as Garcia Maynez34, 
Mantilla Molina35 and Antonio Brunetti.36 
(1)   The patrimony appropriation theory. - This theory 
considers that there exists the same legal protection to one good and 
one person in a legal relationship than such created between patrimony 
and purpose. In this manner, the purpose receives rights and 
obligations, that is to say, a patrimony appropriated or earmarked for 
certain purpose. 
In this theory there are no elements to identify what personality 
is, even when intending to put on the same level one subject of law 
with a “purpose” with rights, understood as patrimony that is able to 
generate rights and obligations; however, an inert patrimony is not 
susceptible of creating de jure relationships. For such effects, a volitive 
being or person is required, whether it is natural or juridical, because 
juridical relationships presuppose the expression of a conduct that 
produces consequences of law. At the time one subject expresses or 
                                                 
32   EDUARDO G. MAYNEZ, INTRODUCTION TO LAW 278 (31st ed. 1980). 
33   It is worth mentioning that Ferrara is located, by temporality, very close 
to the time that such doctrinal positions were exposed. See FRANCISCO FERRARA, 
THEORY OF LEGAL PERSONS 122 (Eduardo Shepherd & Maury trans., 1929). 
34   MAYNEZ, supra note 32, at 274, 280, 293.  
35   ROBERTO L. MANTILLA MOLINA, COMMERCIAL LAW 207 (29th ed. 
2002)  
36   ANTONIO BRUNETTI, JOINT STOCK COMPANY 45 (1960). 
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personifies himself juridically, it is required that this subject has will 
because only in that way is it possible to produce consequences of law, 
which also allows individualization of the volitive subject in respect to 
other persons who intervene in those relationships. 
(2)   Theory of the apparent subject. - The theory of the 
apparent subject was developed by Rudolph Von Ihering,37 who argues 
that the law consists of two elements. One element is substantial, 
which resides in the practical end that produces utility or enjoyment of 
the things that have economic or moral value, and, the other element, 
formal, is only related to this aim as a means of enjoyment protection; 
so this author asserts: “the rights are interests juridically protected; the 
law is the legal certainty of enjoyment.”38 
For Ihering, only the natural person has personality because it 
is the sole recipient of the protected interests (the above mentioned), 
contrary to juridical persons who do not enjoy said prerogative. The 
juridical personality of legal entities is something that is not inherent 
to the quality of man because personality does not derive from the will 
of natural persons. 
Although the legal entity has its own legal interests, this does 
not mean that personality resides essentially in norms. This is because 
even when law is effectively “a set of substantive and adjective 
norms”39 used to regulate the life of man; these norms by themselves 
do not create personality, in contrast, they only recognize a situation 
can be useful as a factor of individualization for the volitive subject, 
even when this subject suffers a reduction in its capacity. 
(3)   Atomistic theory of the state. - This theory stems from 
the idea that the creation of the State is grounded in the conception of 
                                                 
37   Rudolf Von Ihering was born in Aurich, Germany in 1818. His legal 
training took place at the universities of Heidelberg, Munich, Göttingen, and Berlin. 
He served as a teacher in Basel, Rostok, Kiel, Gissen, Vienna, and Göttingen, where 
he died in 1892. His methodological points of view had a great impact on the field 
of historical legal research and the science of law in general. 
38   RUDOLF VON IHERING, THE SPIRIT OF ROMAN LAW 1033, 1040 
(1998). 
39   ARCELIA QUINTANA, COMMERCIAL LAW SCIENCE 6 (2d ed. 2004) (the 
law is “a set of substantive and procedural rules issued by the state and that govern, 
during the time in which they are in effect, members of a society in a given 
territory.”). 
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Ihering. This means that only men are a reality and are able to act, 
therefore, personality is an attribution for individuals only, not for the 
State. 
The juridical person in private law is conceived as a fact ruled 
by the legal order. A personality, then, is when the law recognizes the 
pursuit of a common purpose by a collection of individuals, as if the 
pursuit was done by a single person. This emerges when personality is 
linked with a situation of fact40 recognized by the juridical norm, as a 
factor of individualization of the volitive being, and it does not imply 
that a sole statement defines the personality, because the recognition 
of the norm is a requirement as well as the will of the being whose 
norm should be individualized. 
(4)   Theory of fiction. - Friedrich Karl Savigny41 supported 
the theory of fiction, which is considered the most disseminated and 
the oldest since it prevailed until the first half of the 19th century in 
Germany, and the middle of the 20th century in Italy and France42.In 
conformity with this stance, only man has capacity to be a holder of 
rights and obligations. 
The theory of fiction sets forth the idea that the juridical 
person or legal entity represents an exception to the principle that only 
the natural person has capacity to act as holder of rights and 
obligations. This is a result of a legal fiction that recognizes the artificial 
capacity for possession or ownership of property43 by a fictitious being. 
Savigny defines the juridical person as a subject of goods who 
was created artificially, by virtue of the fact that said being only 
develops his capacity or juridical personality within the limit of the 
domain of goods, which are the only means to reach the purposes it 
was created for. 
                                                 
40   The expression “situation of fact” is used in strict law way, understood 
as factual circumstance which necessarily produce legal consequences. 
41   Karl Friedrich Savigny (1779-1861) was born in Frankfurt, Germany. 
He studied at the University of Gitinga and University of Merburg, and was a 
professor of law in Universitu of Merburg, University of Landshut and at University 
of Berlin. He was a leader in the field of legal history.  
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The theory of fiction confuses personality with the capacity to 
act; likewise, this theory puts in the same level the natural persons, who 
are incapable juridically, with collective juridical persons. When 
considering that fictitious subjects of law and those affected by a capitis 
deminutio, are not able to personify themselves or express their will in 
juridical relationships by themselves, in consequence, they require a 
representative to exercise the personality – capacity to act – that law 
provides them in a fictitious manner. 
(5)   Theory of the legal act. - Ferrara,44 when referring to the 
juridical personality of the legal entity, argues that juridical personality 
is not a thing, but instead a way things are. The juridical personality is 
the organic vestment used by certain groups of men or establishments 
to introduce themselves in the life of law, it is the legal configuration 
certain groups of men assume in order to participate in commerce. The 
personality is a juridical seal that comes from the outside to 
superimpose on these phenomena of association and social order, 
which may facilitate, vary, or change the substratum of the substance 
subject to this juridical seal which is always a collectivity or a social 
organization. For this reason, there is not a substantial difference 
between corporations and non-recognized associations. Both have an 
identical substratum, and the recognition of personality does not have 
value other than granting to these pluralities of individuals´ variables, 
which are the most appropriate form of a juridical unit.45 
As derived from the theory subject matter of this section, the 
legal order does not create juridical person; it only recognizes them as 
individualized subjects with pre-existing rights and duties in the social 
reality. This legal recognition is the element that comes to construct its 
personality. 
Juridical personality is a juridical fiction due to juridical person 
exists by rule of law and it is necessary emphasizes it. It is necessary to 
understand the rights and duties applicable to the juridical person; as 
they are still the origin of legal disputes. 
(6)   Theory of veil. - This stance arises from the argument 
that it is possible to “penetrate” the legal entity raising its “formal veil” 
                                                 
44   See FRANCISCO FERRARA, THEORY OF LEGAL PERSONS 342 (Eduardo 
Shepherd & Maury trans., 1929). 
45   Id. 
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up. The theory covers the same in situations where a determined 
corporate form confers directly to partners the legal consequences 
from acts this entity executed to disregard it or set said legal entity 
aside, with the purpose that partners respond to corporate transactions 
they made with personal purposes under the protection of the 
corporate structure in question, causing a patrimonial detriment to 
third parties or evading legal prohibitions, that as a natural person, they 
could have not overcome. 
The legal scholar Rolf Serick is recognized as the pioneer in the 
systematization of the study based on the analysis of diverse court 
decisions. The theory of veil has its origin in United States law, having 
as a frame of reference the precedent of diverse judicial resolutions 
issued by United States courts, as well as opinions from different legal 
scholars. This trend of thought is known as the “theory of disregard” 
or doctrine of the “disregard of legal entity”. 
The argument supporting this theory begins from the “abuse” 
by partners of the juridical personality by commercial corporations 
when they use it as “screen” for a personal benefit. These partners hide 
behind “the veil” that covers them with a corporate structure, failing 
contractual obligations that infringe third parties interests and evading 
the law. 
Frederick James Powell is considered one of the most 
representative propenents of the theory of disregard in the United 
States. He has defined this theory as “the non-recognition of the 
juridical personality of a commercial corporation in a concrete case, 
which allows said legal entity to reach natural or juridical persons 
behind the same, including the underlying economic reality, in order 
to apply them the corresponding positive law for the concrete 
situation.”46 
In English law, Laurence Cecil Bartlett Gower47 classifies the 
cases in which partners are permitted to “prescind” from the legal 
personality of a commercial corporation into four categories: 1) cases 
related to tax matters; 2) cases of sole partner corporations; 3) cases in 
                                                 
46   Id. at 30 (citing Nicolas H. Oreggia). 
47   Id. at 21. 
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which corporations develop their activity with fraudulent purposes; 4) 
holdings and subsidiaries. 
On the other hand, when making a severe critique to the 
concept of juridical person, the supporters of the contractual theory 
assure there are not absolute and invariable concepts, and the juridical 
person should be subject to an examination; especially, if under its 
scope there is an abuse of the legal personality. 
Now then, the applicability of this theory has used the 
technique of disregard of a legal entity, which consists of setting aside 
the juridical personality of the being, penetrating in the personal 
substratum of the partners (shareholders), “raising the veil up” of the 
legal entity. 
In Mexican Positive law48, which also involves in an implied 
manner, the non-recognition of said personality, as an essential 
element of the legal entity which will cause to deny that commercial 
corporations are subjects or rights different to those granted to 
partners who gave rise to its foundation. 
The above would contradict the principle contained in Article 
2 of the Law of Commercial Corporations, which recognizes a 
personality in legal and illegal corporations, with the requirement for 
the latter to reveal themselves as such before third parties. 
As a conclusion, we may affirm that juridical personality is 
conceived as a “veil” that covers the legal entity, which may be raised 
up or uncovered in case of its abuse and use by the partners for their 
personal benefit in prejudice of third parties or to evade the 
applicability of legal provisions, which, as individual persons would fail 
to observe, provided, however, that making use of said person and its 
personality they do overcome such obstacles for their personal benefit. 
                                                 
48   The theory of the abuse of the juridical personality, the theory of the 
underestimation of the personality, the raising up of the veil (to mention only some 
of the names given to this theory). 
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2. Requirements for the legal personality. - The requirements that 
help to construct or concrete the legal personality, and, at the same 
time, establish its juridical concept are the following: 
First of all, the patrimony appropriation theory, the theory of 
the apparent subject, the atomist theory of the State and the theory of 
fiction identify personality as something innate to man, therefore they 
use as synonyms the terms person and personality, even when there 
are different juridical figures. Likewise, they associate personality with 
will or capacity. For that reason, these theories affirm that only the 
natural person holds a real personality, since a human being exclusively 
has a will, the collective beings are only a fiction or an appearance. 
Different from the theories cited above, the theory of legal act 
recognizes the own will to the legal entity, and it also distinguishes 
person and personality. 
In order to produce the individualization of the subject of law, 
three requirements must be fulfilled. These refer in a certain manner 
to the real factor and the formal factor: 
1. The existence of a being or a subject of law. To specify the 
personality we require the existence of a being or a subject 
of law, a volitional entity considered legally real, that could 
be expressed in juridical relations. 
2. A situation of fact that individualizes it in the holdership 
of rights and the fulfillment of obligations. Juridical 
relations, who can be established as a result of a natural 
phenomenon, achieve this or the will externalized by that 
subject. In such a way that this one is situated or has a status 
which allows to differentiate it from the other volitive 
subjects; that is, it is legally individualized. 
3. The recognition of individualization by the normative legal 
order. This third requirement refers to legitimation49 of the 
                                                 
49   Legitimacy comes from –legitimo- that, in turn derives from the Latin 
legitimus (-a, um). In common language it means “under the rules”. In the legal 
literature, legitimus means, “according to law”, “fair”. For the Romans, “designate 
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volitive subject as a holder of determined rights or certain 
obligations in a juridical relationship. It is necessary that 
the being or volitive subject and the situation of fact are 
under a legal rule in order to individualize that person, that 
is, acquire a certain legal status. 
In conclusion, personality is established when a legal 
assumption is updated in reality as long as it is foreseen in a general 
norm of law that describes a determined situation of fact where the 
subject or undetermined person is, with the purpose to individualize it 
as a holder of determined rights or certain obligations in a specific 
juridical relationship. 
IV.         PERSONALITY IN THE COMMERCIAL LEGISLATION. 
In Mexican commercial legislation there is no precept that 
defines juridical personality, even when the term is also used by said 
legislation; especially in adjective or procedural aspects. Thus, the legal 
provisions that refer to the juridical person generally do it in function 
of the necessary quality that one person shall have to intervene in 
certain legal act or legal transaction of a commercial nature.50 
In other commercial laws,51 the term is used in reference to the 
fact that certain beings who belong to the State, in charge of regulating 
                                                 
something practiced or maintained as correct; produces a favorable reaction, 
approval.” 
50   Código de Comercio [CCo.], as amended, art. 391, Diario Oficial de la 
Federación [DO], 17 de abril de 2012 (Mex.) (unless the otherwise agree, the assignor 
of goodwill will answer only for the legitimacy of the credit and for the personality 
from who made the assigment).  
51   Among these bodies of regulatory law are the Ley de Cámaras 
Empresariales y sus Confederaciones y del Código de Comercio [Law of Chambers 
of Commerce and their Confederations], as amended art. 4, Diario Oficial de la 
Federación [DO], 30 de abril de 2009 (Mex.); Ley de la Casa de Moneda de México 
[Law of the Mint of Mexico], art. 2, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 20 de 
enero de 1986 (Mex.); Ley Federal de Proteccion al Consumidor [LPC] [Federal 
Consumer Protection Law], Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO] 24 de diciembre 
de 1992 (Mex.); Ley General de Sociedades Mercantiles [LGSM] [General Law for 
Commercial Corporations], Diario Oficial de la Federacion [DO], 4 de agosto de 
1934 (Mex.). 
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several aspects of the commercial activity, have juridical personality of 
their own, without expressing what it means. 
The reference to personality cited in said legal systems is 
generally in a negative way, that is, it refers to the inexistence or loss 
of the same; it is a contrario sensu circumstance that allows to affirm that 
persons shall demonstrate the existence of that element to execute 
certain juridical acts. 
The adjective precepts of the Commercial Code52 that rule this 
juridical figure, do not provide a definition thereof; however, its 
meaning is understood when determining that judges shall examine ex 
officio the personality of the parties. They even foresee that litigants may 
challenge such of their counterpart, when it is considered that the 
plaintiff or defendant does not have the juridical quality he holds and 
appears in court. 
It is possible to conclude derived from the analysis above, 
related to several commercial provisions in which it is proven the 
concept of legal personality that we expressed as a personal opinion, it 
is the appropriate because such element holds a practical applicability. 
V.         THE PERSONALITY IN JURISPRUDENCE. 
The criteria that has been established in federal courts does not 
provide a clear concept of what personality is, because the courts are 
limited to produce the text of the law with some variations, when 
establishing that “personality is a matter that shall be examined in any 
status of a trial and even ex officio since it is the fundamental basis of 
the procedure.”53 
In reference to a commercial corporation that appears at a trial, 
it is necessary to show two personalities. First, from the juridical as a 
legal entity who is legitimated in the legal cause. Second, as the one 
from its representative, being understood that the latter shall prove it 
                                                 
52   Código de Comercio [CCo.], art. 1056–62 (regulating personhood and 
the legal capacity of the parties).  
 
53   See Jurisprudential Thesis II, Personhood: Its Study can be made in any Stage 
of Trial, Even Officiously, Semanario Judicial de la Federación 1917-1995 41.  
2015 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 4:1 
386 
has sufficient powers to act on behalf of the other, which should have 
been granted by the corporate body authorized for said purposes. The 
above has been considered by the jurisprudential criteria by the Second 
Courtroom of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation.54 
However, there are other criteria55 in which the personality of 
a representative of a legal entity is still being considered as a derivation 
of its principal. 
Thus, the topic related to the personality of juridical persons is 
controversial in the field of jurisprudence, because there is not 
uniformity of criteria in the final judgements pronounced in that sense. 
VI.         ELEMENTS OF THE LEGAL ENTITY IN MEXICAN 
LEGISLATION 
The Political Constitution of the United Mexican States in its 
federal nature, in Articles 5, 13, 14, 16, 20 of sections V and IX, among 
others, use the term person to refer to natural persons and legal 
entities, and the Magna Carta considers them as subjects of law in 
generic hypothesis that rule said precepts. From such normative 
assumptions, it may be confirmed that the constitutional text alludes 
to those who are holders of constitutional individual guarantees that 
include the legal entity and the natural person as well. Afterwards, it is 
deduced that the principal element that recognizes to the juridical 
person is such of the subjective rights expressed as guarantees. 
On its part, the Federal Civil Code in the First Book known as 
“Book for Persons” includes natural persons in its First Title, in the 
Second Book includes the legal entities. This Law details that legal 
entities are the following: the Nation, the States and the Municipalities, 
the other corporations of public nature recognized by this Law, 
professional associations and others cited by Section XVI of Article 
123 of the Federal Constitution, the mutual cooperative companies, 
                                                 
54   See Jurisprudential Thesis, Personhood in the Labor Process, Requirements that 
Notarial Testimony must Satisfy Regarding Corporations, XII Federation Judicial Weekly 
and its Gazette 112 (2000). 
55   See Thesis 892, Personhood Derived Representation or Support, VI Semanario 
Judicial de la Federación 1917-1995 613.   
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those associations who are different to the above mentioned (natural 
person and legal entity or juridical person) that propose political, 
scientific, artistic, recreational purposes or any other legal purpose, as 
long as they are recognized by law, as well as foreign legal entities of a 
private nature. 
From the above we conclude in conformity to the provisions 
of the Federal Civil Code that rule the person subject matter of this 
study, the following elements are deducted: subjective rights, 
obligations and will.56 
The commercial legislation57 also refers to the natural person 
and the legal entity or juridical person, to qualify them as merchants, 
applying for such affects an objective and subjective criteria as to the 
first of them, and one formal for the second.58 
Now then, the qualification as merchant that is provided by the 
Commercial Code in respect to the juridical person, commercial 
corporation, is an effect related to its juridical personality as it happens 
in the Federal Labor Law that qualifies the worker to the individual 
that provides a personal service who is subordinated to another, 
whether it is a natural person or legal entity by means of the payment 
of a salary. Accordingly, the element that is deduced from the 
Commercial Code is the juridical personality of the legal entity that 
allows it to individualize itself as merchant. 
From the General Law of Commercial Corporations, the other 
element that is deduced is concerned with the will of the juridical 
person. However, this will is referred to the activities of the juridical 
                                                 
56   See section V.1 supra, the legal entity defined by doctrinal elements. 
57   Código de Comercio [CCo.], as amended, art. 391, Diario Oficial de la 
Federación [DO], 17 de abril de 2012 (Mex.). 
58   ARCELIA QUINTANA, COMMERCIAL LAW SCIENCE 258 (2d ed. 2004) 
(according to the subjective criterion, those who conduct themselves according to 
law are merchants, regardless of whether or not they have a fixed place of business. 
According to the objective criterion, merchants are persons with legal capacity to 
enter into contracts and bind a business, engage in commercial transactions, and 
make this their ordinary job. According to the formal criterion, merchants are the 
personas morales formed upon satisfaction of the requirements of commercial statutes 
or and other applicable laws). 
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person itself which are reflected in the juridical relationships that are 
established or created as a consequence of that conduct, from which 
necessarily gathers subject rights and obligations for the juridical 
person, as the case may be. 
The elements of the legal entity which come from the 
legislation are the juridical personality, the will, subjective rights and 
obligations referred to a being or subject, which are coincident with 
those detailed in the personal opinion. 
VII.        ELEMENTS OF JURISPRUDENCE. 
The legal entity as a subject of law has also been a topic for its 
reference in the different criteria issued by the tribunals of the 
federation. 
In this way, as provided in an isolated jurisprudential criteria, 
the Full Circuit Tribunals refer to the nature and to the juridical 
personality of the legal entity, considering that “a legal entity is a 
fictitious entity, whose juridical personality is expressed and exercised 
by means of its representatives; since due to its nature, the juridical 
persons need individuals, managers or administrators to represent 
them, to act in their behalf because fictions do not operate by 
themselves.”At the time of analyzing these criteria, we may deduct 
other elements of juridical persons: 
 One of them identifies the faculties or subjective rights of 
the juridical person;59 
 The other is considered as the will of the being of social 
will; and another are60 
                                                 
59   See Thesis, Directors, The Inherent Powers of a Trustee are Governed by the 
General Law of Business Corporations, XVI Judicial Weekly of the Federation and its 
Gazette 1237 (2002).  
60   See Thesis, Legal Representation and Corporate Manager, Differences Between 
Functional or Organic Representation and Mandates, XII Judicial Weekly of the Federation 
and its Gazette 759 (2001).  
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 Obligations of the legal entity.61 
From the above, we may also conclude that jurisprudence 
establishes the following elements of the legal entities: 
1. The existence of a juridical being. 
2. A will from said being which shall be foreseen in its bylaws 
contained in the incorporation deed and expressed in its 
representation bodies. 
3. The legal entity is holder of rights and susceptible of 
acquiring obligations, which the legal entity exercises and 
fulfills. 
4. It has a juridical personality of its own that distinguish the 
same from the partners who incorporate and convert it in 
a subject of law. 
VIII.        DEFINITION OF THE JURIDICAL PERSON OR LEGAL ENTITY 
FROM THE PERSONAL POINT OF VIEW 
A legal entity is a juridical construction that is given with the 
following five elements: the being or subject, its will, the subjective 
rights, the obligations and the juridical personality. 
In the specific case, the legal entity is individualized through 
the recognition of the juridical personality that allows the same to 
acquire the holdership of rights and being susceptible of obligations. 
In consequence, the conduct of a juridical person implies its 
will. The importance of the personality, in addition to individualizing 
the subject as holder of rights and obligations, is also that it is the 
suitable means to allow the legal entity to exteriorize itself juridically. 
The factual circumstance that individualizes the legal entity and 
the recognition made by the legal order is the essence that provides the 
legal entity with a juridical personality, since it is a factor of legal 
                                                 
61   See Thesis, General Managers, cases in Which They Lack Standing to Obtain 
an Amparo Remedy, III Judicial Weekly of the Federation and its Gazette 846 (1996). 
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exteriorization that distinguishes it from other subjects who also have 
a will and are capable of exercising rights and fulfilling obligations. 
From the ideas above expressed it is asserted that juridical 
personality is a creation of law, which function is to individualize the 
subjects with rights and obligations, granting them legitimacy in the 
ownership of said rights to exercise them, and fulfill its corresponding 
obligations. 
After we have established the arguments that support the 
present research, it is possible to assert that the juridical figure subject 
matter of the present study is not innate to the natural person, 
therefore, may be applied to legal entities, ideal beings for the real 
world, but real for the world of Law. 
In effect, in juridical persons concur the five elements: 
The first is related to the being or subject of law, that contrary 
to what we may think, it does not need a physical body to legally exist, 
and it is enough to have existence for the purpose of law. 
The second element is the will of the subject, which is detailed 
in its bylaws. 
The third and fourth elements, related to the subjective rights 
and obligations, are updated in the legal entity because the juridical 
person holds a will. However, there are cases in which it is not 
necessary the will in order to produce rights and obligations, since 
there are facts that determine it even if the volitive aspect concurs. 
As to the juridical personality, as the fifth element, we may 
establish that the juridical personality also requires the conjunction of 
diverse requirements for its conformation. One of the other 
requirements that help to concretize the juridical personality is the 
factual situation that individualizes that subject. This occurs when the 
legal entity adopts one of the corporate structures foreseen in the 
General Law of Commercial Corporations, which individualizes it as a 
determined commercial corporation. 
Besides, due to the recognition of those types of corporations 
in the legal order above cited, we obtain other of the elements 
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applicable to personality, which is the juridical recognition of such 
individualization, at the same time, as a result of the concurrence of 
said elements, the legal entity acquires a legitimate legal personality to 
consider it as holder of rights and obligations. 
In summary, we may conclude that, joining the five elements 
that shall be met to conform said person, this is defined in the 
following terms: 
The legal entity is a subject of an abstract existence, legally 
constructed with a will of its own, including rights, obligations and a 
juridical personality that individualizes it in the relationships of law and 
make it a center that generates rights and obligations of an economic, 
financial and commercial nature. 
Following the order of ideas set out above, the legal personality 
is also susceptible to having a concept which will allow it to distinguish 
this from the legal entity. 
Personality is the individualization of the juridical person by 
means of a factual situation in which it is placed, foreseen by a legal 
norm that allows personality to distinguish it from other volitive beings 
in the commercial-legal relationships in an environment of law where 
the concrete case develops. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On December 5, 2008, the Colombian government enacted 
Law 1258.1 Over the five years since it was enacted, the country has 
witnessed a revolutionary turnaround in its corporate law.2 Law 1258 
introduced a new type of business entity to the Colombian system, 
which is referred to as a Sociedad por Acciones Simplificada (SAS).3 
                                                 
*   Chairman of the United Nations Commission for International Trade 
Law (UNCITRAL) 2015-2016. Author on the draft for the Colombian legislation on 
Simplified Corporations and of the OAS proposed Model Act on Simplified 
Corporations. Law Professor at Los Andes University School of Law in Colombia. 
Visiting professor at University of Arizona, Stetson University College of Law, 
Louisiana State University, University of Fribourg, University of Tilburg, and 
Universidade Agostinho Neto de Angola. 
1   L. 1258, deciembre 5, 2008, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.) 
[hereinafter Law 1258]. 
2   See Data: Colombia, THE WORLD BANK, 
http://data.worldbank.org/country/colombia (last visited Nov. 12, 2014) 
(Colombia is a Latin American developing country. It has a mid-size economy, the 
fourth in Latin America after Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina. According to the World 
Bank, its GDP for 2012 was U.S. $369.8 billion and its ranked 30th within 214 
countries on the GDP 2012 index). 
3   The entity’s name was taken from French legislation enacted in 1994 
concerning the Société par Actions Simplifiée. Additional legal provisions of the 
Colombian SAS were also transplanted from the French model. However, the entity 
also derives its inspiration from U.S. and Colombian sources. In fact, certain reforms 
initiated in Colombia almost twenty years ago (L. 222 deciembre, 20 1995, DIARIO 
OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.)) which had a limited impact in the business community, 
were reviewed and incorporated within the SAS law.  
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Consistent with a progressive approach, this law reduced cumbersome 
incorporation formalities to a filing before the Mercantile Registry.4 
Moreover, the law streamlined operations, reduced costs, and 
minimized formalistic requirements.5  Importantly, Law 1258 made it 
clear that shareholders would be shielded from any liability concerning 
obligations arising from corporate business. It also reduced old-
fashioned prohibitions pertaining to shareholders and managers 
activities and, most significantly, it reinforced an effective principle of 
freedom of contract. Furthermore, Law 1258 introduced an innovative 
enforcement environment where arbitration and administrative 
adjudication superseded inefficient judicial procedures6. 
The Colombian SAS legislation is a simple but comprehensive 
legal system that governs relationships between shareholders and other 
corporate participants and outsiders, and also between the participants 
themselves. It is endowed with legal personality, invertor ownership, 
and full-fledged limited liability. All these features are available to 
corporate participants at the outset through an expeditious 
incorporation system. Concerning relationships with outsiders, the law 
provides a system of exceptional shareholder liability through the 
                                                 
4   Pursuant to L. 1258 art. 5, “the simplified corporation shall be created 
through a contract or a unilateral decision, that must be consigned in a private 
document filed before the Mercantile Registry . . . .” All traditional forms of business 
entities that existed before the SAS are still subject to Article 110 of the Commercial 
Code, whereby a company can only be created through a public deed granted before 
a notary public. Such deed must contain at least the clauses referred to in already 
quoted Article 110 (paragraphs 1 to 14), and fulfill the requirements set forth in L. 
960, junio 20, 1970 [D.O.] (Colom.), for any instrument to be granted before a 
Notary Public. For additional information on the proceedings required to create a 
traditional type of business association in Colombia, see NÉSTOR HUMBERTO 
MARTÍNEZ, CÁTEDRA DE DERECHO CONTRACTUAL SOCIETARIO 96 et seq.  
(Abeledo Perrot ed., 2010).  
5   See L. 1258, art. 5-8; see also Menos Trámites, REVISTA SEMANA, Jan. 11 
2009, at 68; see also Las Sociedades por Acciones Simplificadas, REVISTA DINERO, Mar. 25, 
2010, at 20. See also Ignacio Sanín Bernal, La ley SAS Remoza las Sociedades Comerciales 
(y Crea, También, Nuevos Retos), in ESTUDIOS SOBRE LA SOCIEDAD POR ACCIONES 
SIMPLIFICADA 47 (Franciso Reyes Villamizar ed., 2010). 
6   See L. 1258, art. 40 (stating that all differences arising among the 
corporation, shareholders, officers and directors can be submitted to arbitration); see 
also Alejandra Buitrago, Colombia Simplifica Creación de Sociedades, PORTAFOLIO, Dec. 
18, 2008, at 6 (“Conflicts in the SAS can be resolved at the Superintendency of 
Companies or through private arbitration . . .”). 
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application of the disregard of the legal entity theory, although 
restricted to the events of abuse or fraud. As a result of the SAS 
revolution, there is increasing awareness concerning the need to revise 
anachronistic legal institutions that still hinder commerce and 
represent an obstacle to economic development. 
The creation of this successful entity has changed the manner 
in which people do business in Colombia. The SAS has contributed 
vigorously to the regulation of thousands of businesses that in the 
absence of the benefits afforded by the new law would have never been 
formalized. It has also permitted local and national governments to 
collect millions of dollars in taxes.7 At the same time, the SAS has 
fostered an exponential growth in franchise fees charged by mercantile 
registries all over the country.8 Social security contributions, as well as 
other payments to governmental agencies, have increased over the last 
five years thanks to this new type of business entity.9 Furthermore, 
several accounting, legal, and managing services have flourished along 
with the new business realities that the SAS has brought about.10 
Even more significant is the impact that the SAS has had in the 
creation of new jobs. Statistical analysis suggests that the 
unemployment rate may have gone down after the introduction of this 
new type of business entity. According to statistical analysis rendered 
by the National Office of Corporations (Superintendencia de Sociedades), 
                                                 
7   According to a report rendered on September 2013 by the Deputy 
Superintendent for Economic and Accounting Matters at the Superintendence of 
Companies (on file with author) for the years 2010 to 2012, the SAS paid significant 
amounts of income taxes. In fact, the report states the following figures: Col$ 
1.311.589.000 for income taxes on 2010, Col$70.784.132.000 for 2011, and 
Col$176.571.054.000 for 2012. For franchise taxes (i.e., registration fees) and State 
registry tax see Table 6 below. 
8   See report rendered by the Colombian Confederation of Chambers of 
Commerce, March 2015 (on file with author). 
9   Id. 
10  See El Último Grito, REVISTA DINERO, Feb. 21, 2012 (stating that the 
SAS is broadly use for all sorts of undertakings involving foreign investment). See also 
Miguel Ramírez, Sociedades por Acciones Simplificadas (SAS) y sus Ventajas para los 
Emprendedores, COLUMBIA LEGAL CORPORATION, (Sept. 1, 2013), 
http://www.colombialegalcorp.com/sociedades-por-acciones-simplificadas-sas-
ventajas-para-emprendedores/) (holding that this type of business entities are 
intended to promote entrepreneurial and technological creativity and innovation).  
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at least two and a half million people all over the country are employed 
through the existing SAS.11 
Furthermore, the SAS has displaced almost all traditional 
business forms that existed during the 1971 Colombian Commercial 
Code rule.12 Today these outdated forms represent 3.4% of business 
entities that file articles of association before the country’s fifty-two 
Mercantile Registries.13 Not surprisingly, the remaining 96.6% of new 
incorporations corresponds to the formation of new Simplified 
Corporations.14 This is probably due to the formalistic nature of the 
previous regulation and the SAS’ reduced transaction costs, simplified 
structure, and contractual flexibility. Moreover, the new type of entity 
has sparked legal innovation and fostered new business structures that 
were difficult to design in the recent past. 
Law 1258 also sought to curtail opportunistic behavior by 
controlling shareholders, directors, and officers. By replacing ex ante 
directory rules with ex post legal standards, it has allowed for more 
nuanced scrutiny of the insiders’ activities. Standards such as good 
faith and fiduciary duties of directors and officers (also applicable to 
controlling shareholders)15 are intended to promote honest behavior in 
the day-to-day affairs of the corporation.16 In order to make these new 
                                                 
11   See supra note 7.  
12   Those types of entities were: (1) The General Partnership (Sociedad 
Colectiva), (2) The Corporation (Sociedad Anónima), (3) The Limited Liability 
Company (Sociedad de Responsabilidad Limitada), (4) The Limited Partnership by 
Quotas (Sociedad en Comandita Simple), and (5) The Limited Partnership by Stocks 
(Sociedad en Comandita por Acciones). 
13   See Graph 2. 
14   Id. 
15   Through the legal concept of “Shadow Directors” all the rules 
governing fiduciary duties of directors and officers can also be applicable to 
controlling corporations. According to Article 27 of Law 1258, “natural persons or 
legal entities that shall intrude in any positive managing or administrative activity in 
the corporation will be subject to the same liabilities and penalties applicable to 
managers.” 
16   The now famous case of Finagro against Mónica Semillas SAS is a good 
example of the application of ex post standards in a specific case of abusive behavior. 
In this case a number of sham corporations were used to unduly obtain governmental 
agricultural subsidies. The Superintendence decided that this was a form of 
“deputization” and, therefore, reversed the illegal transactions. See 
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standards workable, an innovative enforcement system has been put in 
place. A highly sophisticated and efficient corporate law has replaced 
an inefficient judicial system. 
Within this advanced legal framework, it is expected that the 
usually high consumption of private benefits of control by majority 
shareholders will decrease overtime. This qualitative change would 
allow for a more reasonable allocation of economic benefits among all 
shareholders. Likewise, it is expected that in the future minority 
shareholders will be able to profit from the controlling shareholders’ 
monitoring and managerial efforts without being exposed to the 
exponential risk of expropriation.17 In this manner, the conceivable 
distributional effects that may stem from a more flexible regulatory 
business environment will be timely enabled by the efficient 
application of the above-mentioned standards. 
The starting point for the Simplified Corporation’s original 
proposal was the idea of facilitating the formalization of business 
entities and updating the legal system in order to introduce forward-
looking approaches to corporate law. For that purpose, a thorough and 
critical revision of the company law framework was required. This 
analysis was made under a functional Comparative Law methodology 
along with the application of relevant notions of Economic Analysis 
of Law. As expected, the results of such evaluation revealed the 
inadequacy of most company law provisions and the need to carry out 
an overhaul of both the legal and the institutional frameworks.18 
                                                 
SUPERINTENDENCIA DE SOCIEDADES, JURISPRUDENCIA SOCIETARIA 335 et seq. 
(vol. I, 2014).  
17   The higher level of protection that can be attained with the SAS 
regulation is clearly demonstrated in the amount of cases being brought before the 
Court at the Superintendence of Companies. Several cases involving Simplified 
Corporations have been adjudicated within the last 3 years. Such cases are 
consistently reported by the Superintendence as can be seen in the publication 
entitled Jurisprudencia Societaria edited by the same governmental entity. The first 
volume was published in Bogotá in March 2014. The second one was published by 
the same institution in July 2015. See supra SUPERINTENDENCIA DE SOCIEDADES 
note 16; SUPERINTENDENCIA DE SOCIEDADES, JURISPRUDENCIA SOCIETARIA (vol. 
II, 2015).   
18   See FRANCISCO REYES, LATIN AMERICAN COMPANY LAW, A NEW 
POLICY AGENDA: RESHAPING THE CLOSELY HELD ENTITY LANDSCAPE (2013). 
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Soon after the law was passed, the business community reacted 
eagerly to the new legal realities. The SAS has not only changed the 
manner in which people do business in Colombia, but it can also be 
credited for a significant change in the legal culture. This new type of 
business association has fostered additional legal reforms to other 
traditional institutions that were still present in old codes and statutes 
in Colombia.19 Surprisingly, until 2008, legal scholars found these 
outdated laws appropriate for the local business environment, and had 
unanimously hailed this antiquated legislation as a virtuous body of 
law.20 
Also, Law 1258 of 2008 represents a step forward in the 
manner in which corporate documents can be written. Notably, the 
law permits corporations to choose the type of clauses to be included 
in their own bylaws. However if the corporation’s bylaws are silent on 
a matter, default provisions of general corporate law apply. Yet, despite 
the option for corporations to create unique bylaws, the default rules 
contain provisions, which are particularly useful for those parties who 
lack the expertise, time, or resources needed to negotiate tailor-made 
corporate contracts and shareholders agreements.21 To this effect, the 
Colombian Mercantile Registry offices have designed and 
implemented model bylaws that are extensively used by Micro Small 
and Medium Entities (MSMEs)22 across the country. In this manner 
                                                 
19   For instance, Law 1429 of 2010 introduced substantial changes to the 
processes of dissolution and liquidation of corporations. Following the trend 
initiated with the SAS, this new law reduced unnecessary formalities and created 
hasty proceedings to wind up a business corporation. L. 1429, diciembre 29, 2010, 
DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.). 
20   CUBEROS DE LAS CASAS FELIPE, SOCIEDAD POR ACCIONES 
SIMPLIFICADA: NOVEDADES, ACIERTOS Y DESACIERTOS 43 (2012) (quoting Gabino 
Pinzón holding that the types of business entities regulated in the comercial codes 
were sufficient to satisfy the needs of business people). The author goes as far as 
holding that the idea of single member simplified corporations such as the SAS is a 
“conceptual mistake.” Id. at 49. 
21   See L. 1258, art. 45 (stating that the by-laws are fully enforceable if there 
is no specific rule to the contrary on the statute). 
22   Colombian law provides rules to define the concept of MSMEs on the 
grounds of the amount of assets, income and number of employees. Accordingly, 
for a company to be classified as a small or medium size business it has to meet the 
requirements set forth in Laws 590 of 2000, L. 590, julio 10, 2000, DIARIO OFICIAL 
[D.O.] (Colom.), and 905 of 2004, L. 905, agosto 2, 2004, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] 
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entrepreneurs can significantly reduce transaction costs and may 
incorporate without the aid of costly advisors.23 
Naturally, the SAS’ opt out approach also allows for private 
parties to step out of the standard provisions contained in model 
bylaws and to draft sophisticated agreements that are appropriate for 
more complex undertakings. The enabling non-directory provisions of 
Law 1258 have fostered private ordering and sparked innovation in 
corporate law across the country. Aside from the boilerplate type of 
agreements that are used by most start-ups, practicing attorneys are 
becoming skillful at developing new legal models suitable for a more 
sophisticated business environment. A survey conducted by the 
Bogotá Chamber of Commerce, in the capital city, has allowed for the 
identification of several types of business in which one or more SAS 
can be properly used for an unlimited number of business purposes.24 
The Colombian SAS represents a substantial improvement in 
reducing transaction costs and providing contractual flexibility to 
business parties. In accordance with this approach, Law 1258 of 2008 
requires formalities to be applied only with regard to those matters that 
have a functional effect on the marketplace.25 It also promotes private 
ordering, fosters the drafting of innovative shareholders agreements, 
and facilitates corporate capitalization through the issuance of all types 
of securities. 
This new type of business entity is also intended to dramatically 
alter the inefficient enforcement landscape by aiding in the 
development of a specialized jurisdiction in which matters are rapidly 
resolved by proficient and honest judges. The deterrence effect of 
decisions rendered by this jurisdiction in a short period of time has 
                                                 
(Colom.), which refer to the number of employees and the total assets, as measured 
in current legal minimum monthly wages. 
23   See, e.g., CÁMARA DE COMERCIO DE BOGOTÁ, http://www.ccb.org.co. 
24   See CÁMARA DE COMERCIO DE BOGOTÁ, PERFIL ECONÓMICO Y 
JURÍDICO DE LA SAS EN SU PRIMER AÑO 19-38 (2010). 
25   See, for example, L. 1258, art. 5 requiring registration of the private 
document of incorporation in order to provide publicity concerning basic data on 
the corporation. Likewise, art. 22 sets forth minimum standards for quorum and 
majorities at shareholders’ meetings. 
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impacted the business community in an unprecedented manner.26 
Knowing that justice will be on the side of those who play by the rules 
and that wrongdoers will be rapidly punished signals that Corporate 
Governance mechanisms work27 at least in the context of closely held 
corporations. It remains to be seen, however, if in the long run this 
enforcement system will have a direct impact on the cost of capital. It 
is foreseeable that this will be the case, as the system is rapidly 
migrating from personal to impersonal exchanges. It is also expected 
that this new legal reality will have an impact in the reduction of the 
usually high control premium in closed corporations, and also in 
incentivizing local and foreign investment by minority shareholders in 
this type of business. 
Six years after the enactment of Law 1258 of 2008, the success 
of the Simplified Corporation has surpassed all expectations. The 
empirically measured success of the Colombian SAS in both the legal 
and business environment can be attributed to the simplified nature of 
the substantive provisions that govern its incorporation and operation, 
and to the efficient results of the specialized jurisdiction put in place 
immediately following the enactment of the SAS.28 
The Colombian SAS can become an export product. It is a 
blend of common law and civil law approaches to business 
associations. Instead of adhering to dogma or established tradition, it 
                                                 
26   In fact, before the enactment of Law 1258, conflicts between 
shareholders had to be brought before the ordinary courts. After the creation of the 
Corporate Court at the Superintendence of Companies litigators have found a 
significant opportunity to get their cases decided in a reasonable period of time. See 
Graph 8. The expeditious nature of the processes handled before the 
Superintendence. Along with this significant development the periodical publication 
of decisions rendered by the new court provide predictability and legal certainty both 
to practitioners and parties alike. See SUPERINTENDENCIA DE SOCIEDADES, vols. I 
& II supra note 17.  
27   A good example of this sort of effect can be seen in the case of Serviucis 
S.A. vs. Clínica Sagrado Corazón SAS reported by the Superintendence of 
Companies. In this case the breach of a shareholders agreement along with an 
abusive exercise of the voting right by the defendant gave rise of the application of 
a remedy of specific performance by the Court. In this case the enforcement of the 
agreement as well as the decision rendered against the defendant’s wrongdoing have 
signaled to the business community that this sort of behavior shall not be tolerated. 
See SUPERINTENDENCIA DE SOCIEDADES, supra note 16, at 385-420. 
28   See Graph 2. 
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reflects the economic needs of common business people and 
successfully offers clear and sensible solutions to reduce entry barriers, 
ameliorate organizational problems, and provide expedited dispute 
resolution mechanisms. This legislation is also an attempt to deal with 
agency problems that are common in most countries without taking 
into account each jurisdiction’s ownership pattern.29 For this reason, 
the Organization of American States’ (OAS) Legal Committee has 
recommended the adoption of a Model Act on Simplified 
Corporations for all countries in the Americas on the grounds that it 
represents a “very credible case in favor of legislative reforms to permit 
such innovative business forms” to promote economic growth.30 
This paper briefly analyzes the evolution of the Colombian 
SAS over the first five years following the enactment of Law 1258 of 
2008. It provides an empirical evaluation based on statistical data 
collected at the Colombian Confederation of Chambers of Commerce, 
the Mercantile Registry of Bogotá, and the National Office of 
Corporations. 
I. EMPIRICAL DEMONSTRATION CONCERNING THE COLOMBIAN 
                                                 
29   The success of legal transplants in the area of closely held firms is 
significantly facilitated by the homogeneity of agency problems that are present in 
non-listed firms everywhere.  Therefore, the dichotomy between diffuse and 
concentrated ownership and the resulting differences in the identification of the 
relevant agency problems become irrelevant in the context of non-listed firms.  
Additionally, incentives to neutralize agency problems in closely held companies 
could be applied in different jurisdictions, without regard to the economic 
circumstances prevailing in each country. See REYES, supra note 18, at 60. 
30   See David P. Stewart, Recommendations on the Proposed Model Act on the 
Simplified Stock Corporation, in ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN JURIDICAL 
COMMITTEE TO THE FORTY-SECOND REGULAR OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 50 
(2012) (the OAS Legal Committee Model Act was crafted after Law 1258. It is not 
intended to serve as a partial amendment to be introduced to traditional business 
forms regulated in national codes and statutes. Instead, what is recommended is that 
the enactment takes place on a separate legislation that could be linked to the existing 
system). 
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SAS 
   The enactment of Colombian Law 1258 of 2008 has been by 
far the most successful recent company law reform in Colombia.31 The 
implementation of the SAS corporation model has given rise to a 
certain degree of competition among the different types of business 
associations that exist within the country’s commercial legislation. The 
creation of this new business form allows entrepreneurs to choose 
between a traditional legal regime, and a new modern corporate entity. 
The comparative inferiority of traditional business association types 
formerly used to structure closely-held companies make their future 
use unnecessary. The preference of business people for the recent 
legislation is evident in light of the exponential growth of the 
Simplified Corporation in Colombia.32 
The following empirical analysis is divided into three parts. 
Part A refers to data gathered at the Colombian Confederation of 
Chambers of Commerce,33 and corresponds to the evolution of SAS 
in Colombia. Part B relates to information obtained by the Bogotá 
Chamber of Commerce and, naturally, is restricted to the urban 
perimeter of Colombia’s capital city. Part C relates to the empirical 
analysis undertaken by the Superintendence of Companies concerning 
the operation of the new specialized Corporate Law Court34 that 
operates in the same Office. 
                                                 
31   See FRANCISCO REYES, REFORMA AL RÉGIMEN DE SOCIEDADES Y 
CONCURSOS (1996) (certainly, previous reforms such as the one introduced by Law 
222 of 1995, L. 222, diciembre 20, 1995, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.), had a 
more restricted impact than the SAS. This law constituted only a “patch up” reform 
to traditional corporate rules contained in the Colombian Commercial Code. Such 
approach limited the scope of legislative changes that otherwise could have been 
made under a more progressive orientation). 
32  See Editorial, PORTAFOLIO.CO (Feb. 3, 2011), 
http://www.portafolio.co/archivo/buscar?producto=portafolio&q=febrero+3+de
+2011&a=2011&pagina=1&m=02&d=03. 
33   Confederación de Cámaras de Comercio (CONFECAMARAS), 
Bogotá, 2013 (Colom.). 
34 This court is the Delegatura para Procedimientos Mercantiles de la 
Superintendencia de Sociedades.  
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A. National Data on SAS 
1. Formalization of economic activities and number of SAS compared to 
other types of business entities. – The SAS structure has been useful for 
thousands of business that today confront lower entry barriers for 
their regular operation. As can be observed in Graph 1, the number 
of incorporations filed before the Colombian Mercantile Registries 
has increased exponentially since the enactment of Law 1258 on 
December 5 of 2008. 
The reaction of the business community to the new legislation 
on Simplified Corporations has surpassed all expectations.35  As Graph 
2 shows, the SAS has acquired a level of significant importance for 
local business associations of all dimensions. The data not only shows 
the impressive acceptance of the SAS during this five-year period, but 
also the progress made by this company type vis-à-vis the previously 
existing ones. 
 
                                                 
35   See CONFECAMARAS, supra note 33 (data for this section 
(consolidated for the entire country) has been obtained directly from the 
CONFECAMARAS). 
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Graph 1. Growth in formalization of business entities 
between 2009 and  2010 (25.3%) 
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2. SAS incorporations. - In the period between December 2008 and 
September 2013, 206,704 business associations were incorporated 
before Colombia’s Mercantile Registries under the type of Simplified 
Corporations. In September 2013 alone, 5,804 business entities were 
incorporated before the country’s Mercantile Registries. Out of this 
number, 5,595 were Simplified Corporations (SAS). While in 
December 2008 the percentage of SAS only reached 7.42% of the total 
registration of business associations, by September 2013 this type of 
business corporation represented 96.4% of all registered companies 
(Table 1). 
  
Graph 2. Evolution of the SAS Compared to Other Company 
Types (2008-2012).  
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 2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  
 Amt. % Amt. % Amt. % Amt. % Amt. % Amt. % 
Jan.   293 11 2422 70 3697 88 5203 93 4846 95.6 
Feb.   629 19.8 3091 71 4302 90 6224 93 5443 94.5 
Mar.   1019 33.8 3364 74 5204 89.6 6875 94 4456 95.3 
Apr.   1184 39.4 2817 74 4271 91 4637 93.7 5130 95.1 
May   1424 47.6 2879 77 4961 93.5 4935 93.5 5358 95.1 
June   1544 53.6 3069 79 4712 91.1 4509 93.5 4458 95.1 
July   2052 59.4 2923 78 4318 91.5 4955 93.5 6259 95.7 
Aug.   1773 62.4 348 81 4734 91.9 4692 94.1 5405 95.8 
Sept.   2316 66.5 3734 82 4772 91.1 4577 93.7 5595 96.4 
Oct.   2183 67.8 3414 83 4073 92.3 4665 93.9   
Nov.   1872 70.2 3275 84 4160 92.4 4087 93.1   
Dec. 160 7.42 1151 74.2 2935 82       
Table 1. Incorporation of SAS between December 2008 and 
September 2013, by number and percentage. 
 3. SAS’ regional distribution. - Naturally, most SAS incorporations 
take place in regions and cities where there is a significant economic 
activity, such as in the capital city of Bogotá and the State of Antioquia. 
However, it is noteworthy that the penetration of this business entity 
is also noticeable in less developed areas where the economy is based 
on agricultural and extractive business activities, such as in Arauca.36 
In these less economically active regions, the increasing importance of 
SAS is evidenced by the growth of this type of business entity within 
the last two years. In fact, whereas in 2011 the SAS incorporations in 
Bogotá represented 44% of the total amount of business entities 
formally set up in Colombia (see Graph 3), in 2012, such percentage 
had decreased to 39%, showing a correlative increase of incorporations 
in the other regions (see Graph 4). 
For the years 2011, 2012, and 2013, the number of Simplified 
Corporations has been distributed regionally according to Graphs 3, 4, 
and 5 below. 
                                                 
36   See Graphs 3, 4, 5. 
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 4. Economic activities of SAS. -  Although according to the regulation 
governing the SAS there is no need to define any specific business 
purpose in the corporation’s purpose clause, the Mercantile Registry 
keeps a record of these entities’ main economic activity. The statistical 
data shows that the SAS model is mostly used for agricultural 
economic activities, manufacturing undertakings, construction 
business, and commercial activities (wholesale and retail) (see Table 2). 
  
Graph 5. Regional Distribution of SAS 2013 (until September). 
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CIIU_Sector 
2011 2012 2013 Total 
A Agriculture, cattle breeding, 
hunting, fish breeding 
1682 390 1050 3122 
B Mining 927 294 540 1761 
C Manufacturing Industries 5652 3474 4067 13193 
D Electricity, gas, steam and air 
conditioning 
121 53 68 242 
E Water and Sewer and 
environmental cleaning activities 
 
 
180 
 
297 
 
477 
F Construction Businesses 5203 3397 4067 12667 
G Wholesale commerce and 
retail; vehicle and motorcycle 
repair 
13100 7472 8651 29223 
H Transportation and Storage 3047 1248 1596 5891 
I Hotels and Restaurants 1287 643 1102 3032 
J Information and 
Communications 
 1146 1787 2933 
K Financial and Insurance 
Activities 
821 560 485 1866 
L Real Estate 13733 1533 1659 16925 
M Professional, Scientific and 
technical Activities 
 4102 5390 9492 
N Administrative services and 
logistics 
 2356 2043 4399 
O Public Administration and 
Defense, Social Security Plans 
and Mandatory Health Insurance 
171 49 59 279 
P Education 381 292 576 1249 
Q Health and Social Assistance 
Businesses 
1510 791 1371 3672 
R Artistic, entertainment and 
recreational activities 
 218 486 704 
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Table 2. Economic activities of SAS. 
 5. Dimension of SAS undertakings in the country. - One of the most 
significant observations in this empirical investigation is the success of 
the Simplified Corporation for all types of undertakings irrespective of 
the size segment to which the entrepreneur belongs. In fact, the 
Simplified Corporation is not only important in the micro and small 
business segments, but also has proven useful for large corporations. 
In Colombia, as in other developing economies, Micro Small 
and Medium Entities are responsible for a significant number of jobs 
and income for the economy.37 The Colombian Government has 
created certain criteria to define the various sizes of business 
enterprises. 
Table 3 shows the allocation of SAS according to the size 
criteria described above for the period between January 2011 and 
September 2013. The table relates to the number of SAS that can be 
classified in each segment. These data demonstrate the significant 
relevance of SAS to the formalization of micro and small businesses. 
  
                                                 
37   See Thorsten Beck, Asli Demirguc-Kunt, Ross Levine, SMEs, Growth, 
and Poverty: Cross-Country Evidence, 10 J. OF ECON. GROWTH 199 (2005).  
S Other services 1154 320 344 1818 
T Home business activities 
4 
 
4 
 
5 
 
13 
Z Unlisted business activities 
(CIIU V4) 
229 26837 234 27300 
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Company 
Size 
Number of 
Employees 
 
Total 
Assets 
(CLMMW) 
2011 2012 2013 
Micro 1-10 Under 501 96831 13739 167061 
Small 11-50 501-5000 14827 23341 31818 
Medium 51-200 5001-30000 3709 5797 8073 
Large Over 200 Over 30000 875 1398 2008 
Table 3. Dimension of SAS according to legal criteria. 
Table 4 provides the percentage of SAS in each of the dimension 
brackets referred to above. It is noteworthy that this type of entity only 
represents 4.85% of the total amount of micro businesses. This is due 
to the fact that most entrepreneurs in this segment carry out their 
business activities in their individual capacity (i.e., the vast majority are 
natural persons). Obviously, on a different scale, the SAS represents 
the broad majority of “incorporated” micro-business. As can be 
observed in Table 4, the micro-business segment represents the broad 
majority in terms of the number of SAS incorporated in Colombia. 
Table 4. Percentage of SAS (as compared to total number of business 
participants including natural persons). 
 6. Cancellation of SAS registrations. - Table 5 below depicts the number 
of SAS cancellations for the period between January 2011 and July 
2013. The empirical data show that the number of Simplified 
Corporations formally going out of business is very low in comparison 
to the ones that remain active and in good standing. 
  
Total No. Of 
Businesses 
No. Of SAS Percentage Dimension 
2,374,086 115,157 4.85% MICRO 
66,792 15,635 23.40% SMALL 
15,116 3,928 25.98% MEDIUM 
4,99 921 18.79% LARGE 
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Month 
2011 2012 2013 
Total Total Total 
January 165 232 324 
February 172 277 383 
March 389 562 545 
April 214 302 496 
May 177 275 354 
June 186 295 425 
July 174 274 511 
August 173 322 N.A. 
September 237 311 N.A. 
October 215 402 N.A. 
November 213 417 N.A. 
Total 2315 3669 3038 
Table 5. Cancellation of SAS registrations 
B. Empirical Analysis of Data Obtained at the Bogota Chamber of 
Commerce 
In the period between January 2009 and August 2 2013, 86,861 
Simplified Corporations were registered before the Bogota Chamber 
of Commerce. Although the majority of SAS registrations correspond 
to new incorporations a small percentage relates to conversion of 
traditional business forms, which existed before the enactment of Law 
1258, into simplified corporations. 
1. Franchise fees and registration taxes. - The figures in Table 6 include 
two types of economic resources that are collected by the Offices of 
the Mercantile Register. The first is a State registration tax that was 
levied by Law 225 of 1995,38 Decree 650 of 1996,39 and Resolution No. 
24 of 1997.40 The amount collected is charged at a 0.7% rate over the 
value of the subscribed capital. This tax is paid to the State of 
incorporation. The second amount relates to a franchise or registration 
fee established by Decree 393 of 2002,41 and corresponds to a variable 
percentage that is applied to the amount of subscribed capital. This fee 
                                                 
38   L. 225, diciembre 20, 1995,DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.). 
39   L. 650, abril 3, 1996, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.). 
40   L. 24, 1997, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.). 
41   L. 393, marzo 4, 2002, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.). 
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is updated every year to adjust to the legal minimum monthly wage for 
each year. The amounts collected through this franchise or registration 
fee go directly to the Chamber of Commerce that operates each 
Mercantile Registry. 
Amount 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Registry Tax 
  440,247,089   
Franchise Fee 
and Registration 
1,854,524 5,982,308 12,692,596 20,573,988 23,444,806 
Table 6. Franchise Fees and State Registry Taxes (Figures above are in 
thousands of U.S. dollars) 
2. Public deed of incorporation versus private document. - Articles 5 and 6 
of Law 1258 of 2008 allow for the incorporation of SAS to be made 
either by private document or by public deed granted before notary 
public.42 The latter is only required where real estate is turned in as an 
in-kind contribution. It is not surprising that the majority of 
incorporations (88.12%) are undertaken through a private document. 
In fact, only 9% of the business parties that set up a SAS use the public 
deed as a means for its incorporation (see Graph 6 and Table 7). These 
figures also may suggest that most capital contributions in the SAS are 
made in assets different to real estate. 
Furthermore, it is important to stress that a public deed is not 
needed for a business entity to convert into a SAS (see Article 31 of 
Law 1258 of 2008).43 It is also noteworthy that according to this law, it 
is viable for a SAS to be incorporated online. In accordance with data 
provided by the same Chamber of Commerce, only for the year 2009, 
1,077 corporations were incorporated online. 
. 
 
                                                 
42   L. 1258, art. 5, 6.   
43   Id. at art. 31. 
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Table 7. Incorporation Method. 
  
Document Number Percentage 
Record 8,001 9.21 
Certification 1 0 
Private 
Document 
76,532 88.12 
Public Document 2,314 2.66 
Resolution 1 0 
Total 86,861  
Number, 
Record,
7,827
9%
Number, 
Private 
Document,
76,532
88%
Number, 
Public Deed,
2,609
3% Record
Certification
Private Document
Public Deed
Resolution
Graph 6. Incorporation method. 
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3. SAS’ life span. - The empirical research shows that the 
registration of most of the Simplified Corporations formed during the 
last years have not been cancelled. This data may suggest the long 
breadth nature of a substantial majority of the entities operating under 
the SAS structure. This analysis is based on two sets of data: first, the 
renovation of corporate registration that is made every year; and 
second, the filing before the Mercantile Registry of corporate decisions 
for the dissolution and liquidation of simplified corporations. 
Table 8 shows figures concerning the annual renovation of 
mercantile registration for the years 2009 to 2013. 
Year of Registry 
Renovation 
Number of SAS PERCENTAGE 
2009 1394 1,60 
2010 4246 4,89 
2011 8648 9,96 
2012 17750 20,43 
2013 54823 63,12 
TOTAL 86861 100 
Table 8. Renovation of mercantile registration of SAS. 
The data presented above implies that there is a high 
conservation rate for the SAS. This is supported by the fact that the 
registration of dissolution and liquidation proceedings for Simplified 
Corporations represents a very low percentage in comparison with the 
total amount of active SAS. In the Bogota’s Mercantile Registry, only 
4,031 out of 86,861 registered SAS, filed for dissolution before the 
Mercantile Registry (representing 4.61% of the sample). Out of the 
4,031 that filed for dissolution, 2,919 (72%) registered the termination 
of the liquidation proceeding. 
4. Management. - The SAS law allows for a simplified organic 
structure, where the board of directors is not a mandatory organ. In 
the absence of a clause providing otherwise, one or more managers 
will conduct the day-to-day affairs of the corporation.44 The empirical 
research concerning the preference for a simplified organic structure 
                                                 
44   Referred to in L. 1258, art. 26 as legal representatives. 
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in which there is no appointment of a board of directors is conclusive.45 
In fact, only 921 of the total amount of analyzed SAS registered the 
appointment of a board (i.e., a figure close to 1% of the total sample) 
(see Table 8). This finding is interesting, because the data suggests that 
the traditional regulation, which required a mandatory board of 
directors to do business under the corporate form, did not match the 
preferences of business people. The legal framework imposed a 
burden to the parties, which represented undesirable transaction costs. 
A similar situation is observable concerning the appointment 
of fiscal auditors. The SAS law only requires an internal auditor to be 
appointed if the corporation surpasses certain thresholds (determined 
in the amount of assets or annual income). Only 3,023 fiscal auditors 
were appointed. This figure represents 3.5% of all registered 
companies in Bogota (see Table 9). The conclusion provided for the 
board of directors is equally applicable to the fiscal auditors. It is 
obvious that if businesspersons are given the opportunity to opt out 
of the relevant clause, they will do so. 
Shareholder 
managed SAS 
Percentage 
Board 
managed 
SAS 
Percentage 
85,949 98.93 921 1.07 
Table 9. Shareholder Managed SAS versus Board Managed SAS. 
 
Appointment 
of Internal 
Fiscal Auditor 
for SAS 
Percentage Shareholder 
monitored 
SAS 
Percentage 
 83,838 96.50 3,023 3.50 
Table 10. Appointment of Fiscal Auditor. 
5. Unrestricted purpose clause. - Law 1258 does not require the parties 
to provide for a restricted purpose clause in the corporation’s bylaws. 
                                                 
45   An empirical study conducted by the Bogota Chamber of Commerce 
concluded that only 14% of the SAS created during the first year after the enactment 
of Law 1258, provided for a mandatory board of directors in their by-laws. See 
CÁMARA DE COMERCIO DE BOGOTÁ, PERFIL ECONÓMICO Y JURÍDICO DE LAS SAS 
EN EL PRIMER AÑO 28 (2010). 
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Accordingly, as a default rule, the law allows for the corporation to be 
set up for any lawful purpose. According to previous research 
conducted by the Bogotá Chamber of Commerce in 2011, most of the 
simplified corporations set up in the capital city prefer the flexibility 
afforded by the unlimited purpose clause to the rigidities of self-
imposed restricted objects.46 A smaller percentage of SAS opted for 
limited purpose clauses by specifying restricted business activities in 
the corporation’s bylaws. Interestingly, during the period between 
January 2009 and July 2013, a total of 2,162 amended their internal 
rules in order to insert in their objects the phrase “any lawful activity.” 
This move again represents a preference for flexibility and 
demonstrates that the traditional system was inconsistent with 
entrepreneurs’ needs and preferences. 
Dimension of SAS undertakings in the country. - As already 
explained the size of a business undertaking can be legally classified in 
four separate categories on the grounds of their employee population 
and aggregate assets. The following table shows the size of SAS 
incorporated in the city of Bogotá. 
Size of 
the 
company 
 
Number of 
Employees 
Total Assets 
(CLMMW) 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Micro 1-10 Under  501 86,362 84,776 81,744 77,954 75,679 
Small 11-50 501-5000 443 1,736 4,095 7,060 8,508 
Medium 51-200 5001-30,000 46 297 849 1,484 2,097 
Large Over  200 Over  30,000 10 52 173 363 577 
Table 11. Dimensions of SAS in Colombia. 
  
                                                 
46   See CÁMARA DE COMERCIO DE BOGOTÁ, EL PRIMER AÑO DE LA SAS 
(2011).  
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3. Empirical Observations on Enforcement 
The relevance of the specialized jurisdiction created by Law 
1258 of 2008 can be empirically demonstrated under several variables 
that measure the efficiency of the new court to adjudicate complex 
corporate law cases in a short period of time. The data collected by the 
National Office of Corporations demonstrates the increasing 
confidence with which private parties appear before the specialized 
court to litigate all kinds of legal matters.47 It is relevant to observe that 
during the period from 2008 to 2011, the complaints filed before this 
court related exclusively to four different issues (appeals of previous 
decisions, intra-corporate disputes, actions to set aside resolutions of 
the shareholders meeting, and requests for dissolution). Alternatively, 
between 2012 and 2013, the types of legal disputes were significantly 
broadened to encompass additional matters (including, inter alia, 
processes for lifting the corporate veil, the appointment of experts to 
provide appraisals of shares of stock, and actions arising from the 
abuse of rights).48 The increased scope of matters resolved at the 
Specialized Corporate Court has begun to provide credibility to the 
Government’s ability to enforce substantive law provisions contained 
in the SAS legislation. It is probably the first time in which law in the 
books is very close to law in action in Colombia. 
  
                                                 
47  See JOSÉ MIGUEL MENDOZA, ESTUDIO SOBRE LA NUEVA 
DELEGATURA DE PROCEDIMIENTOS MERCANTILES (2013).  
48   See SUPERINTENDENCIA DE SOCIEDADES, vols. I and II, supra note 17. 
2015 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 4:1 
418 
In a country accustomed to protracted litigation, endless 
formalities, and corruption in the judicial system, it is a great 
achievement to have a jurisdiction in which these vices are absent. The 
high quality of the decisions rendered by the Specialized Corporate 
Court and the short time required to obtain a final judgment are 
eloquent evidence concerning the great success of this legal 
experiment. Graph 8 shows the efficient operation of the new 
jurisdiction in terms of the average term employed by the court to 
render a final decision. As it can be observed, on average, the Deputy 
Superintendent produces final judgments in a reasonable four-month 
term. 
  
Graph 7. Type of Corporate Law disputes litigated before the 
specialized court. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Colombian SAS legislation has proven to be an 
appropriate framework for the operation of all types of closely held 
corporations. The law that gave rise to this business entity was the 
result of a combination of common law and civil law types of modern 
business corporations. Five years after the enactment of Colombian 
Law 1258 of 2008, it seems clear that it is possible to achieve high 
impact changes from a relatively simple reform of outdated corporate 
law provisions. 
The incorporation of more than 200,000 Simplified Stock 
Corporations in the first five years following the enactment of this law 
eloquently shows the usefulness of new corporate vehicles endowed 
with flexibility and simplified incorporation features. Through the 
SAS, Colombia has achieved higher levels of economic formalization, 
access to credit and investment, increased collection of taxes, and the 
creation of new jobs. 
Graph 8. Duration of legal processes at the Specialized Corporate 
Court. 
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The SAS experiment may be beneficial in other countries if 
appropriately transplanted. It could be particularly useful in developing 
and emerging economies where there is an increasing need for flexible 
and user-friendly corporate vehicles. The success of the SAS clearly 
suggests that business people prefer flexibility to old-fashioned, 
misguided paternalism. 
Welfare enhancement reforms such as the introduction of the 
Simplified Corporation would require, however, breaking up path 
dependence and overcoming certain pressure groups and backward 
looking legal traditions. For this purpose it would be extremely useful 
to prepare and promote a model act on Simplified Corporations. An 
instrument such as this could serve as a starting point in legislative 
processes for the amendment of corporate laws in several countries. 
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HIGH-TECH COMPANIES AND THE 
DECISION TO “GO PUBLIC”: ARE 
BACKDOOR LISTINGS (STILL) AN 
ALTERNATIVE TO “FRONT-DOOR” 
INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS? 
Erik P.M. Vermeulen* 
INTRODUCTION 
Financial and capital markets play a key role in the funding of 
high growth technology companies. There is little doubt that 
companies in highly capital-intensive, often volatile, and disruptive 
sectors will eventually have to float their shares on a stock exchange to 
obtain access to capital to grow and expand their operations, enhance 
the company’s reputation and visibility, attract and retain talented 
employees, and provide liquidity to shareholders. The traditional path 
to a listing in an equity market is an initial public offering (IPO). 
However, the companies that consider a first sale of stock to the public 
are often overwhelmed by the costly and time-consuming legal and 
financial regulations that must be complied with while pursuing an 
IPO. 
These costly and lengthy regulatory barriers, together with 
sluggish IPO markets and their unavailability to smaller firms, have 
been reasons for high-tech companies and their shareholders to look 
for alternatives to IPOs.1 A popular alternative is to pursue a backdoor 
                                                 
*   Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Professor of Business and Financial Law at 
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1   See Stephen Bell, As IPOs Struggle in Australia, Reverse Takeovers Shine, 
WALL ST. J.: DEAL J. AUSTL. (Jan. 23, 2013, 11:52 AM), 
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listing, most often accomplished through a reverse merger or reverse 
takeover.2 Both alternatives “transform” a private company into a 
publicly traded company by combining directly or indirectly with a 
listed company (whether through a merger, exchange offer, or 
otherwise). A backdoor listing has not only allowed companies to 
focus more on their business and less on compliance with “going 
public” rules and regulations, but also to gain access to more liquid and 
robust stock markets. In addition to the cheaper and quicker access to 
capital and liquidity, backdoor listings have also been employed to 
receive tax benefits that stem from “tax loss carry-forwards” in the 
public shell. If the reverse merger or takeover involves a public 
company that operates in the same or complementary industry or 
sector as the private company, synergies are often the reason for the 
backdoor listings. Moreover, besides the fact that a private company 
becomes instantly “listed” on a stock exchange, a backdoor listing 
usually gives shareholders of the private company the opportunity to 
receive the majority of the shares of the public entity, allowing them a 
tight grip on control (as if they still run a private company).3 
Recently, backdoor listings have become increasingly popular 
among high-tech companies in the United States. Consider venture 
capital-backed RMG Networks, a Chicago-based global provider of 
smart visual solutions (particularly advertisements on airplanes and 
airport lounges), which went public through a reverse merger in the 
United States in April 2013, bypassing the IPO procedures. RMG 
Networks was first acquired by SCG Financial Acquisition 
Corporation. As a result, the shareholders of RMG Networks received 
                                                 
http://blogs.wsj.com/dealjournalaustralia/2013/01/23/as-ipos-struggle-reverse-
takeovers-shine/. 
2   The terms “backdoor listing,” “reverse merger,” and “reverse takeover” 
are used interchangeably. These three approaches, mostly distinguished by legal 
differences at their implementation stage, are alternatives to an IPO.  
3   See David N. Feldman, Comments on Seasoning of Reverse Merger Companies 
Before Uplisting to National Securities Exchanges, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 140 (2012). See 
also DAVID N. FELDMAN, REVERSE MERGERS: TAKING A COMPANY PUBLIC 
WITHOUT AN IPO (2006). 
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stock in SCG. Subsequently, the listed company’s profile was changed 
from SCG to RMG.4 
Australia also experienced a surge in high-tech backdoor 
listings in 2014.5 For instance, Australian Bitcoin focused company 
digitalBTC (which was acquired by the already listed Macro Energy 
and renamed to DigitalCC Limited) is another example of a high-tech 
(and disruptive) company that turned to a backdoor listing to go public 
in 2014. 
Backdoor listings are also a common “IPO alternative” in the 
real estate development sector. For instance, in October 2013, the 
Hong Kong Parkview Group Limited acquired the commercial 
property portfolio in China from the non-listed subsidiary of Cofco 
Corporation and changed its name to Cofco Land Holdings Ltd.6 
Since backdoor listings are often not excessively burdened by 
complex listing rules and regulations, they are prone to fraud and 
abuse. Certainly, there are probably more examples of instances where 
a backdoor listing has been a prudent and effective alternative to an 
IPO. However, there is also evidence suggesting that lower quality 
firms pursue listings through a reverse merger. It is therefore not 
surprising that policymakers and regulators have recently introduced 
(or are considering) special rules and regulations that govern backdoor 
listings. These rules and regulations vary depending on each country’s 
respective experience with this “going public” alternative. 
This paper attempts to shed light on the question of whether 
and when a backdoor listing is still a sustainable alternative to the 
“front door” IPO. There is no clear-cut answer to this question. For 
instance, stringent and complex rules and procedures for reverse 
                                                 
4   See Sean Ludwig, Digital Signage Biz RMG Networks Goes Public at $10 a 
Share in Reverse Merger, VENTUREBEAT (Apr. 8, 2013, 1:36 PM), 
http://venturebeat.com/2013/04/08/rmg-networks-goes-public-reverse-merger/.  
5   See Paul Garvey, ASIC Snarls at Backdoor Listings, AUSTL. BUS. REV. (July 
31, 2014, 12:00 AM), http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/asic-snarls-at-
backdoor-listings/story-e6frg8zx-1227007785116.  
6   See Esther Fung, Chinese Developers Take the Backdoor to Hong Kong Listings, 
WALL ST. J.: MONEYBEAT (July 1, 2013, 10:00 PM), 
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mergers can be found in the United States due to the scandals 
surrounding backdoor listings involving Chinese companies, 
significantly reducing the attractiveness of backdoor listings. Sweden, 
which has minimal experience with the backdoor listing phenomenon, 
has adopted a more moderate (hybrid) approach that combines a case-
by-case determination of the applicable rules with a system designed 
to create awareness among investors about suspicious backdoor listing 
activities. More specifically, the NASDAQ OMX Stockholm has the 
potential to give a reverse merger company a temporary “observation 
status” to alert investors about the risks and uncertainties associated 
with a backdoor listing. Theoretically, Swedish companies that are 
unable or unwilling to conduct an IPO (for instance, due to eligibility 
issues and/or a sluggish IPO market) would still have access to capital 
and/or liquidity more quickly and with fewer costs compared to their 
U.S. counterparts. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I provides an overview 
of the general trends and facts regarding backdoor listings in countries 
with a history of alternative public offerings, such as the United States, 
the United Kingdom, and Australia. Section II discusses the general 
perception of backdoor listings from the perspective of high-tech 
companies. Since the availability of the IPO alternative also depends 
on the applicable rules and regulations, Section III compares 
regulatory responses to backdoor listings in the United States, 
Australia, and Sweden. Section IV provides a glimpse into the future 
of backdoor listings by taking into account the changing policy and 
regulatory landscape designed to make it easier for young high-tech 
companies to trade on stock exchanges. In fact, in an effort to spur 
economic growth and job creation, policymakers, regulators, and 
exchange operators are increasingly unveiling measures to relax rules 
and regulations governing IPOs. This is illustrated by the signing of 
the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act) in the United 
States on April 5, 2012. The Act introduces the Emerging Growth 
Company (EGC) status. Companies that are able to secure EGC status 
will be offered a transition period (or an “on-ramp” period) during 
which they are exempted from a number of regulatory requirements 
associated with going public. Such speedier and cheaper IPO process 
will have a reductive effect on the total number of backdoor listings, 
but will not make them completely obsolete. 
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I. TRENDS AND FACTS REGARDING BACKDOOR LISTINGS 
Companies need capital as they go through the stages of their 
life cycles. These life cycles typically start with turning an idea into a 
start-up company. The start-up company attempts to raise capital from 
venture capital funds and other private investors. These investors 
support the start-up by contributing money and services, which brings 
the company to the next stage in its development. Ideally, this 
continues until the moment the company seeks to raise capital from 
the “public” by pursuing an IPO, giving private investors and venture 
capitalists an opportunity to gradually exit their investment. 
The IPO, however, triggers the obligation to comply with a 
plethora of rules and regulations required by regulators to protect the 
shareholders (and other stakeholders) in listed companies and prevent 
managerial misbehavior. These rules and regulations can be divided 
into three categories: (1) listing requirements to determine whether a 
company is eligible to go public; (2) disclosure and transparency rules 
to provide financial and other information to the market and to 
enhance investor confidence; and (3) corporate governance 
requirements to ensure that the company’s affairs are conducted in the 
interests of all concerned. Clearly, the regulatory framework makes the 
process of an IPO expensive and time-consuming. The costs of an 
IPO include the fees paid to investment banks, accountants, auditors, 
lawyers, and other service providers and consultants for advice and for 
preparing the registration statements, prospectus, and other legal 
documents. Low valuations and disappointing IPO performances are 
also reasons for companies to forego the IPO route.7 
It is therefore probably not surprising that companies that 
need capital to fund growth and/or provide liquidity to investors have 
always been looking for quicker, cheaper, and more flexible 
alternatives to get access to stock markets. When it comes to floating 
the shares, the idea of avoiding the costs and complexities associated 
with IPOs is certainly very appealing, particularly to companies that 
operate in volatile, frequently changing, and quickly evolving markets, 
                                                 
7   See Stacy Lawrence, Reverse Mergers Attract Top-Tier Biotechs in Sluggish IPO 
Market, 24 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 598 (2006).  
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such as the Bitcoin industry.8 Moreover, control over the timing of the 
listing and the information released about the IPO process is usually 
very important to these companies. Clearly, control over both the 
timing and the information not only enables a smoother transition 
from the non-listed status to being listed on public markets, but also 
provides these companies with the opportunity to withdraw their plans 
without alerting the public. Backdoor listings, particularly through 
reverse mergers or reverse takeovers, are examples of these alternatives 
to IPOs that have gained popularity in recent decades. These 
alternatives, however, are often subject to controversy because an 
increasing number of alternative listings fail to meet the expectations 
of investors in the post-listing period. 
Indeed, the growing trend of using backdoor listings is not 
necessarily the consequence of a shift toward a more preferable listing 
option. Literature denouncing reverse mergers as a suitable substitute 
to IPOs is plentiful, and some venture so far as to say that they are not 
even comparable. For instance, a recent empirical study argues that 
going public via an IPO is simply not feasible for many companies that 
do not exhibit significant growth potential, do not meet minimum 
revenue and income levels, or are unable to convince an investment 
bank (typically the gatekeepers to the public) to underwrite its offering. 
The study also shows that most reverse merger companies begin 
trading in over-the-counter (OTC) markets.9 It should be noted that 
gaining access to traditional forms of additional capital and ensuring a 
liquid market for shares that typically come along with an IPO listing 
are virtually non-existent when pursuing a reverse merger. Therefore, 
a backdoor listing does not always facilitate a large infusion of new 
capital from new investors because it is inherently not a capital-raising 
endeavor where there is exchange of cash for shares in the 
transaction.10 This observation raises the question of why a high-tech 
company should pursue a backdoor listing. 
                                                 
8   See Peter Brown, Andrew Ferguson & Peter Lam, Choice between 
Alternative Routes to Go Public: Backdoor Listing versus IPO, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH 
ON IPOS, 503, 503-30 (Mario Levis and Silvio Vismara eds., 2010).  
9   See Charles M. C. Lee, Kevin K. Li & Ran Zhang, Shell Games: Are Chinese 
Reverse Merger Firms Inherently Toxic? (Working Paper No. 3063, 2014).  
10   See William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The Truth About Reverse Mergers, 2 
ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 743 (2008). 
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In this respect, it is remarkable that although backdoor listings 
occur on a global scale, there are significant differences between the 
characteristics, motivations, and implications of these listing options. 
These differences can be explained to a large extent by differences in 
the legal framework applicable to backdoor listings, and also by supply-
demand dynamics (the market for backdoor listings). For instance, 
backdoor listings through reverse mergers have become an attractive 
alternative to an IPO in the United States throughout the previous 
decade. The number of reverse mergers was even higher than the 
number of regular IPOs in 2008.11 
In a reverse merger, a private company that wishes to go public 
through the “backdoor” merges with a public shell. Clearly, in order to 
maintain the trading status, the public shell must survive the merger, 
which explains the term “reverse.” As mentioned above, trades in the 
public shell companies are usually carried out through electronic 
quotation venues such as the Over-the-Counter Bulletin Board 
(OTCBB) or the “Pink Sheets” system (referring to the color of the 
paper the quotations were printed on). This over-the-counter (OTC) 
market mainly deals in low-grade securities issued by firms in economic 
distress or in “microcap” issues that fail to qualify for a regular listing 
on a stock exchange. Most of the shares traded in these OTC markets 
are of such low value—many of which are “penny stock” shares 
trading under U.S.D. $1 each—that they become perfect targets for 
reverse mergers. 
It should be noted that backdoor listings in the United States 
are often accomplished through a reverse triangular merger instead of 
a direct merger. This form of merger enables the parties to circumvent 
expensive and time-consuming disclosures under the listing rules and 
securities regulations. Under reverse triangular mergers, the publicly 
listed company typically creates a new wholly owned subsidiary, which 
subsequently merges into the private company. The merger must be 
approved by the public shell (as shareholder of its new subsidiary) and 
the shareholders of the private company. Approval from the 
shareholders of the public shell company can be avoided if the 
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company trades on the OTCBB. As a result of the merger, the private 
company becomes the wholly owned subsidiary of the public shell, 
which in return issues shares to the shareholders of the private 
company. At the final stage, the name of the shell is usually changed 
to the name of the private company, and the directors and officers of 
the listed shell are replaced by those of the private company. 
Regardless of how effective reverse mergers might be for meeting the 
needs of a broad range of companies, the lack of regulatory scrutiny 
has clearly caused increasing concerns about the degree to which these 
mergers are used as a means of committing fraud or other securities 
violations, particularly in terms of misleading financial statements. 
In other jurisdictions, supply and demand dynamics, rather 
than the lack of rules and regulations, explain the popularity of 
backdoor listings strategies and arrangements. Consider the Australian 
Stock Exchange (ASX), which is dominated by the volatile mining and 
high-tech sectors. Companies seeking access to the capital market have 
almost always been able to find a financially distressed listed vehicle 
that could serve as a shell for a backdoor listing. For instance, high-
tech companies in Australia are often able to obtain the listed status 
through shell companies that are active in the mining industry. 
Undoubtedly, some of these high-tech companies have or will become 
targets themselves and are thus fundamental in attaining the backdoor 
listing aspirations of new mining companies.12 Recent data on 
backdoor listings confirms this cycle: while seventy-six percent of the 
Australian backdoor listings were conducted by mining companies in 
2012,13 there was a surge in backdoor listings by high tech companies 
(using unloved mining shells) in the first half of 2014. 
Finally, in the United Kingdom, backdoor listings are often 
used by companies that (1) are mainly interested in the synergies that 
can be achieved by merging with (or taking over) a listed operating 
company (this is often combined with raising new capital), and (2) seek 
access to a wider exposure to investors and liquidity when the IPO 
market is weak. What is interesting about the experience of the United 
                                                 
12   See Owen Richards, How Primary and Secondary Markets Work, ASX 
INVESTOR UPDATE (2012) (on file with author). 
13   See Stephen Bell, ‘Back Door’ May Be Closing for Miners, WALL ST. J.: DEAL 
JOURNAL (Jan. 30, 2013, 5:36 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2013/01/30/back-
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Kingdom is that it shows that specific rules and regulations do not 
necessarily make backdoor listings less attractive. On the contrary, the 
“backdoor listing” practice in the United Kingdom was more 
widespread than in the United States.14 However, alleged irregularities 
at subsidiaries of Bumi, an Indonesian company that listed on the 
London Stock Exchange through a reverse merger in the summer of 
2011,15 quickly gave a negative notion to backdoor listings. This, 
together with the fact that the Financial Services Authority (FSA)—
now the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA)—introduced new rules 
with the aim to prevent reverse takeovers of companies that are not 
eligible for listing, explains the sudden decline in the use and popularity 
of backdoor listings in 2012.16 The experiences in the three countries 
show that, besides the applicable rules and regulations, the general 
perception regarding backdoor listings also appears to play a role in 
determining whether a backdoor listing provides a viable alternative to 
high-tech companies that seek to float their shares. 
II. THE GENERAL PERCEPTION OF BACKDOOR LISTINGS 
It is a common refrain that backdoor listings are prone to abuse 
and inappropriate transactions. In the early days of the reverse merger 
practice (1970s and 1980s) in the United States, a number of 
opportunistic promoters were fraudulently establishing new shell 
companies that subsequently raised capital through their IPOs.17 After 
the shell company was established, they leaked speculative information 
about an upcoming (reverse) merger to the market in the hope that the 
stock price would rise, which would then give them the opportunity to 
sell shares and make a significant profit. In response to this fraudulent 
                                                 
14   See Peter Roosenboom & Willem Schramade, Reverse Mergers in the United 
Kingdom: Listed Targets and Private Acquirers, in INTERNATIONAL MERGERS AND 
ACQUISITIONS ACTIVITY SINCE 1990: RECENT RESEARCH AND QUANTITATIVE 
ANALYSIS 181, 182 (Greg N. Gregoriou & Luc Renneboog eds., 2007).  
15   See David Oakley, City Watchdog to Tighten Listing Rules, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 
2, 2012, 9:11 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a2709378-0c8c-11e2-a73c-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz3myolCy8a.  
16   Sylvia Pfeifer, Genel Faces Delay to Premium Listing Plan, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 
23 2012, 7:05 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/6dedca2c-5e44-11e1-85f6-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz3myolCy8a. 
17   See Aden R. Pavkov, Ghouls and Godsends – A Critique of Reverse Merger 
Policy, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 475 (2006). 
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practice, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) passed a 
number of amendments to the Securities Act 1933 in 1992. The most 
important rule in this context is Rule 419. This Rule introduced a 
“blank check company,” which is defined as a company that: (i) is a 
development stage company that has no specific business plan or 
purpose or has indicated that its business plan is to engage in a merger 
or acquisition with an unidentified company or companies, or other 
entity or person; and (ii) is issuing “penny stock.” Rule 419 introduced 
special rules for blank check companies. For instance, Rule 419 
required virtually all cash raised during the IPO to be placed in escrow. 
Furthermore, under Rule 419, blank check companies were prohibited 
from trading in the shell’s stock prior to a reverse merger. Rule 419 
also introduced a time limit of eighteen months to complete a 
transaction, and failure to do so would lead to a return of the invested 
cash to the shareholders.18 
The regulatory restrictions on blank check companies are the 
reason for the emergence of Special Purpose Acquisition Vehicles 
(SPAC). Interestingly, SPACs largely mirror the blank check 
companies of the 1980s that caused Congress to adopt Rule 419. The 
business plan for a SPAC is simple. A SPAC is a shell company without 
historical operations that was taken public through an IPO solely for 
the purpose of acquiring an operating business, which is typically not 
pre-determined prior to listing, within an eighteen to twenty four 
month timeline. For entities looking to list through a reverse merger, a 
SPAC can be a favorable partner by offering the operating company 
an immediate cash infusion directly from the proceeds of the SPAC’s 
IPO as well as a liquid trading market for its securities. Though a 
merger with a SPAC eliminates the primary downsides associated with 
a traditional reverse merger, this type of merger is often only a pipe 
dream for less than exceptional operating companies, and the 
likelihood of such a deal is at the whim of the SPAC’s management 
group. 
Despite the introduction of Rule 419 and the restrictions on 
the use of SPACs, the reverse merger or reverse takeover was utilized 
at a greater frequency as a mechanism to list publicly in the lead up to 
2010. In fact, the number of reverse mergers eclipsed the IPO count 
                                                 
18   Offerings by Blank Check Companies, 17 C.F.R. § 230.419 (1992). 
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in 2008 for the first time in the United States. Clearly, there exists a 
cohort of promulgating instances where the use of a reverse merger 
has been effective. For instance, a reverse merger can be a viable 
mechanism to tap into previously untapped sources of additional 
capital for companies that have exhausted other financing options and 
do not meet the demanding performance criteria necessary to pursue 
an IPO. In such instance, the access to Private Investment in Public 
Equity (PIPE) financing, which is excluded as a financing source for 
private companies, becomes an important potential source of 
invaluable capital for entities with no other viable alternatives.19 A track 
record of institutional investments in underperforming public 
companies with relatively illiquid stocks makes this financing option 
not only a realistic avenue for smaller, less reputable entities, but also 
a means to eventually obtain a listing in a higher segment of one of the 
major stock exchanges.20 
In addition to access to additional avenues of capital, a reverse 
merger tends to be both a quicker and cheaper listing option relative 
to its IPO counterpart. On average, a backdoor listing through a 
reverse merger can be completed in as little as a couple of weeks and 
is unquestionably timelier than an IPO, which can take months. This 
is recently confirmed by the CEO of Bitcoin Shop, a U.S. company 
that operates a Bitcoin-based e-commerce website, who stated (after 
successfully concluding a reverse merger through which the company 
raised U.S.D. $1.875 million in a private placement in February 2014) 
that the reverse merger only took three weeks.21 From a cost 
standpoint, IPOs can run a bill north of the six-figure mark while 
reverse mergers can be done for a significantly lower amount under 
the standard circumstances. However, it is important to qualify the 
speed and cost effectiveness of a reverse merger as it is often touted as 
                                                 
19   See David N. Feldman, Reverse Mergers + PIPEs: The New Small-Cap IPO, 
in PIPES: REVISED AND UPDATED EDITION—A GUIDE TO PRIVATE INVESTMENTS 
IN PUBLIC EQUITY (Steven Dresner & E. Kurt Kim eds., 2005), reprinted in 3 BUS. L. 
BRIEF 34 (2007). 
20   See Helen Luk & Heda Bayron, Sneaking in Through the Back: Chinese 
Companies that have used Reverse Mergers to List on U.S. Regulators are Finally Taking Notice 
and Cosing the Door, A PLUS, May 2011, at 18. 
21   See Bill Meagher, Bitcoin Retailer Raises $1.9M in Reverse Merger, THE DEAL 
PIPELINE, (Feb. 10, 2014, 4:03 PM), http://www.thedeal.com/content/consumer-
retail/bitcoin-retailer-raises-19m-in-reverse-merger.php.  
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a surefire benefit in favor of reverse mergers when that is not always 
the case. In fact, reverse mergers on the slower end of the spectrum 
(more than four months) can take as long as some IPOs. Additionally, 
the cost argument in favor of a reverse merger becomes questionable 
after factoring for the expenses associated with a backdoor listing 
along with the consideration paid to shell promoters in the form of 
cash and sometimes an equity stake. 
High-tech companies that face difficulties in accessing 
domestic capital markets and attracting funding to help them reach the 
next stage in their development also use backdoor listings to enter a 
foreign market. This is particularly true if stock exchanges have a 
competitive interest in encouraging foreign listings. Consider the 
Chinese companies that listed in the United States via reverse mergers. 
According to data collected by the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board (PCAOB), 159 Chinese companies completed a 
reverse merger between January 1, 2007 and March 31, 2010.22 Because 
taking the reverse merger route let these companies avoid the scrutiny 
that would otherwise be required by state and federal rules and 
regulations in the United States, the reverse merger count 
outnumbered the number of Chinese companies that completed an 
IPO in the United States in the same period. Clearly, even though 
legally accepted, this trend was only possible with the help of a network 
of U.S. advisors and consultants, such as underwriters, investment 
banks, lawyers, and auditors.23 
Despite the benefits of reverse mergers, there is a notion of 
adverse selection in the pool of entities pursuing a listing through the 
“alternative” listing route. This notion is supported by the delisting of 
forty-two percent of the entities listed via the backdoor within its first 
three years.24 Reverse takeovers are typically exercised by smaller and 
                                                 
22   See PCAOB Issues First Research Note on Chinese Reverse Mergers, PUB. CO. 
ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., (Mar. 14, 2011), 
http://pcaobus.org/News/Releases/Pages/03152011_ResearchNote.aspx. 
23   David Barboza & Azam Ahmed, China to Wall Street: The Side-Door 
Shuffle, N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/24/business/global/reverse-mergers-give-
chinese-firms-a-side-door-to-wall-st.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.  
24   See Frederick Adjei, Ken B. Cyree & Mark M. Walker, The Determinants 
and Survival of Reverse Mergers vs IPOs, 32 J. OF ECON. & FIN. 176, 189 (2008). 
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lesser-known entities relative to their larger, more reputable 
counterparts that list through an IPO, giving rise to a negative signaling 
effect for those that elect to pursue a backdoor listing.25 This notion of 
an adverse selection in entities pursuing a reverse merger is echoed in 
the literature that showcases the decision tree that lay ahead of Chinese 
companies, which account for a large majority of the reverse mergers 
in the late 2000s, when pursuing a public listing.26 Empirical data 
reveals that, despite the benefits of reverse mergers, the most well-
known and profitable Chinese companies generally elect to pursue an 
IPO. By contrast, there are many examples of smaller Chinese entities 
that listed through a reverse merger that are subject to a greater 
frequency of class action lawsuits, are less profitable, exude lower 
balance sheet liquidity, and are highly leveraged.27 
Indeed, many of these Chinese companies ended up being sued 
for securities law violations, particularly related to financial 
misrepresentation, failure to disclose material facts, and/or deficient 
internal control systems. Academic research reveals that U.S. listed 
Chinese companies that pursued a reverse merger were not always in 
compliance with the internationally accepted accounting standards.28 
Customarily, the adoption of these standards is a prerequisite as well 
as a requirement to maintain a public listing for entities pursuing a 
reverse merger, regardless of the accounting practices employed in 
local jurisdictions. This listing obligation underscores the growing 
                                                 
25   See Augusto Arellano-Ostoa & Sandro Brusco, Understanding Reverse 
Mergers: A First Approach (Bus. Econ. Series 11, Working Paper No. 02-17, 2002), 
available at 
http://orff.uc3m.es/bitstream/handle/10016/66/wb021711.pdf?sequence=1.  
26   See Jan Jindra, Torben Voetmann & Ralph Walkling, Reverse Mergers: The 
Chinese Experience (Working Paper No. 2012-03-018, 2014).  
27   The 159 Chinese firms that pursued a reverse merger in the United 
States in the period between January 1, 2007 and March 31, 2010 had a combined 
market capitalization of U.S.D. $12.8 billion (which is less than fifty percent of the 
market capitalization of the fifty-six Chinese companies that completed a U.S. IPO). 
See Reverse Mergers: A Looming U.S.-China Showdown over Securities Regulation?, WHARTON 
UNIV. OF PA. (March 5, 2013), 
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/reverse-mergers-a-looming-u-s-
china-showdown-over-securities-regulation/.  
28   See Katherine T. Zuber, Breaking Down a Great Wall: Chinese Reverse 
Mergers and Regulatory Efforts to Increase Accounting Transparency, 102 GEO. L.J. 1307 
(2014). 
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importance of audits and places a tremendous amount of responsibility 
on the auditors of these (often times) foreign entities because they 
usually serve as the only safeguard between the foreign entity and 
ensuring that domestic investors receive reliable statements. 
What is remarkable in this respect is that filings with the SEC 
reveal that Chinese reverse mergers tended to retain their own auditors 
post-merger as opposed to those of the former shell company.29 Audit 
quality concerns in these mergers were only to be expected when 
compliance with PCAOB accounting standards increasingly faltered. 
The large majority of accounting firms employed by Chinese reverse 
mergers were only inspected by the PCAOB on a triennial basis rather 
than the typical annual basis, which had only compounded concerns 
over fraud whirling around Chinese reverse mergers. The questionable 
audit quality and non-compliance has stemmed partially from added 
difficulty for U.S. registered accounting firms to conduct 
comprehensive audits on companies based abroad due to language 
barriers, accounting standard discrepancies, use of under qualified 
assistants, the lack of enforcement of accounting laws in China, and 
additional expenses as well. 
The negative attention regarding backdoor listings has caused 
companies to look at other financing alternatives, such as direct private 
placements or private sales.30 However, although poor performing 
Chinese reverse merger companies are inextricably tied to the general 
perception of reverse mergers, as they account for a large proportion 
of entities pursuing backdoor listing through public shell companies, 
research indicates that the negative spillover effects of fraudulent 
activity or reporting by Chinese companies have not always harmed 
other non-Chinese companies’ backdoor listing activities. Reverse 
mergers involving non-Chinese entities appear to largely escape the 
wrath of investors, as the stock market reaction to news of fraud is 
focused on Chinese companies as opposed to questioning reverse 
                                                 
29   See Benjamin A. Templin, Chinese Reverse Mergers, Accounting Regimes, and 
the Rule of Law in China, 34 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 119 (2011). 
30   See David Thomas, The IPO Road Less Traveled: Form 10, 
BIOTECHNOW (Feb. 25, 2013) http://www.biotech-now.org/business-and-
investments/inside-bio-ia/2013/02/the-ipo-road-less-traveled-form-10.  
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mergers in general as a viable mechanism to list publicly.31 Still, the 
global turbulence in the credit markets, triggered by the turmoil in the 
subprime mortgage market in 2007-2008, largely brought an end to the 
laissez-faire era in the backdoor listing process. For instance, in 
response to the scandals, U.S. policymakers introduced legislation that 
subjects reverse mergers to registration requirements and provisions 
targeted at improving the companies’ accountability. The backdoor 
listings rules and regulations—and their impact on high-tech 
companies—will be discussed in the next Section. 
III. REGULATORY IMPACT ON BACKDOOR LISTINGS 
Regulatory responses to the increase in backdoor listings vary 
significantly from country to country based on a country’s respective 
experience in this area. These responses can be roughly split into three 
distinct approaches.32 On one end of the spectrum, the United States 
has undertaken a number of initiatives spearheaded by organizations 
such as the SEC and the PCAOB to curb issues stemming from reverse 
mergers in the form of issuing investor warnings and more stringent 
listing rules for these transactions. On the other end of the spectrum, 
Sweden has only limited experience with backdoor listings (and has yet 
to express concern similar to that of the United States). However, to 
ensure that investors have sufficient information to distinguish 
between prudent and imprudent backdoor listings, the Rule Book of 
OMX NASDAQ Stockholm contains a light touch signaling system 
that enables regulators to give companies involved in backdoor listings 
a temporary “observation status.”33 Regulatory responses worldwide to 
the widely publicized backdoor listings/reverse mergers waver 
between the approaches taken by the United States and Sweden, as 
                                                 
31   See Masako N. Darrough, Rong Huang & Sha Zhao, The Spillover Effect 
of Chinese Reverse Merger Frauds: Chinese or Reverse Merger? (Working Paper, 2012).  
32   Rather than making a strict distinction between the different regulatory 
approaches, this Section argues that regulatory measures undertaken by national level 
regulators are best seen in terms of a spectrum of possible regulatory paths. It ranges 
from countries that introduced special rules and regulations for backdoor listings via 
countries that implemented rules and regulations that treat backdoor listings as IPOs 
to jurisdictions that adopted a more flexible regulatory approach. 
33   See NASDAQ OMX STOCKHOLM, RULE BOOK FOR ISSUERS 17 r. 2.7 
(2015), available at http://www.nasdaqomx.com/digitalAssets/96/96156_nasdaq-
stockholm-s-rule-book-for-issuers—-1-january-2015.pdf. 
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evidenced by the changes (or lack thereof) in the respective listing rules 
following these developments in Australia. 
A.  Special Rules and Regulations for Backdoor Listings 
In light of the string of alleged fraudulent activity and 
accounting gaffes concentrated within entities that have undertaken 
reverse mergers in the latter portion of the 2000s, the SEC and the 
PCAOB acted swiftly in an attempt to halt further incidents. In 
addition to issuing an investor bulletin highlighting the additional 
potential risks associated with investing in companies that were 
engaged in a backdoor listing process,34 the SEC imposed a wave of 
more stringent listing rules for determining if and when companies are 
eligible to list publicly through the “backdoor.” Additional listing 
requirements include maintaining a closing share price beyond a 
certain threshold, complying with all periodic filing requirements of 
financial reports, and having been traded in the United States on the 
OTC market or another regulated exchange for at least one year prior 
(“seasoning rules”).35 These amendments, which were ultimately 
approved by the SEC in November 2011, aim to address the concerns 
surrounding the inaccuracies of financial statements produced by 
reverse merger companies.36 
In addition, the PCAOB proposed to implement a set of 
supplementary auditing standards in the fall of 2011 by requiring audit 
reports to disclose and identify the names of audit firms or individuals 
that provided more than three percent of the total hours spent on the 
most recent audit.37 The rationale for this additional requirement is 
                                                 
34   See generally Investor Bulletin: Reverse Mergers, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N  (June 
2011), http://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/reversemergers.pdf. 
35   See David N. Feldman, Comments on Seasoning of Reverse Merger Companies 
Before Uplisting to National Securities Exchanges, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 140 (2012). 
36   See Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Approves New Rules 
to Toughen Listing Standards for Reverse Merger Companies (Nov. 9, 2011), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-235.htm.  
37   Moreover, the PCAOB and China entered into a cooperative 
agreement in October 2012 under which PCAOB inspectors are allowed to observe 
the oversight activities of Chinese regulators. In return, the agreement allows the 
Chinese regulators to observe the work of the PCAOB. See PCAOB Taking Steps to 
Work with China, NASBA STATE BOARD REP., Oct. 2012, at 2, available at 
http://www.nasba.org/files/2012/10/OctoberSBR_2012.pdf. 
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twofold. First and foremost, such a standard helps fulfill consistent 
requests from investors for further information about the firms that 
are performing audits on their investments. Second, the names of 
auditing firms that are located in jurisdictions beyond the PCAOB’s 
current investigatory scope is publicized under this mandate and hence 
allows investors to be better informed about the quality of firms 
conducting a company’s auditing. This is particularly relevant in China 
where the PCAOB and other foreign regulatory bodies are currently 
barred from inspecting China-based audit firms on grounds of 
sovereignty and state secrecy. Though the PCAOB has been trying to 
further cooperation with jurisdictions, such as China, which are 
particularly salient and which make up almost five percent of the 
PCAOB registered firms, additional measures, including the 
publication of the names of foreign auditing firms, are useful steps 
toward greater transparency in audit practices in favor of investors. 
The impact of the seasoning rules and regulatory scrutiny on 
“backdoor listings” is significant. Data provider PrivateRaise recorded 
257 reverse mergers in 2010. After the introduction of the rules, the 
number decreased to “only” 124 companies in 2013.38 Interestingly, 
U.S. healthcare and biotech companies are increasingly willing to 
pursue a backdoor listing despite the seasoning rules. The benefits of 
the informal and flexible reverse merger process often outweigh the 
costs of applying the more cumbersome seasoning rules. According to 
data provider PrivateRaise, at least sixty-nine companies have availed 
themselves of the reverse merger option during the first half of 2014, 
and most of these companies were healthcare and biotech companies.39 
Surprisingly (recall that a backdoor listing is inherently not a capital-
raising endeavor), twenty-eight companies in these reverse merger 
                                                 
38   See Bill Meagher, Alternative Public Offering Market Is Booming, THE DEAL 
PIPELINE (Feb. 24, 2014, 1:58 PM), 
http://www.thedeal.com/content/healthcare/alternative-public-offering-market-
is-booming.php. 
 39 Bill Meagher, Investment in Reverse Mergers Doubled in Second Quarter, The 
Deal Pipeline (July 21, 2014, 2:43 PM), 
http://www.thedeal.com/content/healthcare/investment-in-reverse-mergers-
doubled-in-second-quarter.php. 
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transactions were also able to raise a respectable total of U.S.D. $85.6 
million in private placements.40 
B.  Re-Compliance Regulation 
In contrast to the United States, the financial regulatory body 
in Australia has had a rather tepid response to the wave of fraudulent 
backdoor listings. In fact, the Listing Rules of the Australian Stock 
Exchange (ASX) makes no specific references to backdoor listings or 
reverse takeovers. However, ASX Listing Rules Guidance Note 12, 
which was published in December 2013 and revised in October 2014, 
provides legal certainty for the companies and their advisors by 
explaining how backdoor listings are regulated under Listing Rules 11.1 
(including 11.1.2 and 11.1.3), 11.2, and 11.3.41 The Australian Securities 
Exchange generally compels a listed entity involved in a backdoor 
listing to re-adhere to listing requirements under ASX Listing Rule 11.1 
(proposed change to nature or scale of activities).42 Non-compliance 
with the listing rules could lead to a suspension of the quotation. 
Exceptions to the re-admission process exist only if the 
backdoor listing does not constitute a significant change to the nature 
or scale of the activities of the listed company. However, a close 
reading of the previously mentioned Guidance Note 12 shows that the 
most common backdoor listings will lead to a significant change in the 
nature of an entity’s activity.43 The following activities (associated with 
the mining industry) are explicitly mentioned in the Guidance Note: 
(1) an entity whose main business activity is manufacturing consumer 
goods deciding to switch its main business activity to mining 
exploration (or vice versa); and (2) an entity whose main business 
activity is exploring for minerals deciding to switch its main business 
activity to exploring for oil and gas.44 As for the scale of the activities, 
the ASX considers a twenty-five percent change to the size of an 
entity’s operations to be significant. It therefore comes as no surprise 
that empirical research found that approximately seventy-nine percent 
                                                 
40   Id.  
41   ASX Listing Rules, ch. 12 (Austl. Sec. Exch. 2014). 
42   Id. at ch. 11.1. 
43   Id. at ch. 12. 
44   Id. 
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of the backdoor listings that took place between 1992 and 2007 would 
have been required to re-comply with ASX’s listing requirements.45 
However, the recently revised Guidance Note 12 arguably 
makes backdoor listings more appealing to high-tech companies by 
giving the ASX more flexibility and leeway in interpreting the re-
admission rules. For instance, Guidance Note 12 includes more 
flexible policies on the requirements regarding the minimum spread of 
security holders (usually 400 shareholders each holding shares with a 
minimum value of AUD $2,000). Guidance Note 12 also has a “20 
cent rule,” which requires—with few exceptions—that shares (or other 
securities) offered as part of a backdoor listing should have a minimum 
issue price or sale price of A.U.D. twenty cents or more per share. 
Clearly, the ASX Guidance Notes not only increase the compliance 
rate with the regulatory requirements, but also enhance legal certainty 
and limit possible abuse of the rules, while taking the specifics of 
backdoor listings into account. 
C. A Light Touch—Flexible—Regulatory Approach to Backdoor 
Listings 
The Listing Rules of NASDAQ OMX Stockholm also 
embrace flexibility in assessing backdoor listing processes. First, Rule 
3.3.8 requires listed companies to disclose information to the market 
about significant changes in its identity.46 The information must be 
equivalent to what is required under the IPO regulations. In order to 
determine whether there is a significant change in identity, the Swedish 
regulator typically takes the following criteria into account: (1) changes 
in ownership structure, (2) the acquisition of a new business, and (3) 
the change in market value of the listed company following an 
acquisition. What is interesting is that the exchange has the possibility 
to give a company’s shares a temporary “observation status” if the 
disclosed information is insufficient. The rationale behind this status is 
straightforward: it provides information to the market and warns 
investors and potential investors of the risks and uncertainties 
associated with the company or its shares. The observation status is a 
flexible, but powerful mechanism to remind investors to be cautious 
                                                 
45   See Philip Brown, Andrew Ferguson & Peter Lam, supra note 8.  
46   NASDAQ OMX Stockholm, supra note 33, at r. 3.3.8. 
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about investing in companies that are subject to a reverse takeover.47 
The observation status can only be granted for a limited period of time, 
usually not more than six months. 
Clearly, other measures in backdoor listing procedures 
available to the Swedish regulator are the cancellation or suspension of 
the trading in the shares of a listed company. However, if the regulator 
is of the opinion that more drastic interventions are necessary, 
flexibility remains an important element in the regulator’s decision-
making process. Consider Immune Pharmaceuticals Inc., the 
byproduct of a reverse merger between a privately held Israeli based 
bio-pharmaceutical company (Immune Pharmaceuticals Limited) with 
a listed American developer in pain and cancer treatment (EpiCept 
Corporation).48 The newly merged entity hoped to achieve a public 
listing on the NASDAQ OMX in Sweden following the transaction.49 
It also intended to list on a U.S. securities exchange. Daniel Teper, 
Immune Pharmaceuticals Inc. Chairman and CEO, highlighted the 
limitations for Israeli capital markets to fulfill the financing needs of 
companies operating within the life sciences space that are not 
concurrently listed in the United States as the primary cause for 
pursuing a public listing.50 A reverse merger was ultimately elected as 
the mechanism to list, since an IPO was initially not a feasible option 
at the time of the consummation of the merger. 
However, even though an active listed company (such as 
EpiCept), as opposed to a shell company, was involved in the reverse 
merger, the newly merged Immune Pharmaceuticals Inc. was not 
immediately allowed to maintain its listing on the regulated NASDAQ 
OMX market in Sweden. Instead, the regulators approved trading of 
the shares of Immune Pharmaceutical Inc. on NASDAQ OMX First 
                                                 
47   Id. at r. 2.7(v). 
48   See Immune Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Immune Pharmaceuticals’ Common Stock 
Approved for Trading on NASDAQ OMX First North Premier, NASDAQ 
GLOBALNEWSWIRE (November 26, 2013, 00:38 AM), 
http://globenewswire.com/news-release/2013/11/26/592383/0/en/Immune-
Pharmaceuticals-Common-Stock-Approved-for-Trading-on-NASDAQ-OMX-
First-North-Premier.html?parent=591162. 
 49 Id. 
 50 See Gali Weinreb, Immune Pharmaceuticals Lists in US, Sweden After Reverse 
Merger, GLOBES (Oct. 5, 2015 8:30 PM), http://www.globes.co.il/en/article-
1000870466. 
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North Premier, a market for high growth companies that are in the 
process of preparing for a listing at the main market.51 This decision 
reflects the importance of the introduction of less regulated and more 
accessible segments to smaller high-tech companies that would 
otherwise consider entering the market through the backdoor. The 
impact of segmented stock markets on high-tech companies and 
backdoor listings will be discussed in Section IV. 
IV. SPECIAL LISTING SEGMENTS FOR HIGH GROWTH 
COMPANIES AND BACKDOOR LISTINGS 
The Swedish experience indicates that the outlook for 
backdoor listings is dismal when high-tech companies can list on an 
accessible, vibrant, liquid, and high-growth market. The question, 
however, is whether the benefits of such a market are large enough for 
high-tech companies to completely turn away from the backdoor 
listing route to the stock market. What is important in this respect is 
the gradually changing regulatory landscape for companies that 
consider floating their shares on a stock exchange. Policymakers and 
regulators have introduced (or plan to introduce) more flexible listing 
rules and regulations to stimulate IPO activity by high-tech 
companies.52 These initiatives appear to be successful. For instance, 
the increase of the number of high tech IPOs in the United States in 
2013 and the first half of 2014 could arguably be attributed to the 
possibility of a firm to qualify as an emerging growth company (EGC) 
under the JOBS Act.53 
The EGC label offers several benefits to high growth 
companies in the pre- and post-IPO period. In the pre-IPO period, an 
EGC will only be required to include two years—instead of the usually 
                                                 
 51 Immune Pharmaceuticals, Inc., supra note 48. 
52   For example, in February 2015 the European Commission started a 
consultation process expected to evolve into a E.U.-wide Capital Markets Union. 
The idea is that a small company’s access to financing would be significantly 
improved in a more harmonized capital market. See Commission Green Paper on Building 
a Capital Markets Union, COM (2015) 63 final (February 18, 2015). 
53   See generally Gillian Tett, Investors Enjoy a Sweet Aftertaste to the Candy Crush 
Crunch, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2014, 5:30 PM), 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/39e3e9ba-b418-11e3-a102-00144feabdc0.html.  
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required three years—of audited statements in its IPO registration.54 
More importantly, the special status introduces “testing-the-waters” 
provisions, which allow EGCs to communicate with professional 
investors (qualified institutional buyers or institutional accredited 
investors) to determine investors’ interest in the company prior to or 
following the date of the IPO registration statement.55 Moreover, the 
JOBS Act provides these companies with the possibility to 
confidentially submit a draft of its IPO registration statement for 
review to the SEC.56 
Also, the “on-ramp” provisions grant important reliefs in the 
post-IPO period. For example, EGCs are exempted from the 
obligations under Sarbanes-Oxley Act Section 404(b) to provide an 
auditor attestation of internal control.57 Furthermore, the Act excludes 
EGCs from (1) complying with the full range of executive 
compensation disclosures and (2) say-on-pay votes on executive 
compensation.58 Finally, EGCs need not comply with any new or 
revised accounting standards until the date on which private 
companies are required to apply these standards to their organization. 
The success of the JOBS Act is reflected by the significant increase in 
the number of EGCs that have pursued a listing after having used the 
option to confidentially file their registration statements. According to 
data provider Renaissance Capital, approximately seventy to eighty 
percent of the 222 IPO companies (including non-venture capital 
backed companies) in 2013 have availed themselves of the JOBS Act’s 
confidential filing provision.59 This is not surprising since high-tech 
companies value increased control over the timing of the IPO, which 
is arguably provided by a confidential filing, more than the likely 
                                                 
54   Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act), H.R. 3606, 112th 
Cong. § 102 (2012) (enacted). 
55   Id. at §105. 
56   Id. at §106. 
57   Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, § 404(b) 
(2002) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2002)). 
 
58   Investor Protection and Securities Reform Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, § 953(b)(1) (2010) (codified in 15 U.S.C. 78l note). 
59   See David Gelles & Michael J. De La Merced, ‘The New Normal’ for Tech 
Companies and Others: The Stealth I.P.O., N.Y. TIMES: DEAL BOOK (February 9, 2014: 
8:58 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/02/09/the-new-normal-for-tech-
companies-and-others-the-stealth-i-p-o/?_r=0. 
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discount in the stock price due to the reduced disclosure and reporting 
requirements for EGCs. 
Clearly, the JOBS Act is a success, but will it send the backdoor 
listing option to oblivion? It is already evident that high-tech 
companies have started to consider the IPO option again in the United 
States. In 2014, 116 high-tech (and venture capital-backed) companies 
floated their shares, compared to eighty-five companies in 2013.60 
However, despite the booming high growth market segment in the 
United States, there has been a surge in reverse mergers, particularly 
conducted by companies that operate in volatile industries. As 
discussed, despite the need to comply with onerous special reverse 
merger regulation, these companies still find that a reverse merger is 
quicker and easier than conducting a traditional IPO (even under the 
JOBS Act). 
CONCLUSION 
In the previous decade, backdoor listings became increasingly 
popular as a mechanism to list publicly in the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and Australia. However, empirical studies indicate that 
backdoor listing activity has significantly decreased due to negative 
publicity, the introduction of more stringent rules and regulations, and 
increased regulatory scrutiny. Therefore, the question is whether 
measures employed to strengthen the rules and regulations governing 
backdoor listings will eventually put an end to this alternative option 
of going public. The evidence is mixed. The number of and amount 
raised by Chinese reverse mergers has plunged approximately fifty-
three percent and ninety-five percent respectively in 2011 (compared 
to 2010). In contrast, we observe a backdoor listing boom in the high-
tech industry in the United States and Australia in 2014. 
The answers to the question of whether backdoor listing is still 
a sustainable alternative for high-tech companies compared to the 
“front door” IPO vary depending on a country’s respective experience 
with backdoor listings. These answers can be divided into four 
categories. In the first category, there are countries such as the United 
States that have a vibrant, accessible, and liquid stock market for high-
                                                 
60   See PitchBook, 2Q 2015 U.S. VENTURE INDUSTRY REPORT (2015). 
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tech companies as well as a long history with backdoor listings. In such 
countries, high-tech companies are willing to accept more stringent 
rules, such as the seasoning rules, if the backdoor listing strategy still 
offers them flexibility as well as low-cost and timing advantages 
compared to the regular IPO route. 
Second, in countries such as Australia, which has no special 
high-tech segment on the stock exchange but has an active market for 
alternative listings, backdoor listings are there to stay even during the 
gloomiest days of the economy. Policymakers and regulators seem to 
understand the importance of alternative public offerings by allowing 
flexibility in the application of the “re-admission” rules. 
The third category includes countries that have a robust and 
liquid high-tech stock market, but no recent experience with backdoor 
listings. The Swedish experience shows that, even though backdoor 
listings are permitted, high-tech companies rarely employ this 
alternative option. This can partly be explained by the lack of available 
shell companies. 
Fourth, even if countries have no history with backdoor 
listings, policymakers and regulators should be wary of the fact that 
entrepreneurial high-tech companies may start to explore alternative 
public offerings if the high-tech segment of the stock market is not 
accessible through relatively cheap and fast means. They should realize 
that backdoor listings continue to provide a viable and legitimate listing 
option for high-tech companies that are always in search for capital 
and liquidity. 
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In commercial law policy debates in the United States, the 
consideration of public interests has been muted.  The success of 
“contractualist” ideas (along with “public choice” theory) has forced 
to the background notions of broader social interests and the 
significant secondary effects of commercial law rules, leaving the policy 
debates focused largely on competing claims of efficiency and injustice 
to the immediate parties to an activity or transaction.  In this essay, I 
want to explore this phenomenon in a preliminary way.  My long-term 
objective is to understand the reasons for this move away from 
considerations of public interests and perhaps to find a way to return 
those interests to their proper place. 
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How did the notion of a public interest in commercial law 
questions get elbowed aside when it had long been a staple of 
American academic and political discourse?  The primary reason has 
been the rise of “public choice” theories1 and “contractualism.”2  This 
essay focuses on the contractualists as its primary example. For the 
most part, the contractualists are content to identify one public 
interest—freedom of contract in a free market—as the singular public 
interest to be served in commercial law, primarily on the basis of 
efficiency. 
One of the reasons that other public interest considerations 
have been elbowed aside is that those who are concerned with public 
interest factors do not have a church as do the public choice and 
contractualist scholars. That is, these scholars have a set of 
institutions—conferences, centers, and the like—and a common set of 
intellectual “moves” and terminology combined with a deep sense that 
their approach is almost always the best approach to any legal policy 
question. 
In my field of insolvency, Professor Douglas Baird has 
attempted a distinction between “proceduralists” and “traditionalists” 
to mark these scholars from the rest,3 but the labels are not very helpful 
and the foundation for them is weak.  I think it is more useful to focus 
on the contractualists versus the “regulators” (both of which are 
defined below). 
I try in this essay to explain how and why public interests have 
been ignored. The essay form permits suggestion and speculation to 
substitute for precision and detailed references in these early stages of 
my developing project.  Many points are uncertain at this stage.  I am 
unclear, for example, whether the relative decline of arguments about 
                                                 
  
1   See, e.g., JAMES M. BUCHANAN, PUBLIC CHOICE: THE ORIGINS AND 
DEVELOPMENT OF A RESEARCH PROGRAM (2003). 
2  See, e.g., ELIZABETH WARREN, JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, 
KATHERINE PORTER & JOHN POTTOW, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 
(7th ed. 2014) [hereinafter DEBTORS AND CREDITORS].  
3   See Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy’s Uncontested Axioms, 108 YALE L.J. 573, 
576-77 (1998). For a critique of his position, see Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Empirical 
Research in Consumer Bankruptcy, 80 TEX. L. REV. 2123 (2002).   
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the public interest is primarily an American phenomenon or one found 
in many parts of the academic world. 
The most challenging element in the analysis is the definition 
of the public interest as distinct from an individual or aggregate 
interest.  An example may help at the start.  In debates about the 
enforcement of form (boilerplate) contracts against consumers, those 
favoring enforcement generally speak of freedom of contract in a 
market society and rely on the consumer’s consent as the central reason 
for enforcement.  Those who would limit enforcement generally argue 
(a) that the consumer does not really consent in a meaningful sense; 
and (b) that, even with consent, enforcement of some or all of the form 
provisions would be unjust or unfair to the consumer party. 
The arguments on each side have considerable power, but my 
point here is that each argument is rights-based—that is, limited to the 
rights of one of the parties to the contract. The arguments may apply 
to many sellers that issue form contracts and to millions of consumers 
against whom they might be enforced, but this aggregation of instances 
does not amount to an argument about the public interest.  No doubt 
the sellers’ advocates would claim that society generally is benefitted 
by enforcement, and the consumers’ champions would make the same 
claim about nonenforcement, but each would be speaking of the 
aggregation of individual results, not a distinct collective interest that 
should be included in determining an appropriate legal policy. 
By contrast, other sorts of arguments—whether good or bad 
on the merits—would be based on a notion of the public interest.  As 
a first approximation, a public interest may be defined as a concern 
about the positive and negative effects of a policy on most of the 
people in society, including those whose individual interests are not 
directly implicated by a given transaction or activity.  In our pending 
example, the public interest in boilerplate might include factors 
different from freedom of contract or an unjust result for the 
consumer party. 
There are a number of public interest concerns in the context 
of form contracts.  One category might be called “secondary effects.” 
Consider the consumer advocate’s argument that courts or regulators 
should be more ready than they have been to strike down unreasonable 
and oppressive contract terms.  One aspect of that claim would be the 
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benefit to the consumers thus spared from enforcement of those 
terms.  But another would be the assertion that judicial activism would 
serve the public interest by arming the sellers’ lawyers with tools to 
convince their clients to draft form contracts with a more even hand.  
That result might benefit society generally by giving everyone more 
confidence in entering into form contracts and creating a pervasive 
sense of fairness in the market place.  This sort of argument differs 
from the individual rights argument because it rests upon costs and 
benefits to society generally rather than arguments about “true” 
consent or normative beliefs about fairness.  This sort of argument is 
also less subject to claims of individual consent or waiver.  My sense is 
that this sort of shift in the focus of the argument would be important, 
albeit sometimes subtle in the abstract.4 
For the purposes of this paper, I have no interest in how these 
arguments come out or in the numerous counter and counter-counter 
arguments that would arise.  The necessary point is that there may be 
a public interest to be identified and that interest may have a significant 
influence on the nature and direction of the debate.  It can have that 
effect even though it must be conceded that the importance of the 
distinction is sometimes masked by the difficulty in making it.  It must 
also be conceded that aggregate and public interest benefits/harms 
may overlap considerably, but that ambiguity does not necessarily 
make the public interest less salient. 
I. THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
In recent years, discourse in many legal fields has been 
“privatized” by the assumption that the stakes—the benefits and 
costs—at play in a given activity are limited to the private parties who 
are individually interested in possible outcomes.  Commercial scholars 
are prominent among those committed to this view.  Such scholars are 
                                                 
4   These sorts of arguments are often about “externalities,” positive or 
negative, that are recognized in principal in contractualist presentations, but are often 
omitted or subordinated.  Externalities sometimes effect only a certain group of 
people and therefore are not public interest questions in the sense that I am using 
the phrase.  But a fair number of public interest arguments are about ignored 
externalities. 
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generally found among those who embrace “public choice” theory and 
among those whom I have characterized as “contractualists.”5 
Loosely speaking, scholars who embrace the “public choice” 
theory might claim that there is rarely such a thing as a public interest 
that is relevant to a legal issue, only an aggregation of private ones that 
become expressed in law largely as a matter of interest group wins, 
losses, or compromises. 
Next door live the contractualists, who believe that commercial 
policies are best understood as a series of contracts, rather than 
sovereign commands.  For them, the ideal society consists of a web of 
contracts freely adopted by each person.  (Locke meets the Uniform 
Commercial Code.) Because public law is sometimes a practical 
necessity, that law should be defined by the results that private 
contracts would produce if they were feasible.  The contractualists are 
in turn divided between those who view the contractual approach as a 
useful metaphor for determining the correct legal result and others 
who argue for commercial laws that facilitate actual bargains that 
would replace substantive legislative rules to the maximum extent, 
often by enabling the legal contortions necessary to attempt to avoid 
the problem of third-party effects.  Each of these views privatizes legal 
thought by banishing traditional notions of a societal or collective 
interest. Their opponents I will call the “regulators”: scholars who are 
more sympathetic to mandatory legal rules and government regulation 
in the public interest. 
Both public choice and contractualism are closely related to 
neoclassical economic theory and to the Law and Economics 
“movement” in the U.S. and elsewhere, with its emphasis on increasing 
efficiency in the generation of wealth and its disinterest in questions of 
wealth distribution.  They also parallel a reductionism in political 
science, where the literature has been dominated by interest group 
influence and legislator self-interest, rather than the actors’ beliefs and 
perceptions about the public interest.  In recent years, this approach 
has been extended to scholarship about judges, seeking patterns of 
decision-making related to political affiliations and personal 
                                                 
5   See Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Contracting Out of 
Bankruptcy: An Empirical Intervention, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1199 (2005); DEBTORS 
AND CREDITORS, supra note 2.   
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backgrounds.  Much of this scholarship is useful, but like the 
rhododendron it has too often exterminated valuable competitors. 
These and other factors have contributed to a focus on 
individual rights and obligations and thus on individual benefits and 
harms.  This focus has had a major impact on policy debates.  
American examples of affected policy issues include the existence vel 
non of private rights of action based on statutory provisions that do not 
explicitly grant such rights; the nature of fiduciary and other 
management duties owed to investors and creditors in corporate law; 
the proper scope of arbitration clauses in both consumer and 
international commercial arbitration; and the emergence of secured 
creditor domination of the reorganization of distressed businesses.  In 
this essay, I want to address just the last one as an illustration. 
II. AN EXAMPLE: THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN 
REORGANIZATION CASES 
Chapter 11 reorganization lies at the heart of United States 
insolvency law, and it is the primary feature of our law that has 
influenced legal reformers all over the world.  Yet it seems to me that 
some of the central policies that drove its adoption in the United States 
and its influence elsewhere in the world have become obscured in 
modern scholarship.  Obviously, the achievement of a law’s goal 
should be the touchstone for every aspect of its implementation, yet 
often in the United States goals are merely assumed and these 
assumptions often change sub silencio.  For example, there is 
considerable discussion currently about the control of Chapter 11 
proceedings by secured creditors, but relatively little attention to the 
goals of Chapter 11 in relation to control rights.  Because secured 
creditor control effectively converts Chapter 11 to a vehicle for a 
version of contractualism, it is congenial to that school but unattractive 
to those who see a larger role for protective rules in the Bankruptcy 
Code.  The correct result of the contention between them ultimately 
turns on convictions about the proper goals for reorganization law. 
I do not attempt here to make the case for or against creditor 
control or to answer the larger predicate question, which is the purpose 
of reorganization procedures.  Instead I want to put on the table some 
of the public interest issues that should be part of those discussions. 
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It is striking that the debate has become almost entirely rights 
based, ignoring any suggestion of public interests in the outcome, just 
as with the form consumer contract example discussed earlier.  The 
debate has been conducted by scholars committed to a private-sector, 
free-market view versus those more concerned with normative values 
like protecting weak parties and nonparticipating parties.  As with form 
contracts, the lack of apparent concern with a public interest is often 
found on both sides.6 
Most of the scholars who favor secured creditor control are 
contractualists or quasi-contractualists.  Dean Robert Rasmussen is a 
pure contractualist who would use a company’s articles of 
incorporation as a standard contract with creditors: 
When a firm is formed, it would be required to select 
what courses of action it wishes to have available if it 
runs into financial difficulties down the road. . . . By 
offering a discrete set of choices, the menu would 
enable banks and other creditors to anticipate the 
interest-rate adjustments that would be made for each 
option. They could then communicate to those 
establishing the firm the true cost of selecting one 
bankruptcy provision over another.7 
His fellow contractualists propose various other techniques for 
producing contractual agreement, but all support their position with 
arguments that rest on benefits to the individual firms as debtors or 
creditors and consider any possible harms in the same way.  Underlying 
their approach is only one contention that could be read as invoking 
the public interest.  Professor Lynn LoPucki, a frequent opponent of 
the contractualists, summarizes that argument as follows: 
                                                 
6   A nice example of the absence of the public interest argument is found 
in the Detroit bankruptcy where little of the legal debate seems to have addressed 
the public interest benefits arising from the availability to the public of a remarkable 
collection of art at very low cost.  Yet that interest had a major impact on the results 
of the case.  See Melissa B. Jacoby, Federalism Form and Function in the Detroit Bankruptcy, 
33 YALE J. ON REG. (forthcoming 2016) (importance to the public of preservation 
of art museum). 
7   Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor’s Choice: A Menu Approach to Corporate 
Bankruptcy, 71 TEX. L. REV. 51, 66-67 (1992). 
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The case for freedom of contract rests squarely on the 
assumption that each party chooses the contract 
because the contract makes that party better off. 
Because each party is better off, all parties are better 
off in the aggregate. That aggregate then becomes a 
proxy for “social welfare.” In the bankruptcy context, 
this theory holds that thousands of correct decisions 
by a debtor and each of its creditors and shareholders 
will generate one correct decision—the bankruptcy 
contract—in the aggregate. That decision will 
maximize social welfare.8 
Other contractualists hedge their commitment to contract a bit 
more than Dean Rasmussen, but their caveats serve to emphasize their 
concern with individual rights and obligations.  Thus Professor Steven 
Schwarcz limits enforceability of contract deviations from the 
“default” rules of the Bankruptcy Code to those that do not offend the 
principle of equality of distribution nor create an externality that would 
be unenforceable as a matter of contract law.9  The former limit is 
protective of the rights of claimants in a specific case, while the latter 
amounts to a public policy exception, something rarely found in 
American contract law and quite different from the broader and much 
more common instance of a relevant public interest. 
Only one contractualist article has seemed to me to rely 
importantly on a public interest other than the general ground of 
freedom of contract.  It was written by Professor Alan Schwartz who 
supported a contractualist approach with the claim that it would 
further the only legitimate goal of reorganization, which for him is 
generation of the lowest possible interest rate on debt capital.10  
Whatever the merits of that interesting assertion, it does make a claim 
about a public interest. It is probably significant that no other 
contractualist scholar has taken up that argument. 
                                                 
8   Lynn LoPucki, Contract Bankruptcy: A Reply to Alan Schwartz, 109 YALE 
L.J. 317, 341 (1999). 
9   Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking Freedom of Contract: A Bankruptcy Paradigm, 
77 TEX. L. REV 515, 542-44 (1999). 
10   Alan Schwartz, Bankruptcy Contracting Reviewed, 109 YALE L.J. 343, 343 
(1999). 
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What is more surprising is that fairly often scholars who are 
regulators also focus on private concerns rather than public ones.  For 
example, I wrote an article directly attacking the contractualist position 
on secured creditor control of reorganization, but devoted it almost 
entirely to the negative effects of that approach on the maximization 
of value and fair distribution to the claimants rather than any 
considerations beyond those immediate parties.11  Elizabeth Warren 
and I launched a direct attack on the contractualists based on empirical 
data, but the entire thrust of the article was that a contractualist 
approach would result in disadvantage to various parties to a 
reorganization proceeding.12 The principal exception was a small 
section dealing with transaction costs, and even that had a focus on the 
contracting parties rather than society in general. 
Only two major articles on the rule maker side in the debates 
about bankruptcy seem to have squarely addressed an alleged public 
interest.  Professor Susan Block-Lieb pointed to the adoption of 
various statutes regarding pensions and retiree benefits as establishing 
a public interest that should have weight in making bankruptcy policy.13  
She insisted that Congressional action to support pension benefits 
represented a Congressional determination that pension protection 
was a general interest of our society and therefore required the 
consideration of that public interest in forming bankruptcy policy. 
Her discussion illustrated an important aspect of the conflict 
between party-oriented arguments and public interest arguments.  She 
explicitly rejected the standard contractualist argument that substantive 
public policy should have no place in bankruptcy, viz any concerns 
about pensions must be cabined in pension law discussions, concerns 
about financial speculation must be resolved in legislation directed at 
financial speculation, and so on.  The effect is to prevent many public 
interest factors from being given weight in making bankruptcy law. 
The compartmentalization of legal policy contributes substantially to a 
focus on the interests of the immediate parties to a particular economic 
relationship and away from a more general social or economic 
                                                 
11   See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Control of Wealth in Bankruptcy, 82 TEX. 
L. REV. 795, 837-52 (2004). 
12   See Warren & Westbrook, supra note 5. 
13   See Susan Block-Lieb, The Logic and Limits of Contract Bankruptcy, 2001 
U. ILL. L. REV. 503 (2001). 
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perspective. By taking on the argument against policy balkanization, 
Professor Block-Lieb staked out a position for substantive public 
interests in bankruptcy policy. 
The second major article pointing out public interest 
considerations in reorganization policy was written by Professor (now 
Senator) Elizabeth Warren.  In an article responding to the 
contractualist approach, Professor Warren listed the goals of 
bankruptcy as follows: 
Enhance Value. By creating specialized collection rules to 
govern in the case of multiple default and by requiring collective rather 
than individual action, the value to be gleaned from the failing business 
can be increased while the expenses of collecting that value are 
decreased. Bankruptcy rules can also preserve going concern value 
while they can cabin many forms of strategic behavior that would 
otherwise waste collective resources. 
Establish an Orderly Distribution Scheme. By moving away from 
the race of the diligent at state law, there can be a considered judgment 
of who should receive preferences in the event that not all parties’ 
expectations can be met. Distributions to parties with different legal 
rights can be settled in a legislative arena. Parties with no formal rights 
to the assets of the business, such as employees who will lose jobs and 
taxing authorities that will lose ratable property, may profit from a 
second chance at restructuring debt and giving the business a chance 
to survive in situ. 
Internalize the Costs of Default. A viable Chapter 11 system 
reduces the pressure on the government to bail out failing companies, 
thus forcing creditors to make market-based lending decisions and to 
monitor their debtors more closely. 
Establish a Privately Monitored System. The initiation decision in 
bankruptcy is one of the hardest. A system that provides sufficient 
incentives for debtors to choose bankruptcy voluntarily or for 
creditors to force their debtors into it avoids the high costs that come 
with a publicly monitored system, both in terms of the costs of errors 
(decisions to place a company in bankruptcy that come too quickly or 
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too slowly) and the costs of monitoring. Such a system also avoids the 
potential politicization of such decisions.14 
I have underlined portions of this list that reflect public interest 
factors.  It is important to note that Warren was not often able to cite 
specific provisions protecting such values.  Public interest factors are 
often hard to tie to particular legal rules.  In effect, legislators rely on 
the courts to have those factors in mind, along with the structure of a 
statutory system as a whole, when construing a rule. 
Generally, however, the debates about secured creditor control 
of reorganization and its relation to reorganization goals have settled 
into a rights argument with little attention to public interest factors. 
That is so despite the fact that the discussions surrounding the 
proposal and adoption of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978 were filled with 
public interest factors supporting reorganization.  Jobs, community 
stability, and a second chance for company owners were high on the 
legislators’ lists of statutory goals. For example: 
The purpose of a business reorganization case, unlike 
a liquidation case, is to restructure a business’s 
financings so that it may continue to operate, provide 
its employees with jobs, pay its creditors, and produce 
a return for its stockholders . . . It is more economically 
efficient to reorganize than to liquidate, because it 
preserves jobs and assets.15 
Taking the preservation of jobs as an example, there is 
evidence that public officials continue to be deeply concerned with the 
preservation of jobs, but jobs have virtually disappeared from the 
reorganization conversation in the United States. 
This point is illustrated when competing reorganization plans 
are presented to the courts.  Under some circumstances, the 
Bankruptcy Code permits more than one reorganization plan to be 
submitted to creditors.  If the necessary majorities vote in favor of both 
plans, which sometimes happens, the court must decide which plan to 
                                                 
14   See Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect World, 92 
MICH. L. REV. 336, 344-76 (1993) (emphasis added). 
15 H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 220 (1977).
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adopt.  There is no statutory standard for making that choice, so the 
courts are free to consult such policy grounds as they think relevant.  
In the reported decisions on this point, there is little sign that the better 
preservation of jobs is a legitimate tie-breaker, despite the legislative 
history and despite the professed concerns of nearly all our political 
leaders.  The interests of communities are also ignored, despite 
widespread state-level legislation in the United States designed to 
protect communities against hostile takeovers. 
In addition to jobs and community stability, both mentioned 
by Warren, there was in 1978 an underlying theme of helping equity 
owners as well.  The new Chapter 11 arose from the old Chapter XI, 
which was designed to permit small business owners to keep their 
businesses alive through negotiating a payout plan with their creditors.  
Congress intended to extend this idea by permitting management of 
all businesses, large and small, to remain as the “Debtor in Possession.”  
Thus we have the view of Chapter 11 reflected in the United Kingdom 
terminology: “rescue” proceedings.16 That view of reorganization is 
reflected in the legislative history quoted above and continued to be a 
part of the culture and folklore of the new Chapter 11 well into its first 
decade. 
Given that history, it is far from evident that only bondholders 
and other creditors are entitled to consideration while shareholders are 
not. Yet at some point the focus of scholarship and practice narrowed 
to the interests of the immediate parties and their statutory 
entitlements. Although the abolition in 1978 of the “absolute priority” 
rule (which puts shareholders at the bottom of the priority waterfall) 
in its strictest form17 was intended to permit more flexibility in 
protecting the interests of shareholders, a number of articles continued 
to call the rule “absolute” and to decry any departure from it, which in 
turn obscured the legislators’ evident interest in “rescue.” 
                                                 
16   See, e.g. Vannessa Finch, Re-Invigorating Corporate Rescue, 2003 J. BUS. L. 
527, 536-39 (2003); see also Gabriel Moss, Comparative Bankruptcy Cultures: Rescue or 
Liquidation? Comparison of Trends in National Law—England, 23 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 115, 
121 (1997).  
17   John D. Ayer, Rethinking Absolute Priority After Ahlers, 87 MICH. L. REV. 
963 (1989). 
2015 Westbrook 4:1 
457 
The issue is whether interest of specific owners in a specific 
publicly held company is worthy of consideration, especially if equity 
is “under water” or “out of the money.”  The contractualists consider 
that equity investors at that point cease to be parties in any real sense 
because of the absolute priority rule. Thus, the law’s concern should 
be solely with the interests of those who remain in the hunt. But the 
public interest in ensuring that shareholder interests are appropriately 
considered remains an important one, beyond recoveries in particular 
cases.  Is a quick exit for equity sound business policy, given the 
importance of equity investing in the capital markets?  That sort of 
public interest should be considered in deciding, for example, whether 
case law should give shareholders more protection against 
undervaluation of their company and other financial maneuvers.  Little 
evidence can be found of an appreciation that there may be a public 
interest in the resolution of that question. 
The lack of consideration of a possible public interest in these 
decisions—a public interest in jobs, in community stability, and in 
promoting and protecting equity interests—seems especially 
anomalous because they played an important part in the adoption of 
the most important single reform in the 1978 Code.  That reform 
replaced a trustee in bankruptcy with a Debtor-in-Possession (“DIP”), 
conferring extraordinary power and flexibility on the managements of 
distressed businesses in Chapter 11.18  Yet the notion of protecting 
owners of companies provided important support for that reform.  If 
they are now replaced by an assumption, often explicit, that only the 
interests of creditors are important, and that the maximization of value 
for creditors is the only aim of bankruptcy law,  then the idea of putting 
old management in charge of a company’s Chapter 11 case needs 
comprehensive review.  Indeed, because nowadays the result is often 
to put a secured creditor in control despite its conflict of interest with 
the rest of the creditors, the DIP concept seems ripe for revisiting.19  
It is in consideration of the public interest in protecting equity 
investors that puts that question on the table. 
                                                 
18   11 U.S.C. §1107. 
19  See generally A. Mechele Dickerson, Privatizing Ethics in Corporate 
Reorganizations, 93 MINN. L. REV. 875 (2009). 
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III. A POSSIBLE RESPONSE 
The nature and weight of these public interest factors in the 
evolution of reorganization is a long discussion far beyond the 
boundaries of this essay.  What I do want to suggest are possible 
reasons for the lack of concern for the role of the public interest in 
commercial law debates.  No doubt part of the answer is political.  
Regulation is not popular in the abstract, despite the recent reminders 
of the effects of deregulation provided by the Great Recession.  But 
another reason for this lack of concern is that the regulators in 
academia have been too long on the defensive and have had too little 
new to offer.  The contractualists have proclaimed “The End of 
Bankruptcy”20 (via secured creditor control, which they embrace) and 
devised ever more clever and intricate ways for contract to replace legal 
provisions.  All these have provided much fuel for academic reflection, 
tinkering, and debate. The regulators have been “traditionalists” 
defending the eroding status quo.  Professors Warren and Block-Lieb 
published their public interest articles a decade ago, but little new has 
been done to explain or vindicate the interests they identified.  
Although the contractualists have largely run out of intellectual steam 
themselves, until the regulators resume a positive reform agenda at the 
conceptual level the public interest will remain behind the door when 
bankruptcy policy is made.  The same is true throughout commercial 
law. 
One step that courts might be encouraged to take would be to 
try to identify (or encourage the parties to identify) any public interest 
factors in a commercial dispute.  In an appropriate case, they could 
even invite governmental agencies or NGOs to submit views and 
arguments if those submissions would not unduly delay the case or 
increase the expense for the private parties.  Pointing out those 
opportunities would be a major step forward in rediscovering the 
public interests we have somehow misplaced. 
                                                 
20   See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 
55 STAN. L. REV. 751, 754-55 (2002) (describing a fundamental shift in Chapter 11 
bankruptcy from a reorganization vehicle to a means of liquidation driven in large 
part by secured creditors who increasingly view the sales value of a firm’s current 
assets as greater than the going-concern value of those assets in the future). 
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JUDICIAL IMPLEMENTATION OF SOUTH 
AFRICA’S NEW BUSINESS RESCUE 
MODEL: A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT 
Patrick C. Osode 
INTRODUCTION 
One of the most exciting and innovative aspects of South 
Africa’s New Companies Act1 (“the 2008 Companies Act” or “the 
Act”) is the creation of a new business rescue model in Chapter Six of 
the Act (“Chapter Six”). The scheme of Chapter Six of the 2008 
Companies Act2 replaces the judicial management model that was 
contained in the 1973 Companies Act,3 which is the predecessor of the 
current Act. Like most major pieces of legislation enacted in post-
apartheid South Africa, the 2008 Companies Act in general, and 
Chapter Six in particular, are intended by the legislature to significantly 
enlarge the capacities of both the government and the private sector 
                                                 
 This is the revised version of a paper presented at the 17th Biennial 
Meeting of the International Academy of Commercial and Consumer Law (IACCL) 
held at Istanbul Bilgi University, Turkey from July 16-19, 2014. Excellent research 
assistance received from Melissa A.A. Omino, doctoral candidate, University of Fort 
Hare, is gratefully acknowledged. Responsibility for any error or omission remains 
exclusively mine. 
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Mercantile Law, University of Fort Hare, South Africa.  
1 Companies Act 71 of 2008 (S. Afr.). Unless otherwise indicated, all 
references to statutory provisions are references to provisions of this Act. Although 
enacted in 2008, the Act only came into force on May 1, 2011. Pursuant to powers 
conferred under the Act, the Minister of Trade and Industry has enacted The 
Companies Regulations, 2011 which are expected to assist both the application and 
implementation. See GN R351 in GG 34239 of 26 April 2011 (S. Afr.). 
2 Companies Act 71 of 2008 Chapter Six (S. Afr.). 
3 Companies Act 61 of 1973 (S. Afr.). The 1973 Companies Act has now 
been repealed by the 2008 Companies Act. 
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to preserve existing jobs, create new employment opportunities, and 
make the country’s economy competitive relative to its 
contemporaries.4 But beyond the purely economic policy objectives, 
the 2008 Companies Act was also intended to infuse the regulatory 
framework governing companies with the treasured democratic values 
of equality, non-racialism, and human dignity enshrined in South 
Africa’s post-apartheid Constitution.5 
The fact that both social and economic objectives impelled the 
enactment of the 2008 Companies Act and Chapter Six can be gleaned 
from the twelve objects of the Act set out in section 7. With particular 
respect to Chapter Six, it is specifically stated that part of the policy 
intent behind the enactment of the Act is “to provide for the efficient 
rescue and recovery of financially distressed companies, in a manner 
that balances the rights and interests of all relevant stakeholders.”6 
Especially significant is the provision of section 5(1) of the 2008 
Companies Act, which explicitly enjoins the courts to interpret and 
apply the provisions of the Act in a manner that gives effect to the 
purposes set out in section 7. Based on the provisions of sections 5, 7, 
and Chapter Six, both judges and academics7 are in agreement that the 
legislature has unequivocally signalled its preference for the rescue of 
financially distressed companies as against liquidation.8 Both the 2008 
Companies Act and Chapter Six constitute another glaring example of 
South Africa’s attempt to use commercial legal regulatory instruments 
                                                 
4   SOUTH AFRICAN COMPANY LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: GUIDELINES 
FOR CORPORATE LAW REFORM, GENERAL NOTICE 1183, ¶ 1.2 (2004), available at 
http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/26493_gen1183a.pdf. 
5 S. AFR. CONST., 2008. 
6 Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 7(k) (S. Afr.). 
7 CONTEMPORARY COMPANY LAW 861-64 (Farouk H.I. Cassim et al. eds., 
2d ed. 2012); 1 HENOCHSBERG ON THE COMPANIES ACT 71 OF 2008 44-46 (Piet 
Delport et al. eds. 2012) [hereinafter “DELPORT”]. 
8 This point was made most distinctly by the court in Koen and Another v. 
Wedgewood Village Golf and Country Estate Ltd. 2012 (2) SA 378 (WCC) at para. 14 (S. 
Afr.) as follows: “It is clear that the Legislature has recognised that the liquidation of 
companies more frequently than not occasions significant collateral damage, both 
economically and socially, with attendant destruction of wealth and livelihoods. It is 
obvious that it is in the public interest that the incidence of such adverse 
socioeconomic consequences should be avoided where reasonably possible. Business 
rescue is intended to serve that public interest by providing a remedy directed at 
avoiding the deleterious consequences of liquidations . . . .”  
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to boost socio-economic transformation by creating conditions that 
will enable significantly increased participation of the formerly 
disenfranchised black majority in the mainstream economy. These 
reforms will help the society overcome the multiple legacies of 
apartheid with which South Africa continues to struggle twenty years 
into the democratic era. 
The quality of real or tangible outcomes achieved by statutory 
regulatory instruments generally, and commercial law-related 
instruments in particular, may depend in part on their interpretation 
and application by the courts.9 To be sure, the adoption of an 
interpretive approach that is conservative, largely textual or literal, and 
purpose-neutral will significantly undermine the prospect of Chapter 
Six achieving the public policy goals intended by law and policymakers. 
Indeed, such an approach may by itself lead to regulatory failure.10 The 
plausibility of this concern is clearly borne out by the experience of 
“judicial management” in the courts. In this respect, it is especially 
noteworthy that virtually all of the academic and judicial post-mortem 
done on the judicial management scheme of the 1973 Companies Act 
suggest that one of the main reasons for the dismal failure of that 
scheme was the conservative judicial approach to the interpretation 
and application of the requirement of “reasonable probability” (of 
successful financial rehabilitation of the debtor company), which was 
a prerequisite for the granting of a judicial management order under 
section 417 of that Act.11 The risk of business rescue suffering the same 
                                                 
9   COMPARATIVE COMPANY LAW: A CASE-BASED APPROACH 378-79 
(Mathias Siems & David Cabrelli eds. 2013). 
10 Such failure would almost certainly become reality if the courts adopt a 
disposition and develop a jurisprudence that is generally “creditor-friendly,” as was 
the case in the judicial management era and as is still the case under the country’s 
insolvency law and related processes. It should be noted here that judicial 
management was first introduced into South African law through the Companies Act 
of 1926 and only became consigned to history when the 2008 Companies Act came 
into force. See Richard Bradstreet, The New Business Rescue: Will Creditors Sink or Swim?, 
128 SALJ 352, 353-56 (2011); Anneli Loubser, The Role of Shareholders during Corporate 
Rescue Proceedings: Always On the Outside Looking In?, 20 SAMLJ 372, 372-73 (2008). 
11 See, e.g., David Burdette, Some Initial Thoughts on the Development of a Modern 
and Effective Business Rescue Model for South Africa (Part 1), 16 SAMLJ 249 (2004); 
CONTEMPORARY COMPANY LAW, supra note 7, at 2; Pieter Kloppers, Judicial 
Management Reform – Steps to Initiate a Business Rescue, 13 SAMLJ 358 (2001); Koen and 
Another v. Wedgewood Village Golf and Country Estate Ltd. 2012 (2) SA 378 (WCC) at 2 
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fate in the courts as its judicial management predecessor is significantly 
heightened by the deficiencies of the 2008 Companies Act generally 
and of Chapter Six in particular.12 
Against the above background, it is clear that the interpretive 
approach and attitude of the courts will be critical to the efficacy of the 
Chapter Six rescue mechanism and, therefore, to the attainment of the 
underlying public policy objectives. Without doubt, if they adopt an 
                                                 
(S. Afr.); Anneli Loubser, Judicial Management as a Business Rescue Procedure in South 
African Corporate Law, 16 SAMLJ 137 (2004); Oakdene Square Properties Ltd. and Others 
v. Farm Bothasfontein (Kyalami) Ltd. and Others 2013 (4) SA 539 (S. Afr.); Propspec 
Investments Ltd. v. Pacific Coast Investments 97 Ltd. 2013 (4) SA 539 (S. Afr.). Other 
factors that have been identified include the absence of a business rescue culture 
among all the various role players (creditors, judges, etc.) and the fact that judicial 
managers were usually chosen from the ranks of liquidators who have neither the 
skill nor experience in rehabilitating businesses. See Richard Bradstreet, The Leak in 
the Chapter 6 Lifeboat: Inadequate Regulation of Business Rescue Practitioners May Adversely 
Affect Lenders’ Willingness and the Growth of the Economy, 22 SAMLJ 195, 195 (2010). It 
would seem that there were also historical factors that lay behind the spectacular 
impotence and ultimate failure of judicial management. See Anneli Loubser, Tilting 
at Windmills? The Quest for an Effective Corporate Rescue Procedure in South African Law, 25 
SAMLJ 437, 438 (2011). 
12 In this respect, the following points are noteworthy. First, consisting of 
a total of 225 sections and 5 schedules, the 2008 Companies Act is about the shortest 
contemporary companies’ legislation. It can in this respect be sharply contrasted with 
the United Kingdom 2006 Companies Act, which consists of 1300 sections and 16 
schedules; Australia’s Corporations Act 2001 made up of 1516 sections and 4 
schedules; Hong Kong’s Companies Ordinance 2012, which consists of 921 sections 
and 11 schedules; and India’s Companies Act 2013 consisting of 470 sections and 7 
schedules. However, the interpretation and application of the Act is supported by 
the Companies Regulations of 2011 made by the Minister of Trade and Industry 
pursuant to powers conferred by Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 223 (S. Afr.). As 
already pointed out by some academic commentators and as the emerging case law 
is beginning to show, the result of this extreme minimalist approach and economy 
of content is that several important issues of company law are either not covered at 
all or are addressed in significantly inadequate detail. See CONTEMPORARY COMPANY 
LAW, supra note 7, at 2; PIET DELPORT, THE NEW COMPANIES ACT MANUAL 3-4 
(2009); Loubser, Judicial Management as a Business Rescue Procedure in South African 
Corporate Law, supra note 11, at 137. Second, the deficit in the width of regulatory 
coverage is exacerbated by the poor quality of legislative drafting apparent in several 
parts of the 2008 Companies Act. This has already been the subject of judicial 
lamentation in the emerging case law. See also DH Brothers Industries v. Gribnitz NO and 
Others 2014 (1) SA 103 (S. Afr.) and Tuning Fork Ltd. t/a Balanced Audio v. Greeff and 
Another 2014 (4) SA 521, ¶ 90 (S. Afr.). 
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approach and attitude similar to that which was consistently visited on 
“judicial management,” there is a real likelihood that the rescue 
mechanism will fail at the judicial altar. Cognisant of this possibility, 
this paper examines some of the Chapter Six related decisions and 
pronouncements made by South African courts in the last three years, 
with a view to assessing the practical or policy implications of those 
decisions and pronouncements. The analysis will determine whether 
the decisions are ultimately favourable to the emergence of Chapter 
Six as an effective corporate rescue mechanism in South Africa. 
I.         BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE MAIN FEATURES OF SOUTH 
AFRICA’S CORPORATE RESCUE MODEL 
The scheme of Chapter Six can be activated in either one of 
two ways. The first is by way of a resolution adopted by the board of 
directors of a “financially distressed company” where the directors 
genuinely believe that the company is “financially distressed”13 and that 
there is a reasonable prospect of rescue.14 Alternatively, where the 
board of such a company appears reluctant to adopt such a resolution, 
and thereby activates business rescue proceedings voluntarily, any 
“affected person”15 may apply to the court for an order placing the 
                                                 
13 In terms of Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 128(1)(f) (S. Afr.), a company 
is “financially distressed” if, within the immediately ensuing six-month period, (a) it 
appears reasonably unlikely that the company will be able to pay all of its debts as 
they become due and payable; or (b) it appears reasonably likely that the company 
will become insolvent.  
14 “Rescuing a company” is defined as the achievement of either one of 
two goals, namely, (a) the restructuring of the affairs, business, property, equity, debt, 
and other liabilities of a financially distressed company in a manner that maximizes 
the likelihood of the company continuing in existence on a solvent basis or, (b) if it 
is not possible for the company to continue in existence, results in a better return to 
the company’s creditors or shareholders than would result from the immediate 
liquidation of the company. See Companies Act 71 of 2008 §§ 128(1)(b)(iii), 128(1)(h) 
(S. Afr.). 
15 In relation to a company, the term “affected person” refers to the 
shareholders or creditors, trade unions representing the company’s employees, the 
employees themselves, or their representatives where they are not represented by a 
trade union. See Companies Act 71 of 2008 §§ 128(1)(a), 144 (S. Afr.). The 
recognition of trade unions and employees and the vesting of significant rights on 
them in the corporate rescue context is one of the innovations introduced by the 
2008 Companies Act and is consistent with South African law and policymakers’ 
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company under rescue.16 Irrespective of how the proceedings are 
commenced, the first major consequence is that the business and 
affairs are placed under the supervision and control of a “business 
rescue practitioner” to whom all the “affected persons” must now look 
for the possible rehabilitation of the company.17 
The second major legal consequence flowing from the 
commencement of business rescue proceedings is the moratorium on 
legal proceedings, executions, and claims (secured and unsecured) 
against the company.18 This effectively insulates a company undergoing 
rescue from legal or enforcement proceedings either pending or in 
prospect.19 The moratorium, which is general in its reach, arises both 
immediately and automatically upon the proper commencement of the 
said proceedings.20 While the effect of the moratorium does not extend 
to an alteration of existing rights acquired by the company’s creditors 
in the period preceding business rescue, it does effectively freeze those 
rights “in the sense that creditors may not enforce their rights while 
the company is under the rescue process without the written consent 
of the business rescue practitioner or in certain circumstances, the 
court[.]”21 
                                                 
conviction that these particular stakeholders deserve stronger protection in processes 
and transactions aimed at resolving challenges posed by financially distressed 
employers. See CARL STEIN & GEOFF EVERINGHAM, THE NEW COMPANIES ACT 
UNLOCKED 411 (2011). 
16   Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 129(1) (S. Afr.). 
17 In this respect, although the South African business rescue scheme 
shares several features with the famous 11 U.S.C. § 1101 corporate bankruptcy 
management regime, it also differs sharply in that it adopts what Professor 
McCormack has described as a “management displacement model” when compared 
to the “debtor-in-possession” model of 11 U.S.C. § 1101. See GERARD MCCORMACK, 
CORPORATE RESCUE LAW: AN ANGLO-AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE 80-83, 152-54 
(2008). See also CONTEMPORARY COMPANY LAW, supra note 7, at 861, 866; STEIN & 
EVERINGHAM, supra note 15, at 409. 
18 Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 133 (S. Afr.). 
19 This feature appears common to most of the corporate rescue schemes 
in Anglo-American jurisdictions. MCCORMACK, supra note 17, at 156-175. 
20   CONTEMPORARY COMPANY LAW, supra note 7, at 878-79. 
21 Id. 878-79. In the recent case of Moodley v. On Digital Media (Pty) Ltd. 2014 
(6) SA 279 (GJ) (S. Afr.), the court held that the scope of the said general moratorium 
does not extend to legal proceedings brought against a company under business 
rescue and its business rescue practitioner in connection with the rescue plan, 
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Perhaps the most crucial part of the business rescue process 
consists of the development, approval, and implementation of a 
competent rescue plan.22 Inevitably, exclusive responsibility for this 
part of the process is imposed on the practitioner who must begin his 
tenure by simultaneously investigating the company’s affairs and 
consulting with the creditors, management, employees or their trade 
unions, and other stakeholders.23 Following development of the plan, 
it must be presented for approval of the creditors at a meeting which 
is also open to participation by other groups of “affected persons.”24 
A rescue plan is only “approved” if it is supported by seventy-five 
percent of the creditors out of which fifty percent must be claimants 
who qualify as “independent creditors.”25 Implementation of the plan 
can only be properly embarked upon by the business rescue 
practitioner if approval has been given in accordance with the 
requirements of the 2008 Companies Act.26 If the required level of 
creditor support for the plan is not received, the rescue proceedings 
automatically terminate, unless the practitioner or an “affected person” 
pursues the very limited recourse available to him under the Act.27 
                                                 
including its interpretation and execution towards implementation. In reaching this 
decision, the court declined to follow an earlier high court decision to the contrary 
handed down in Redpath Mining South Africa (Pty) Ltd. v. Marsden No and Others 2013 
ZAGPJHC 148 (GSJ) (S. Afr.).  
22   Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 140(1) (S. Afr.).  
23   Id. § 141(1). However, there is an obligation imposed on directors by 
Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 142 (S. Afr.) to provide assistance and cooperation to 
the business rescue practitioner. 
24 Id. § 152 (S. Afr.). For a detailed discussion of the various stakeholders’ 
participatory rights, see CONTEMPORARY COMPANY LAW, supra note 7, at 899-905; 
and DELPORT, supra note 7, at 500-14. 
25 The term “independent creditor” is defined by Companies Act 71 of 
2008 § 128(1)(g) (S. Afr.) as a creditor, including an employee, who is not related to 
the debtor company. It specifically excludes the company’s directors as well as the 
business rescue practitioner. 
26 Id. § 152(5), (6). These provisions impose a mandatory obligation on the 
debtor company, under the direction of the business rescue practitioner, to take all 
steps necessary to satisfy any conditions on which the rescue plan is contingent and 
to implement the plan. 
27 Where a plan is rejected by the creditors, there are essentially two 
options available under Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 153(1) (S. Afr.). The first is for 
either the business rescue practitioner or an “affected person” to make an application 
to court for an order setting aside the creditors’ negative vote on the basis that it was 
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II.         ASSESSMENT OF THE EMERGING JURISPRUDENCE 
Since the 2008 Companies Act came into operation on the May 
1, 2011, there have been no less than fifteen reported judicial decisions 
on business rescue applications and resulting or related proceedings. 
For the purposes of this paper, it is especially significant that business 
rescue appears to have been granted in only one of the cases that have 
come before the courts.28 Consistent with sound judicial practice, the 
courts have taken the opportunity in each case to make decisions and 
pronouncements on several questions pivotal in the context of the 
interpretation, application, and implementation of Chapter Six. In the 
discussion that follows below, this paper discusses the judicial 
decisions and pronouncements on some of those questions. 
A.         What Constitutes a “Reasonable Prospect of Rescue” 
The most recurring questions in the emerging case law pertain 
to the provision empowering a court to grant an order, at the behest 
of an “affected person,” placing a company under business rescue 
where, inter alia, “there is a reasonable prospect for rescuing the 
company.”29 Not surprisingly, this provision also featured prominently 
in the two cases on business rescue that have thus far reached the 
Supreme Court of Appeal (“SCA”).30 The first question that the courts 
have had to confront in this context, is as to what exactly the legislature 
meant by the words “reasonable prospect of rescue.” Indeed, most of 
the applications for business rescue made thus far have failed mainly 
on the ground that the applicants were unable to meet the evidentiary 
                                                 
“inappropriate.” The second option is for an “affected person” or “combination of 
affected persons” to make an offer to purchase the voting interests of one or more 
of the opposing creditors at a value independently and expertly determined to be a 
fair and reasonable estimate of the return to the said creditor(s) if the company were 
to be liquidated. 
28 That solitary case is African Banking Corp. of Botswana Ltd. v. Kariba 
Furniture Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd. and Others 2013 (6) SA 471 (S. Afr.). 
29 Id. § 131(4)(a). 
30 See Oakdene Square Properties Ltd. and Others v. Farm Bothasfontein (Kyalami) 
Ltd. and Others 2013 (4) SA 539 (S. Afr.); and the very recent (and yet to be reported) 
decision in Newcity Group (Pty) Ltd. v. Allan David Pellow NO and Others 2014 ZASCA 
162. The SCA of South Africa is the highest court in South Africa for all matters 
except those raising constitutional questions for which the Constitutional Court 
(where the Chief Justice sits) is the apex court. 
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burden implicit in this requirement.31 For supporters and enthusiasts 
of business rescue in South Africa, these “pioneering” High Court and 
SCA judgments32 must be troubling, partly because of the 
overwhelmingly negative findings and conclusions which point to the 
possibility that the courts might be unwittingly setting the bar too high 
for the applicants and in the process unfairly denying access to the 
remedial potential of the Chapter Six statutory scheme for financially 
distressed companies and their stakeholders.33 In this regard the 
decision in Southern Palace Investments (Pty) Ltd. v. Midnight Storm 
Investments 386 Ltd.34 stands out. Here the court began the articulation 
of the basis for its decision by noting that the 2008 Companies Act 
clearly requires something less than that the debtor company’s 
rehabilitation should be a reasonable probability. This, in the court’s 
view, is an inference that must be drawn from the difference in 
language between the 1973 Companies Act which used the words 
“reasonable probability” in its s 417 and the 2008 Companies Act 
where the words used in section 131(4) are “reasonable prospect”. In 
other words, the legislature must have intended to set the rehabilitation 
bar at a level lower than that prescribed under the 1973 Companies 
Act. The court was especially critical of the judicial approach to 
applications for “judicial management” when it stated that, “the 
mindset reflected in various cases dealing with judicial management 
                                                 
31 See E.P. Joubert, “Reasonable Possibility” versus “Reasonable Prospect”: Did 
Business Rescue Succeed in Creating a Better Test than Judicial Management?, 76 J. Contemp. 
Roman-Dutch L. 550, 562 (2013) (observing that, based on the recent case law, “the 
single most problematic factor that stands in the way of the granting of business 
rescue orders, is the uncertainty experienced by the courts regarding the meaning of 
‘reasonable prospect.’”). 
32 See Swart v. Beagles Run Investments 25 (Pty) Ltd., (Four Creditors Intervening) 
2011 (5) SA 422 (S. Afr.); AG Petzetakis International Holdings Ltd. v. Petzetakis Africa 
(Pty) Ltd. and Others 2012 (5) SA 515 (S. Afr.); Engen Petroleum Ltd. v. Multi Waste (Pty) 
Ltd. and Others 2012 (5) SA 596 (S. Afr.); Cape Point Vineyards (Pty) Ltd. v. Pinnacle Point 
Group Ltd. and Another, (Advantage Projects Managers) (Pty) Ltd. Intervening 2011 (5) SA 
600 (S. Afr.); Essa and Another v. Bestvest and Another 2012 (4) SA 103; Investec Bank Ltd. 
v. Bruyns 2011 (5) SA 430 (WCC) (S. Afr.); Nedbank Ltd. v. Bestvest 153 (Pty) Ltd. 2012 
(5) SA 497 (S. Afr.); Zoneska Investments (Pty) Ltd. t/a Bonatla Properties (Pty) Ltd. v. 
Midnight Storm Investments 386 Ltd. 2012 (4) SA 590 (WCC) (S. Afr.). 
33 Joubert, supra note 31, at 563. 
34 Southern Palace Investments (Pty) Ltd. v. Midnight Storm Investments (Pt) Ltd. 
2012 (2) SA 423 (WCC) (S. Afr.). The decision and reasoning in this case was 
followed in Koen and Another v. Wedgewood Village Golf and Country Estate Ltd. 2012 (2) 
SA 378 (WCC) (S. Afr.). 
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applications in respect of the recovery requirement was that, prima facie, 
the creditor was entitled to a liquidation order, and that only in 
exceptional circumstances would a judicial management order be 
granted.”35 
Having made the above points regarding the significance of the 
difference in the wording of sections 131(4) and 417, the court in 
Southern Palace Investments seems to have lost its course when it not only 
held that, in order to satisfy the lower threshold, the business rescue 
applicant must provide a business plan that: 
Addresses the cause of the demise or failure of the debtor 
company’s business and offers a remedy that has a reasonable prospect 
of being sustainable; 
Provides concrete and objectively ascertainable details of: 
The likely costs of making the company able to resume its 
business; 
The likely availability of the necessary cash resources to enable 
the debtor company to meet its day-to-day expenses upon resumption 
of its operations; 
The availability of any other resources; and 
The reasons why the applicant suggests that the proposed 
business plan would have a reasonable prospect of success.36 
Having indicated that the legislative intent behind the wording 
of section 131(4) was to set the bar lower than was the case in the 
“judicial management” era, the court in Southern Palace Investments ended 
up setting the bar even higher. But perhaps more troubling is the fact 
that the court’s reasoning, with due respect, drifted into the realm of 
blatant error when it decided to impose, by implication, the duty to 
develop and present a sound and detailed rescue plan upon the 
applicant—for this is a duty that is expressly imposed on the business 
                                                 
35 See Southern Palace Investments, 2012 (2) SA 423 at para.  21.  
36 Id. 
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rescue practitioner by the pertinent provisions of Chapter Six.37 
Furthermore, in terms of the minimum three months timeline that the 
Act allows for the practitioner to attempt successful rehabilitation of a 
financially distressed company, a careful reading of the pertinent 
provisions38 would seem to suggest that the practitioner has a 
minimum of four weeks, subsequent to her appointment, within which 
to develop the rescue plan. But perhaps more worrisome is the fact 
that the courts in Southern Palace Investments and Koen v. Wedgewood39 
found that it was fair and realistic to require an applicant for business 
rescue to furnish a complete business rescue plan laden with the level 
of detail spelled out in their judgments as part of the minimum required 
to persuade a court to exercise its discretion in favour of an application 
for corporate rescue. This is because a careful reflection on the profile 
of stakeholders included in the definition of “affected persons” should 
suggest that such business rescue applicants would have neither the 
company-specific information nor the resources required to produce a 
competent rescue plan at the time of making the application under 
section 131 of the 2008 Companies Act. The view and attitude adopted 
by the courts in the above two cases smacks of judicial apathy towards 
business rescue applicants which does not bode well for the future of 
the Chapter Six rescue mechanism. 
It is against the above background that the SCA’s decision in 
Oakdene Square Properties40 really does make a welcome entry into the 
corpus of the emerging South African business rescue jurisprudence.41 
In Oakdene Square Properties, the applicants for business rescue, having 
failed in the high court, argued before the SCA that the requirement of 
a “reasonable prospect” for rescuing the company in section 131(4) 
demands no more than a reasonable prospect of development and 
delivery of a rescue plan (by a business rescue practitioner). According 
                                                 
37   Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 140(1)(d)(i) (S. Afr.). It is both surprising 
and unfortunate that the decision in Southern Palace Investments was followed without 
reservation in Koen and Another v. Wedgewood Village Golf and Country Estate Ltd. 2012 
(2) SA 378 (WCC) (S. Afr.). 
38 Companies Act 71 of 2008 at § 132. The court is conferred with 
discretion to allow a longer time on application made to it by the practitioner. See 
Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 132(3) (S. Afr.). 
39 CONTEMPORARY COMPANY LAW, supra note 7, at 861-64. 
40 Oakdene Square Properties Ltd. and Others v. Farm Bothasfontein (Kyalami) Ltd. 
and Others 2013 (4) SA 539 (S. Afr.).  
41 Joubert, supra note 31, at 562-63. 
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to them, an applicant for business rescue is therefore not required to 
show a reasonable prospect of achieving one of the two goals 
contemplated in section 128(1)(b). On this reasoning, all that the 
applicant is obliged to show is that “a plan to do so is capable of being 
developed and implemented regardless of whether or not it may fail.”42 
Furthermore, according to the applicants’ contention, once it is 
established that a business rescue applicant’s intention is to develop 
and implement a plan whose purpose is the rescue of the debtor 
company, the court should grant the application even if it is skeptical 
regarding the potential of the applicant’s plan to achieve the intended 
outcome.43 
The SCA rejected the applicants’ arguments in toto. It held that 
the words “rescuing the company”—as used in section 128(1)(b)—
require the achievement of one of the alternative goals of business 
rescue. To that extent, the Court found that the argument advanced by 
the applicants “is in direct conflict with the express wording of 
s[ection] 128(1)(h).”44 According to the SCA, on a careful reading of 
section 128(1)(b), it is evident that the development of a plan cannot 
be a goal in itself, but rather it can only be the means to an end which 
“must be either to restore the company to a solvent going concern, or 
at least to facilitate a better deal for creditors and shareholders than 
they would secure from a liquidation process.”45 Therefore, the 
evidentiary burden in the view of the SCA clearly lies on the business 
rescue applicant to establish grounds for the reasonable prospect of 
achieving one of the twin goals of section 128(1)(b). 
Fraught with greater uncertainty, and therefore more 
worrisome, is the practical question as to how the business rescue 
applicant ought to discharge the said evidentiary burden. Should this 
applicant present the court with a detailed business rescue plan? Or 
should the applicant provide details of the likely costs enabling the 
company to recommence its business? Or should the applicant present 
                                                 
42 Oakdene Square Properties Ltd. and Others v. Farm Bothasfontein (Kyalami) Ltd. 
and Others 2013 (4) SA 539 at para. 31 (S. Afr.).  
43 Id.  
44 Id.  It should be noted that while Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 128(1)(b) 
(S. Afr.) defines the term “business rescue,” Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 128(1)(h) 
(S. Afr.) provides the definition of the term “rescuing the company.” 
45 Id. 
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details pertaining to the likely availability of the cash resources required 
to enable the company to meet its day-to-day expenses? Or yet still, is 
the applicant required to provide concrete factual details of the 
source(s), nature, and extent of the resources that are likely to be 
available to the company as well as the terms on which such resources 
will be made available? In its decision on this practical question,46 the 
SCA made it crystal clear that a business rescue applicant is not 
required to present a detailed rescue plan. However, an applicant must 
present “more than a mere prima facie case or an arguable 
possibility.”47 In this respect, mere speculative suggestions and vague 
averments will not suffice.48 According to the SCA, what is required of 
an applicant is to establish the “reasonable grounds” on which she 
believes that there is a possibility of rescuing the company. Implicit in 
the court’s decision here is that the applicant must provide a factual 
basis for the said grounds. Very significantly, however, the SCA held 
that it would be both impractical and imprudent to prescribe the 
manner in which business rescue applicants must meet this evidentiary 
burden in every case. Accordingly, to the extent that the courts in 
Southern Palace Investments49 and Koen v. Wedgewood50 sought to do so, they 
erred. 
In setting the bar for the applicant regarding what is required 
to discharge the said evidentiary obligation, much judicial caution and 
circumspection is required. This is because if the bar is set too high, 
the practical effect will be devastating for the new business rescue 
regime and the achievement of policy goals it has been enacted to 
promote. Clearly, such a judicial approach will severely limit the 
availability of business rescue proceedings through section 131 of the 
2008 Companies Act. It is noteworthy that this particular danger and 
the underlying concern has already been recognized by the high court 
                                                 
46 Id. ¶¶ 29-31. The SCA here approved and applied the approach adopted 
by the High Court in Propspec Investments Ltd. v. Pacific Coast Investments 97 Ltd. 2013 (4) 
SA 539 (S. Afr.).  
47 Id. ¶ 29. 
48 Id. See also Propspec Investments Ltd. v. Pacific Coast Investments 97 Ltd. 2013 
(4) SA 539 at para. 11 (S. Afr.).  
49 Southern Palace Investments (Pty) Ltd. v. Midnight Storm Investments (Pt) Ltd., 
2012 (2) SA 423 (WCC) (S. Afr.). 
50 Koen and Another v. Wedgewood Village Golf and Country Estate Ltd. 2012 (2) 
SA 378 (WCC) at para. 14 (S. Afr.). 
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in Propspec Investments Ltd. and by the SCA in Oakdene Square Properties 
where it essentially endorsed the approach and related comments of 
van der Merwe J in Propspec Investments Ltd. The judges in both cases 
were of one mind in the view that the bar ought to be set fairly low for 
business rescue applicants, with a view favorable to maximizing the 
availability and use of business rescue proceedings. In this respect, the 
court in Propspec Investments Ltd.51 and the SCA in Oakdene Square 
Properties52 seem to both recognize that a contrary judicial approach 
would be effectively tantamount to judicial frustration of the real 
prospects of attaining the legislative and policy objectives behind the 
enactment of the Chapter Six provisions.53 
The risk of business rescue becoming a victim of a judicial 
approach that is not predisposed to magnanimity towards those 
seeking to access the scheme is not far-fetched. This is because such a 
judicial attitude may be easily justifiable as an appropriate response to 
the real risk of abuse of business rescue proceedings by debtor 
companies and/or their controllers involved in a pattern of conduct 
clearly aimed at improperly defeating or delaying legitimate claims and 
rights of innocent creditors.54 
In some cases, such patterns of behavior have been 
accompanied by evidence of misappropriation or abuse of company 
funds, assets, and/or opportunities by the controller(s) of the debtor 
company.55 In such cases, business rescue proceedings are simply 
activated mala fides to allow the wrongdoing to continue for as long as 
                                                 
51 Bradstreet, supra note 10, at 353-56; Loubser, Tilting at Windmills? The 
Quest for an Effective Corporate Rescue Procedure in South African Law, supra note 11, at 372. 
52 Id.  
53 In this respect it is pleasing to note the recent SCA decision in Newcity 
Group (Pty) Ltd. v. Allan David Pellow NO and Others 2014 ZASCA 162, where the court 
confirmed its approach and reasoning in Oakdene Square Properties.  
54 This risk of abuse by company directors, majority shareholders and 
other stakeholders has been recognized by other academic commentators. See, e.g., 
Anneli Loubser, The Business Rescue Proceedings in the Companies Act of 2008: Concerns and 
Questions (Part 1), 3 J. SOUTH AFRICAN L 501, 505 (2010); DELPORT, supra note 7, at 
446; Michael Steiner, The Insolvency Bill 2000: Rescue Culture in the new Millennium, 15 J. 
Int’l Banking L. 61, 62 (2000). 
55 See, e.g., Swart v. Beagles Run Investments 25 (Pty) Ltd., (Four Creditors 
Intervening) 2011 (5) SA 422 (S. Afr.); Oakdene Square Properties Ltd. and Others v. Farm 
Bothasfontein (Kyalami) Ltd. and Others 2013 (4) SA 539 at para. 29 (S. Afr.). 
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possible to the maximum detriment of the company, creditors, 
shareholders and other stakeholders. Such undesirable behavior and 
tendencies on the part of directors and company controllers are readily 
apparent from the factual findings of the courts in the cases of Oakdene 
Square Properties,56 Newcity Group (Pty) Ltd. v. Allan David Pellow and 
Others57 and Swart v. Beagles Run.58 Naturally, the public would expect 
the courts to be very vigilant in ensuring that the Chapter Six 
provisions are not invoked by company controllers or stakeholders 
acting mala fides for purposes that have little to do with achieving the 
underlying policy objectives but, instead, have all to do with wanting 
to co-opt business rescue proceedings into premeditated elaborate and 
illegal self-aggrandizing schemes capable of being perpetrated in the 
corporate context. 
It is in their zeal to prevent the abuse of the Chapter Six 
provisions and related judicial processes that the courts may adopt 
principled positions leading to an unintended consequence, namely, a 
severe restriction of the availability of business rescue proceedings and 
frustration of the underlying legislative and policy intent. This could in 
turn lead to the business rescue model suffering the same fate as that 
which befell judicial management under the 1973 Companies Act. 
Against this background, the SCA decision in Oakdene Square Properties 
and the pronouncements on the applicable legal principles in Propspec 
Investments Ltd. must be applauded. Clearly, business rescue-related 
matters brought before the courts in the coming years will be guided 
by the pronouncements of legal principle made on this critical issue by 
the SCA in Oakdene Square Properties. 
                                                 
56 In Oakdene Square Properties, there was evidence of management 
deadlock and related paralysis at the level of the board of directors resulting from the 
active conduct of the two director-shareholders who were the applicants for business 
rescue. In addition, the company had apparently been stripped of its sources of 
income through questionable dealings with its main assets, which were done by one 
of the said directors acting unilaterally without board approval but with the apparent 
tacit support and collusion of his co-applicant. 
57 Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 131(4)(a) (S. Afr.). 
58 Here, the facts accepted by the court showed that in the months 
immediately preceding the business rescue application, the company had been 
involved in a pattern of insolvent and fraudulent trading while under the control of 
the sole director-shareholder who was the stakeholder behind the application.  
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B.         What Constitutes “Business Rescue” Under the Act 
According to section 128, which is the opening definition 
section of Chapter Six, “business rescue” means “proceedings to 
facilitate the rehabilitation of a company that is financially distressed 
by providing for”59 among others: 
the development and implementation, if approved, of 
a plan to rescue the company by restructuring its 
affairs, business, property, debt and other liabilities, 
and equity in a manner that maximises the likelihood 
of the company continuing in existence on a solvent 
basis or, if it is not possible for the company to so 
continue in existence, results in a better return for the 
company’s creditors or shareholders than would result 
from the immediate liquidation of the company.60 
In the academic discussions of this particular provision, there 
seems to be consensus that business rescue proceedings are intended 
by the legislature to have both a primary and a secondary objective—
rehabilitating the company so that it is able to continue to operate as a 
solvent going concern being the primary goal, while rehabilitation for 
the very limited purpose of securing better returns for creditors and 
shareholders being secondary.61 The suggestion implicit in the 
academic commentaries is that the proceedings must be initiated solely 
for the attainment of the said primary purpose; and may only turn to 
the pursuit of the secondary purpose after a realization bona fides in the 
course of implementing a properly adopted business rescue plan that 
the primary purpose is unattainable. This was one of the key issues that 
the SCA had to confront in Oakdene Square Properties where the court 
had to pronounce itself on whether a business rescue application under 
section 131 of the 2008 Companies Act could succeed where the 
proposed rescue plan only provides for the pursuit of the so-called 
secondary objective. In other words whether the requirement of 
“rescuing the company” as contemplated in section 131(4)(a) is 
satisfied where it is clear from the outset that there is no real chance 
                                                 
59 Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 128(1)(b) (S. Afr.). 
60 Id. § 128(1)(b)(iii). 
61 CONTEMPORARY COMPANY LAW, supra note 7, at 864-65; DELPORT, 
supra note 7, at 445-47. 
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of the company being saved from immediate liquidation and that the 
best the stakeholders can hope for is a better return to creditors and 
shareholders than that which would result from liquidation.62 
Before the SCA, the respondents (who were creditors opposed 
to the business rescue application) relied on the dictionary meanings 
of the words “rescue” and “rehabilitate” to argue that the statutory 
definition of “business rescue” in section 128(1)(b) contemplates 
proceedings aimed at the rehabilitation of a company which in turn 
requires that the proceedings must be aimed at achieving the primary 
goal in section 128(1)(b)(iii), which is to restore the company to the 
normal healthy state of solvency.63 In the respondents’ view, the so-
called secondary objective, to provide a better deal for creditors and 
shareholders than liquidation, can only be an alternative goal of the 
proposed business rescue plan. Accordingly, they submitted that a 
proposed plan, such as that in this case, that holds out no hope of a 
return of the company to a state of solvency, but provides at best for 
achievement of the secondary goal, does not amount to “rescuing the 
company” as required by the Act.64 
The SCA held that Chapter Six of the Act, in section 128(1)(b) 
provides its own meaning for the terms “rescue” and “rehabilitate,” 
neither of which coincide with the dictionary meanings of the words 
upon which the respondents sought to rely. In the SCA’s view, 
“business rescue” under the Act means “to facilitate ‘rehabilitation’ 
which in turn means the achievement of one of two goals: (a) to return 
the company to solvency, or (b) to provide a better deal for creditors 
than what they would receive through liquidation.”65 Accordingly, the 
SCA concluded that the achievement of either one of the two goals 
                                                 
62 Oakdene Square Properties Ltd. and Others v. Farm Bothasfontein (Kyalami) Ltd. 
and Others 2013 (4) SA 539 at para. 23 (S. Afr.). 
63 In this respect, the respondents urged the court to endorse the approach 
followed by the High Court in the earlier case of AG Petzetakis International Holdings 
Ltd. v. Petzetakis Africa (Pty) Ltd. and Others 2012 (5) SA 515 (S. Afr.). 
64 Oakdene Square Properties Ltd. and Others v. Farm Bothasfontein (Kyalami) Ltd. 
and Others 2013 (4) SA 539 at para. 25 (S. Afr.). 
65 Id. ¶ 26. 
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referred to in section 128(1)(b) qualify as “business rescue” under the 
Chapter.66 
The argument of the opposing creditors in Oakdene Square 
Properties invited the court to adopt a narrow construction of the 
meaning of “business rescue” under the 2008 Companies Act. If 
accepted, such an interpretation would effectively limit the availability 
of business rescue proceedings to those cases where there is at least a 
reasonable prospect of the company being restored to continuation as 
a going concern. Considering the policy goals and public interests 
behind the enactment of South Africa’s business rescue scheme—
especially those pertaining to employment preservation and creation as 
well as protection of vulnerable non-shareholder constituencies such 
as employees, customers, and communities—the restriction of the 
availability of business rescue only to those scenarios where there is at 
least some chance of saving the debtor company as a going concern 
would seem to be prima facie plausible. Indeed, it is arguable that the 
primary public interest rationale behind law and policymakers’ decision 
to establish the business rescue model is to make it available for use by 
companies and stakeholders who find themselves with a financially 
distressed company that has a chance of being restored to its status quo 
prior to its financial woes.67 
However, there are sound reasons why the SCA should be 
applauded for shunning a narrow interpretation of the meaning of 
“business rescue”—preferring instead to adopt a broad, generous 
construction that will ensure the availability of the rescue provisions 
                                                 
66 Id. 
67 The socio-economic policy goals and public interests at the heart of 
modern statute-based corporate rescue schemes can be readily gleaned from the 
pertinent primary and secondary sources, including the multiple reports issued or 
commissioned by relevant government departments. See, e.g., CONTEMPORARY 
COMPANY LAW, supra note 7, at 861-64; CHAIRMAN SIR KENNETH CORK, 
INSOLVENCY LAW AND PRACTICE, REPORT OF THE REVIEW COMMITTEE, CMND 
8558 (1982); SOUTH AFRICAN COMPANY LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: 
GUIDELINES FOR CORPORATE LAW REFORM, GENERAL NOTICE 1183, supra note 4; 
Anneli Loubser, Business Rescue in South Africa: A Procedure in Search of a Home, 40 COMP. 
INT’L L. J. S. AFR. 152, 152-54 (2007); MCCORMACK, supra note 17, at 18-25. 
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even in those scenarios where liquidation is inevitable.68 In the first 
place, creditors and shareholders, as company stakeholders, are not 
inherently undeserving of judicial sympathy and assistance when faced 
with a debtor that has no reasonable prospect of survival as a solvent 
going concern. Indeed, their role in the sustainable development of an 
enabling environment for companies and entrepreneurs to thrive 
cannot be overemphasized.69 Limiting the availability of business 
rescue by excluding it from scenarios where there is only a likelihood 
of creditors and shareholders receiving better returns than on 
immediate liquidation would amount to adopting a statutory 
interpretation that is patently hostile to these two groups of 
stakeholders, both of whom are indispensable to the sustainable 
growth and survival of the modern company. This is so because the 
narrow definition for which the respondents argued in Oakdene Square 
Properties amounted to stating that business rescue ought not to be 
available where the primary beneficiaries will be creditors and 
shareholders. Clearly, such anti-creditor, anti-shareholder 
interpretation cannot be consistent with the underlying intention of 
the legislature.70 
Furthermore, as the SCA itself pointed out,71 a narrow 
interpretation seeking to limit the availability of business rescue to 
cases where there is a reasonable prospect of restoring the debtor 
                                                 
68 See Richard Bradstreet, Business Rescue Proves to be Creditor-Friendly: CJ 
Claasen’s Analysis of the New Business Rescue Procedure in Oakdene Square Properties, 130 
SALJ 44, 49-52 (2013). 
69 See Bradstreet, supra note 11, at 195. 
70 It should be recalled here that Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 7(k) (S. Afr.) 
specifically states that one of the objects of the Act is to provide for the efficient 
rescue of financially distressed companies in a manner that balances the rights and 
interests of “relevant stakeholders.” To the extent that creditors and shareholders are 
“relevant stakeholders,” any interpretation of a provision of Companies Act 71 of 
2008 Chapter Six that is hostile to their rights and interests without compelling 
justification, including being necessary for the protection of other relevant 
stakeholders’ interests, would actually be inconsistent with the legislative intent 
encapsulated in the wording of Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 7(k) (S. Afr.). To the 
extent that the broad interpretation of the meaning of “business rescue” adopted by 
the SCA in Oakdene Square Properties is more consistent with the legislative 
prescription to balance the various stakeholder rights and interests, such an 
interpretation is highly plausible. See Bradstreet, supra note 68, at 49-52. 
71 Oakdene Square Properties Ltd. and Others v. Farm Bothasfontein (Kyalami) Ltd. 
and Others 2013 (4) SA 539 at para. 26 (S. Afr.). 
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company to financial health as a going concern would be one that 
effectively ignores the historical context out of which the Chapter Six 
provisions originate. Central to that context is the “judicial 
management” model. The pertinent provisions of the 1973 Companies 
Act made the proper granting of a judicial management order 
conditional upon a finding of a reasonable probability that implementation 
of the order will result in the debtor regaining its ability to meet its 
financial obligations in the normal course of things. As indicated 
above, it is now widely acknowledged in both academic and judicial 
commentaries that it was the narrow restrictive meaning attributed by 
the judiciary to those key words that largely led to the abysmal failure 
of judicial management and its replacement with the business rescue 
model under the 2008 Companies Act. As the SCA concluded, it is 
unlikely that the legislature would have intended to repeat the mistakes 
of the past.72 
C.         Status of the Tax and Public Revenue Collection Authorities 
in Business Rescue Proceedings 
The fascinating question of whether the South African 
Revenue Service (“SARS”) enjoys special status in business rescue 
proceedings, as a preferent creditor, has come before the court in 
Commissioner, South African Revenue Service v. Beginsel NO and Others.73 In 
this case, SARS contended that there was no reason why it could not 
have been specified as a preferent creditor in the proposed business 
rescue plan seeing that section 150(2)(b) of the 2008 Companies Act 
permits such a plan to create and specify the order of preference, in 
which proceeds of property sold pursuant to the plan will be applied 
subject to preferences conferred by the Act in section 135 upon 
different classes of post-commencement creditors.74 The critical issue 
for determination was whether SARS ought to be treated as a preferent 
                                                 
72 Id. ¶¶ 27-28. 
73 Commissioner of South African Revenue Services v. Beginsel NO and Others 2012 
(1) SA 307 (WCC) at para. 20 (S. Afr.). 
74 In requiring that every business rescue plan contain all information 
reasonably required to enable affected persons to decide whether or not to accept or 
reject a plan, Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 150(2)(b) (S. Afr.) prescribes a division of 
the plan into three parts: Part A providing a background; Part B setting out the debt 
and business restructuring proposals; and Part C setting out the assumptions and 
conditions on which the plan is based. See DELPORT, supra note 7, at 516-21. 
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creditor for purposes of reckoning its voting interest,75 as well as for 
purposes of distributions of proceeds from disposals of company 
property by the business rescue practitioner. In advancing its case, 
SARS relied heavily on the provisions of sections 96 to 103 of the 
Insolvency Act No. 24 of 193676 (“Insolvency Act”), arguing that it is 
a preferent creditor whose claim ranks ahead of ordinary concurrent 
creditors. Based on section 103(1)(a) of the Insolvency Act, SARS 
further contended that because ordinary concurrent creditors are 
included in the class of concurrent creditors who would be 
subordinated in a liquidation referred to in section 145(4)(b) and 
because they would receive nothing on liquidation of the company in 
the instant matter, they (ordinary concurrent creditors) had no voting 
interest at the creditors’ meeting.77 
According to the court, the meaning and practical implication 
of the argument advanced by SARS is that while SARS, as preferent 
unsecured creditor, would have had a voting interest equal to the value 
of its claim against the company, the remainder of the (non-preferent) 
concurrent creditors representing eighty-seven percent of all creditors 
present at the particular meeting would have been disenfranchised 
concurrent creditors under section 145(4)(b). The obvious and 
inevitable result is that the vote of SARS alone would have ensured the 
rejection of the business rescue plan notwithstanding the wishes of the 
substantial majority of the creditors.78 The court held that the 
construction of section 145(4) urged on it by SARS would lead to an 
illogical result that would fail to balance the rights and interests of all 
relevant stakeholders as envisaged in section 7(k) of the Act. In any 
event, according to the court, that interpretation is contrary to the 
ordinary grammatical meaning of the words used in the provisions of 
section 145(4). In the court’s view, it is “wholly inconsistent with the 
                                                 
75 Creditors of a debtor company are conferred with voting interests in 
accordance with Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 128(1)(j) (S. Afr.) read together with 
Companies Act 71 of 2008 §§ 145(4) and (5) (S. Afr.). These provisions effectively 
fix a creditor’s voting interest at the value of her claim against the company. Some 
academic commentators have taken the view that, at least for this purpose, it is 
immaterial whether a creditor’s claim is secured or unsecured. See CONTEMPORARY 
COMPANY LAW, supra note 7, at 903. 
76 Insolvency Act No. 24 of 1936 (S. Afr.), as amended. 
77 Commissioner of South African Revenue Services v. Beginsel NO and Others 2012 
(1) SA 307 (WCC) at para. 20 (S. Afr.).  
78 Id. ¶ 21. 
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purpose and scheme of the Act, to include all concurrent creditors 
under s[ection] 145(4)(b) of the Act, thereby almost certainly having 
their voting interests reduced and quite possibly entirely 
emasculated.”79 In this regard, the court agreed with the authors of 
Henochsberg80 that such an interpretation of section 145(4) is grossly 
unfair to concurrent creditors, especially given that they have a greater 
level of interest in the debtor company’s rescue than the secured 
creditors who can fall back on their security interest if the attempt at 
business rescue turned out to be a failure.81 
The practical implications of judicial acceptance of the 
principle advanced by SARS would have been devastating, not only for 
non-preferent creditors generally, but also for the viability and 
attractiveness of business rescue proceedings in scenarios where the 
debtor company is substantially indebted to SARS. By adopting a legal 
position that is consistent with the principles of fairness and equality 
of creditors as against one that unduly places a particular creditor in a 
dominant position by enabling it to wield a casting or controlling vote 
(and thereby allowing it to predetermine the outcome of creditors’ 
meetings), the court clearly signalled its discomfort with positions of 
legal principle that are certain to have the effect of undermining 
inclusive and egalitarian character of the rescue scheme that the 
legislature has established in Chapter Six of the Act. The court in SARS 
v Beginsel deserves to be applauded in this regard considering the fact 
that, under South Africa’s tax and insolvency laws and related 
jurisprudence, granting preference to the claims or legal position of 
SARS is the norm rather than the exception. In this respect it would 
again have been easily defensible for the court to have aligned itself to 
the claim for preference by SARS ostensibly in defense of the public 
interest in maximizing legal protection of claims and monies owing to 
the national fiscus. It was therefore bold and courageous for the court 
to refuse preferential treatment for SARS in business rescue 
proceedings. The practical significance of this legal position is 
                                                 
79 Id. ¶ 32. 
80 DELPORT, supra note 7, at 509.  
81 See Commissioner of South African Revenue Services v. Beginsel NO and Others 
2012 (1) SA 307 (WCC) at para. 35 (S. Afr.); See also Okkie Blom & William Maodi, 
Demoting SARS, WITHOUT PREJUDICE (Sept. 2013), 
http://www.withoutprejudice.co.za/index.php/issues/item/demoting-
sars?category_id=1.  
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enhanced by the likelihood that it will serve to discourage the granting 
of preference to other state-related claims that may be outstanding 
against debtor companies, such as monies due under municipal and 
environmental legislation. 
D.        Judicial Review and Setting Aside of Resolution of Board of 
Directors Commencing Business Rescue 
As indicated above, the board of a financially distressed 
company may voluntarily place the entity under business rescue by 
adopting a resolution to that effect.82 The Act provides recourse to 
unhappy stakeholders by stipulating that an “affected person” may 
apply to the court for an order setting aside the board’s resolution on 
either one of three grounds:83 
1. That there is no reasonable basis for believing that 
the company is financially distressed; 
2. That there is no reasonable prospect for rescuing 
the company; or 
3. That the company has failed to satisfy the 
procedural requirements set out in section 129 of 
the Act. 
However, in adjudicating over an “affected person’s” challenge 
against the board’s resolution, the Act provides that the resolution may 
be set aside where, “having regard to all of the evidence, the court 
considers that it is otherwise just and equitable to do so.” An 
interesting and important question that arose in the case of DH Brothers 
Industries84 was whether the above provision constituted an additional 
(fourth) ground for invalidating the said resolution of the board on 
                                                 
82 It is required that the resolution be supported by a majority of the board. 
Accordingly, the absence of clear and credible evidence that the majority of directors 
were behind the resolution is fatal. See DH Brothers Industries v. Gribnitz NO and Others 
2014 (1) SA 103 at para. 16 (S. Afr.) (holding that adoption of the resolution by one 
of two directors constituted a failure to satisfy the procedural requirements of section 
129—which is one of the bases on which the resolution may be set aside).   
83 Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 130(1)(a) (S. Afr.).  
84 DH Brothers Industries v. Gribnitz NO and Others 2014 (1) SA 103 (S. Afr.). 
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which an “affected person” could rely.85 What seems apparent from 
the text of sections 130(1)(a) and 130(5)(a) is that while the court is 
empowered to set aside the board resolution on four grounds, an 
“affected person” is only entitled to premise the application on one or 
more of the three grounds. According to the court in the DH Brothers 
Industries case, it would seem that “an application cannot be based on 
this fourth ground because the application then would not qualify as 
one brought in terms of section 130(1)(a).”86 Given that section 
130(5)(a) essentially empowers the court to grant relief on a cause of 
action which cannot, on its face, be relied upon by an applicant seeking 
to set aside the board resolution in question, the court concluded that 
the said provision creates an anomaly. Taking the view that “the 
distinction between s 130(1)(a) and s 130(5)(a) clearly arises from a 
drafting error,” the court in DH Brothers Industries held that, “the only 
sensible meaning which avoids the absurdity which would otherwise 
result is to construe the just-and-equitable basis as an additional 
ground to the three listed in s 130(1)(a).”87 The result is that it can be 
relied upon as a fourth ground or cause of action by an “affected 
person” seeking relief under section 130(1)(a).88 
Section 130(5)(a) specifically requires a court to consider all of 
the evidence before reaching a decision on the just and equitable 
ground. In the DH Brothers Industries case, the court held that the 
following were factors that must be considered: 
 Whether the business rescue plan was properly 
adopted; and 
 The terms of the plan and, in particular, whether it 
contains any offensive provision.89 
                                                 
85 This issue was addressed by the court in DH Brothers Industries, 2014 (1) 
SA 103,  because the applicant-creditor specifically relied on the “just and equitable 
provision” of Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 130(5)(a)(ii) (S. Afr.). 
86 Id.  
87 Id. ¶ 18. 
88 Id.  
89 Id. ¶ 19. It is submitted that there are at least two additional factors that 
courts should in this context recognize as relevant, namely: (a) whether there are any 
real prospects of a successful rescue given the debtor-company’s circumstances; and 
(b) whether there is any evidence of the directors acting mala fides. 
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The manner in which the court in DH Brothers Industries 
resolved the anomaly and potential conflict created by the provisions 
of sections 130(1)(a) and 130(5)(a) is jurisprudentially significant in 
more ways than one. First, the court’s decision effectively enlarged the 
provisions of section 130(1)(a) by explicitly making available a fourth 
additional ground that may be invoked by company stakeholders 
seeking to prevent a financially distressed company from being 
voluntarily placed under business rescue by its directors. Second, given 
the omnibus, open-ended (catch-all), and amorphous nature of the 
just-and-equitable ground, the decision in DH Brothers Industries 
significantly strengthens the hands of creditors who comprise the 
stakeholder group more likely to be opposed to business rescue while 
similarly weakening the prospects of such a board resolution surviving 
judicial scrutiny. It is submitted that, at least on the face of it, this 
decision is not supportive of the institution of business rescue. 
E.         Legality of Contents of Plan: Appropriateness and Validity of 
a Provision Effecting Compulsory Cession of Part of 
Creditors’ Claims 
In the DH Brothers Industries case, part of the fact complex was 
that the opposing creditor who sought an order setting aside the 
board’s resolution placing the debtor company under business rescue 
was owed a debt of approximately R 5,000,000, which was secured by 
deeds of suretyship provided by the company’s two directors (who 
were also the only shareholders). The plan put forward by the business 
rescue practitioner provided for the creditor to (a) receive 12.25% of 
the face value of its claim as a dividend; and (b) cede (transfer) 75.75% 
of its claim to a share trust established for the exclusive benefit of the 
company. The applicant creditor contended that, to the extent that the 
plan provided for a compulsory cession of a substantial part of its 
claim, it was not the kind of plan envisaged under the Act, especially 
given that the applicant would be rendered unable to recover the ceded 
portion of its claim from the directors who acted as sureties for the 
company.90 
It is noteworthy that none of the provisions of the now famous 
Chapter Six speaks to the effect, if any, of business rescue proceedings 
                                                 
90 Id. ¶ 64. 
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on the liability of persons who had in the period preceding the 
commencement of the proceedings furnished deeds of suretyship on 
the debtor company’s behalf.91 Interestingly, section 155(9) of the Act, 
which is located in the same Chapter Six, specifically provides that the 
adoption of a scheme of arrangement or compromise has no effect on 
the liability of a person who is a surety of the company.92 In this 
respect, the applicant submitted that, given that all creditors are bound 
by an adopted plan irrespective of whether or not they voted in favor, 
the legislature would have included a provision similar to section 
155(9) if it had been within its contemplation that compulsory cessions 
of creditors’ claims could properly form part of a business rescue plan. 
With respect to compulsory partial or total forfeiture of 
creditors claims and/or related rights, the court in DH Brothers Industries 
noted that Chapter Six of the 2008 Companies Act only provided for 
(a) partial deprivation or forfeiture on the part of creditors who 
consented to the discharge of their debt in whole or in part93 and (b) 
enforcement of pre-business rescue debts to the limited extent 
permitted by the terms of an adopted rescue plan.94 Against the 
background of these two provisions, the court held that “any provision 
in a plan which goes beyond a voluntary discharge of the whole or part 
of a debt is not competent.”95 After noting that the plan in this case 
went far beyond what was permitted by the pertinent provisions of 
sections 152 and 154 and emphasizing the well-established 
presumption in South African law against any deprivation of rights by 
legislation, the court concluded that “it must follow as night follows 
                                                 
91 Interestingly, Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 155(9) (S. Afr.), which section 
is located in the same Companies Act 71 of 2008 Chapter Six (S. Afr.), specifically 
provides that the adoption of a scheme of arrangement or compromise has no effect 
on the liability of a person who is a surety of the company. 
92 Companies Act 71 of 2008 Chapter Six (S. Afr.) consists of twenty-eight 
sections laid out in five parts (A-E). It is interesting to note that only part E, 
consisting of only one section, deals with the subject of “compromise between 
company and creditors.” 
93  See id. § 152(4). 
94  Id. § 154(2). 
95  DH Brothers Industries v. Gribnitz NO and Others 2014 (1) SA 103 at para. 
67 (S. Afr.). 
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day that a plan which deprives non-acceding creditors of the right to 
enforce a claim against a surety does not pass muster.”96 
Most interestingly, this is one issue on which the court in DH 
Brothers Industries agreed with the reasoning and conclusions of the 
court in the earlier case of African Banking Corporation of Botswana Ltd. v. 
Kariba Furniture Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd.97 In the latter case, the applicant 
creditor bank maintained that the fact that the board of the debtor 
company resolved to place it under business rescue could not deprive 
it of its right to pursue the directors as sureties pursuant to the 
suretyships they provided in the period preceding commencement of 
business rescue. However, the practitioner took a different view, 
similar to that of the shareholders who happened to be the same 
directors and sureties in question. Accordingly, the bank sought a 
declaratory order that the adoption of a business rescue plan, with 
respect to a company placed under business rescue, would not affect 
the rights a creditor has under suretyships executed with respect to 
amounts owed by the company under business rescue. The court held 
that there was no express provision in Chapter Six providing that the 
adoption of a business rescue plan will deprive creditors of the 
company of their rights as against sureties for the company’s debts.98 
The court concluded that there need be no connection between a 
surety and either the company in financial distress or the stakeholders, 
and that whether or not a creditor is entitled to pursue a surety will, in 
the ordinary course, have no bearing on the prospects of rescuing the 
company. Thus, in the court’s view, the interests of sureties do not fall 
within the scope of the objectives of the business rescue regime. In 
this regard, it relied on the sentiments of Rogers AJ in Investec Bank Ltd. 
v. Bryuns,99 where the court decided that section 133 (2) explicitly 
referred to the stay of suretyship undertaken by the company and not 
a suretyship undertaken by a third person for the indebtedness of the 
                                                 
96  Id. ¶ 67. 
97 African Banking Corp. of Botswana Ltd. v. Kariba Furniture Manufacturers (Pty) 
Ltd. and Others 2013 (6) SA 471 (S. Afr.).  
98 Id. ¶¶ 68-69. The court also opined that: “If the legislature intended that 
the adoption of a business rescue plan would have such a far-reaching consequence, 
the legislature would have expressly provided for this consequence . . . . There is, 
furthermore, no basis to suggest that such a provision could be read into the business 
rescue regime.”  
99 Investec Bank Ltd v. Bruyns 2012 (5) SA 430 (WCC) (S. Afr.). 
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company. Accordingly, the court in African Banking Corporation held 
that the adoption of the plan would not affect the opposing creditor 
bank’s claim against the debtor company’s directors as sureties for the 
debts of the company. 
The overwhelmingly pro-creditor position and perspective 
adopted by the courts in the three cases mentioned above are both 
plausible and justifiable on a number of grounds. First, it prevents 
abuse and opportunism in the context of business rescue proceedings. 
This is because, as observed by the court in African Banking Corporation, 
there is no functional link between the policy goal of ensuring success 
for the process of rescuing a financially distressed company and the 
continuation or cessation of the liability assumed by persons who 
provided suretyships in support of the company’s pre-business rescue 
debts. Allowing such sureties to essentially “free-ride” on the business 
rescue proceedings to abandon their contractual obligations (as was 
attempted by the two directors in DH Brothers Industries) smacks of 
opportunism and unjust enrichment, which is the kind of conduct or 
behavior that the courts are expected and indeed duty bound to 
discourage.100 Second, it is required of the courts to strive to maintain 
a careful balance between the relevant stakeholders’ interests in the 
business rescue context.101 The development of jurisprudence that is 
accepting of business rescue plan provisions aimed at advantaging 
sureties by terminating their obligations under the suretyships merely 
because the debtor company has been successfully placed under 
business rescue inappropriately skews that balance against company 
creditors and their interests. This is especially problematic given that 
the impugned terms of the rescue plans in DH Brothers Industries and 
African Banking Corporation sought to effectively negate existing 
contractual rights of company creditors and actually did so in a manner 
that was akin to “expropriation” of property rights without 
compensation. Such jurisprudence does not belong in the corpus of 
contemporary South African company law. Third, permitting terms in 
                                                 
100 Not surprisingly, the court in DH Brothers Industries found the provisions 
of the business rescue plan aimed at the compulsory, non-consensual nullification of 
the two shareholder-directors’ obligations under suretyships held by a number of the 
creditors to be both offensive and constitute a basis on which it could be properly 
concluded that it was “just and equitable” to set aside the proceedings. See DH 
Brothers Industries v. Gribnitz NO and Others 2014 (1) SA 103 at para. 68 (S. Afr.). 
101 Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 7(k) (S. Afr.). 
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business rescue plans that seek to, inter alia, terminate suretyship 
obligations could undermine the integrity and credibility of the entire 
corporate rescue regime by creating space and incentives for collusion 
between business rescue practitioners and sureties aimed at improperly 
benefiting the latter. 
CONCLUSION 
Prima facie, the fact that there have been significantly more 
adverse judicial decisions on business rescue applications than those in 
favor may be troubling for law and policy makers and their supporters 
desperate to see the firm establishment of South Africa’s corporate 
rescue model as well as the rapid entrenchment of a similarly 
supportive judicial culture. Obviously, such a culture would be one that 
is hostile to the idea of liquidating companies that have the slightest 
prospects of rehabilitation, especially where, as in DH Brothers Industries, 
there is no evidence of fraud or bad faith on the part of either the 
business rescue practitioner or the “affected persons” supporting the 
business rescue plan.102 Shareholders, employees, trade unions, and the 
Companies and Intellectual Property Commission are certain to be 
among those stakeholders already getting concerned about the very 
poor success rate of business rescue applications thus far. 
This apparently poor start to the tenure of Chapter Six can be 
considered problematic from another perspective, namely, that it may 
lead to the proliferation of a perception among stakeholders that the 
courts are generally not supportive of, or favorably disposed toward, 
business rescue applications. This perception may in turn create a 
chilling effect through the under-utilization of the mechanism due to 
the emergence of widespread belief that applications for business 
rescue proceedings by “affected persons” are not worth the inevitable 
investment of time and resources because of their limited prospects of 
success. Perhaps more importantly, the resulting decline in enthusiasm 
and support for the business rescue mechanism could significantly 
                                                 
102   In this respect the unmistakeable pro-rescue disposition of the courts 
in India is of great interest and, from a South African perspective, probably worth 
emulating. See Kristin Van Zwieten, Corporate Rescue in India: The Influence of the Courts, 
1 J. CORP. L. STUD. (Forthcoming 2015). 
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undermine the prospects of Chapter Six achieving the socio-economic 
public policy goals intended for it by the legislature. 
However, it is arguable that, notwithstanding the fact that the 
courts’ decisions on business rescue applications have been generally 
negative, the rulings and interpretive positions they have taken on most 
of the pivotal questions and issues can be said to be business rescue-
friendly and therefore supportive of the future development of the 
mechanism. In this respect, the decisions and reasoning in the cases of 
Oakdene Square Properties, Beginsel NO v. SARS, and African Banking 
Corporation should be applauded in the hope that courts will 
enthusiastically follow them in future cases. 
Finally, judgments are also beginning to clearly show that there 
are significant gaps in the framework and provisions of Chapter Six in 
terms of both the omission to make express provisions on what are 
important and foreseeable business rescue-related issues and the poor 
drafting quality of those provisions.103 The result is that in the coming 
years South Africa is likely to see sharply contrasting judicial decisions 
as already appears from cases dealing with the question of “reasonable 
prospect of rescue.” Accordingly, for the early years of the regime’s 
implementation, company stakeholders, business rescue practitioners, 
and their legal advisers will have to contend with a significant degree 
of uncertainty in this area of contemporary South African company 
law.104 
                                                 
103   This has come out most starkly in the context of the litigation around 
the “binding offer” provisions of Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 153(1)(b) (S. Afr.) in 
the two cases of African Banking Corp. of Botswana Ltd. v. Kariba Furniture Manufacturers 
(Pty) Ltd. and Others, 2013 (6) SA 471 (S. Afr.) and DH Brothers Industries v. Gribnitz 
NO and Others 2014 (1) SA 103 (S.Afr.). In the latter case, Gorven, J. lamented the 
drafting-related weaknesses of the Chapter Six provisions in no less than two 
paragraphs of his judgment.  
104   See DELPORT, supra note 7, at 5 (predicting, two years before the 2008 
Companies Act came into operation, that it will pose multiple problems that are likely 
to “cause uncertainty in its application”); Anneli Loubser, The Business Rescue 
Proceedings in the Companies Act of 2008: Concerns and Questions (Part 2), 4 J. SOUTH 
AFRICAN L. 689, 701 (2010) (calling for legislative intervention by way of amendment 
of the pertinent provisions as a matter of urgency because of “the many unclear, 
confusing and sometimes alarming provisions.”). 
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  THE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LICENSES IN INSOLVENCY: 
LESSONS FROM THE NORTEL CASE 
Anthony Duggan and Norman Siebrasse* 
INTRODUCTION 
Intellectual property-based industries have become an 
increasingly vital part of the economy, but firms in these industries are 
not immune from economic distress. Prominent Canadian illustrations 
include the Nortel proceedings and Blackberry’s recent  financial woes. 
Nortel filed for protection under Canada’s Companies’ Creditors 
Arrangement Act1 (CCAA) in January 2009. At the same time, various 
Nortel affiliates commenced parallel proceedings under Chapter 11 of 
the U.S. Bankruptcy Code2 and the Insolvency Act 1986 (U.K.). In Re 
Nortel Networks Corp., the Canadian court approved Nortel’s 
application to sell its assets in a series of going concern business sales. 
The assets included a substantial patent portfolio, and many of the 
patents were subject to current licensing agreements. Nortel developed 
an elaborate strategy to ensure as far as possible that licensees’ interests 
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2 11 U.S.C. (2014). 
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would not be affected by the sale of the patents, but the broader 
question raised by the case was whether a transferee of intellectual 
property acquires title subject to, or free of, outstanding licenses. If 
those licenses are not enforceable against a transferee, the licensee may 
find itself in the unenviable position of having to re-license rights 
which it had already paid for, after having invested substantial sunk 
costs in reliance on those rights. The question can arise whether the 
sale takes place in the course of insolvency proceedings (as with 
Nortel) or whether it takes place outside the insolvency system (as 
Blackberry had been planning). 
In principle the answer to this question should be the same in 
both contexts; otherwise outcomes may vary arbitrarily depending on 
the circumstances of the sale, which in turn may skew the choice 
between selling inside or outside the insolvency system. In other 
words, the priority rules that apply in insolvency proceedings should 
mirror the rules that apply outside insolvency. There are two main 
problems in this connection. The first is that in Canada the priority 
rules governing competing claims to intellectual property outside 
insolvency are remarkably unsettled. The second is that while the 
Canadian insolvency laws permit a debtor to sell its assets outside the 
ordinary course of business, subject to court approval, they do not 
specifically import the priority rules that apply outside insolvency 
proceedings to determine the purchaser’s rights relative to those of 
third party claimants. 
In both respects, the Canadian and United States positions are 
very different. By and large, the law outside bankruptcy in the United 
States is that a transferee of intellectual property is bound by prior 
licenses. This rule is imported into bankruptcy by section 363(f) of the 
U.S. Bankruptcy Code, which provides that, in the case of an asset sale, 
the purchaser acquires title free and clear of competing interests “if . . . 
applicable nonbankruptcy law permits sale of such property free and 
clear of such interest.”3 The concern U.S. laws address is that the 
licensee may have made substantial investments in reliance on the 
license, which would be lost if the license was subordinate to third 
party claims. The potential damage to its reliance interest would 
increase the upfront risk to prospective licensees, which in turn would 
                                                 
3   11 U.S.C. § 363 (2014). 
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have a chilling effect on the licensing of intellectual property. This 
policy is also reflected in section 365(n) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code 
which, in general terms, limits the right of an intellectual property 
owner in bankruptcy to reject (disclaim) license agreements.4 There is 
a similar restriction in the Canadian insolvency law provisions 
governing disclaimer of agreements,5 suggesting that the importance 
of protecting the intellectual property licensee’s reliance interest has 
been recognized in Canada too. The problem in Canada is that this 
policy has not been carried over into the asset sale context. 
The purpose of this article is to compare and contrast the 
protection given to intellectual property licensees in Canada and the 
United States, using the Nortel case as the focus for the discussion. Part 
I expands on the underlying policy considerations.  The strategy Nortel 
developed for addressing licensees’ interests revolved around section 
365(n) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. In Part II, we provide a fuller 
account of section 365 at large and section 365(n) in particular, and of 
the corresponding Canadian provisions. We discuss the Nortel case in 
Part III.  In Part IV, we turn to the rules governing asset sales in both 
countries, making the point that in Canada, as the law currently stands, 
while a debtor may be effectively precluded from disclaiming 
intellectual property licenses in insolvency proceedings, it might 
nevertheless be able to achieve the same result by selling the underlying 
intellectual property. This possibility did not surface in the Nortel case 
itself, because the sale process in Nortel was largely driven by United 
States, not Canadian, law; but it is likely that in some future case the 
issue will arise. In Part V, we discuss possible reforms. We conclude 
that reform of Canadian law relating to the rights of licensees on 
assignment of the licensed rights is urgently required, both outside and 
inside of insolvency. 
I. THE POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
Protection against termination of licenses as a result of the 
licensor’s financial distress has become a pressing concern with the rise 
of “patent assertion entities,” pejoratively referred to as “patent trolls,” 
whose business model consists of buying and asserting patents against 
                                                 
4   11 U.S.C. § 365 (2014) (discussed infra Part II , Section A). 
5   See, e.g., CCAA, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-36; see infra Part II , Section B. 
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other firms without exploiting the technology themselves.6 The $612.5 
million settlement entered into by Research in Motion in consequence 
of its litigation with the patent assertion entity NTP is the best known 
example of trolling involving a Canadian firm, but any firm doing 
business in the United States is exposed.7 At present, trolls are most 
active in the United States, but at least one patent assertion entity is 
already active in Canada, and there is concern that trolling will spread 
further in Canada and other jurisdictions as the business model 
matures.8 
There are two broad types of trolling behavior.9 One is 
litigation of poor quality patents to obtain litigation cost settlements, 
in which the defendant finds it cheaper to settle than to challenge the 
validity of the patent in court.10 The more problematic variety involves 
opportunistic litigation, which takes advantage of the defendant’s 
investment in the technology at issue.11 The well-known NTP v. 
Research in Motion, Ltd. litigation is a classic example.12 NTP held broad 
patents covering the use of cell phone frequencies for email access.13 
While this idea itself was no doubt valuable, there is no question that 
the large investment made by RIM (Research in Motion) in 
implementing the concept also made a major contribution to the 
success of the company; indeed, it is not unlikely that RIM’s 
contribution very substantially exceeded the value of the idea itself. 
However, RIM did not obtain a license from NTP at the outset, 
apparently because it developed the concept independently and it was 
not aware of the patent at the time of its investment.14 Independent 
creation is not a defense to patent infringement however, and as a 
                                                 
6   See generally Norman Siebrasse, Business Method Patents and Patent Trolls, 54 
CAN. BUS. L.J. 38 (2013). 
7   See NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd, (Fed. Cir.  2005); and see 
Coastal Contacts Inc. v. Elastic Path Software Inc. (2013) B.C.S.C. 133 (Can.) for an 
example of a smaller Canadian firm caught by a U.S. troll. 
8   Dovden Investments Ltd. has filed approximately one third of patent 
infringement actions in Canada in 2013. See Alan Macek, Patent Trolls in Canada?, 
SLAW (June 21, 2013), www.slaw.ca/2013/06/21/patent-trolls-in-canada/. 
9   See generally Norman Siebrasse, supra note 6. 
10   Id. at 42. 
11   Id. 
12   See NTP, 418 F.3d 1282.  
13   See id.   
14   Id. 
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patent is a property right, injunctive relief is normally granted to a 
successful patentee.15 After succeeding in its U.S. infringement action 
against RIM, NTP was awarded $53.7 million in damages, but armed 
with a permanent injunction, it was able to extract a settlement of over 
$600 million.16 This illustrates the general problem of opportunism; if 
bargaining between the parties takes place after the user of the 
patented technology has invested sunk costs in reliance on that 
technology, the amount which the owner of the patent can extract is 
not merely the value of the technology, but also the value of that 
additional investment, which would have to be abandoned if no 
settlement can be reached. The higher price that can be extracted 
because of sunk costs is known as the “hold-up” value of the patent, 
and correspondingly, the problem is commonly known as “patent 
hold-up.” To use a simple analogy, if you are going to buy land to build 
your retirement home, you want to negotiate the price with the 
landowner before you build your house, not afterwards. 
The potential for opportunism arises in patent cases because 
independent creation is not a defense, and patent rights are often 
poorly defined, so it may be difficult for a technology user to know in 
advance whether it is infringing any patent rights. The problem of 
patent trolls appears to be greatest with respect to software patents and 
business methods patents, both of which are said to be particularly 
poorly defined.17 More generally, however, the problem of 
opportunism arises whenever the user of technology has to bargain 
after investing sunk costs in reliance on that technology.18 This is 
pervasive in the case of licensees. It is normal for a business user of 
almost any technology to invest in its implementation. Even basic 
office productivity software requires training staff in its use, and any 
more specialized technology requires commensurately more specific 
investment. Licensees, by definition, protect themselves against 
opportunism by licensing the technology on reasonable terms before 
investing in it. But the opportunism will be a threat if the license is 
terminated, even though the licensee is living up to its terms and wants 
                                                 
15   This has changed in the United States since the decision of the U.S. 
Supreme Court in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006), which held 
that injunctions should no longer be granted routinely to prevailing patentees. 
16   NTP, 418 F.3d at 1287, 1325-26.   
17   Siebrasse, supra note 6 at 47.  
18   Id. at 42-43. 
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to continue using the technology. This is exactly the problem that 
arises if the license can be terminated on insolvency of the licensor, or 
if a licensor can effectively terminate the license simply by assigning 
the intellectual property rights to a third party. Opportunism of this 
type can arise with respect to trademarks or copyright just as well as 
with patents, because it does not depend on features of the intellectual 
property peculiar to patents. 
The problem is illustrated by the recent Qimonda decision in the 
United States.19 A major German semiconductor manufacturer, 
Qimonda, became insolvent, and the insolvency administrator sent 
letters to the licensees of Qimonda’s patents declaring that their 
licenses were unenforceable under the German Insolvency Code.20 
The insolvency administrator intended to re-license the patents back 
to the existing licensees for the benefit of Qimonda’s creditors.21 That 
is, the existing licensees would have had to pay again for licenses that 
they already had. Moreover, the licensees were apparently largely other 
semiconductor manufacturers who would have had to negotiate the 
licenses in the face of very large sunk costs invested in their 
semiconductor designs in reliance on the licensed technology, and the 
re-negotiated licenses would have been substantially more expensive 
than the original licenses.22 
The United States litigation arose because the insolvency 
administrator appointed by the Munich court sought an order from the 
U.S. courts recognizing the German proceeding in order to obtain 
administration of Qimonda’s U.S. patents. The U.S. courts ultimately 
granted the order, but subject to the condition that licensees of 
Qimonda’s U.S. patents be given the same treatment that they would 
have received under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, which, as described 
below, provides substantial protection to existing licensees. 
                                                 
19   Jaffé v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 737 F.3d 14 (4th Cir. 2013) (known as 
Qimonda after the name of the debtor, for which Jaffé was the insolvency 
administrator) [hereinafter Qimoda].  
20   Insolvenzordung [InsO] [German Insolvency Code], Oct. 5, 1994, 
BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBL] 2082. 
21   Qimonda, 737 F.3d 14.   
22   Id. (The original licenses were largely paid for in-kind with cross-
licenses, which is common practice in the semi-conductor industry.). 
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Qimonda illustrates the threat to the licensee’s reliance interest, which 
may emerge from unilateral termination of licenses as a result of 
insolvency. We will see that the recent amendments to the Canadian 
insolvency laws provide some protection to licensees from termination 
by the insolvency administrator, as in Qimonda, but that protection can 
potentially be circumvented by termination of the rights on an 
assignment of the technology by the insolvency administration, rather 
than disclaimer of the license by the insolvency administrator itself. 
This is a major concern because patent trolls often obtain their patents 
on the insolvency of a technology company. This means that if 
Qimonda were to arise in Canada, the licensees might have to re-
negotiate their licenses from trolls who had purchased the patent rights 
from the insolvency administrator. Moreover, the rights of a licensee 
outside of bankruptcy are unclear; remarkably it may well be that 
license rights are unenforceable against an assignee. This means that 
an intellectual property owner in financial distress might be able to 
monetize its rights by assigning them to a troll prior to any insolvency, 
and the troll would be able to re-negotiate with the licensee free of the 
licenses, which bound the original owner. 
II. The Rejection (Disclaimer) of Executory Contracts 
A.       The United States’ Position 
Section 365 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code provides for the 
rejection, assumption, and assignment of executory contracts in 
bankruptcy proceedings.23 All three options require court approval, 
and the courts generally apply a business judgment test in determining 
whether to grant approval.24  The purpose of the provisions is to 
maximize the value of the bankruptcy estate for the benefit of the 
creditors by allowing the trustee to cherry-pick the debtor’s 
uncompleted contracts, rejecting contracts that would be unprofitable 
for the estate to perform and assuming contracts where the returns to 
the estate from performance are likely to exceed the cost. The 
Bankruptcy Code does not define “executory contract,” but the term 
is generally accepted to mean “a contract under which the obligation[s] 
of both the bankrupt and the other party to the contract are so far 
                                                 
23   11 U.S.C. § 365 (2014).  
24   The provision imposes various other restrictions on assumption and 
assignment, which are not presently relevant. 
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unperformed that the failure of either to complete performance would 
constitute a material breach excusing the performance of the other” 
(the “Countryman definition”).25 The key feature of the Countryman 
definition is that to qualify as an executory contract, an agreement must 
remain at least partially unperformed on both sides. 
Some intellectual property license agreements may fall outside 
the scope of the provision for this reason. The outright sale of a 
product coupled with a non-exclusive license to use the intellectual 
property embodied in the product is case in point. A particular example 
is where the debtor or counter-party distributes “a mass-marketed 
computer software product . . . in conjunction with a ‘shrink wrap’ end 
user license agreement granting the user nonexclusive rights to use the 
software.”26 “The end user makes a one-time payment and receives the 
software product. . . . [T]he end user may have ongoing responsibilities 
under [the] license based on the restrictions in the license,” but the 
licensor’s performance is complete upon delivery of the product.27  
Another example is where an “author . . . licenses a completed 
copyrighted work to a publisher in exchange for either a lump sum 
payment or an ongoing royalty stream.”28 Here the “licensor’s 
obligations are complete upon delivery of the work” and, since the 
contract is not still at least partially unperformed on both sides, section 
365 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code may not apply.29 
On the other hand, many intellectual property licenses do fall 
within the Countryman definition because there are outstanding 
obligations on both sides. For example, in the case of a patent license, 
the licensee will typically have “an ongoing obligation to . . . pay 
royalties for the life of the agreement” and may have “[o]ther material 
ongoing . . . obligations [as well,] such as sharing [the] technology with 
the licensor . . . and marking all products sold under the license with 
[the appropriate] patent notice.”30 For its part, the licensor will 
                                                 
25   Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part 1, 57 MINN. L. 
REV. 439, 460 (1973).  
26   Peter S. Menell, Bankruptcy Treatment of Intellectual Property Assets: An 
Economic Analysis, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 733, 759 (2007). 
27   Id. at 766. 
28   Id. at 762 
29   Id. 
30   Id. at 761. 
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commonly have ongoing obligations such as giving a “nonexclusive 
licensee notice of any patent infringement suit or any other use or 
licensing of the process, refraining from licensing the technology to 
anyone else at a lower royalty rate . . ., approving grants of 
sublicenses . . ., indemnifying licensees for losses, and defending 
claims of infringement.”31 
Some courts in the United States have held that the licensor’s 
forbearance from suing the licensee for infringement is an ongoing 
obligation and that the license agreement is an executory contract on 
that basis, regardless of whether the licensor is subject to any other 
ongoing obligations.32 However, this view has been disputed on the 
ground that by granting the license, the licensor gives up the right to 
sue the licensee for infringement and the licensor’s performance is 
complete at that point.33 A copyright license will satisfy the 
Countryman definition if it relates to a work yet to be created or that 
is still to be edited, revised, or otherwise adapted.34 In such cases, the 
creative artist is subject to ongoing obligations and so the contract 
remains at least partly unperformed on her side, while the publisher’s 
obligation to publish the work represents an unperformed obligation 
on its side.35 A trademark license will nearly always satisfy the 
Countryman definition because the licensor has continuing quality 
control obligations and the licensee typically has payment, reporting, 
marketing, and other continuing performance obligations.36 Business-
to-business software licensing agreements typically involve ongoing 
performance obligations on both sides and so satisfy the Countryman 
definition, but, as indicated above, business-to-consumer (end user) 
                                                 
31  Id. at 761-62; see also Peter M. Gilhuly, Kimberly A. Posin & Ted A. 
Dillman, Intellectually Bankrupt?: The Comprehensive Guide to Navigating IP Issues in Chapter 
11, 21 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 1, 2-10 (2013). 
32   See, e.g., Everex Sys. v. Cadtrak Corp. (In re CFLC, Inc.), 89 F.3d 673 
(9th Cir. 1996). 
33   Id.; Cf. Madlyn Gleich Primoff & Erica G. Weinberger, E-Commerce and 
Dot-Com Bankruptcies: Assumption, Assignment and Rejection of Executory Contracts, Including 
Intellectual Property Agreements, and Related Issues Under Sections 365(c), 365(e) and 365(n) 
of the Bankruptcy Code, 8 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 307, 316. 
34   Menell, supra note 26 at 763. 
35   Id. at 763; Gilhuly et al., supra note 31, at 8-9. 
36   Menell, supra note 26 at 764; Gilhuly et al., supra note 31, at 9-10.  
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license agreements typically do not involve ongoing performance 
obligations on the licensor’s part.37 
In Lubrizol Enterprises v. Richmond Metal Finishers, the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that a technology license was an 
executory contract to which section 365 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code 
applied, entitling the debtor-licensor’s trustee to reject the agreement, 
subject to the court’s approval.38 The Lubrizol case was widely criticized 
on both doctrinal and policy grounds and, in 1988, Congress enacted 
section 365(n) to reverse the decision.39 Section 365(n) provides that 
“[i]f the trustee rejects an executory contract under which the debtor 
is the licensor of a right to intellectual property, the licensee” may 
either: (1) treat the contract as terminated if the rejection would 
constitute a repudiatory breach outside bankruptcy; or (2) elect to 
retain its basic rights under the contract for the duration of the term, 
including the right to enforce any exclusivity provision, subject to a 
continuing obligation to make royalty payments.40 If the licensee 
exercises the second option, it retains its right to the intellectual 
property itself, effectively limiting the trustee’s rejection to ancillary 
aspects of the agreement (for example, obligations relating to the 
provision of training, maintenance, or update facilities). 
B.       The Position in Canada 
Section 65.11 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA), 
which applies in BIA proposal proceedings, and CCAA, section 32, 
which applies in CCAA proceedings, provide for the disclaimer or 
resiliation (rejection) of agreements.41  The provisions were enacted in 
                                                 
37   Menell, supra note 26 at 765-66. 
38   See generally Lubrizol Enters. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, 756 F.2d 
1043 (4th Cir. 1985). 
39   Jay Westbrook, The Commission’s Recommendations Concerning the Treatment 
of Bankruptcy Contracts (1997) 5 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 463, 470-72. See also 
Sunbeam Prods. v. Chi. Am. Mfg., 686 F.3d 372 (7th Cir. 2012) (rejecting the Lubrizol 
reasoning); Jarrod N. Cone, A “Sunbeam” of Hope: The Seventh Circuit’s Solution 
Overcoming Disparaging Treatment to Trademark Licensees Under the Bankruptcy Code, 20 J. 
INTELL. PROP. L. 347 (2013). 
40   11 U.S.C. § 365(n) (2014). 
41   Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA), R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3.  
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2005, amended in 2007, and came into force in 2009.42 The main 
features are: 
 the trustee (monitor) must first approve the proposed 
disclaimer; 
 following this, the debtor must notify the counter-party, 
and the counter-party has fifteen days to apply to the 
court for disallowance of the disclaimer; 
 in hearing an application by either the counter-party or the 
debtor, the court must consider whether the disclaimer 
would enhance the prospects of a viable restructuring43 
and whether the disclaimer “would likely cause significant 
financial hardship to [the counter-party]”44; 
 if the contract is disclaimed, the counter-party has a 
provable claim in the proceedings for any loss; and 
 the following contracts cannot be disclaimed: eligible 
financial contracts, collective agreements, a financing 
agreement where the debtor is the borrower and a lease 
of real or personal property where the debtor is the 
landlord (lessor). 
The provisions refer to “agreements” and, unlike their United 
States counterpart, they are not limited to “executory contracts.”45 It is 
beyond the scope of the present discussion to explore the implications 
                                                 
42   Statute c. 47, enacted in November 2005; Statute c. 36, enacted in June, 
2007. 
43   “[W]ould enhance the prospects of a viable proposal being made in 
respect of the debtor”, BIA, R.S.C. 1985,,s. 65.11; “would enhance the prospect of a 
viable compromise or arrangement being made in respect of the company”, CCAA, 
R.S.C., 1985, s. 32.  This wording presupposes restructuring proceedings, as opposed 
to liquidation proceedings. But it has been held that the provision should be 
interpreted expansively to cover liquidation proceedings as well: Re Timminco Ltd., 
[2012] ONSC 4471 (Can. Ont. S.C.J.), at ¶¶. 51,52. 
44   CCAA, R.S.C., 1985, s. 32. 
45   See David Ullmann & Melissa McCready, Licensed to Steal: The Rights of 
IP Licensors and Licensees in an Insolvency, ANN. REV. INSOLVENCY L. 201, 203 (2010). 
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of this point;46 for present purposes, it is sufficient to note that the 
provisions clearly apply to intellectual property license agreements. 
BIA section 65.11(7) and CCAA section 32(6) are loosely 
based on section 365(n) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. They provide 
that if the debtor has granted to a party to an agreement a right to use 
intellectual property, the disclaimer or resiliation does not affect the 
party’s right to use the intellectual property during the term of the 
agreement, as long as the party continues to perform its obligations 
under the agreement in relation to the use of the intellectual property.47 
BIA section 65.11 applies in BIA proposal proceedings and 
CCAA section 32 applies in CCAA proceedings.48 There is, 
inexplicably, no corresponding provision for disclaimer in bankruptcy 
proceedings. However, the courts have held that there is a common 
law power of disclaimer.49 The common law power of disclaimer 
derives from the trustee’s freedom not to perform the contract. Non-
performance is a breach of contract which entitles the counter-party 
to the normal contract remedies. However, unless the counter-party 
has a right of specific performance or a similar right, the counter-party 
cannot compel the trustee to perform the contract and it will be limited 
to a damages claim for which it will have to prove in the debtor’s 
bankruptcy.50 In Re Thomson Knitting Co., the court held that the trustee 
must elect to affirm or disclaim within a reasonable time and, failing 
an election, the counter-party is entitled to assume that the trustee has 
disclaimed the contract.51 BIA, section 121(1) defines “provable claim” 
to mean “debts and liabilities . . . to which the bankrupt is subject” on 
the date of the bankruptcy or “to which the bankrupt may become 
subject during” the bankruptcy by reason of an obligation incurred 
                                                 
46   For discussion, see Anthony Duggan & Norman Siebrasse, The 
Disclaimer, Affirmation and Assignment of Intellectual Property Licences in Insolvency, J. 
INSOLVENCY INST. CAN. 163, 166-69. 
47   BIA, R.S.C. 1985, s. 65.11(7); CCAA, R.S.C., 1985 s. 32(6). 
48   BIA, R.S.C. 1985, s. 65.11(7); CCAA, R.S.C., 1985 s. 32(6). 
49   Re Thomson Knitting Co. (1924), 5 C.B.R. 189 (Can. Ont. S.C. in 
Bankruptcy)(aff’d (1925) 5 C.B.R 489 (Can. Ont. S.C. in Bankruptcy App. Div.)); 
New Skeena Forest Products v. Don Hull Sons Contracting (2005), 251 D.L.R 4th 
328 (Can. B.C. C.A.); In the Matter of the Bankruptcy of North American Steamships 
Ltd. 2007 B.C.S.C. 267. 
50   Id.  
51   See generally Re Thomson Knitting Co. (1924), 5 C.B.R. 189. 
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before the date of the bankruptcy.52 In other words, generally speaking, 
only pre-filing claims are provable claims. However, the counter-
party’s claim, which arises when the trustee disclaims a contract, is a 
provable claim even though it arises post-filing. This is an exception to 
the general rule.53 
It is unsettled whether the common law right of disclaimer 
extends to intellectual property licenses. In Re Erin Features No. 1 Ltd., 
the court denied the right of a trustee in bankruptcy to disclaim a 
license agreement giving the licensee exclusive rights to market a film 
in Canada.54 The decision was based on the proposition that the right 
of disclaimer cannot be used to disturb established property rights. On 
the other hand, in Re T. Eaton Co., the court allowed the debtor in 
CCAA proceedings to disclaim an agreement giving a credit card 
company an exclusive license to supply credit card services to the 
debtor’s customers.55 The court decided the case mainly on the basis 
that restricting the debtor’s right to disclaim unprofitable contracts 
                                                 
52   BIA, R.S.C. 1985, s. 121(1). 
53 The exception is provided for in BIA, R.S.C. 1985, s. 121(1), which 
provides as follows: 
 
“All debts and liabilities, present or future, to which the bankrupt 
is subject on the da[te] on which the bankrupt becomes bankrupt 
or to which the bankrupt may become subject before the bankrupt’s discharge 
by reason of any obligation incurred before the day on which the bankrupt 
becomes bankrupt  shall be deemed to be claims provable in 
proceedings under this Act.” (Emphasis added). 
 
Duncan explains the meaning of the italicized words as follows: 
 
“The class of claims covered by [these words] include[s] cases of 
contract where the trustee either disclaims or ceases to perform 
the contract. In such case[s] the creditor may prove against the 
estate for the damages occasioned by the breach of the contract, 
and this is his only remedy.” 
 
See Roderick J. Wood & David J. Bryan, Creeping Statutory Obsolescence in Bankruptcy 
Law, 3 J. INSOLVENCY INST. CAN. 1, 14-15 (2014) (citing LEWIS DUNCAN, THE LAW 
AND PRACTICE OF BANKRUPTCY IN CANADA 428-29 (Carswell ed., 1922). 
54   See generally Re Erin Features No. 1, Ltd. (1991), 8 C.B.R 3d 205 (Can. 
B.C. S.C.). 
55   Re T. Eaton Co., (1999) 14 C.B.R. 4th 288 (Can. Ont. S.C.J.). 
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would threaten the viability of restructuring arrangements.56 But the 
court also held, relying on English authority and contrary to Erin 
Features, that a license does not confer property rights on the licensee. 
Therefore, there is no reason for treating the disclaimer of licenses any 
differently from contracts at large.57 
It may be a mistake to think of the issue in terms of property 
rights.  Disclaimer of a contract in insolvency proceedings amounts to 
a breach of the contract, not rescission. The essence of a license 
agreement is that the licensor promises not to sue the licensee for 
infringement provided the licensee observes the terms of the license. 
Outside bankruptcy, if the licensor sued the licensee for infringement 
even though the licensee was in compliance with all its obligations 
under the license agreement, the licensor would be in breach of its 
primary obligation under the license agreement and the court would 
disallow the action. In principle, the position should be the same in 
bankruptcy, given that the rights of the trustee or debtor in bankruptcy 
are no larger than the debtor’s rights outside bankruptcy. In other 
words, disclaimer of a license should not prevent the licensee from 
using the intellectual property: if the trustee or debtor sues the licensee 
for infringement, the court should disallow the action, just as it would 
have done if the action had been brought outside bankruptcy. 
CCAA section 32 had been enacted but had not been brought 
into force at the time of the Nortel proceedings. It follows that at the 
time of the proceedings the right of a debtor to disclaim agreements in 
CCAA proceedings was governed by the common law as outlined 
above and at common law it was unclear whether a licensor could 
disclaim a license agreement. 
III  THE NORTEL CASE 
In Re Nortel Networks Corp.,58 the court approved Nortel’s 
application to sell its assets, which included a substantial patent 
portfolio, in a series of going concern business sales. The proposed 
                                                 
56   See generally id.  
57   See Heap v. Hartley (1889), 42 Ch.D. 461 (C.A.).  
58   Re Nortel Networks Corp (2009), 56 C.B.R.  5th 224 (Can. Ont. S.C.J. 
[Commercial List]). 
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patent sales were complicated by the fact that Nortel had entered into 
numerous license agreements respecting the patents and it did not have 
records for all of them. In other words, some of the patents were 
subject to licenses Nortel could not identify. To avoid potential 
disputes, which would have detracted from the value generated by the 
sales, Nortel decided that the patents would be sold subject to certain 
classes of licenses, including “known licenses” and “commercial 
licenses.” Known licenses were licenses of which Nortel was aware; 
commercial licenses were licenses Nortel had granted in the ordinary 
course of its business, including end-user licenses, whether or not they 
were specifically known to Nortel or the purchasers. 
To deal with licensees whose rights would not be preserved by 
the terms of sale (the “unknown licensees”), Nortel devised a strategy 
based on section 365(n) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. As indicated 
above, section 365(n) provides that if the trustee rejects an executory 
contract, under which the debtor is an intellectual property licensor, 
the licensee has a choice either to: (1) treat the contract as terminated; 
or (2) elect to retain its basic rights under the contract for the duration 
of the term. The Nortel strategy gave unknown licensees this choice. 
Notices of the proposed sales were widely published, in newspaper 
advertisements and elsewhere, inviting unknown licensees to identify 
themselves and establish their claims by a specified date. The interests 
of licensees who responded in time would continue following the 
patent sales and all such licenses would be enforceable against the 
patent transferee. In effect, unknown licensees who came forward by 
the specified date would transform themselves into known licensees. 
On the other hand, unknown licensees who failed to identify 
themselves by the claims bar date would be deemed to have elected, 
under section 365(n), to have their contracts terminated. 
It should be noted that there was no particular class of 
unknown licensees that were suspected to exist but could not be 
tracked down, and it may well be that there were no unknown licensees 
at all. The problem was that Nortel’s records were not sufficiently 
complete to confirm this. In summary, the sale was to be subject to all 
known licenses and also unknown licenses that were commercial 
licenses, but the purchaser would take the patents free and clear of 
unknown licenses other than commercial licenses. The objective was 
to maximize the sale price while protecting the reliance interests of 
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essentially all licensees. The patent sale procedure was approved at a 
joint hearing of the Canadian and United States courts in the CCAA 
and Chapter 11 proceedings, and the sale took place in late June 2011.59 
The patents were bought by a consortium of technology companies 
for “a record price of $4.5 billion.”60 
Given the cross-border nature of the proceedings, Nortel’s 
patent sale process needed to satisfy the requirements of both United 
States and Canadian law.  As indicated above, Canadian law at the time 
of the case was unsettled. The Nortel patent sale process was designed 
to ensure compliance with the United States requirements—
specifically, section 365(n) of the Bankruptcy Code—on the 
assumption that these were more stringent than Canadian law, so that 
if the sale process complied with the United States requirements it 
would also necessarily comply with Canadian law.61 The picture may 
have changed with the subsequent coming into force of CCAA, section 
32. Section 32 is similar to section 365 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, 
with section 32(6) being loosely based on section 365(n). However, 
there are some potentially significant differences. First, CCAA section 
32 clearly requires the debtor to identify the specific agreement it wants 
to disclaim, whereas section 365 is more open to interpretation on this 
point. The difference matters in cases like Nortel, because if the 
debtor’s objective is to disclaim licenses it is unaware of, it will not be 
in a position to provide details of individual agreements.62 Second, in 
contrast to section 365(n), section 32(6) does not give the counter-
party licensee a choice when the license is disclaimed between treating 
the agreement as terminated and retaining its rights under the 
                                                 
59   Following the joint hearing, the U.S. court and Canadian court made 
separate orders: see In re Nortel Networks, Inc., No. 09–10138 (KG), 2011 WL 
4831218(Bankr. D. Del. July 11, 2011); Re Nortel Networks Corporation (Certain 
Patents and Other Assets Bidding Procedures Order) (unreported, Can. Ont. Ct. 
Justice, 2 May 2011). 
60   Joseph Pasquariello and Chris Armstrong, The Nortel Stalking Horse 
Sales: Maximising Value Via CCAA Flexibility, 1 J. INSOLVENCY INST. CAN. 123, 137 
(2012). The consortium comprised Apple, Ericsson, Microsoft, Research in Motion, 
EMC Corporation, and Sony. 
61   Id. at 135. 
62   But see id. at 136 (arguing that a court might be prepared to accept less 
specific characteristics, such as a description of the general nature or type of 
agreement, so long as the details were sufficient to enable counter-parties to identify 
the agreements the debtor is proposing to disclaim).  
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agreement to use the intellectual property for the duration of the term. 
Section 32(6) simply provides that disclaimer does not affect the 
licensee’s right to use the intellectual property for the duration of the 
term.63 
In the Nortel case, the debtor relied on the rejection (disclaimer) 
rules to avoid the unknown licenses. What might the result have been 
if it had relied on the asset sale provisions instead? Section 363 of the 
U.S. Bankruptcy Code permits a debtor to sell its assets free and clear 
of third party interests, but only if “applicable nonbankruptcy law 
permits sale of such property free and clear of such interest.”64 As a 
matter of U.S. patent law, the transferee of a patent acquires title 
subject to any prior license, whether or not it knew of the license.65 
Therefore, if Nortel had proceeded under section 363, it could not 
have sold the patents free and clear of the unknown licenses. In the 
Nortel case, given the cross-border nature of the proceedings, the sale 
process had to comply with the requirements of both U.S. and 
Canadian law. But, assume that Canadian law alone had been in play 
and Nortel had sold the patents pursuant to CCAA, section 36. Would 
the sale have extinguished the licenses? It is to this question that we 
now turn. 
                             IV. ASSET SALES 
Assume an intellectual property owner, A, assigns the 
intellectual property to B and subsequently assigns the same 
intellectual property a second time to C. Which assignment prevails? 
Or suppose A grants B a license to use the intellectual property and 
subsequently assigns the intellectual property to C. Can B enforce the 
license against C? Parallel questions can arise in insolvency 
proceedings. For example, assume A assigns its intellectual property to 
                                                 
63   But see id. at 155-56, note 22 (arguing that the counter-party should be 
free to waive its rights under section 32(6), even though the provision does not 
expressly allow for this). 
64   11 U.S.C. § 363(f). 
65   See Keystone Type Foundry v. Fastpress Co., 272 F. 242, 244-45(2d 
Cir. 1921) (“it ha[s] long passed into the text-books that . . . an assignee acquired title 
subject to prior licenses of which the assignee must inform himself as best he can, 
and at his own risk”). See also, e.g., Armstrong Pump, Inc. v. Hartmann, 745 F. Supp. 
2d 227, 233 (W.D.N.Y. 2010).  
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B and later files for CCAA protection; A wants to transfer the 
intellectual property to C, perhaps as part of a going concern sale of 
A’s business. Can A sell the intellectual property to C free and clear of 
B’s interest? Likewise, suppose A licenses the intellectual property to 
B and subsequently files for CCAA protection; can A sell the 
intellectual property to C free and clear of B’s license? 
In principle, priorities in insolvency proceedings should be the 
same as the priorities outside insolvency proceedings. In other words, 
as a general rule, the insolvency laws should not change the priority 
order that applies outside insolvency proceedings, because otherwise 
parties will have an incentive to use the insolvency laws 
opportunistically as a means of improving their priority position.66 It is 
therefore necessary to understand the priority rules governing 
competing intellectual property interests outside insolvency 
proceedings to establish the contours of the priority regime inside 
insolvency proceedings. Unfortunately, in Canada the law outside 
insolvency proceedings is remarkably uncertain. The intellectual 
property statutes each provide for registration of assignments or 
transfers, but the priority consequences are not clear. We will consider 
first priority as between assignees and then priorities in respect of 
licenses. 
A.       Priorities Outside Insolvency Proceedings 
1.  Competing intellectual property assignments. – The Trade-marks 
Act provides that a mark is transferable and the transfer may be 
registered, but it is entirely silent as to the priority consequences, which 
therefore presumably would be determined by provincial law.67 In 
common law provinces, the rule of nemo dat quod non habet would apply, 
                                                 
66   See Thomas H. Jackson, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY 
LAW chs. 1-2 (1986). 
67   Trade-marks Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. T-13, s. 48. The same is true of the 
Industrial Design Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.I-9, s. 13, and the Integrated Circuit 
Topography Act, S.C. 1990, c. 37, s. 21. “Where the ownership of a trade-mark is 
transferred, failure to register the change of ownership could lead to the loss of the 
distinctiveness of the mark. Thus a delay in the registration of an assignment does 
not negate the transfer, but failure to register in due course may threaten the validity 
of the mark.” TERESA SCASSA, CANADIAN TRADEMARK LAW 123 (2010.  
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and a first assignee of legal title, or any property interest, would prevail 
over all subsequent interests, regardless of registration.68 
The Copyright Act does have a priority provision. Section 
57(3) of the Act provides: 
Any assignment of copyright, or any licence granting 
an interest in a copyright, shall be adjudged void 
against any subsequent assignee or licensee for valuable 
consideration without actual notice, unless the prior 
assignment or licence is registered in the manner 
prescribed by this Act before the registering of the 
instrument under which the subsequent assignee or 
licensee claims.69 
On its face this provision might seem to provide for a first-to-
register priority scheme. However, in Poolman v. Eiffel Productions,70 
Pinard J. in the Federal Court construed the provision very narrowly. 
The plaintiff claimed to have obtained an assignment of copyright 
from the author in 1964.71 The defendant obtained an assignment of 
the copyright from the author in 1989.72 The defendant had no 
knowledge of the purported prior assignment to the plaintiff.73 In 
1991, the plaintiff presented for registration at the Copyright Office 
the assignment that had been executed in 1964.74 The plaintiff claimed 
priority on the basis either of prior assignment or prior registration.75 
Pinard J. held for the defendant.76 There are two points of interest. 
First, Pinard J. held that section 57(3) does not establish a first-to-
register priority regime. Indeed, it does not establish any priority 
regime at all: “the registering of the instrument under which an interest 
in a copyright is granted is not compulsory and, except as expressly 
                                                 
68   Roderick J. Wood, Security Interests in Intellectual Property: Rationalizing the 
Registries, in SECURITY INTERESTS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 699, 671 (Howard 
Knopf, ed., 2002). 
69   Copyright Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-42 s. 57 (2014). 
70   Poolman v. Eiffel Productions (1991), 35 C.P.R. 3d ¶384 (Can. Fed. Ct.).   
71   Id. ¶ 2. 
72   Id. ¶ 6. 
73   Id. ¶ 16. 
74   Id. ¶ 2 
75   Id. ¶ 4 
76   Id. 
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provided . . . in s.57(3) above, creates nothing more than a 
presumption of ownership of such interest that can be rebutted.”77 
Second, Pinard J. held that ownership was to be determined as a matter 
of provincial law, which in this case was the law of Quebec, where all 
the transactions had taken place.78 On the facts, and relying on the 
Quebec Civil Code, Pinard J. held that, even if the plaintiff had in fact 
taken an assignment of the copyright from the author in 1964, the 
defendant’s later assignment prevailed as being a “commercial sale” 
without notice of the prior assignment.79 The defendant was therefore 
the owner of the copyright.80 
As Professor Vaver has remarked, Poolman effectively 
“subordinated the whole federal scheme” to provincial law.81 Poolman 
implies that in a common law province, therefore, the rule of nemo dat 
quod non habet would apply, as discussed above, and a first assignee 
would prevail whether or not it was the first to register.82 Indeed, even 
a first assignee who failed to register at all would prevail, so long as 
they could prove the assignment, since registration “creates nothing 
more than a presumption of ownership.”83 
Vaver describes Poolman as “doubtful” on the basis that “[t]he 
Copyright Act provides its own national registration and priority scheme 
for copyrights. Little room seems left for the different provincial 
                                                 
77   Id. ¶ 24. 
78   Id. 
79   Id. 
80   Id. ¶ 27 
81   DAVID VAVER, COPYRIGHT LAW 248 (2000). 
82   Wood, supra note 68. 
83   It is not clear what independent effect Pinard J. would give to s. 57(3). 
He stated that “This provision of the Copyright Act states only that a prior 
assignment of an interest in a copyright must be adjudged void as against any 
subsequent assignee unless such prior assignment is duly registered before the 
registering of the instrument under which the subsequent assignee claims.” But, it is 
not clear what this means if it does not apply on the facts of Poolman itself. But cf. 
Apotex Inc. v. Wellcome Foundation Ltd., [2002] (2001) 1 F.C. 495, ¶ 100 (Can. Fed. 
Ct.) (where Rothstein J., in obiter, read s.51 of the Patent Act as establishing a first to 
register priority rule. Patent Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-4, s. 51 is in similar terms to 
Copyright Act, R.S.C., 1985, s. 57(3) (2014)). 
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schemes to operate.”84 In his view, under the priority scheme 
established by section 57(3), registrable interests 
usually take priority in order of registration. If the 
grants are unregistered, the later grant has priority if 
taken for valuable consideration without actual notice 
of the prior grant. Otherwise unregistered grants are 
subordinated to later registered grants, except perhaps 
where reliance on the registration is fraudulent.85 
Vaver’s interpretation is a straightforward reading of the 
provision, and to date Poolman has not been judicially re-considered. It 
is entirely possible that a different court would view the Copyright Act 
as enacting a complete code, as Vaver suggests. 
The priority provision in the Patent Act is section 51: 
Every assignment affecting a patent for invention, 
whether it is one referred to in section 49 or 50, is void 
against any subsequent assignee, unless the assignment 
is registered as prescribed by those sections, before the 
registration of the instrument under which the 
subsequent assignee claims.86 
This is in slightly different terms than section 57(3) of the 
Copyright Act, but it is sufficiently similar that the same problem will 
arise as to whether it constitutes a complete code.87 One difference 
between the two provisions is that section 57(3) specifically 
subordinates interests taken with actual notice of a prior interest, while 
section 51 of the Patent Act does not. Nonetheless, it has been held in 
the patent context that a party taking with actual notice of a prior 
                                                 
84   VAVER, supra note 81, at 248. 
85   Id. at 248-49 
86   Patent Act, R.S.C. 1985, s. 51. 
87  The registration provision of the Plant Breeders’ Rights Act, S.C. 1990, 
c. 20, s. 31(3), is also in similar terms.  The Patent Act priority provisions have 
recently been amended. . In particular, t s. 51 has been renumbered s. 49(4), and it 
has been redrafted to read as follows: “A transfer of a patent that has not been 
recorded is void against a subsequent transferee if the transfer to the subsequent 
transferee has been recorded.”  The new wording does not appear to affect the 
substance of the provision. 
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interest will be subordinated, so this difference on the face of the Acts 
does not amount to a difference in the law.88 
2.  Priorities relating to licenses. - Given the uncertainty regarding 
priority between assignees, it should not be surprising that the priority 
of licensees is also uncertain. The traditional view is that a license is 
non-proprietary in nature and that it gives the licensee a mere 
contractual right against the licensor. Consequently, at common law 
the nemo dat rule of priorities would not apply to give a licensee priority 
against a subsequent transferee of the intellectual property. On the 
contrary, the position is that, since equity will not order specific 
enforcement of the license against a party who was not in privity, a 
subsequent transferee of the intellectual property will have priority 
over a prior licensee, even if the subsequent transferee had actual 
knowledge of the license.89 
Intellectual property licenses have traditionally been 
assimilated to licenses generally, as not giving a proprietary interest.90 
The Supreme Court of Canada has said that, under the Copyright Act, 
an exclusive licensee has “a limited property interest in the 
copyright,”91 at least to the extent that an exclusive licensee can sue in 
its own name, though at the same time the Court confirmed that the 
interest of a non-exclusive intellectual property licensee is entirely non-
proprietary.92 The Patent Act is even broader; it gives any subordinate 
interest holder the right to sue in its own name, though the patent 
owner must be joined.93 Similarly, under the Trade-marks Act, any 
licensee can sue in its own name if the owner fails to institute an action 
at the licensee’s request.94 In Heap v. Hartley, the leading case for the 
general proposition that an intellectual property license is not 
proprietary in nature, the question at issue was whether an exclusive 
                                                 
88   Colpitts v. Sherwood (1927), 3 D.L.R. 7 (Can. C.A.). 
89   King v. Allen (1916), 2 A.C. 54 (H.L.); see Richard E. Gold, Partial 
Copyright Assignments: Safeguarding Software Licensees Against the Bankruptcy of Licensors, 33 
CAN. BUS. L.J. 193, 206-07 (2000). 
90   Heap v. Hartley (1889), 42 Ch.D. 461 (C.A.); Euro-Excellence Inc. v. 
Kraft Canada Inc., [2007], 3 S.C.R. 20, 28 (Can.). 
91   Euro-Excellence, 3 S.C.R. 2 at 22. 
92   Id. at 28. 
93   Patent Act, R.S.C. 1985, s. 55. 
94   Trade-marks Act, R.S.C. 1985, s. 50(3). 
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licensee could sue in its own name.95 The specific holding in Heap v. 
Hartley, that it cannot, has therefore been legislatively reversed.96 
However, the ability to sue in one’s own name is only one indication 
of a proprietary interest, and it is doubtful that this characteristic would 
make an exclusive license proprietary for priority purposes as well.97 In 
other words, the fact that an exclusive license is proprietary for the 
purposes of bringing suit probably does not suffice to make it 
proprietary for priority purposes. 
The question, therefore, is the extent to which the statutory 
priority provisions operate to affect the priority of licensees. As the 
Trade-marks Act has no priority provisions, the priorities of licenses 
will depend on provincial law.98 If Poolman is good law, the same is true 
with respect to patent and copyright licenses, notwithstanding any 
registration. 
If, on the other hand, the statutory provisions of the Copyright 
Act and the Patent Act do provide a complete code, the priority of 
licenses will turn on the interpretation of those provisions. Under the 
Copyright Act, any “licence granting an interest in [a] copyright” is 
registrable99 and treated in exactly the same manner as an assignment 
for priority purposes under section 57(3). It is clear that an interest in 
a copyright includes an exclusive license, and Professor Vaver has 
                                                 
95   Heap, 42 Ch.D. at 464-65. 
96   See generally id. 
97   The Supreme Court in Euro-Excellence, referred to the property interest 
as “limited” and it cited statutory provisions, inferring that these granted the 
exclusive licensee the right to sue in its own name; so it may be that the reference to 
a “limited proprietary interest” was no more than a label for a conclusion regarding 
the interpretation of the Act on this point, with no wider implications. The Court 
also stated that the property interest of the exclusive licensee “does not include an 
interest that defeats the ownership interest of the licensor.” Euro-Excellence, 3 S.C.R. 
¶ 34. This implies, without stating directly, that it could not defeat the ownership 
interest of a party claiming under the licensor. 
98   The Canadian Intellectual Property Office now allows registration of 
security interests under that provision; James G. Fogo, Assignment and Licensing of 
Trade-marks, in TRADE-MARKS LAW OF CANADA 165, 175 (Gordon F. Henderson, 
ed., 1993). (The registration provisions of the Trade-marks Act provide for the 
registration of the “transfer” of any registered mark. At one time “transfer” was 
interpreted by the Canadian Intellectual Property Office to mean only the outright 
assignment in full of all rights.). 
99   Copyright Act, R.S.C., 1985, s. 53(2.2) (2014). 
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argued that it also includes an irrevocable non-exclusive license, 
especially if the licensee has invested in reliance on the license.100 If that 
is so, then irrevocable non-exclusive licenses are both registrable and 
subject to the same priority rules as assignments. 
The Patent Act priority provision is not entirely clear. 
Exclusive licenses are clearly registrable: section 50(2) provides that 
every “assignment of a patent, and every grant. . . of any exclusive 
right . . . shall be registered.”101 However, the priority provision, 
section 51, refers only to “every assignment,” and makes no mention 
of exclusive licenses. On the one hand, it would seem logical that if it 
is possible to register an exclusive license in the same manner as an 
assignment, the priority consequences of registration should be the 
same; on the other hand, the failure to mention exclusive licenses in 
the priority provision, when they are expressly mentioned in the 
registration provision, suggests a legislative intent to treat them 
differently.102 
Non-exclusive licenses are clearly not registrable at all under 
the Patent Act. Non-exclusive licenses may also not be registrable 
under the Copyright Act, as Professor Vaver’s interpretation has never 
been judicially tested. It is not clear which priority rules apply to 
unregistrable non-exclusive licenses. If, as Vaver argues, the federal 
statutes provide a complete code, then federal law and not provincial 
law should determine the priority of unregistrable interests. But there 
is no case law as to what such a priority scheme might be. Alternatively, 
                                                 
100   David Vaver, The Exclusive Licence in Copyright, 9 INTELLECTUAL PROP. 
J. 163, 189 (1995). 
101   Patent Act, R.S.C. 1985, s. 50(2).  
102   As indicated in note 87, supra, the Patent Act priority provisions have 
recently been amended.. Section 50(2) has been renumbered s.49(3), and it has been  
reworded to read as follows: “The Commissioner shall, subject to the regulations, 
record the transfer of a patent on the request of the patentee or . . . of a transferee 
of the patent.” The proposed new provision omits the reference to “any exclusive 
right.”  Consequently, an exclusive license may no longer be registrable, unless the 
courts read the reference to a “transfer” as including an exclusive license. 
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provincial law might apply to fill the gaps in the federal priority 
scheme.103 
Even if they are registrable, it is generally not practical to 
register non-exclusive licenses, such as end-user licenses. The result is 
that a subsequent assignee will probably take clear of non-exclusive 
licenses. If non-exclusive licenses are not registrable at all, and 
provincial law applies, then under the common law at least the assignee 
will take clear, even if it has knowledge of the prior licenses. If they are 
registrable, but unregistered, then the assignee will take clear unless it 
has knowledge, as a matter of the statutory priority rules. 
As a matter of policy, the basic assimilation of intellectual 
property licenses to licenses of real or personal property is 
questionable. An exclusive license of intellectual property is 
functionally very similar to an assignment, as the licensee’s rights are 
normally exclusive even of the rights of the owner. On the other hand, 
a non-exclusive license relating to intellectual property is different 
from a license relating to tangible property. A license relating to 
tangible property will affect the licensor’s ability to make use of the 
property itself; a license granted to allow the licensee to post 
advertisements on the wall of a building will prevent the licensor from 
doing the same. However, this is not true of intellectual property. A 
non-exclusive license does not prevent the licensor from making use 
of the intellectual property in any way; it simply prevents the licensor 
from suing the licensee for infringement. In this respect, giving 
recognition to the license-holder’s rights against a third party assignee 
does not prejudice the assignee. On the other hand, failing to uphold 
the license in these circumstances may significantly prejudice the 
licensee who may have made substantial investments in reliance on the 
license. Even a non-exclusive licensee may rely heavily on a license, as 
where a large corporation trains its employees in the use of a suite of 
office productivity software. The vulnerability of non-exclusive 
licensees to having their interests defeated by an assignment outside of 
bankruptcy is therefore problematic as a matter of policy. The 
unsatisfactory state of the current non-bankruptcy laws in this respect 
                                                 
103   This is implied by Poolman v. Eiffel Productions (1991), 35 C.P.R. 3d ¶384 
(Can. Fed. Ct.), though the point in that case was that the Copyright Act does not 
provide a priority system at all. 
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creates a challenge for insolvency law reform: to what extent is it 
possible or desirable to protect the intellectual property licensee’s 
reliance interest inside bankruptcy without simultaneously undertaking 
a wholesale reform of the applicable non-bankruptcy rules? We pursue 
this question below. 
B.       Priorities Inside Insolvency Proceedings 
1.  Assignments. - Assume an intellectual property owner, A, 
assigns its intellectual property to B and later applies for CCAA 
protection. As part of the CCAA proceedings, A wants to sell its 
intellectual property to C, perhaps as part of a going concern sale of 
A’s business. Can A sell the intellectual property to C free and clear of 
B’s interest? The starting point is CCAA, section 36, which deals with 
the sale of assets in CCAA proceedings. CCAA, section 36(1) provides 
that the debtor may not sell assets outside the ordinary course of 
business without court approval.104 Section 36(3) provides that in 
hearing the case, the court must take account of various factors, 
including the effects of the proposed sale on creditors and other 
interested parties.105 Section 36(6) provides: 
The court may authorize a sale . . . free and clear of any 
security, charge or other restriction and, if it does, it 
shall also order that other assets of the company or the 
proceeds of the sale . . . be subject to a security, charge 
or other restriction in favour of the creditor whose 
security, charge or other restriction is to be affected by 
the order.106 
The provision appears to have been drafted with security 
interests and the like specifically in mind, and it does not seem to 
contemplate other third party interests such as the prior assignee of an 
intellectual property right. However, section 36 would presumably be 
read subject to the relevant non-bankruptcy law outlined above.107 On 
                                                 
104   CCAA, R.S.C., 1985, s. 36(1). 
105   Id. s. 36(3). 
106   Id. s. 36(6). 
107   CCAA, R.S.C., 1985, s. 36 is similar to U.S.  Bankruptcy Code, 11 
U.S.C. § 363; § 363(f) provides specifically for a free and clear sale if “applicable non-
bankruptcy law permits sale of such property free and clear of such interest.” 
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this basis, a purchaser of intellectual property in a CCAA, section 36 
sale would acquire title subject to any interest which would have 
priority under applicable non-bankruptcy law. BIA, section 65.13, 
which applies to BIA proposals, is in similar terms to CCAA, section 
36, and so the same analysis applies. There are no corresponding 
provisions governing the sale of assets in bankruptcy proceedings or 
receiverships but, in principle, the capacity of a trustee in bankruptcy 
or a receiver to sell intellectual property free and clear of a prior 
assignee’s claim should be determined by reference to non-bankruptcy 
law, as described above. 
2.  Licenses. - Now assume that A grants B a license to use its 
intellectual property and A subsequently applies for CCAA protection. 
Can A, as part of the CCAA proceedings, sell the intellectual property 
to C free and clear of B’s license? Again, the starting point is the 
proposition that a purchaser of intellectual property in a CCAA, 
section 36 sale takes subject to any competing claim that would have 
priority outside insolvency proceedings. As indicated above, the 
applicable law outside insolvency proceedings is unsettled. The answer 
depends on whether the license is registrable so that one or other of 
the statutory priority rules applies. If not, then applying provincial law, 
C, who is not party to the license agreement between A and B, is not 
bound even if C was aware of the license at the date of the transfer.108 
This appears to be the result for trademark licenses and non-exclusive 
patent licenses, which are not registrable. A different result may follow 
if the license is registrable and registered, as in the case of an exclusive 
patent or copyright license. But, as discussed above, there is 
considerable uncertainty as to application of the Patent Act priority 
provision and the scope and application of the Copyright Act 
registration and priority provisions. 
As noted above, U.S. law is significantly different in this 
respect. In the United States, as a general rule, outside bankruptcy an 
intellectual property transferee is bound by prior licenses.109 This rule 
is imported into bankruptcy law by section 363(f) of the Bankruptcy 
Code, which provides that the trustee may sell assets free and clear of 
                                                 
108   See generally Royal Bank of Canada v. Body Blue, Inc. (2008), 42 C.B.R. 
5th 125 (Can. Ont. SCJ). 
109   See Keystone Type Foundry v. Fastpress Co., 272 F. 242 (2d Cir. 1921). 
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an interest subject to certain restrictions, including a requirement that 
“applicable nonbankruptcy law permits sale of such property free and 
clear of such interest.”110 One problem with the current Canadian 
position is that, if the transferee of intellectual property takes free and 
clear of outstanding licenses, a licensor debtor in CCAA proceedings 
can do an end run around the restriction in CCAA, section 32(6) on 
disclaimer of intellectual property licenses: instead of directly 
disclaiming the license, the debtor can avoid it indirectly by assigning 
the underlying intellectual property to a third party purchaser. The 
result may be to seriously compromise the licensee’s reliance interest, 
which was the very concern CCAA, section 32(6) was enacted to 
address.111 
C.        Nortel  Revisited 
As discussed earlier, the terms of Nortel’s patent sale were that 
buyers would take the patents subject to known licenses and 
commercial licenses, but free of unknown licenses. The debtor also 
developed a procedure aimed at giving unknown licensees an 
opportunity to assert their rights under section 365(n) of the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Code. Licensees who responded before the specified date 
became admitted to the “known licenses” fold, which meant that, 
under the terms of the proposed sale, their rights were enforceable 
against the purchaser. On the other hand, licensees who failed to 
respond in time, or at all, were deemed to have elected under section 
365(n) to treat their license agreements as terminated. Consequently, 
the purchaser acquired title to the patents free and clear of licenses in 
this category. 
In Nortel, the sale process had to comply with the requirements 
of both Canadian and U.S. law and, given section 363(f) of the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Code read in conjunction with U.S.  patent law, Nortel 
would not have been able to sell the patents free and clear of the 
unknown licenses. This explains why it was forced to take the more 
round-about route of relying on section 365(n) instead. But if only 
Canadian law had applied, Nortel could have proceeded under CCAA 
section 36 (the asset sale provision), in which case the court would 
                                                 
110   11 U.S.C. § 363(f)(1). 
111   The same point applies with respect to BIA, R.S.C. 1985, s. 65.11(7) 
in relation to BIA proposal proceedings. 
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probably have applied the priority rules discussed above to determine 
the rights of the unknown licensees. It is instructive to compare the 
result in Nortel with the result that would have followed if the Canadian 
priority rules had applied. 
In short, the Nortel plan put the licensees in a substantially 
better position than they would have been in otherwise. First, under 
the plan the sale was subject to all known and unknown commercial 
licenses, including end-user license agreements. By contrast, if the 
Canadian priority rules had applied, the purchasers would have taken 
free of any such license unless—perhaps—the license was registered 
or the purchasers had knowledge of it. Second, while the plan provided 
that the purchasers were to take free and clear of any unknown license 
other than a commercial license, it gave unknown licensees the 
opportunity to identify themselves and to avoid extinguishment of 
their claims. Licenses in this category might have included exclusive 
licenses—these would certainly have been of the greatest concern to a 
purchaser—and so, under Canadian law, they would have been 
registrable, and a registered license probably has priority over the claim 
of a subsequent transferee. In effect, the plan excused the holders of 
registrable licenses for their failure to register by giving them a second 
chance to publicize their claims. 
The generosity of the Nortel plan brings into sharp relief the 
inadequacy of current Canadian law in terms of protecting intellectual 
property license holders both inside and outside insolvency 
proceedings. BIA section 65.11(7) and CCAA section 32(6) protect the 
licensee against extinguishment of its interest following disclaimer by 
the licensor-debtor. As noted above, however, these reforms are 
compromised to the extent that the licensor-debtor can sell the 
underlying intellectual property interest free and clear of current 
licenses. As it happens, the Nortel plan avoided this concern, but the 
Nortel plan was substantially shaped by the requirements of United 
States law, and there can be no guarantee that licensees will be as 
generously provided for in future cases. 
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V. POSSIBLE REFORMS 
In the interests of economy, the following discussion focuses 
mainly on patents.112 A partial response to the problem identified in 
Part IV above, would be to amend CCAA, section 36 and the 
corresponding provision in BIA, section 65.13 to make it clear that the 
court may authorize a sale of assets, including patents and other 
intellectual property, free and clear of third party claims, but only if the 
laws that apply outside insolvency proceedings allow for free and clear 
sales. This measure would bring the Canadian rules relating to asset 
sales in insolvency proceedings more closely into line with the U.S. 
position. 
However, in the United States, the laws that apply outside 
bankruptcy to the enforceability of a patent license against a transferee 
of the intellectual property are well-established, and they favor the 
licensee. By contrast, the corresponding Canadian laws are uncertain, 
under-developed, and outdated. It follows that a comprehensive 
solution to the issue in Nortel requires reform of not only the 
insolvency laws, but the patent laws as well. Specifically, the patent 
registration system should be expanded and modernized, and the 
Patent Act itself should be amended to provide comprehensive and 
coherent priority rules for competing claims. These new priority rules 
would apply in insolvency proceedings in the same way they apply 
outside insolvency, with the result that it would make no difference to 
the parties’ relative entitlements whether the priority issue arises in the 
context of insolvency proceedings or outside the insolvency system.113 
A simpler and quicker response might be to amend BIA, 
section 65.13 and CCAA, section 36 to make it clear that, while the 
provisions extend to the sale of patents and other intellectual property, 
the court may not authorize the sale of intellectual property free and 
                                                 
112   Somewhat different considerations may apply to other types of 
intellectual property for which registration is not a requirement. 
113   See INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INSTITUTE OF CANADA, POSSIBLE 
AMENDMENTS TO THE PATENT ACT AND PATENT RULES 13 (2013) (the Intellectual 
Property Institute of Canada has recognized the need for reforms more or less along 
these lines: “[c]larify interplay between registrations under the Patent Act/Personal 
Property Security Act and bankruptcy proceedings under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency 
Act/Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act.”). 
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clear of current licenses.114  While a quick fix like this might be 
tempting, given the challenges that would be involved in overhauling 
the intellectual property laws, the temptation should be resisted. 
Taking this approach would create a discrepancy between insolvency 
law and the law that applies outside insolvency proceedings in the 
treatment of intellectual property licenses. Specifically, the reforms 
would put the intellectual property licensee in a stronger position, 
relative to a transferee of the intellectual property, in the transferor’s 
insolvency proceedings than it would be outside insolvency. As a 
general rule, priority flips of this nature are inadvisable because they 
encourage parties to use the insolvency laws opportunistically to 
improve their priority position. Furthermore, the proposed reforms 
would create a discrepancy between cases where the financially 
troubled debtor’s asset sale takes place in insolvency proceedings and 
cases where the asset sale is conducted outside the insolvency system. 
In Nortel, the patent sale took place in the course of CCAA and 
Chapter 11 proceedings. By contrast, Blackberry, another financially 
troubled technology company, was until recently planning to sell its 
patent portfolio without relying on the insolvency laws. Had the 
Blackberry sale gone ahead, licensees’ interests would have been 
governed by the non-bankruptcy priority rules described above.  But 
there is no principled reason why the parties’ entitlements, relative to 
one another, should vary depending on whether the sale happens to 
take place inside or outside insolvency proceedings.115 
                                                 
114   Or at least: (1) a  prior registered license; (2) a prior unregistered 
licensee of which the purchaser has knowledge; or (3) a license  granted in the 
ordinary course of the licensor’s business (for example, to an end-user). 
115   The reforms proposed above may have conflict of laws implications, 
for example, where a patent is registered in Jurisdiction A and the patent sale takes 
place in Jurisdiction B. The conflict of laws issues are complex and require separate 
study. See LEGISLATIVE REVIEW TASK FORCE (COMMERCIAL) OF THE INSOLVENCY 
INSTITUTE OF CANADA AND THE CANADIAN ASSOCIATION OF INSOLVENCY AND 
RESTRUCTURING PROFESSIONALS, REPORT ON THE STATUTORY REVIEW OF THE 
BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY ACT AND THE COMPANIES’ CREDITORS 
ARRANGEMENT ACT 8 (2014) (identifying some of the issues). See also UNCITRAL, 
LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON SECURED TRANSACTIONS: SUPPLEMENT ON SECURITY 
RIGHTS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, Part X., U.N. Sales No. E.11.V.6 (2011). 
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CONCLUSION 
The Canadian insolvency laws, similar to the U.S. Bankruptcy 
Code, limit an intellectual property owner’s freedom in insolvency 
proceedings to disclaim licenses it has granted. The purpose of this 
limitation is to protect the licensee’s reliance interest and to prevent 
disruption of the licensee’s business. If the insolvency laws freely 
allowed disclaimer of intellectual property licenses, they would increase 
the up-front risk to prospective licensees and might have a chilling 
effect on the licensing of intellectual property to the detriment of both 
licensors and licensees. 
Logically, this policy should also be reflected in the provisions 
governing asset sales so that at least as a general rule, it should not be 
possible for an intellectual property owner in insolvency proceedings 
to sell the intellectual property free and clear of current licenses. 
However, while this appears to be the law in the United States, the 
position in Canada is much less certain. In principle, a Canadian 
bankruptcy court should approach the issue with reference to the rules 
which apply outside bankruptcy to priority disputes between 
competing claims to intellectual property. But the applicable non-
bankruptcy laws, as they currently stand, are fragmented, complex, and 
unsettled. The laws are badly in need of reform. 
It might be possible to amend the insolvency laws without also 
reforming the intellectual property laws. However, this would be a 
second-best solution. The problem is that it would make the licensee’s 
position stronger or weaker, relative to a transferee of the intellectual 
property, depending on whether the sale takes place inside or outside 
insolvency proceedings. In other words, tackling the problem via the 
insolvency laws, without reforming the intellectual property laws, may 
result in arbitrary case outcomes and may induce debtors to favor asset 
sales outside the insolvency system with a view to defeating licensees’ 
interests. 
In any event, there is some urgency about the need for reform 
because sales of intellectual property, and patent portfolios in 
particular, are becoming increasingly common. The uncertain state of 
the law threatens to reduce the returns from such sales because it 
means parties must take expensive and time-consuming steps, as in 
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Nortel, to clarify the purchaser’s title.  It also threatens to reduce the 
returns from the licensing of intellectual property because, as matters 
presently stand, a prospective licensee cannot be sure that its license 
will still be valid if the underlying intellectual property is subsequently 
transferred.116 
In today’s economy almost every business depends on licensed 
intellectual property rights to a greater or lesser extent, and 
consequently every business is potentially exposed to the threat of 
“hold-up” by patent assertion entities which have acquired intellectual 
property rights from a licensor in financial distress. This is not a remote 
or theoretical problem; it is happening regularly around the world. 
There is no question that the problem will come to Canada, if it has 
not already. The only question is whether we will be ready when it does 
arrive. 
 
                                                 
116   See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, 
PATENT CHALLENGES FOR STANDARD-SETTING IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: 
LESSONS FROM INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY (2013) (see 
Chapter 5 dealing with transfers of patents with licensing commitments, and 
especially Chapter 5.2 discussing recent cases from around the world, including 
Nortel). 
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ONE MORE BRICK IN THE WALL: THE 
IMPACT OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION 
OF EX JURIS DEFENDANTS ON THE 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED 
STATES AND CANADA 
Matthew Johnson 
“When I have been in Canada, I have never heard a Canadian 
refer to an American as a “foreigner.” He is just an “American.” And, 
in the same way, in the United States, Canadians are not “foreigners,” 
they are “Canadians.” That simple little distinction illustrates to me 
better than anything else the relationship between our two countries.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
The United States and Canada have a lengthy and historical 
development of their common law and statutory standards for 
obtaining personal jurisdiction of ex juris defendants in civil litigation.2 
The United States’ doctrine has been developing since the mid-
nineteenth century.3 Canada, however, followed a rigid common law 
                                                 
1   Sarah Lipkis, United States of Canada, WORLD POLICY BLOG (Oct. 22, 
2013, 10:18 AM), http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2013/10/22/united-states-
canada(quoting Franklin Delano Roosevelt). 
2   See generally Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878) (stating the proposition 
that in personam jurisdiction cannot be had over an absent defendant, but in rem 
jurisdiction can be had over the absent defendant’s property); see also Moran v. Pyle 
Nat’l (Can.) Ltd., [1975] 1 S.C.R. 393 (discussing in personam jurisdiction in tort cases 
over a foreign defendant). 
3   See, e.g., Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 727, 731; see also J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. 
v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011) (holding a court may not exercise jurisdiction over 
a defendant that has not purposefully availed itself to doing business within the 
jurisdiction). 
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system until the end of the twentieth century.4 Since 1990, there have 
been five important cases altering the current Canadian doctrine on 
personal jurisdiction of ex juris defendants.5 Most recently, the 2012 
decision of Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda marked a notable shift from 
its predecessor, Muscutt v. Courcelles.6 
Today, the United States’ greatest ally and biggest trading 
partner is Canada.7 As China continues to establish itself as a global 
economic power, retaining close ties is important for both nations.8 
Though executives, legislatures, and judiciaries exercise comity9 
between nations,10 the judiciary has the ability to influence and control 
the other branches’ exercise of comity through its decisions and 
interpretations.11 Because of this significant judicial power, this 
                                                 
4   Muscutt v. Courcelles, 2002 CanLII 44957 (ON CA). 
5   Id. ¶ 14-17 (citing Tolofson v. Jensen [1994] 3 S.C.R. 1022; Amchem 
Prod. Inc. v. B.C. (Workers’ Comp. Bd.), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 897; Hunt v. T&N plc., 
[1993] 4 S.C.R. 289; Morguard Inv. Ltd. v. De Savoye, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077). 
6   Tanya J. Monestier, (Still) A “Real and Substantial” Mess: The Law of 
Jurisdiction in Canada, 36 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 396, 402 (2013). 
7   See U.S. Relations with Canada, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE (Aug. 23, 2013), 
www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2089.htm (noting the U.S. and Canada trade $1.6 
billion worth of goods, daily, and three hundred thousand people cross their shared 
border, daily); see also, Doug Lamborn, U.S. Rep. from Colorado, Building Keystone 
Pipeline will Cement U.S.-Canadian Relations, THE HILL (Mar. 6, 2013), 
http://thehill.com/opinion/op-ed/286669-building-keystone-pipeline-will-cement-
us-canada-relations (describing Canada as the United States’ most important trading 
partner, sharing “close ties in culture, language and values”). 
8   See Lipkis, supra note 1 (discussing the potential benefits of the United 
States and Canada forming an E.U.-like relationship to combat the efficiency of 
China’s form of capitalism); When Giants Slow Down, ECONOMIST (July 27, 2013), 
http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21582257-most-dramatic-and-
disruptive-period-emerging-market-growth-world-has-ever-seen (discussing the 
slowing but steadying growth of Brazil, Russia, India, and China). 
9   Comity is defined as “the recognition which one nation allows within 
its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due 
regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own 
citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws.” Hilton v. 
Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895). 
10   See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Cal., 509 U.S. 764, 817 (1993) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (explaining legislatures practice “prescriptive comity” by limiting the 
reach of their laws when enacting them). 
11   See Donald Earl Childress III, Comity as Conflict: Resituating International 
Comity as Conflict of Laws, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 11, 14 (2010). 
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comment recognizes the important role courts play in maintaining and 
increasing comity between the United States and Canada. 
This comment will argue that the Van Breda decision has 
moved Canadian courts closer to United States courts on the issue of 
personal jurisdiction over ex juris defendants, which in turn has created 
increased comity among the two nations. Part II of this comment will 
introduce the history of personal jurisdiction over ex juris defendants 
in the United States and Canada. Furthermore, Part II will briefly 
discuss comity and its international role. Part III analyzes the current 
state of jurisdiction in the United States and compares it with the new 
Canadian standard set forth in Van Breda. Through this comparison, 
this comment will explore the opportunity for increased comity 
between the two nations. Part IV proposes that the current positions 
of both nations regarding personal jurisdiction over ex juris defendants 
allows for greater comity between the two nations, increasing their 
economic partnership and individual international strength. 
I.         Historical Background of Personal Jurisdiction Over Ex Juris 
Defendants in the United States and Canada and the Role of 
International Comity 
A.         Personal Jurisdiction Over Ex Juris Defendants in the United 
States 
The United States’ modern day jurisdiction found its roots in 
Pennoyer v. Neff,12 but has undergone substantial change, culminating in 
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown.13 
1.  Pennoyer to International Shoe. — In Pennoyer v. Neff, the 
United States Supreme Court determined due process does not give a 
state the authority to assert in personam jurisdiction over an out-of-
state defendant who does not personally assent to jurisdiction.14 In 
reaching this determination, the Court focused on two “principles of 
                                                 
12   Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 730. 
13   See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 
(2011); see generally Michael H. Hoffheimer, General Jurisdiction After Goodyear Dunlop 
Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 60 KAN. L. REV. 549 (2012) (discussing the evolution 
of Supreme Court rulings on personal jurisdiction). 
14   Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 730 (citing D’Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. 165 (1851)). 
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public law.”15 First, every state has jurisdiction over persons and 
property within its jurisdiction. Second, a state does not have 
jurisdiction over persons or property beyond its jurisdiction.16 
Relying on previous state and federal court decisions, however, 
the Pennoyer Court reiterated that a plaintiff who is unable to subject a 
foreign defendant to in personam jurisdiction may attach a defendant’s 
property within the court’s jurisdiction to hail the defendant into 
court.17 But, if the defendant fails to appear, any judgment may “only 
bind [the defendant] to the extent of such property.”18 The Court 
noted the burdens a state may impose upon foreign persons.19 
In the courtroom, Pennoyer v. Neff has essentially become 
irrelevant.20 As legal scholar Michael Hoffheimer states, “[i]t is late in 
the day to argue . . . Pennoyer.”21 However, the court’s reasoning is still 
relevant to understanding and discussing the connection between due 
process and personal jurisdiction.22 With increasing global complexity, 
the United States Supreme Court found itself needing to shift toward 
a new doctrine, which could better adjudicate the increased mobility of 
citizens between different states.23 
Nearly five decades after Pennoyer v. Neff was handed down, the 
Supreme Court, in an attempt to expand the reach of Pennoyer,24 actually 
began to subtly shift away from its precedent.25 The Court in Hess v. 
                                                 
15   Id. at 722. 
16   Id. (citing Story, J., Confl. Laws, sect. 539) (emphasis added). 
17   Id. at 724-25 (citing Cooper v. Reynolds 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 308 (1870); 
Picquet v. Swan, 5 Mas. 35 (1828)). 
18   Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 724 (citing Picquet, 5 Mas. 35). 
19   Id. at 734-35 (conditions for marriage/divorce, requiring foreign 
persons to appoint an agent to receive service of process when entering into a 
partnership within the state, and conditions for enforcing obligations against 
corporate officers other than personal service). 
20   See Carol Andrews, Another Look at General Personal Jurisdiction, 47 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 999, 1007 (2012). 
21   Hoffheimer, supra note 13, at 554. 
22   Id. at 554-55. 
23   See Andrews, supra note 20, at 1003. 
24   Id. 
25   See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356-57 (1927) (asserting the power 
of a state to exclude a non-resident confers upon the state a power to imply 
appointment of an agent through use of state highways, rendering physical presence 
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Pawloski allowed the state of Massachusetts to serve an out-of-state 
defendant, who was involved in an accident, pursuant to a 
Massachusetts statute.26 The statute stated that in using Massachusetts’ 
highways, a driver appoints the registrar as his agent for service of 
process.27 Thus, once a driver enters Massachusetts, he impliedly 
consents that a state official may act as his agent, thereby making it 
possible for the state to obtain jurisdiction over him in the event he is 
involved in an accident or collision within the State’s borders.28 Despite 
citing numerous authorities,29 all of which appeared to direct the court 
toward a strict Pennoyer ruling, the Court opted to base its decision on 
public policy reasons.30 By using this type of analysis, as well as relevant 
case law,31 the Court determined that whether the appointment of a 
state officer is formal or implied is “not substantial” so far as the 
Fourteenth Amendment is concerned.32 Thus, by allowing an implied 
appointment of an agent by non-resident drivers, the Court had a 
manner in which it could obtain jurisdiction over the non-resident 
driver, and despite not having attachable property it could enforce a 
judgment as Pennoyer would allow. 
While Hess helps illustrate the difficulties courts faced in 
applying Pennoyer to modern America, it did not address the difficulties 
associated with determining jurisdiction over corporations.33 Courts 
formulated different rules to define when a state could and could not 
claim jurisdiction over a corporation doing business within its 
boundaries.34 The Supreme Court tried to settle the split in 1945 and 
                                                 
in the territory unnecessary for service); see also Wendy Collins Perdue, What’s 
“Sovereignty” Got to Do with It? Due Process, Personal Jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court, 63 
S.C. L. REV. 729 (2012) (noting the court shifted the analysis from whether 
Massachusetts lacked authority to serve the defendant, rendering any judgment as 
contrary to the Due Process Clause, to whether enactment of the statute violated the 
Due Process Clause). 
26   90 Gen. Laws Mass. as amended by Stat. 1923, c. 431, § 2. 
27   See Hess, 274 U.S. at 356-57. 
28   Id. at 356-57. 
29   See id. at 355 (citing e.g. Flexner v. Farson, 248 U.S. 289 (1918); Goldey 
v. Morning News, 156 U.S. 518 (1894); Pennoyer, 95 U.S. 714). 
30   See Hess, 274 U.S. at 356. 
31   See id. at 356 (quoting Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160, 167 (1916)). 
32   Hess, 274 U.S. at 357. 
33   See Andrews, supra note 20, at 1007. 
34   Id. 
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provide a universal standard in determining jurisdiction over 
corporations.35 
2.  International Shoe. — In International Shoe Company v. 
Washington, the Supreme Court ruled that the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment embodies substantive criteria for deciding 
personal jurisdiction issues.36 Criticism has been levied against the 
Court, however, for its vagueness in defining what general jurisdiction 
entails.37 
International Shoe Company was a St. Louis-based company, 
which sent sample shoes to approximately eleven agents located in the 
state of Washington et alibi.38 Washington wanted to collect 
employment taxes, which were due from International Shoe.39 Notice 
was served to International Shoe’s agent in Washington and by 
certified mail to its home office.40 International Shoe argued that its 
activities in Washington were not “sufficient to manifest its 
‘presence,’” and thus, the state of Washington violated its due process 
rights in subjecting it to suit.41 
In his majority opinion, Chief Justice Stone analyzed Pennoyer-
era decisions42 and determined that the satisfaction of due process in 
personal jurisdiction “depend[s] rather upon the quality and nature of 
the activity . . . .”43 Based on this principle, Chief Justice Stone 
announced what is known as the “minimum contacts” doctrine.44 As 
stated by Chief Justice Stone, “due process requires only that in order 
to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present 
                                                 
35   See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
36   Perdue, supra note 25, at 733. 
37   See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. 310 (Black, J., concurring); Hoffheimer, supra 
note 13; Kevin C. McMunigal, Desert, Utility, and Minimum Contacts: Toward a Mixed 
Theory of Personal Jurisdiction, 108 YALE L.J. 189, 189 (1998); Perdue, supra note 25 at 
734-35. 
38   Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 313. 
39   Id. at 312-13. The commissions received by the salespersons were in 
excess of $31,000. 
40   Id. 
41   Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 315. 
42   Andrews, supra note 20, at 1008. 
43   Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319. 
44   Id. at 316. 
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within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts 
with it. . . .”45 Chief Justice Stone continued to rule that, “the 
maintenance of the suit [can]not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play 
and substantial justice.’”46 
Chief Justice Stone’s “minimum contacts” doctrine provides 
no real guidance on how courts are to determine a corporation’s 
presence within a certain jurisdiction.47 To better substantiate its new 
standard, the Court returned to the Pennoyer era and sorted cases into 
one of four categories.48 The categories assist in determining whether 
a corporation has sufficient minimum contacts with a forum state to 
allow jurisdiction.49 Chief Justice Stone asserts that those cases 
involving continuous and systematic activities related to the claim at 
bar, and cases involving isolated incidents not related to the claim at 
bar are obvious cases in which jurisdiction could be conferred and not 
conferred, respectively.50 Conversely, those cases involving continuous 
activities not related to the claims at bar or single occasional acts by a 
corporate agent make the jurisdictional determination more difficult.51 
The “minimum contacts” doctrine has served as an expansion 
of the basic principles set forth in Pennoyer v. Neff and its progeny.52 The 
new test serves as a policy-based and flexible analytical approach, 
                                                 
45   Id.; but see, id. at 322 (Black, J., concurring) (the Court went too far by 
announcing its new due process rule). 
46   Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Miliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 
(1940); see also McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91(1917)). 
47   See Hoffheimer, supra note 13, at 561 (“the court’s new ‘minimum 
contacts’ requirement added little more than the appropriate label when a court 
decided that a case satisfied constitutional requirements.”); See also Douglas D. 
McFarland, Drop the Shoe: A Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 68 MO. L. REV. 753, 761 (2003) 
(criticizing the minimum contacts test). 
48   See Hoffheimer, supra note 13, at 558-61 (describing the four categories 
as cases involving: (1) a corporation’s continuous and systematic contacts within a 
state; (2) the casual presence of a corporate agent, or an isolated incident unrelated 
to the claims at bar; (3) continuous and systematic contacts distinct from the causes 
of action; and (4) single occasional acts by an agent in the state). 
49   See id. 
50   Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317. 
51   Id. at 318. 
52   Hoffheimer, supra note 13, at 561. 
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taking into consideration concerns like fairness, to both states and 
corporations.53 
3.  Onward Ho!: Development of the “Minimum Contacts” Doctrine. — 
Since the ruling of the “minimum contacts” doctrine in International 
Shoe Co. v. Washington, the United States Supreme Court has 
proceeded to split personal jurisdiction into two categories. These 
categories are 1) specific, “case-linked” jurisdiction, and 2) general 
jurisdiction.54 
The specific, case-linked category of cases has been bifurcated 
to examine, first, the minimum contacts of a corporation within the 
forum, and second, the fairness of hailing the corporation into such 
forum.55 Furthermore, the Court has continued to apply this analysis 
to the realm of products liability cases, adopting a “stream of 
commerce” doctrine.56 
The second category, general jurisdiction, involves the two 
categories of cases proffered in International Shoe in which personal 
jurisdiction determinations are obvious.57 The following subsections 
will discuss each of the categories with more detail.58 
a.  Stream of commerce and fairness. – In World Wide 
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, the Supreme Court set forth a “stream 
                                                 
53   See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. 310; see also Hoffheimer, supra note 13, at 561; 
McFarland, supra note 47, at 761; McMunigal, supra note 37, at 195-96. 
54   Taylor Simpson-Wood, In the Aftermath of Goodyear Dunlop: Oyez! Oyez! 
Oyez! A Call for a Hybrid Approach to Personal Jurisdiction in International Products Liability 
Controversies, 64 BAYLOR L. REV. 113, 116 (2012). 
55   Id. at 117. 
56   See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980). 
57   See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317 (cases involving continuous and systematic 
activities related to the claim at bar are cases in which jurisdiction could obviously be 
conferred, while cases of isolated incidents not related to the claim at bar are 
situations in which jurisdiction could obviously not be conferred); see also Simpson-
Wood, supra note 54, at 118 (describing these cases as those in which “a foreign 
defendant’s contacts with the forum do not relate to the cause of action, but are “so 
‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the forum state”) 
(citing Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A., 131 S. Ct. at 2851 (quoting Int’l 
Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317)). 
58   The “minimum contacts” portion of category one will not be discussed, 
as it was expounded upon in the previous section. 
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of commerce” standard by determining whether a corporation 
“purposefully availed” itself to the forum.59 The Court based this 
doctrine on fairness.60 In doing so, the Court listed five factors to be 
considered in determining whether it is fair to hail a defendant into 
court in a particular forum: (1) the defendant must have a relationship 
with the forum which would make it “reasonable . . . to require the 
corporation to defend the particular suit which is brought there,” (2) 
the interest of the forum state in adjudicating the dispute, (3) “the 
plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief,” (4) the 
interest of the entire interstate judicial system in the most efficient 
resolution of controversies, and (5) the interest of States in “furthering 
fundamental substantive social policies.”61 
World Wide Volkswagen involved New York residents who were 
injured when their car, purchased in New York, exploded in 
Oklahoma.62 The plaintiffs brought suit against the vehicle’s regional 
distributor, World-Wide Volkswagen, and its retail dealer, Seaway, inter 
alia.63 Seaway only sold cars in Massena, New York, and World-Wide’s 
market only extended to New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut.64 
In determining the defendants could not be brought into court 
in Oklahoma, the Court founded its reasoning in fairness.65 It did so 
through a two-prong approach based in the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.66 
                                                 
59   See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297-98; See also Gray v. American 
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 441 (1961) (that stream of 
commerce was originally espoused in this case). 
60   See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292. 
61   Id. 
62   Id. at 288. 
63   See id. (The plaintiffs argued that it was foreseeable that cars sold by 
World-Wide and Seaway would travel to Oklahoma. From this the plaintiffs asserted 
World-Wide and Seaway had minimum contacts necessary to attain personal 
jurisdiction). 
64   See id. at 298. 
65   See World-Wide Volkswagen, 44 U.S. at 294. 
66   See id. at 292, 297-99; see also Andrews, supra note 20, at 1010-11. 
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Professor Carol Andrews67 explains that the first prong ensures 
protection to foreign defendants by limiting the ability of states to 
exceed their jurisdiction as “coequal sovereigns in a federal system.”68 
This is evident when Justice White writes, “[we] stress[] that the Due 
Process clause ensures not only fairness, but also the ‘orderly 
administration of the laws.’”69 
The second prong protects the defendant from litigating in an 
inconvenient forum by examining facts within the five factors listed by 
the court.70 In applying the second prong, Justice White notes that 
fairness under the Due Process Clause does not turn on a defendant’s 
ability to foresee that its product may end up in a specific forum.71 
Rather, a defendant’s “conduct and connection with the forum state” 
must be “such that . . . [through its] purposeful[] avail[ment] . . . it has 
clear notice that it is subject to suit there, and can act to alleviate the 
risk of burdensome litigation.”72 
Professor Wendy Perdue73 has argued that the World Wide 
Volkswagen Court’s interpretation of the Due Process Clause shifted 
the Clause away from a procedural jurisdiction safeguard to a 
substantive “defendant-focused approach.”74 This criticism certainly 
carries some merit, as Justice White writes that even when fairness is 
not lacking, the Due Process Clause may “divest the State of its power 
to render a valid judgment.”75 Regardless of Professor Perdue’s, and 
other scholars’, critical view of the Court’s reasoning in World Wide 
Volkswagen, gaining in personam jurisdiction over a foreign defendant 
                                                 
67   Douglas Arant Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of 
Law. 
68   See Andrews, supra note 20, at 1010 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 44 
U.S. at 292). 
69   World-Wide Volkswagen, 44 U.S. at 293-94 (quoting Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. 
at 319). 
70   See Andrews, supra note 20, at 1010-11. 
71   See World-Wide Volkswagen, 44 U.S. at 297. 
72   Id. 
73 Dean, University of Richmond School of Law. 
74   See Perdue, supra note 25, at 733-34 (commenting that the Court 
incorrectly restates the holding from Pennoyer v. Neff allowing it to shift the Due 
Process Clause from a mechanism for a procedural challenge of jurisdiction to a 
substantive standard by which to assess a jurisdictional challenge). 
75   World-Wide Volkswagen, 44 U.S. at 294. 
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requires a fairness examination under the Due Process Clause.76 
However, prior to the fairness examination, the defendant had to 
purposefully avail himself to that jurisdiction by introducing his 
product into that jurisdiction’s stream of commerce; the mere 
possibility of the product entering the foreign jurisdiction was not 
enough.77 
Later cases have followed the fairness standard established in 
World-Wide Volkswagen.78 In Keeton v. Hustler Magazine Inc., the plaintiff 
sought jurisdiction in New Hampshire to bring suit against Hustler 
Magazine.79 In holding that New Hampshire had jurisdiction to hear 
the plaintiff’s claim, the Supreme Court reasoned Hustler Magazine 
had sufficient minimum contacts in New Hampshire80 such that it was 
fair to compel the magazine to face suit in New Hampshire.81 Beyond 
the extent of Hustler’s sales in New Hampshire, the Court based its 
reasoning of fairness on the second World Wide Volkswagen factor, 
stating that New Hampshire had a strong interest in holding Hustler 
accountable for libel committed within its jurisdiction.82 This interest 
is created because Hustler’s libel of Keeton harms both Keeton and 
New Hampshire’s own citizens who read Hustler’s publication.83 
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz84 made a very subtle but important 
change to the original two-prong standard established in World-Wide 
                                                 
76   See id. at 294-95. 
77   See id. at 297-98. 
78   See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984); see also Asahi 
Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102 (1987); see also Burger King 
Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985). 
79   Plaintiff Keeton assisted in the production of Hustler Magazine. Her 
name appears in several places on the magazines. Hustler sold approximately 10,000-
15,000 copies of Hustler Magazine in New Hampshire. Plaintiff sued Hustler, 
claiming Hustler libeled her in five separate issues of its magazine. Keeton brought 
suit in New Hampshire, claiming New Hampshire could exert personal jurisdiction 
over Hustler. Neither plaintiff nor defendant was a resident of New Hampshire. 
Keeton, 465 U.S. at 772. 
80   See id. (Hustler sold approximately 10,000 to 15,000 copies of its 
magazines each month in New Hampshire.). 
81   Id. at 781. 
82   See Keeton, 465 U.S. at 775-76. 
83   See id. 
84   Defendants Rudzewicz and MacShara entered into a franchising 
agreement with Burger King Corp. Burger King was headquartered in Miami, 
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Volkswagen.85 Above the surface, the Court’s holding was quite simple 
and aligned with its predecessors.86 According to the Court, the 
contract between Rudzewicz and Burger King created a “continuing 
obligation” between himself and Burger King, a resident of Florida, 
thereby availing himself of the “privilege of conducting business 
there . . . [and being] shielded by [Florida’s] laws.”87 Thus, it was 
foreseeable that he may be brought into court in Florida.88 
Below the surface, however, Justice Brennan attempted to shift 
the Court away from a strong defendant-centered minimum contacts 
test by redefining the burden of proof required to defeat personal 
jurisdiction.89 Brennan made clear that, once the plaintiff has proven 
the existence of a contact, the defendant has what Professor Richard 
Freer90 calls a “strikingly onerous burden.”91 That burden requires the 
defendant to present a “compelling case” showing jurisdiction to be 
“so gravely difficult and inconvenient [he] . . . is at a severe 
disadvantage in comparison to his opponent.”92 As a result of the 
increased burden on the defendant, much of the Court’s discussion in 
subsequent cases has focused on the contacts of a defendant with a 
forum more than the fairness of hailing a defendant into a particular 
forum.93 
                                                 
Florida, but had a regional office in Michigan. The franchising agreement required 
payments over a twenty-year period, which would total more than one million 
dollars. Defendants fell behind on payments to Burger King and subsequently 
entered into negotiations with Burger King’s Michigan and Florida offices to settle 
payment issues. After negotiations broke down, Burger King filed suit in Florida. 
Burger King, 471 U.S. at 464-68. 
85   See Richard D. Freer, Personal Jurisdiction in the Twenty-First Century: The 
Ironic Legacy of Justice Brennan, 63 S.C. L. REV. 551, 570-72 (2012). 
86   See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 462 (a Michigan defendant had contracted 
with a Florida corporation, which, according to the court, fairly availed him to 
Florida’s jurisdiction since the contract had an abundance of requirements, all having 
a connection with Florida). 
87   Id. at 476. 
88   Id. at 474. 
89   See Freer, supra note 85, at 571-72. 
90 Robert Howell Hall Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law. 
91   Id. at 572. 
92   Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477-78 (quoting Bremen v. Zapata-Off Shore 
Co., 407 U.S. 1, 18 (1972)). 
93   See Freer, supra note 85, at 574-76, 581, 589. 
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Interestingly, despite the increased burden of proof on the 
defendant, two years later, in Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of 
Cal.,94 the Court used the fairness standard to find that Asahi could not 
be brought into court in California.95 Justice O’Connor and three other 
justices determined that, in addition to jurisdiction being unfair, 
California lacked sufficient contacts with Asahi.96 The Court reasoned 
that “[t]he ‘substantial connection’ between the defendant and the 
forum State necessary for a finding of minimum contacts must come 
about by an action of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum 
State.”97 Simple awareness by a defendant that its product will be swept 
into a particular forum through a stream of commerce does not 
amount to purposefully directing its product toward that state by 
placing the product within such stream.98 
Post-Asahi, to gain specific personal jurisdiction over a 
defendant, a forum must survive a two-prong approach.99 First, it must 
prove minimum contacts between the defendant and the forum.100 In 
the case of a corporation the Court will look to whether or not the 
defendant purposefully placed its product in the stream of 
commerce.101 Second, it must prove that it is fair to hail the defendant 
into the forum.102 With the post-Burger King increased burden of proof 
upon the defendant to rebut jurisdiction by arguing the forum is unfair, 
                                                 
94   Plaintiff was a California citizen whose wife died in a motorcycle crash 
after one of the tires blew out. Plaintiff brought suit against Cheng Shin Rubber 
Industrial Co., Ltd. Cheng Shin sought indemnification from Asahi Metal Indus. Co. 
Cheng Shin bought parts from Asahi and incorporated those parts in tires it sold. 
Cheng Shin did approximately twenty percent of its business in the United States. 
Asahi has no offices, property, or agents in California. Its offices were located in 
Japan. Asahi, 480 U.S. 102. 
95   See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 114; see also Burger King, 471 U.S. at 576 (Asahi is 
the only case in which fairness was used to reject jurisdiction). 
96   Freer, supra note 85, at 574-75. 
97   Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112. 
98   Id. 
99   See Freer, supra note 85, at 552-53; see also Andrews, supra note 20, at 
1010-11. 
100   See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. 310.  
101   See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297-98. 
102   See id. 
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defendants’ best chance of overcoming jurisdiction is proving a lack of 
contacts, and the case law has reflected this shift towards contacts.103 
b.  Goodyear v. Brown: A look at general jurisdiction. – As 
discussed earlier, Chief Justice Stone in International Shoe classified 
two categories of cases: those in which the alleged acts are tied directly 
to the contacts of the defendant and those in which the alleged acts are 
not tied to the contacts of the defendant.104 Professor Carol Andrews 
has termed cases: in which the alleged acts are tied directly to the 
defendant’s “continuous and systematic” contacts as “easy yes” cases; 
in which the defendant had “isolated” contacts with the forum or the 
alleged acts are not tied to those contacts as “easy no” cases; in which 
the defendant’s contacts were extensive but the alleged acts were 
unrelated or instances where the defendant’s contacts were “isolated” 
but the alleged act was tied to those contacts as “maybe” cases.105 
Andrews further notes that the “easy yes” cases and the 
“maybe” cases involving isolated but related contacts have been 
termed by the court as specific jurisdiction.106 Those cases were 
discussed above. This subsection seeks to inform the reader as to the 
Court’s position on the “easy no” and continuous but unrelated 
contacts cases, now termed general personal jurisdiction.107 
The most recent case involving general personal jurisdiction is 
Goodyear Dunlop Tire Operations v. Brown.108 The defendant contested 
jurisdiction in North Carolina as improper.109 The defendants had no 
connections to North Carolina outside of their parent company and a 
small fraction of tires they sold in North Carolina, typically custom 
ordered for specific vehicles.110 According to the Court, the “paradigm 
forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction . . . for a corporation 
                                                 
103   See Freer, supra note 85, at 589. 
104   See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317-18; see also Hoffheimer, supra note 13. 
105   See Andrews, supra note 20, at 1008-09. 
106   Id. at 1009. 
107   See id. at 1009-10. 
108   Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2848 (subsidiaries of Goodyear U.S.A. were 
sued by the parents of children killed when a bus, using tires manufactured by the 
subsidiaries, rolled over near Paris, France). 
109   Id. at 2852. 
110   Id. 
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[is] . . . one in which [it] is fairly regarded as at home.”111 Hoffheimer 
states that the Court understands “at home” as relating to the 
defendant’s state of incorporation, its principal place of business, and 
potentially anywhere in which it has “substantial, continuous, and 
systematic activity.”112 Using the paradigmatic forum analysis, the 
Court determined that the defendant subsidiaries’ connections to 
North Carolina “fall far short of the ‘continuous and systematic general 
business contacts’ necessary” for jurisdiction over them on claims 
“unrelated to anything that connects them to the State.”113 
In reaching its conclusion, the Court contrasted the prior case 
of Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co.114 Perkins involved a Philippine 
mining company which ceased its operations to Ohio during World 
War II.115 The company’s president maintained an office in Ohio and 
supervised its mining activities from the Ohio office.116 The Court in 
Perkins found that, because Ohio was the principal place of business, 
even temporarily, general jurisdiction was proper in Ohio.117 
The Court also compared another prior case, Helicopteros 
Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall,118 in which general jurisdiction in 
Texas was found improper when a Colombian helicopter operation 
company was sued in a wrongful death suit.119 The defendant’s only 
ties to Texas were: acceptance of checks drawn on a Houston bank 
account; helicopters, equipment, and training services purchased from 
a Texas corporation; and personnel training in Texas.120 The Helicopteros 
Court concluded “‘mere purchases [made in the forum State], even if 
occurring at regular intervals, are not enough [for general] jurisdiction 
                                                 
111   Id. at 2853-54. 
112   See Hoffheimer, supra note 13, at 551. 
113   Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2857 (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de 
Colombia S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416 (1984)). 
114   See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952). 
115   Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2856.  
116   Perkins, 342 U.S. at 447-48. 
117   See Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2856; see also Perkins, 342 U.S. 437. 
118   Helicopteros, 466 U.S. 408. 
119   See id. at 415-16. 
120   See Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2856 (quoting Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 416). 
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over a non-resident corporation” when the purchase transactions are 
not related to the cause of action.121 
The Goodyear Court leaned towards the reasoning of 
Helicopteros, indicating that the only way in which systematic activity 
within a forum will allow for general jurisdiction is if such activity takes 
place at extremely high volumes.122 
After Goodyear, the state of general jurisdiction is not fully 
known.123 It appears that the Court stripped general jurisdiction down 
to the point that it is only applicable in cases in which the corporation 
is, literally, “at home” in the forum.124 
Thus, to obtain jurisdiction over an ex juris defendant in the 
United States, a forum must be able to obtain either specific 
jurisdiction, which is focused on minimum contacts and fairness, or 
general jurisdiction, which is focused on whether the defendant is “at 
home.” The Goodyear court informed us that, since International Shoe, 
the Supreme Court has focused primarily on cases involving specific 
personal jurisdiction.125 Nevertheless, general jurisdiction still exists as 
an option for plaintiffs who cannot obtain specific jurisdiction over a 
defendant. 
Having surveyed the development of American jurisprudence 
on personal jurisdiction over ex juris defendants, we must proceed to 
survey such jurisprudence in Canada. 
B.         Personal Jurisdiction Over Ex Juris Defendants in Canada 
Modern day personal jurisdiction in Canada is rooted in the 
English House of Lords, which developed a “real and substantial 
                                                 
121   See id. at 2856 (quoting Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 418). 
122   See Hoffheimer, supra note 13, at 592; but see Freer, supra note 85, at 
587-88 (arguing that even high levels of sales activity is unlikely to justify general 
personal jurisdiction). 
123   See Hoffheimer, supra note 13, at 551. 
124   See Hoffheimer, supra note 13, at 551; see also Freer, supra note 85, at 
585. 
125   See Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2854. 
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connection” test.126 After Indyka, the real and substantial connection 
test was employed three more times before, in 1990, becoming 
“enshrined as a central jurisdictional principle” in Morguard Investments 
Ltd. v. De Savoye.127 
In 1993, Hunt v. T&N PLC. made clear that the principles 
enunciated in Morguard were constitutionally founded.128 Over the next 
nineteen years, the Supreme Court of Canada defined what a “real and 
substantial” connection was, culminating its efforts in its 2012 decision 
of Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda.129 This section will summarily track 
the Supreme Court of Canada’s development of the real and 
substantial connection test from its roots in Indyka to its current state 
following Van Breda. 
1.  Early Development of the “Real and Substantial Connection” 
Doctrine. — The real and substantial connection doctrine originated in 
the English case Indyka v. Indyka.130 Prior to Indyka, an English woman’s 
ability to obtain a divorce was dependent upon a set of particular 
rules.131 With the introduction of the real and substantial connection 
test, the previous rules were replaced by a general principle revolving 
around the strength of a person’s connection with a particular 
forum.132 The Supreme Court of Canada expanded the use of the real 
and substantial connection test, in Moran v. Pyle National (Canada) Ltd., 
to torts.133 
In Moran, the Supreme Court of Canada held it reasonable to 
find a real and substantial connection with a forum, thereby allowing 
that forum to have jurisdiction, if a defendant could reasonably foresee 
that its product would cause injury and be used and consumed in the 
                                                 
126   Joost Blom, Q.C. & Elizabeth Edinger, Conflicts of Law: The Chimera of 
the Real and Substantial Connection Test, 38 U.B.C L. REV. 373, 374-76 (2005)(stating that 
the English case Indyka v. Indyka established a more uniform system of divorce). 
127   Id. at 377-78. 
128   Id. at 378, 385. 
129   See generally, Blom, supra note 126; Peter J. Pliszka, My Place or Yours? 
SCC Sets New and Improved Test for Jurisdiction in Canada, 80 DEF. COUNS. J. 273 (2013). 
130   See Blom, supra note 126, at 375. 
131   Id. at 375-76. 
132   Id. at 376. 
133   See Moran v. Pyle National (Can.) Ltd., [1975] 1 S.C.R. 393, 408-09; see 
also Blom, supra note 126, at 377. 
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foreign jurisdiction.134 The Court’s decision resembled its American 
counterpart’s stream of commerce inquiry.135 Like the Court in World-
Wide Volkswagen, the Moran Court would require a strong enough 
relationship between the defendant and the forum to make it fair to 
require the defendant to litigate in the foreign forum.136 
The Moran holding further compares with the American tort 
case of Calder v. Jones.137 The United States Supreme Court held in Calder 
that California could assert jurisdiction over two Florida journalists, 
with essentially no contacts to California, because they wrote a libelous 
story about a California citizen with the knowledge and expectation 
that it would be widely circulated in California.138 In both cases, the 
American and Canadian Supreme Courts showed they were willing to 
extend a stream of commerce-like analysis to tort cases. 
Almost two decades after Moran, the Supreme Court of Canada 
once again relied on the real and substantial connection test.139 In 
Morguard v. De Savoye, the Supreme Court of Canada addressed the issue 
of whether a judgment in one province could be recognized by 
another.140 In determining that the Alberta judgment should be 
recognized in British Columbia, La Forest J. focused on balancing 
order and fairness.141 Order, La Forest J. opined, dictates that a foreign 
provinces’ judgment should be recognized across Canada for reasons 
                                                 
134   Moran, [1975] 1 S.C.R. (Can.) at 409. 
135   See Asahi, 480 U.S. 102; World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); 
see also Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984). 
136   See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292; Moran, [1975] 1 S.C.R. at 
(Can.) 409. 
137   Calder, 465 U.S. 783. 
138   Id. at 789-90. 
139   Morguard Inv. Ltd. v. De Savoye, [1990] 3 S.C.R. (Can.) 1077; Blom, 
supra note 23, at 378; Monestier, supra note 6, at 180-81. 
140   Morguard, [1990] 3 S.C.R. (Can.) at 1082. The Ontario Court of Appeal 
subsequently explained that, though Morguard explained the real and substantial 
connection test “from the perspective of recognition and enforcement, La Forest J. 
made it clear that precisely the same real and substantial connection test applies to 
the assumption of jurisdiction against an out-of-province defendant.” Muscutt v. 
Courcelles, [2002] CanLII 44957, para. 38 (ON CA). 
141   Morguard, [1990] 3 S.C.R. at 1102-03; see also Blom, supra note 126, at 
381. 
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of comity.142 La Forest J. compared this idea to the United States’ full 
faith and credit clause.143 
Fairness, La Forest J. determined, was more important than 
order.144 While order provided ample reasoning to support judgment 
recognition across Canada, fairness was a necessity.145 La Forest J. 
described fairness as the relationship between the jurisdiction’s 
contacts and the defendant or subject matter of the suit.146 
Accordingly, the Morguard court acknowledges three grounds upon 
which a court can claim jurisdiction over a defendant: 1) the defendant 
is served in personam; 2) the defendant consents to jurisdiction through 
agreement or attornment;147 and 3) there is a real and substantial 
connection between the defendant or cause of action and the forum.148 
Though Morguard focused on the recognition of interprovincial 
judgments, La Forest J. provides undertones throughout his opinion 
which seem to relate the expressed principles to the realm of private 
international law.149 
                                                 
142   See Morguard, [1990] 3 S.C.R. (Can.) at 1096-97. 
143   See id. at 1100, 1102. 
144   See id. at 1102-03; see also Blom, supra note 126, at 381 (arguing the 
Morguard decision sacrificed order for fairness). 
145   See Morguard, [1990] 3 S.C.R. at 1103. 
146   Id. 
147   “Attornment occurs when a defendant, by his or her conduct consents 
or submits to a jurisdiction . . . without reserving its right to challenge the claimant’s 
chosen jurisdiction at a later time.” Melissa Kehrer & John A. Olah, Trips, Traps and 
Jurisdiction Part 2, CLAIMS CAN. (Feb. 2008), 
http://www.claimscanada.ca/issues/article.aspx?aid= 1000219849&er=NA; see also 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 147 (9th ed. 2009). 
148   Morguard, [1990] 3 S.C.R. at 1103-04. For a hypothetical example of all 
three grounds, see also Stephen C. Nadler, Navigating the Litigation Landscape in Canada: 
Securing Evidence and Enforcing Judgments, BUS. LAW TODAY, Jan./Feb. 2008, at 42; Cf. 
Monestier, supra note 6, at n. 2 (noting Beals v. Saldanha, 2003 SCC 72, places the most 
importance on whether there is a real and substantial connection, while other indicia 
(presence and consent) bolster the real and substantial connection). 
149   See Morguard, [1990] 3 S.C.R. at 1095 (“Modern states, however, cannot 
live in splendid isolation and do give effect to judgments given in other countries in 
certain circumstances”); id. at 1097 (“what must underlie a modern system of private 
international law are principles of order and fairness, principles that ensure security 
of transactions with justice”); id. at 1098 (noting that the United States and European 
countries have created more generous rules for recognition and enforcement of 
foreign judgments). 
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Shortly after Morguard, the Supreme Court of Canada, in Hunt 
v. T & N plc.,150 reiterated the importance of order and fairness but 
chose not to further define the scope and application of the real and 
substantial connection test.151 La Forest J. wrote that the real and 
substantial connection test was a flexible test which simply “captured 
the idea that there must be some limits on claims to jurisdiction.”152 
The Hunt opinion details some prior applications of the real and 
substantial connection test, concluding that “no test can perhaps ever 
be rigidly applied . . . [and] the assumption of . . . jurisdiction must 
ultimately be guided by the requirements of order and fairness, not a 
mechanical counting of contacts or connections.”153 
The plaintiff in Hunt, a resident of British Columbia, alleged he 
was injured due to the tortious behavior of the defendants domiciled 
in Quebec.154 The plaintiff brought action in British Columbia and 
sought production of various documents.155 The defendants refused to 
produce the documents on the ground that they were not required to 
do so because they were protected by the Quebec Business Concerns 
Records Act.156 On the basis of Morguard, the Supreme Court of Canada 
held that the Quebec Act was not applicable to the proceedings in 
British Columbia.157 
The Hunt decision elevated the Morguard principles to 
constitutional status, indicating that they cannot be overridden by 
provincial courts.158 The Court determined that the idea of Canadian 
                                                 
150   Hunt v. T & N plc., [1993] 4 S.C.R. 289. 
151   Blom, supra note 126, at 385. 
152   Hunt, [1993] 4 S.C.R. at 325. 
153   Id. at 326; cf. Calder, 465 U.S. 783 (focusing on the fairness of California 
exercising jurisdiction despite a lack of contacts); World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 
293-94 (stressing that the Due Process Clause ensures fairness and the orderly 
administration of the laws); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250 (1958) (describing 
the evolution of American in personam jurisdiction from the rigid Pennoyer v. Neff to 
the more flexible Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington). 
154   Hunt, [1993] 4 S.C.R. at 297. 
155   Id. at 298. 
156   Id. at 298; see generally Robert Wisner, Uniformity, Diversity, and Provincial 
Extraterritorality: Hunt v. T & N plc., 40 MCGILL L.J. 759, 762 (1995) (explaining the 
Quebec Business Concerns Records Act is a blocking statute, prohibiting the removal of 
business documents from the province for the purpose of litigation). 
157   See Hunt [1993] 4 S.C.R. at 331-32. 
158   See id. at 324; see also Blom, supra note 126, at 385. 
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provinces giving full faith and credit to the judgments of other 
provinces was a “constitutional imperative[],” and while provinces may 
enact legislation regarding the recognition of judgments of other 
provinces, Morguard established a minimum threshold for order and 
fairness which the provinces must respect.159 
The international undertones of Morguard and its emphasis on 
the importance of order and fairness, subsequently echoed in Hunt, 
were expressed together in McNichol Estate v. Woldnik.160 McNichol Estate 
involved a Florida chiropractor, Dr. Puentes, being sued in Ontario 
following the death of Louis McNichol, an Ontario resident who died 
in Florida.161 Dr. Puentes was the only non-resident of Ontario named 
in the lawsuit.162 Dr. Puentes argued to have the real and substantial 
connection test applied to him separately from the other defendants. 
The Ontario Court of Appeal refused to do so.163 
Rationalizing why it chose not to apply the real and substantial 
test to Dr. Puentes separately, the Court argued to do so “would be a 
step backwards . . . away from the recognition of the increasingly 
complex and interdependent nature of the modern world community 
which lies at the heart of [Morguard’s and Hunt’s] reasoning.”164 Further, 
the Court wrote, “it would mute the influence of the underlying 
requirements of order and fairness.”165 The decision of the Court 
emphasizes that the order and fairness dictated by the real and 
substantial connection test extends beyond inter-provincial disputes to 
foreign disputes. 
2.  What is a real and substantial connection?: The modern real and 
substantial connection doctrine.- While the Canadian Supreme Court chose 
not to expand upon the real and substantial connection test in Hunt, 
the Ontario Court of Appeal did do so in Muscutt v. Courcelles.166 The 
                                                 
159   Hunt [1993] 4 S.C.R. at 324. 
160   McNichol v. Woldnik, [2001] CanLII 5679 (ON CA). 
161   Id. at para. 1. 
162   Id. 
163   Id. at para. 12-15. 
164   McNichol, 2001 CanLII at para. 12. 
165   Id. 
166   See Muscutt,(2002) CanLII. 44957. The Canadian Court system is 
similar to that of the United States. Provincial trial courts appeal to provincial courts 
of appeal, which appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada. Thus, just as American 
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Ontario court listed eight factors to consider when determining 
whether a forum can ascertain jurisdiction over a foreign defendant: 
the connection between the forum and the plaintiff’s claim; the 
connection between the forum and the defendant; unfairness to the 
defendant in assuming jurisdiction; unfairness to the plaintiff in not 
assuming jurisdiction; the involvement of other parties to the suit; the 
court’s willingness to recognize and enforce an extra-provincial 
judgment rendered on the same jurisdictional basis; whether the case 
is inter-provincial or international in nature; and comity and the 
standards of jurisdiction, recognition, and enforcement prevailing 
elsewhere.167 
Legal Scholar Tonya Monestier notes that the Supreme Court 
of Canada never explicitly endorsed the Muscutt factors.168 The Ontario 
Court of Appeal, following the rationale of the Supreme Court of 
Canada’s opinion in Morguard, believed that fairness to both parties was 
important, and that the eight factors provided for fairness as well as 
flexibility, as Morguard discussed.169 This led to the biggest criticism of 
the Muscutt factors: only the first two factors actually dealt with a 
connection of any sort between the forum and the claim or 
defendant.170 Despite this criticism from scholars, the Muscutt factors 
were considered influential in other provinces.171 
The eight factors were challenged in Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van 
Breda.172 The Canadian Supreme Court found it necessary to more 
clearly articulate factors defining what a real and substantial connection 
                                                 
appellate courts can act in the absence of action by the Supreme Court, so can 
provincial appellate courts in Canada.  
167   Muscutt, (2002) CanLII 44957 (Can.) at para. 75-104. 
168   Monestier, supra note 6, at 183. 
169   See Muscutt, (2002) CanLII 44957 at para. 72, 86-88; see also Monestier, 
supra note 6, at 193-94. 
170   See Monestier, supra note 6, at 184 (“[The final six factors] are not 
strictly concerned with the connection of the forum to the parties and the cause of 
action.”) (quoting Bastarache J., in Castillo v. Castillo, 2005 SCC 83, para. 45)); Stephen 
G.A. Pitel, Reformulating a Real and Substantial Connection, 60 U.N.B.L.J. 177, 182 (2010); 
see also Blom, supra note 123, at 394 (“Only the first two of the eight factors are strictly 
factual in nature”). 
171   Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda, 2012 SCC 17, (Can.) para. 48-51 
available at http://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/8004/index.do. 
172   See Van Breda, 2012 SCC 17 (Can.). 
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is, in line with current trends in Canadian jurisprudence.173 The Van 
Breda Court acknowledged that this was the direction the Ontario 
Court of Appeal was heading in, but that the list of connecting factors 
should not include factors based on fairness, efficiency, and comity.174 
As a result, the Canadian Supreme Court replaced the list of 
eight factors in Muscutt with four factors of its own: the defendant was 
domiciled in the province; the defendant carries on business in the 
province175; the tort was committed in the province; and a contract 
connected with the dispute was created in the province.176 In creating 
these four connecting factors, the Court rejected the fairness and injury 
factors from Muscutt on the grounds that they are too attenuated and 
should not be separated from the factual factors announced in Van 
Breda.177 
Of particular interest to this comment is the Van Breda court’s 
removal of the Muscutt factor considering whether an action is inter-
provincial or international in nature. The Court determined that issues 
relating to foreign law may remain helpful in determining 
jurisdiction.178 However, it cautioned that focusing on juridical 
disadvantages in jurisdictional analysis is not “consonant with the 
principle of comity which should govern legal relationships between 
modern democratic states.”179 
The four connecting factors create a rebuttable presumption 
for the defendant, but do not create a rebuttable presumption in favor 
of the plaintiff.180 Thus, the Van Breda Court moved from what it saw 
as an over-inclusive, unpredictable list of factors, to a more fact-based, 
                                                 
173   See id., 2012 SCC 17 (Can.) at para. 75-79 (indicating that the CJPTA 
and other sources of jurisprudence need to be aligned with a set of rebuttable 
presumptive factors). 
174   Id. ¶¶ 74, 79, 82, 84. 
175   See id. ¶ 87 (recognizing that though carrying on business in the 
province may be a presumptive factor in favor of jurisdiction, there are some 
business activities such as advertising and web site access in the jurisdiction which 
cannot give rise to a presumption of jurisdiction). 
176   Id. ¶ 90(d). 
177   Id. ¶¶ 84-89. 
178   Van Breda, 2012 SCC 17 (Can.) at para. 63. 
179   Id. 
180   See id. ¶¶ 92-93; see also Pliszka, supra note 129, at 277. 
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clear set of factors for determining whether a real and substantial 
connection exists.181 As an example of this rebuttable presumption, the 
Court posed the hypothetical situation in which the factor at issue is 
that a defendant carries on business in the forum.182 According to the 
court, a possible rebuttal to this presumption is that the subject matter 
of the suit is unrelated to the defendant’s business activities in the 
forum, similar to one of the categories of cases identified in International 
Shoe.183 
Van Breda involved a couple who contracted in Ontario with 
Club Resorts Ltd. for sport services at a club in Cuba, managed by 
Club Resorts.184 Shortly after the trip began, Ms. Van Breda was 
catastrophically injured on the beach when a metal contraption 
collapsed on her.185 Upon return from Cuba, Ms. Van Breda and Mr. 
Berg moved to Calgary and British Columbia, but never returned to 
Ontario.186 
Relying on the four presumptive factors created by the 
Canadian Supreme Court, the Court held that the Ontario court could 
exercise jurisdiction.187 The Court reasoned that because the contract 
for services was created in Ontario, the Ontario court properly claimed 
jurisdiction.188 According to the court the injury resulted from the 
obligations created by the contractual relationship which began in 
Ontario.189 
                                                 
181   See Pliszka, supra note 129, at 4. 
182   Van Breda, [2012] SCC 17, (Can.) at para. 96. 
183   Id.; cf. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318 (continuous and systematic contacts 
may not be enough to support jurisdiction). 
184   Van Breda, [2012] SCC 17, (Can.) at para. 2-3 (The contract created an 
obligation for Mr. Berg to teach two hours of tennis per day at the resort in return 
for room and board at the resort for himself and Ms. Van Breda).  
185   Id. ¶ 4. 
186   Id. 
187   Van Breda, [2012] SCC 17 (Can.) at para. 118. 
188   Id. ¶ 117. The court determined that Club Resorts’ advertising in 
Ontario was not sufficient to establish jurisdiction because advertising is often 
international or global, and allowing advertising to confer jurisdiction would subject 
large commercial organizations to jurisdiction almost anywhere in the world, id. ¶ 
114. 
189   Id. ¶ 117. 
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Despite the shift in Van Breda to a more delineated set of 
factors, Monestier believes that the court too quickly discounted 
“fairness” to achieve “order.”190 While Monestier acknowledges that 
the Canadian Supreme Court moved in the correct direction with its 
decision in Van Breda, she believes the Court moved to a system which 
is too rigid.191 While this is a fair criticism of the Van Breda decision, 
the general consensus is that the change was a much needed one, as 
Ms. Monestier herself acknowledges.192 The shift by the Canadian 
Supreme Court in Van Breda recognizes the Court’s desire to dissipate 
the attempt to balance “fairness” and “order” in favor of order.193 
II.         ANALYSIS 
As Ms. Monestier points out, the change in tide made by the 
Supreme Court of Canada in Van Breda ushers in a new understanding 
and era of ex juris jurisdiction in Canada.194 Because of the new 
direction of Canadian ex juris jurisdiction, the Canadian Supreme Court 
has more closely aligned ex juris jurisdiction in Canada with that of the 
United States. As a result, the United States and Canada will be able to 
increase comity with one another resulting in greater cooperation in 
transnational cases. Further, greater cooperation between the two 
nations may further smooth the path for increasing economic ties with 
one another. 
A.         A Fading Border: Closing the Gap Between Canadian 
Jurisdiction and American Jurisdiction 
Professor Black acknowledges that recognition of foreign 
judgments is more likely when the two countries involved have similar 
                                                 
190   Monestier, supra note 6, at 398. 
191   Id. at 412. 
192   Id. at 410-11; see also Pliszka, supra note 129. 
193   See Monestier, supra note 6, at 410; compare Van Breda, [2012] SCC 17 
(Can.) at para. 99 (stating that a court is not required to hear only the tort which 
could be connected with the jurisdiction when there are multiple torts at issue), with 
McNichol, (2001) CanLII 5679 at para. 12 (“I do not agree that where an action has 
some claims with an extra-territorial dimension, and others which have none, the 
former must be tested in isolation”). 
194   See Monestier, supra note 6, at 410-11. 
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or identical standards for personal jurisdiction.195 As the new tide in 
Canadian ex juris jurisdiction commences, the Van Breda factors appear 
to align the new Canadian jurisdiction closer to that of the United 
States.196 
1.  Van Breda Factors One and Two: A Defendant-Centric Approach. 
– The first Van Breda factor, whether or not the defendant was 
domiciled in the province, aligns itself well with the minimum contacts 
doctrine provided in International Shoe.197 At the base of Justice Stone’s 
approach in International Shoe is the previous notion of personal 
jurisdiction dating back to Pennoyer, a defendant domiciled in a state is 
subject to personal jurisdiction.198 This a very defendant-centric 
approach. 
The first Van Breda factor has brought personal jurisdiction in 
Canada to a clear, defendant-centric approach as well.199 The court 
stated that a plaintiff’s presence in a jurisdiction is not sufficient to 
create a relationship between the jurisdiction and the subject matter, 
but that a defendant may always be sued in a jurisdiction in which he 
resides.200 This language has the same basic notion as that in Pennoyer, 
the defendant’s domicile is the important consideration.201 Further, by 
looking at Keeton, the United States Supreme Court’s relative disinterest 
in the domicile of the plaintiff is just as clear as that of the Canadian 
Supreme Court.202 
                                                 
195   See Vaughan Black, A Canada-United States Full Faith and Credit Clause?, 
18 SW. J. INT’L L. 595, 606-10 (2011).  
196   See Burger King, 471 U.S. 462; Keeton, 465 U.S. 770; World-Wide 
Volkswagen, 444 U.S. 286; Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. 310; Hess, 274 U.S. 352; Gray, 22 Ill. 2d 
432; Van Breda, [2012] SCC 17 (Can.). 
197   See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316; Van Breda, [2012] SCC 17 (Can.) at para. 
86. 
198   See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316; see also Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 720. 
199   See Van Breda, [2012] SCC 17 {Can.) at para. 86; see also Pliszka, supra 
note 129, at 5-6. 
200   See Van Breda, [2012] SCC 17 (Can.) at para. 86. 
201   See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 720. 
202   Compare Keeton, 465 U.S. at 780 (stating that a plaintiff’s “lack of 
residence will not defeat jurisdiction established on the basis of defendant’s 
contacts”), with Van Breda, [2012] SCC 17 at para. 86 (stating that a plaintiff’s 
presence in a jurisdiction “will not create a presumptive relationship between the 
forum and either the subject matter of the litigation or the defendant”). 
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Van Breda’s second factor, whether the defendant carries on 
business within the province, is linked to the idea of purposeful 
availment, originating in Gray v. American Radiator,203 but first used by 
the United States Supreme Court in Worldwide Volkswagen.204 Once 
again this factor, like its American counterpart, is defendant-centric.205 
The Canadian Supreme Court determined that the broad 
announcement of a rule relating to the business activities of a 
defendant in a forum was ill-advised.206 The United States Supreme 
Court came to this same conclusion in World-Wide Volkswagen.207 
Additionally, the Canadian Supreme Court’s explanation of 
this factor is similar to general jurisdiction in the United States.208 Part 
of the Canadian Supreme Court’s explanation states one way to satisfy 
this factor is through “maintaining an office [in the jurisdiction].”209 
Such reasoning is precisely what the United States Supreme Court used 
in Perkins v. Benquet Consol. Mining Co. to determine the defendant was 
domiciled in Ohio.210 
While the first two Van Breda factors have aligned U.S. and 
Canadian personal jurisdiction as they relate to the domicile and 
business activities of the defendant, the last two factors revolve around 
the subject matter at dispute in a case. 
2.  Van Breda Factors Three and Four: Subject Matter Focus. - Van 
Breda’s third factor, whether the tort was committed in the province, 
finds an American counterpart in both Pawloski and Keeton.211 This 
                                                 
203   See Gray, 22 Ill. 2d at 441. 
204   See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297-98. 
205   See Pliszka, supra note 129, at 5-6. 
206   See Van Breda, [2012] SCC 17 (Can.) at para. 87. 
207   See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297. 
208   See Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2853-54; see also Hoffheimer, supra note 13, 
at 551. 
209   Van Breda, [2012] SCC 17 (Can.) at para. 87. 
210   See Perkins, 342 U.S. 437. 
211   See Keeton, 465 U.S. 770 (considering the desire of the jurisdiction in 
which the harm was incurred to resolve the case); see also Hess, 274 U.S. 352 (involving 
a car accident in a jurisdiction the defendant did not reside in); Van Breda, [2012] 
SCC 17 (Can.) at para. 88. 
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factor and the fourth factor both focus on the subject matter at 
dispute.212 
While the minimum contacts doctrine focuses on the 
defendant’s locale and actions, it also examines the impact of the tort 
action in the jurisdiction.213 Keeton serves as the best example. The 
Keeton court focused attention on the idea that the state in which the 
tort took place has an interest in remedying the harm done within its 
borders.214 
The Van Breda Court appears to be addressing the same 
concern through this factor. It describes Tolofson v. Jensen215 as the 
common law starting point for serious consideration of the situs of a 
tort as a factor to consider in jurisdictional analysis.216 Tolofson 
determined that in some tort cases, the lex loci delicti must apply to help 
preserve order.217 
Van Breda’s fourth factor, whether a contract connected with 
the dispute was made in the province, finds similarities to Burger King.218 
Both cases place upon their respective jurisdictional standards an 
impetus to consider the creation of a contract sufficient for 
recognizing jurisdiction over the parties.219 In doing such both courts 
concerned themselves with addressing the impact of the subject matter 
at dispute in determining jurisdiction. 
                                                 
212   See Pliszka, supra note 129, at 5-6. 
213   See, e.g., Keeton, 465 U.S. 770. 
214   See id. at 776. 
215   Tolofson v. Jensen; Lucas (Litigation Guardian of) v. Gagnon, [1994] 
3 S.C.R. 1022 available at https://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-
csc/en/item/1209/index.do (then click on PDF document). 
216   See Van Breda, [2012] SCC 17 (Can.) at para. 88. 
217   Tolofson, [1994] 3 S.C.R. at 1058.  
218   See Burger King, 471 U.S. 462; Van Breda, [2012] SCC 17 (Can.) at para. 
88. 
219   See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 480-81; Van Breda, [2012] SCC 17 (Can.) at 
para. 88. 
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B.         Recognition of Foreign Judgments 
Since the decision in Morguard, Canada has been recognizing 
and enforcing United States’ judgments with more consistency.220 
Justice LaForest wrote in Morguard, “[m]odern times [require that] the 
flow of wealth, skills, and people across boundaries be facilitated in a 
fair and orderly manner.”221 Thus, while Morguard is limited to intra-
provincial judgment disputes,222 Canadian courts have expanded its 
mandate to include foreign judgments.223 
The Canadian Supreme Court emphasized in Van Breda that 
jurisdiction and recognition of judgments are intertwined.224 As a 
result, the framework used in determining a court’s jurisdiction can 
have an impact on a court’s recognition of judgments and vise versa.225 
Further, in Muscutt, the Canadian Supreme Court emphasized that one 
aspect of comity includes the consideration of jurisdictional standards 
as well as judgment recognition and enforcement in other countries.226 
Considering this, along with Black’s observation that greater 
international judgment recognition occurs when countries have similar 
personal jurisdiction standards, the opportunity for increased comity 
between the United States and Canada is greater after Van Breda. 
The choice by Canadian courts to expand recognition and 
enforcement to foreign judgments has not been applauded by all of 
Canada, its legal scholars, and even its courts and judges.227 However, 
as Canadian attorney Allison Sears notes, “[i]t seems a fair assumption 
however, that the ease with which the Court embraced the extension 
                                                 
220   See Black, supra note 195, at 612; Ivan F. Ivankovich, Enforcing U.S. 
Judgments in Canada: “Things are Looking Up!”, 15 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 491, 491 (1994-
95). 
221   Morguard, [1990] 3 S.C.R. at 1078 (Can.). 
222   See Ivankovich, supra note 220, at 499. 
223   See Black, supra note 195, at 612. 
224   See Van Breda, [2012] SCC 17 (Can.) at para. 16. 
225   Id. 
226   See Muscutt, [2002] CanLII 44957 at para. 102.  
227   See, e.g., Foreign Judgments Act, R.S.N.B. (2011) c. 162; see also Civil 
Code of Quebec, S.Q., c. 64, arts. 3155-63 (1991); Allison M. Sears, Beals v. Saldanha: 
The International Implications of Morguard Made Clear, 68 SASK. L. REV. 223, 229-30 
(2005) (stating Justice LeBel disagreed with the majority in Beals v. Saldanha, (2003) 
SCC 72, believing that the test should be focused more on fairness to the defendant). 
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of Morguard into the international realm was largely due to the similarity 
between the Canadian and American legal systems.”228 
Even more so than Canada, the United States recognizes and 
enforces Canadian judgments. To this effect, a majority of states have 
adopted statutes similar to the Uniform Foreign Money Judgments 
Recognition Act.229 This act allows for recognition of foreign court 
judgments which are final, conclusive, and enforceable where 
rendered.230 
One of the three requirements for non-recognition is that the 
foreign court lacks personal jurisdiction.231 As a result, though Canada 
and the United States have much in common with one another and, to 
an extent, already recognize and enforce one another’s judgments, 
bringing the two countries’ standards for personal jurisdiction closer 
together will likely decrease the opportunity for this non-recognition 
requirement to materialize. 
Because both countries currently recognize one another’s 
judgments with very little friction, the impact of aligning the two 
standards for personal jurisdiction will not be all that substantial. 
However, though the impact seems minimal, it is an issue which is 
worthy of discussion.232 Four Canadian provinces do not currently 
apply the Morguard standard to American judgments.233 
Further, there is Canadian legislation limiting recognition in 
certain areas, most notably, antitrust and judgments rendered under 
the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996.234 
While the LIBERTAD issue is substantially legislative, further 
aligning personal jurisdiction standards may encourage those 
                                                 
228   Sears, supra note 227, at 242. 
229   Todd J. Burke, Canadian Class Actions and Federal Judgments: Recognition 
of Foreign Class Actions in Canada, BUS. LAW TODAY, Sept./Oct. 2007, at 48. 
230   13 U.L.A. 261 § 1(2) (1986). 
231   Id. § 4(a)(1)-(3). 
232   See Black, supra note 195, at 619. 
233   New Brunswick, Quebec, and British Columbia do not enforce foreign 
judgments, and Saskatchewan will only enforce the damages portion of a judgment, 
but not the punitive portions. See Black, supra note 192, at 613-14. 
234   See Black, supra note 195, at 614. 
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provinces which take issue with enforcing foreign judgments to 
become more cooperative with U.S. courts in recognizing judgments. 
Similarity between the two standards may provide greater assurance 
that the treatment parties in Canada receive is similar to that received 
by parties litigating in the United States.235 
Are there other measures which would be more appropriate? 
Numerous authors have written about the idea of either a bilateral 
treaty or enforcement convention to assist the two countries in their 
recognition of one another’s judgments.236 However, as professor 
Black acknowledges, the chances of the legislatures of either country 
taking the required initiative to enact such a treaty or convention is not 
particularly likely.237 With the floundering likelihood that these 
measures will be taken, bridging the gap between the two countries’ 
personal jurisdiction standards seems to present itself as a more viable 
solution, or at the very least, a holdover until a more definite solution 
can be achieved. 
C.         Van Breda’s Implications for Foreign Class Action Suits 
Moving beyond enforcement of one another’s judgments, the 
new real and substantial framework defined in Van Breda has its 
greatest implications in cases that have yet to be decided. More 
specifically, in the future of transnational class action suits.238 
When it comes to a Canadian court recognizing a class action 
judgment rendered in the United States, one of the major factors, and 
only one concerning this comment, in determining whether to enforce 
the judgment is whether there is a “real and substantial connection in 
favor of the foreign jurisdiction.”239 Canada and the United States 
                                                 
235   See id. at 610. 
236   See, e.g., Black, supra note 195 (discussing his view that an enforcement 
convention between the U.S. and Canada, while also evaluating other scholars’ 
suggestions regarding conventions and treaties). 
237   See id. at 625. 
238   See Burke, supra note 229, at 51 (noting that proper jurisdiction is a 
major factor in recognition of class action judgments in Canada). 
239   Burke, supra note 229, at 50 (citing Currie v. McDonald’s Restaurants 
of Canada Ltd., (2005) CanLII 3360 (ON CA)). 
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differ from one another in certain aspects of class action litigation, 
including how classes are defined240 and issue requirements.241 
As Currie informs us, the presence of a real and substantial 
connection is important.242 This requirement is also expressed in the 
United States in the Uniform Money Judgment Enforcement Act.243 
Thus, the movement towards similar standards of personal jurisdiction 
has the potential to increase the frequency of recognition of United 
States class actions which include Canadian citizens. 
To what extent the new definition of the real and substantial 
connection standard will have on class actions is still unproven. More 
specifically, how many of the members in a class will have to meet the 
standards set forth in Van Breda?244 The direction of Canadian courts 
is likely to lead to a requirement that only one of the class members 
meets one of the presumptive Van Breda factors.245 This determination 
finds support in the Canadian focus on common issues class 
definition.246 
However, this is the point at which a question arises regarding 
whether class actions based in Canada will be enforced in the United 
States since American courts define classes based on amount in 
controversy requirements.247 The history of U.S. recognition of 
Canadian judgments and the importance put on a minimum 
contacts/real and substantial connection under the Uniform Act, along 
                                                 
240   The United States has a numerosity requirement for a class to be 
created. FED. R. CIV. P. 23. Canada only requires two persons to create a class. Class 
Proceedings Act, R.S.B.C., c. 50, §§ 4(1), 7, 27 (1996); Class Proceedings Act 1992, 
S.O., c. 6, §§ 5(1), 6, 25 (1992); see also Western Canadian Shopping Centres Inc. v. 
Dutton, [2001] SCC 46, at para. 37. 
241   The United States has an amount in controversy requirement to certify 
a class. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Canada requires that there be a common issue to certify a 
class. See, e.g., B.C. Class Proceedings Act, Division 3, Part 3, s. 20(3)(a). 
242   See Currie, [2005] [Can.] CanLII 3360 at paras. 11-2. 
243   See Burke, supra note 229, at 51. 
244   See David Paulson, Note, Canada Update: A New Framework for 
Determining Jurisdiction, the Application of Forum Non Conveniens, and Limitations of the 
Solicitor-Client Privilege, 18 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 411, 416-17 (2012). 
245   See id. at 417. 
246   See B.C. Class Proceedings Act s. 20(3)(a); see also Burke, supra note 
226, at 49. 
247   28 U.S.C. § 1332. 
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with Justice Winkler’s recognition that “practical differences [between 
U.S. and Canadian classes] are more apparent than real,” leads to the 
belief that the new Van Breda factors are more likely to lead to greater 
cross-border enforcement than detract from it.248 
D.        What’s to Become of Us?: The Implications of Van Breda on 
the U.S.-Canadian Trade Partnership 
Finally, the implications of the Van Breda decision on comity 
and trade between the two nations is of significant importance. Justice 
LaForest noted the importance of movement of people, skills, and 
wealth.249 In 2013 the U.S. exported 277,038.3 million dollars worth of 
goods to Canada while importing 305,384.8 million dollars worth of 
goods from Canada.250 The staggering amount of trade that these two 
countries share illustrates the importance of the economic friendship 
between these nations. While that partnership has been in existence 
for decades and will likely continue for decades to come, what 
underlies those numbers is the sheer amount of interaction that U.S. 
and Canadian persons and companies have with one another. From 
interaction, conflict arises. That conflict must be directed toward the 
courts of either the U.S., Canada, or both. The increased efficiency that 
the Van Breda decision provides may be miniscule or large. Only time 
will tell. However, as Professor Black notes, to shrug off the minor 
differences between the U.S. and Canadian courts regarding personal 
jurisdiction would be a mistake.251 Those differences do not produce 
much wake in the individual case, but in the aggregate the transaction 
costs become much more significant.252 With a partnership as large as 
that of the U.S. and Canada, the alignment of their personal jurisdiction 
standards may have a positive effect on lessening those transaction 
costs and thus trade costs.253 
                                                 
248   See Burke, supra note 229, at 51 (quoting Justice Winkler in regards to 
the Nortel Networks litigation). 
249   Morguard, [1990] 3 S.C.R. at 1096. 
250   Trade in Goods with Canada, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c1220.html(last visited Jan. 26, 
2014). 
251   See Black, supra note 195, at 619. 
252   See id. at 617, 624. 
253   See id. at 617. 
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CONCLUSION 
The development of personal jurisdiction over ex juris 
defendants has developed in the form of the minimum contacts test in 
the United States, and the real and substantial connection standard in 
Canada. Both tests value the importance of fairness and order. 
The minimum contacts test has evolved into a test which 
focuses on the connection between the defendant and the forum. It 
was not until 2012 that Canada caught up. Prior to the Van Breda 
decision, the real and substantial connection standard focused on the 
plaintiff, defendant, and nature of the claim. Van Breda narrowed that 
focus to the defendant and subject matter of a claim, further aligning 
the U.S. and Canadian personal jurisdiction standards. 
As a result, greater comity between the U.S. and Canada can 
ensue. While as of late there has not been large amounts of friction 
between these two countries, commentators have noted that even a 
small amount of friction is worth addressing, because aggregate 
transaction costs involved in a trade partnership as large as that the 
U.S. and Canada have can be large. 
Any steps toward streamlining transactions, in this case judicial 
cooperation, comity, and judgment recognition, can help in reducing 
those costs. Reduced transaction costs leads to more efficient trade 
and a greater relationship between the U.S. and Canada. 
Realistically, the impact of the Van Breda decision will likely be 
relatively small in respect to the relationship between the U.S. and 
Canada, but as Pink Floyd sang “[it’s] just another brick in the wall.”254 
 
                                                 
254   PINK FLOYD, Another Brick in the Wall Part 2, on THE WALL (Columbia 
Records 1979). 
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MAKING ENDS MEET: USING A MARKET-
BASED APPROACH TO INCENTIVIZE 
FOREIGN VESSELS TO COMPLY WITH 
THE AIR EMISSION STANDARDS OF 
MARPOL ANNEX VI* 
Xiaoxin Shi** 
INTRODUCTION 
Annex VI of the International Convention for the Prevention 
of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) sets mandatory air emission 
standards for ocean-going vessels. Ratifying countries are required to 
enact legislation to implement MARPOL Annex VI (Annex VI) 
within their jurisdictions. The United States adopted Annex VI 
through the Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships (APPS), 1 
administered by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Two 
                                                 
*   The conclusions of this paper reflect the author’s findings between 
late 2013 to early 2014, when the paper was completed. Since then, there have been 
new developments in the Chinese policies and regulations on air emissions from 
ships and vessels. The most significant development is the new Emission Control 
Area (ECA) Implementation Plan, promulgated by the Chinese Ministry of 
Transport on December 2, 2015 (http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2015-
12/04/content_5019932.htm). The Plan establishes three ECAs along China’s 
coast. Beginning on January 1, 2016, ports within the three ECAs will start to 
require ships to switch to 0.5% sulfur fuel while berthing. Starting on January 1, 
2019, all ships will be required to switch to 0.5% sulfur fuel when operating in the 
three ECAs. Before December 31, 2019, the Ministry of Transport plans to 
evaluate the effectiveness of the fuel switching program and decide whether to 
mandate all ships operate within the ECAs to switch to 0.1% sulfur fuel and 
whether to extend the geographical scopes of the ECAs.    
       **   Master of Philosophy 2010, The Chinese University of Hong Kong; 
J.D. 2015, The Pennsylvania State University School of Law.   
1   The Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1915 
(2008).  
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Emission Control Areas (ECAs) have been established under Annex 
VI in the U.S. territory.2 All vessels of United States registry or 
nationality to which MARPOL applies, if found to have violated the 
emission standards of ECAs within the U.S. territory, are subject to 
criminal or in rem civil liabilities.3 
The majority of the vessels calling at U.S. ports are registered 
in foreign countries, many of which have not yet fully enforced 
Annex VI through domestic legislation. 4  Employing judicial 
proceedings as the primary instrument to enforce the compliance of 
foreign flagged vessels, therefore, could be cumbersome and 
expensive administratively, especially considering the large number of 
calls at U.S. ports. This paper explores the perspectives of market-
based mechanisms, as supplements to judicial enforcement, to 
incentivize the compliance of foreign flagged vessels when operating 
in ECAs in the United States, and ultimately, to foster the 
enforcement of Annex VI in all major destinies of international 
shipping. 
This paper first introduces the regulative scheme to enforce 
MARPOL Annex VI standards on foreign ships operating in U.S. 
waters in Section II. Technological alternatives to achieve compliance 
and their constraints are also discussed, along with the review of 
                                                 
2   The North American Emission Control Area (ECA) was jointly 
proposed by the United States, Canada, and France, approved by the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO) in 2010 and came into effect on August 1, 2012. See 
Int’l Mar. Org. [IMO], North American Emission Control Area, Res. MEPC.190(60) 
(Mar. 26, 2010). The United States also proposed the United States Caribbean Sea 
ECA, which was adopted by the IMO in 2011 and will take effect on January 1, 
2014. See Int’l Mar. Org. [IMO], Designation of the United States Caribbean Sea Emission 
Control Area and Exemption of Certain Ships Operation in the North American Emission 
Control Area and the United States Caribbean Sea Emission Control Area under Regulations 
13 and 14 and Appendix VII of MARPOL Annex VI, Res. MEPC.202(62) (July 15, 
2011). 
3   33 U.S.C. § 1908. 
4   See U.S. DEP’T of TRANSP., VESSEL CALLS SNAPSHOT, 2011 (2013). 
In 2011, foreign-flagged vessels accounted for 89% of calls at U.S. ports. The 
number of U.S.-flagged vessels calling at U.S. ports had a range of 6,869 to 7,356 
between 2006 and 2011. Id. at 8; see also Sandra Y. Snyder, EPA’s Category 3 Marine 
Emission Standards: Mimicking MARPOL Annex VI or Mocking the Clean Air Act? 71 
BROOK. L. REV. 1065, 1089 (2005) (most vessels entering U.S. ports are foreign 
vessels).  
2015 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 4:1 
558 
relevant Annex VI provisions. Section III leads a comparison of 
Annex VI regulative schemes in the United States and a major marine 
trade partner, China. The comparison concludes that the United 
States and U.S. shipping companies are likely to bear unfair burdens 
administratively and financially in enforcing this multi-national 
convention due to the uneven regulative landscape globally. Having 
examined, from an economic perspective, the factors that could 
affect the effectiveness of enforcement measures, Section III 
recommends using incentive programs as an interim solution to 
solicit wider voluntary compliance while foreign countries such as 
China are yet to give effect to Annex VI through domestic legislation. 
Finally, Section IV discusses the feasibility of two main types of 
potential market-based incentive programs, cap-and-trade and 
emission credit trading, to provide non-complying foreign ships a 
“last offer” to avoid criminal penalties for violation of Annex VI 
while operating in U.S. waters. This paper favors an emission credit 
trading program, considering the increasing demand of international 
shipping service, in general, and the need to synergize technological 
developments in the ship building industry with the regulatory 
requirements of Annex VI. 
I.         ANNEX VI ENFORCEMENT SCHEME FOR FOREIGN FLAGGED 
VESSELS CALLING AT U.S. PORTS 
Foreign flagged vessels, just as U.S. flagged vessels, are 
regulated under the APPS when they operate in U.S. waters. Vessels 
have to use low-sulfur fuels, the quality and quantity of which are 
documented in Bunker Delivery Notes, and provide engine 
certificates to prove compliance with Annex VI standards. Civil or 
criminal liabilities may be imposed for violations. The U.S. Coast 
Guard, under an agreement with the EPA, has the authority to 
undertake onboard inspections. 
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A.         MARPOL Annex VI and Its Adoption in the United States 
MARPOL,5 as modified by Protocol of 1978,6 is the main 
international convention to prevent marine environment pollution 
from ocean-going vessels.7 Annex VI of MARPOL sets limits for 
NOx,
8 SOx,
9 and particulate matter (PM)10 emissions from ocean-
                                                 
5   International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 
Nov. 2, 1973, 1973 U.S.T. Lexis 322, 1340 U.N.T.S. 184 [hereinafter MARPOL 
Annex VI].  
6   Protocol of 1978, Feb. 17, 1978, 1978 U.S.T. Lexis 322, 1340 
U.N.T.S. 61. 
7   International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 
(MARPOL), INT’L MAR. ORG., 
http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/Internation
al-Convention-for-the-Prevention-of-Pollution-from-Ships-(MARPOL).aspx (last 
visited Feb. 15, 2015). 
8   NOx (Nitrogen Oxides) forms through the diesel engine combustion 
process when the temperature reaches 2000 degrees Kelvin (equivalent to about 
3140 Fahrenheit) and the nitrogen in the air reacts with oxygen. The amount of 
NOx emission is not strongly affected by the specific fuel consumption, but is 
dependent on the temperature, pressure, and duration of combustion time of the 
engine fuel. Most nitrogen is oxidized into nitric oxide (NO) in the early stage of 
combustion. Some of the NO will convert to nitrogen dioxide (NO2) and nitrous 
oxide (N2O) during the later expansion process and in the exhaust. NOx is the 
mixture of NO, NO2, and N2O. One way of measuring NOx emission is based on 
the main engine’s rated speed, presented as revolutions per minute (rpm). See 
LAURIE GOLDSWORTHY, DESIGN OF SHIP ENGINES FOR REDUCED EMISSIONS OF 
OXIDES OF NITROGEN §2 (2002), available at 
http://www.flamemarine.com/files/AMCPaper.pdf. NOx emission is significantly 
higher when an engine operates at lower rpm (50 to 550); Lasse Johansson, 
Emission Estimation of Marine Traffic Using Vessel Characteristic and AIS-Data 
19 (Sept. 19, 2011) (Master’s thesis, Aalto University), available at 
www.lib.tkk.fi/Dipl/2011/ urn100529.pdf. NOx are precursor components for a 
photochemical reaction through which ozone is formed, and catalysts for the 
formation of acid rain. Id. at 5. Exposure to NOx, even if for a short term from 30 
minutes to 24 hours, would adversely affect the human respiratory system, 
including airway inflammation in healthy people and increased respiratory 
symptoms in people with asthma. Nitrogen Dioxide, U.S. ENV’L PROT. AGENCY, 
http://www. epa.gov/air/nitrogenoxides/health.html (last updated Feb. 14, 2013).  
9   SOx is the mixture of SO2, SO3, and SO4. The amount of SOx 
emission from vessels is directly related to the sulfur content of marine fuel burned. 
See Johansson, supra note 8; Zoi Nikopoulou et al., The Role of A Cap-and-Trade 
Market in Reducing NOx and SOx Emissions: Prospects and Benefits for Ships Within the 
Northern European ECA, 227(2) J. ENG’G FOR THE MARINE ENV’T 136, 136 (2013). 
Current world-wide average sulfur content in marine fuel is about 2.7% (27,000 
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going vessels that are of 400 gross tonnages or more, and general 
enforcement and monitoring procedures. 11  The International 
Maritime Organization (IMO), a United Nations specialized agency 
responsible for improving maritime safety and preventing pollution 
from ships, administers the enforcement of Annex VI worldwide.12 
Annex VI requires ratifying states to designate certain sea areas as 
ECAs where “mandatory measures” are required to control the 
emission of “NOx or SOx and [PM] or all three.”
13  These 
“mandatory measures” include limiting the sulfur content of fuel oil 
to reduce SOx and PM emissions through Regulation 14,
14 and 
prescribing three “tiers” of design standards for marine diesel engines 
                                                 
ppm). DONALD DABDUB & SATISH VUTUKURU, AIR QUALITY IMPACTS OF SHIP 
EMISSIONS IN THE SOUTH COAST AIR BASIN OF CALIFORNIA 2 (2008). SOx can 
react with other compounds in the atmosphere to form small particles, which can 
penetrate deeply into lungs and cause or worsen respiratory diseases. Sulfur Dioxide, 
U.S. ENV’L PROT. AGENCY, 
http://www.epa.gov/airquality/sulfurdioxide/health.html  (last updated June 28, 
2013). The SOx particles usually spread up to a few hundred kilometers depending 
on weather and wind conditions. In the presence of catalysts such as NOx, SOx can 
form H2SO4 causing acid rain. Johansson, supra note 8. 
10   PM (Particulate Matter), measured by PM2.5 (diameters of the 
particulates are less than 2.5 μm) and PM10 (diameters of the particulates are less 
than 10 μm), is produced during combustion in the form of soot, ash, organic and 
elemental carbon, SO4 and its associated water molecules. The amount of PM 
emission from vessels is linearly dependent on the sulfur content of the fuel oil. See 
Nikopoulou et al., supra note 9, at 136-37; Johansson, supra note 8. PM contains 
microscopic solids and liquid droplets small enough to get into the lungs and cause 
a range of health problems to the lungs, respiratory systems, and heart. Particulate 
Matter, U.S. ENV’L PROT. AGENCY, 
http://www.epa.gov/airquality/particlepollution/health.html (last updated Mar. 
18, 2013). 
11   See MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 5. 
12   See Introduction to IMO, ABOUT IMO, http://www.imo.org/ 
About/Pages/Default.aspx(last visited Feb. 15, 2015).  
13   MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 5, Regulation 2, ¶ 8. Emissions of 
NOx, SOx, and particulate matter from ocean-going vessels could cause adverse 
impacts to the environment and public health, including premature mortality, 
cardiopulmonary disease, lung cancer, chronic respiratory ailments, acidification 
and eutrophication. Id., Appendix III Criteria and Procedures for Designation of 
Emission Control Areas, ¶ 1.2. 
14   MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 5, Regulation 14. In ECAs, upper 
limits of the sulfur content of fuel oil used on board ships are 1.50% m/m before 
July 1, 2010; 1.00% m/m on and after July 1, 2010; 0.10% m/m on and after Jan. 1, 
2015. Id. ¶ 8. 
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to control NOx emission through Regulation 13.
15  Depending on 
the vessel’s operational area and the time when the vessel engine is 
installed, different levels of NOx emission standard apply: Tier I 
standard applies to engines that are installed on a ship constructed 
between 2000 and 2011;16 Tier II standard applies to engines that are 
installed on ships constructed on or after January 2011, and if 
operating outside ECAs, ships constructed on or after January 1, 
2016;17 the most stringent Tier III standard applies to engines that 
are installed on ships constructed on or after January 1, 2016 if such 
ships operate in ECAs.18 Notably, at the 65th session meeting held in 
May 2013, the IMO considered the proposal of delaying the 
implementation of Tier III standards in ECAs until January 1, 2021.19 
The IMO eventually made only a partial compromise. At the 66th 
session meeting in 2014, the IMO decided to uphold the original 
                                                 
15   Considering the long service life of ocean-going vessels that may last 
for decades, MARPOL Regulation 13 sets three “tiers” of NOx emission standards 
for marine diesel engines that are installed on ships constructed between 2000 and 
2011, after 2011, and after 2016. These emission limits are relative, presented in 
formulas with the rated engine speed (rpm, revolutions per minute) as the variable. 
MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 5, Regulation 13. 
16   For engines that are installed on ships constructed on or after 
January 1, 2000 and before January 1, 2011, Tier I standard applies: NOx emission 
shall be under 17.0 g/kWh when the rated engine speed is less than 130 rpm; under 
45×n(-0.2) with “n” being the rated engine speed is between 130 rpm and 2,000 rpm; 
under 9.8 g/kWh when the rated engine speed is above 2,000. MARPOL Annex 
VI, supra note 5, Regulation 13, ¶ 3. 
17   For engines that are installed on ships constructed on or after 
January 1, 2011, and ships constructed on or after January 2016 and operate outside 
ECAs, Tier II standard applies: NOx emission shall be under 14.4 g/kWh when the 
rated engine speed is less than 130 rpm; under 44×n(-0.23) with “n” being the rated 
engine speed is between 130 rpm and 2,000 rpm; under 7.7 g/kWh when the rated 
engine speed is above 2,000. MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 5, Regulation 13, ¶¶ 
4, 5.1.3. 
18   Tier III standard applies to marine diesel engines that are installed 
on ships constructed on or after Jan. 1, 2016 and operate within ECAs. NOx 
emission from such ships shall be under 3.4 g/kWh when the rated engine speed is 
less than 130 rpm; under 9×n(-0.2) with “n” being the rated engine speed is between 
130 rpm and 2,000 rpm; under 2.0 g/kWh when the rated engine speed is above 
2,000. MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 5, Regulation 13, ¶¶ 5.1.1, 5.1.2. 
19   IMO Marine Environment Protection Committee 65th Session Pushes Forward 
with Energy-Efficiency Implementation, INT’L MAR. ORG. NEWS BRIEFS (May 21, 2013), 
http://www.imo.org/MediaCentre/PressBriefings/Pages/18-
MEPC65ENDS.aspx.  
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2016 deadline for Tier III NOx requirement for marine diesel engines 
installed on new ships constructed on or after January 1, 2016, and 
accept the proposed delay until 2021 for engines installed on large 
yachts, viz. ships that are of less than 500 gross tonnage and 24 
meters or more in length.20 
Annex VI affords ratifying states with broad authority in 
enforcement. But such authority is qualified when the violation is 
caused by non-availability of low-sulfur fuels that are in compliance 
with MARPOL standards. To ensure compliance by ships, regardless 
of their country of registry, port states shall use “all appropriate and 
practicable measures of detection and environmental monitoring,” 
including inspection and bringing proceedings.21 Port states “shall 
[also] take all reasonable steps” to provide low-sulfur fuel at ports 
and terminals in their jurisdictions.22 If a ship furnishes evidence, 
primarily through documentation, of good faith attempts to secure 
compliant fuel yet no such fuel is available,23 the port state shall 
consider “not taking control measures.”24 Importantly, Annex VI 
explicitly provides that no deviation or delay of voyage should be 
required in order to achieve compliance.25 
The United States ratified Annex VI in 2008 26  and 
implemented the mandatory air emission standards domestically 
                                                 
20   IMO, REPORT OF THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION 
COMMITTEE ON ITS SIXTY-SIX SESSION MEPC 66/21, 36 (2014), available at 
http://www.uscg.mil/imo/mepc/docs/MEPC66-report.pdf.  
21   MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 5, Regulation 11, ¶¶ 1, 2, 4. 
22   Id. Regulation 18, ¶ 1. 
23   Id. ¶¶ 2.11, 2.12. 
24   Id. ¶¶ 2.3, 2.5. 
25   Id. ¶ 2.2. 
26   Int’l Mar. Org. [IMO], Status of Multilateral Conventions and Instruments 
in Respect of Which the International Maritime Organization or Its Secretary-General Performs 
Depositary or Other Functions (2015), available at 
http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/ 
StatusOfConventions/Documents/Status%20-%202015.pdf. Seventy five 
countries have ratified MARPOL Annex VI. Status of Conventions, INT’L MAR. ORG., 
http://www.imo.org/ 
About/Conventions/StatusOfConventions/Pages/Default.aspx (accessed by 
clicking on the “excel chart listing ratifications by State”). Ratifying parties “shall 
co-operate” in enforcement of the provisions of this Annex. MARPOL Annex VI, 
supra note 5, Regulation 11, §1.  
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through amendments made in 2008 to the APPS27 and the Clean Air 
Act.28 Currently, two ECAs have been established covering virtually 
all U.S. coastlines. The North American ECA came into force on 
August 1, 2012, extending up to 200 nautical miles from the Pacific 
coast, the Atlantic coast, the Gulf coast, and the eight Hawaiian 
Islands.29 The United States Caribbean Sea ECA, covering coastal 
waters around Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, was approved 
by the IMO in 2011 and became enforceable starting January 1, 
2014.30 Emissions of SOx, NOx, and PM are all regulated in both 
ECAs. 
B.         Enforcement Measures of MARPOL Annex VI on Foreign 
Flagged Vessels Operating in U.S. Waters 
MARPOL Annex VI affords no differentiated treatment of 
foreign flagged vessels and U.S. flagged vessels. 31  The APPS 
provides that Annex VI applies to all foreign flagged vessels “in” or 
bound for “a port, shipyard, offshore terminal, or the internal waters 
of the United States.”32 
                                                 
27   33 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1915. 
28   Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7431 (2006). 
29  IMO, North American Emission Control Area, Resolution MEPC. 
190(60) (Mar. 26, 2010); OFFICE OF TRANSPORTATION AND AIR QUALITY, U.S. 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, EPA-420-F-10-015, DESIGNATION OF 
NORTH AMERICAN EMISSION CONTROL AREA TO REDUCE EMISSIONS FROM 
SHIPS (2010), available at http://www.epa.gov/ 
otaq/regs/nonroad/marine/ci/420f10015.pdf. 
30   IMO, Designation of the United States Caribbean Sea Emission Control 
Area and Exemption of Certain Ships Operation in the North American Emission Control 
Area and the United States Caribbean Sea Emission Control Area under Regulations 13 and 
14 and Appendix VII of MARPOL Annex VI, Resolution MEPC.202(62) (July 15, 
2011); OFFICE OF TRANSPORTATION AND AIR QUALITY, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION AGENCY, EPA-420-F-11-024, DESIGNATION OF EMISSION 
CONTROL AREA TO REDUCE EMISSIONS FROM SHIPS IN THE U.S. CARIBBEAN 
(2011) 
31   International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from 
Ships (MARPOL), Art. 5(4) (with respect to the ship of non-parties to the 
convention, parties shall apply the requirements of the present convention as may 
be necessary to ensure that no more favorable treatment is given to such ships). 
32   33 U.S.C. § 1902 (5)(A), (B). 
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Civil penalties would be imposed for failure to provide 
documentation to prove compliance with Annex VI and each day of 
non-compliance would be considered a separate violation.33 For non-
compliant vessels, the U.S. EPA requires a corrective action plan 
signed by the ship owner or operator, and would report the non-
compliance to the ship’s country of registry.34 A class D felony is 
committed if a ship owner or operator “knowingly violates” Annex 
VI.35 Up to one half of the criminal fines may be paid to the “person 
giving information leading to conviction.”36 The U.S. Coast Guard is 
responsible for conducting ship inspections to verify compliance and 
investigations to establish criminal liability.37 
1.  Enforcement of Regulation 14 for SOx and PM emissions. - To 
comply with Regulation 14, ships must use low-sulfur fuel,38 be 
eligible for exemptions,39 or use “equivalents.”40 Because the price 
                                                 
33   33 U.S.C. § 1908 (2008); OFFICE OF COMMERCIAL VESSEL 
COMPLIANCE (CG-CVC), U.S. COAST GUARD, ECA JOB AID: DOMESTIC & 
FOREIGN VESSELS (2012). 
34  OFFICE OF COMMERCIAL VESSEL COMPLIANCE (CG-CVC), U.S. 
COAST GUARD, ECA JOB AID: DOMESTIC & FOREIGN VESSELS (2012). 
35   33 U.S.C. § 1908, (a) (2008). 
36   Id. 
37   Memorandum of Understanding Between United States Coast 
Guard and United States Environmental Protection Agency Regarding 
Enforcement of Annex VI as Implemented by the Act to Prevent Pollution from 
Ships, June 27, 2011, available at http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/ 
files/documents/annexvi-mou062711.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2015). 
38   Regulation 14 of Annex VI specifies that ships operating within an 
Emission Control Area shall use fuel oil with sulfur content lower than 1.00% 
m/m on and after July 1, 2010, and lower than 0.10% m/m/ on and after January 
1, 2015. MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 5, Regulation 14, ¶ 4. The term “low-
sulfur fuel” in this paper is used broadly to include low-sulfur residual fuel, marine 
diesel oil, and marine gas oil. See Nikopoulou et al., supra note 9, at 141. 
39   Regulation 3 of Annex VI provides that ships on trial for emission 
control technology research could be exempted from certain Annex VI provisions 
if compliance would impede the technology development. MARPOL Annex VI, 
supra note 5, Regulation 3, ¶ 2. See, e.g., Anna Lee Deal, Liquefied Natural Gas as a 
Marine Fuel: A closer look at TOTE’s Containership Projects 12 (Nat’l Energy Policy Inst. 
Working Paper, May 7, 2013), available at 
http://www.glmri.org/downloads/lngMisc/NEPI%20LNG%20as%20a%20Marin
e%20Fuel%205-7-13.pdf (TOTE obtained a waiver from the EPA and Coast 
Guard allowing the company to operate its ships using distillate fuels above 
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of low-sulfur fuels is much higher than that of standard fuels,41 a 
common practice to achieve compliance without splurging on cleaner 
fuel is to flush the fuel piping systems and fill the settling tanks with 
low-sulfur fuel only when approaching an ECA.42 But fuel switching 
is less straightforward than it seems. Changing fuels when the fuel 
temperature is still very high causes loss of engine power.43 Hence, 
vessels need to slow down when switching fuels to avoid 
malfunction.44 Additionally, because the low viscosity of low-sulfur 
fuel45 and the incompatibility of fuels46 when mixed harms diesel 
                                                 
regulative limit within the ECA during the conversion of these ships to liquefied 
natural gas so as to provide savings for the expensive environmental project). 
40   MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 5, Regulation 4, ¶ 1. 
41   See THEO NOTTEBOOM ET AL., ANALYSIS OF THE CONSEQUENCES 
OF LOW SULFUR FUEL REQUIREMENTS 16 (2010), available at www.schone 
scheepvaart.nl/downloads/rapporten/doc_1361790123.pdf.  
42   See DET NORSKE VERITAS (DNV), MARPOL 73/78 ANNEX VI 
REGULATIONS FOR THE PREVENTION OF AIR POLLUTION FROM SHIPS: 
TECHNICAL AND OPERATIONAL IMPLICATIONS 17 (2009), available at 
www.dnv.com/binaries/marpol%20brochure_tcm4-383718.pdf; Chengfeng Wang 
et al., Cost-Effectiveness of Reducing Sulfur Emissions from Ships, 41 (24) ENV’T SCI. 
TECH. 8233, 8234 (2007), available at http://pubs.acs.org/doi/abs/ 
10.1021/es070812w (switching from high-sulfur marine fuels with a sulfur content 
of 2.7%, the worldwide average, to low-sulfur marine fuels with sulfur content not 
exceeding 1.5% can reduce about 44% of SO2 emissions).  
43   DET NORSKE VERITAS (DNV), supra note 42. 
44  AMERICAN BUREAU OF SHIPPING, FUEL SWITCHING ADVISORY 
NOTICE 17 (2010), available at http://www.eagle.org/eagleExternal 
PortalWEB/ShowProperty/BEA%20Repository/References/ABS%20Advisories/
FuelSwitchingAdvisory (operational manual for fuel switching and training for staff 
is necessary).   
45   Main operational problems caused by the low viscosity of low-sulfur 
fuel are the reduced effectiveness of the fuel as a lubricant, loss of capacity in fuel 
supply and circulation pumps, and increased chances of leakage of fuel through the 
fuel pump barrel and plunger, and suction and spill valve push rods, and less energy 
generated per volume of fuel. AMERICAN BUREAU OF SHIPPING, FUEL SWITCHING 
ADVISORY NOTICE 9, 10(2010). 
46   Incompatibility between different fuels would result in excessive 
sedimentation, sludging, and separator and filter problems. Hence, an additional set 
of fuel supply systems may be necessary. DET NORSKE VERITAS (DNV), supra note 
42. 
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engines and boilers, modifications to the fuel system are often 
necessary.47 
Annex VI encourages technological innovation by affording 
flexibilities in achieving compliance. Under Regulation 4, port states 
can allow “any fitting, material, appliance or apparatus . . . or other 
procedures, alternative fuel oils, or compliance methods” so long as 
such alternatives are as effective in terms of emission reductions as 
the measures provided by Annex VI.48 If obtaining low-sulfur fuel is 
difficult, installing desulfurization units to achieve compliance is also 
technically feasible and permissible under MARPOL Annex VI.49 
But the high cost of such exhaust gas cleaning systems make this 
alternative unattractive.50 Even if the cost of a desulfurization unit 
itself is justified, its installment would probably require re-designing 
the fuel system due to the limited space in the engine room, and 
therefore lead to additional investments in vessel retrofitting. 51 
Another rapidly developing technology,52 because of the heightened 
environmental standards driven by MARPOL Annex VI, is using 
                                                 
47   See AMERICAN BUREAU OF SHIPPING, FUEL SWITCHING ADVISORY 
NOTICE 11-14  (2010) (modifications that may be needed include installing 
separate purifier and piping system for the low-sulfur fuels, additional fuel coolers 
if the vessel operates in summer and tropical conditions, special fuel injection 
pumps); DET NORSKE VERITAS (DNV), supra note 42 (ship owners may consider 
upgrading the capacity  of diesel tanks, or installing an additional set of service 
and settling tanks for low sulfur fuels).   
48   MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 5, Regulation 4, ¶ 1. 
49  AMERICAN BUREAU OF SHIPPING, FUEL SWITCHING ADVISORY 
NOTICE 7 (2010); DET NORSKE VERITAS (DNV), MARPOL 73/78 ANNEX VI 
REGULATIONS FOR THE PREVENTION OF AIR POLLUTION FROM SHIPS: 
TECHNICAL AND OPERATIONAL IMPLICATIONS 16 (2009) (exhaust gas cleaning 
alternatives will also reduce PM emissions); see Chengfeng Wang et al., supra note 
42, at 8234. 
50   DET NORSKE VERITAS (DNV), supra note 49 (further technological 
developments or legislation are needed to lower the installation costs of a 
desulfurization unit, which is about $1 million (USD) to $2 million (USD), to make 
this alternative cost-beneficial). 
51   See AMERICAN BUREAU OF SHIPPING, FUEL SWITCHING ADVISORY 
NOTICE 12 (2010); DET NORSKE VERITAS (DNV), supra note 49, at 17-18. 
52   See, e.g., Bridget C. Brett, Potential Market for LNG-Fueled Marine 
Vessels in the United States 34 (June 2008) (Master’s thesis, Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology), available at http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/44920#files-area 
(the four main manufactures who have the technology for LNG-fueled vessels are 
Rolls-Royce, GE, Wärtsilä, and MAN Diesel).  
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Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) as a marine fuel. 53  The cost-
effectiveness of conversion to LNG varies from vessel to vessel, and 
is affected, primarily, by three factors: (1) the amount of time the 
vessel operates in an ECA; (2) LNG tanker size relative to the vessel 
size; and (3) LNG fuel availability.54 
However, Regulation 4 leaves the gap of identifying 
“equivalents,” i.e., alternative compliant measures, to the port states 
to fill in through bilateral negotiations. Currently, the United States 
requires foreign port states to submit to the U.S. Coast Guard 
proposals of equivalents for compliance. 55  The United States is 
seeking IMO’s coordination in identifying equivalents56 to minimize 
the need for enforcement actions if the U.S. Government disagrees 
with the equivalents approved by other port states.57 Absent IMO’s 
                                                 
53   Natural gas is a type of fossil fuel consisting mainly of methane 
(CH4). Id. Gaseous Natural gas transforms into liquid, called Liquefied Natural Gas 
(LNG), when the natural gas is cooled to -162 Celsius degrees. LNG creates the 
economics of scale by saving 99% of the space that natural gas with the same 
energy content in gaseous form would take. Id. at 15-16. NLG is considered the 
cleanest form of fuel because it contains no sulfur and thus all SOx emissions and 
most PM emissions are eliminated. Because LNG burns at lower temperatures than 
standard fuels, NOx emissions are also reduced significantly. Johansson, supra note 
8. The use of LNG as marine fuel became economically attractive when natural gas 
became cheaper than residual oil in early 2006. Nikopoulou et al., supra note 9, at 
143. But the cost of LNG-fueled systems is generally 12% higher than the capital 
investment for a standard diesel engine. Bridget C. Brett, supra note 52, at 57. 
54   Anna Lee Deal, supra note 39, at 12 (LNG facilities are being 
planned for Cameron Parish and Port Fourchon in Los Angeles, along the 
Mississippi River, and in the Great Lakes region). 
55   U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 16711/CG-CVC Policy Letter, 
GUIDELINES FOR COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE EMISSION CONTROL 
AREAS ESTABLISHED WITHIN THE UNITED STATES JURISDICTION AS DESIGNATED 
IN MARPOL ANNEX VI REGULATION 14 (2012), § 5b(ii). 
56   See Letter from Jeffrey G. Lantz, Dir., Commercial Regulations and 
Standards, U.S. Coast Guard, and Margo Tsirigotis Oge, Dir., Office of Transp. 
and Air Quality, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, to Koji Sekimizu, Secretary-General of 
Int’l Mar. Org. (Mar. 12, 2012), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/otaq/regs/nonroad/marine/ci/letter-epa-and-uscg-to-
imo.pdf. 
57   U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 16711/CG-CVC Policy Letter, 
GUIDELINES FOR COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE EMISSION CONTROL 
AREAS ESTABLISHED WITHIN THE UNITED STATES JURISDICTION AS DESIGNATED 
IN MARPOL ANNEX VI REGULATION 14 (2012), § 5b(ii).  
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intervention, countries such as the United States, which are enforcing 
Annex VI in advance of the other countries, might have to act as the 
de facto global administrator of Annex VI. 
The Bunker Delivery Note, where the quality and quantity of 
fuel oil supplied to vessels for combustion purposes is documented,58 
serves as the main evidentiary source for verifying compliance with 
Regulation 14. If the sulfur content of fuel oil exceeds Annex VI 
limits,59 and no exemption or equivalents apply, the ship owner 
should provide documentation to prove that best efforts were made 
to procure compliant fuel oil and notify the EPA of the non-
availability of such fuel oil before entering the ECA. 60  Taking 
together the regulative requirements and available technologies, 
owners of ships registered in countries where Annex VI is not fully 
enforced or no equivalents under Regulation 4 are formally 
established would probably have no choice but to change voyage 
plans, with the hope61 of avoiding criminal charges in the United 
States. 
2.  Enforcement of Regulation 13 for NOx emissions. - The 
reduction of NOx emissions is a function of multiple factors, 
including: engine design, engine age, fuel type, operational mode, 
energy efficiency,62 and any add-on emission reduction equipment.63 
                                                 
58   MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 5, Regulation 18, ¶ 6. 
59   Id. Regulation 14, ¶ 4. 
60   U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INTERIM GUIDANCE ON THE NON-
AVAILABILITY OF COMPLIANT FUEL OIL FOR THE NORTH AMERICAN EMISSION 
CONTROL AREA (2012), 3-4; OFFICE OF COMMERCIAL VESSEL COMPLIANCE (CG-
CVC), U.S. COAST GUARD, ECA JOB AID: DOMESTIC & FOREIGN VESSELS (2012), 
§ 3. 
61   Evidence of good-faith attempt to secure low-sulfur fuel as required 
by Annex VI is only relevant in EPA’s determination of the appropriate 
administrative actions, but does not necessarily remove the possibility of finding 
criminal liability. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 60, at 4-5. 
62   NOx emission is actually a side effect of engine designs that aim to 
enhance energy efficiency by maximizing the completeness of fuel combustion, i.e., 
increasing the pressure and temperature of combustion process. PER KÅGESON, 
MARKET-BASED INSTRUMENTS FOR NOX ABATEMENT IN THE BALTIC SEA 10 
(2009), available at 
http://www.cleanshipping.org/download/2009_11_nox_report_baltic_sea.pdf 
(Air Pollution and Climate Series 24, the European Environmental Bureau and the 
European Federation for Transport and Environment). 
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To a certain extent, the level of compliance with the NOx emission 
standards of Annex VI reflects the sophistication of technological 
research and development in the shipbuilding industry. 64  The 
                                                 
63   See DAVID COOPER & TOMAS GUSTAFSSON, METHODOLOGY FOR 
CALCULATING EMISSIONS FROM SHIPS: 1. UPDATE OF EMISSION FACTORS 13-15 
(2004). The technical issues involved in restricting engine design to minimize air 
emissions are complex not only because the engine design has to fit various ship 
configurations but also because of safety concerns as ships must be able to depend 
on their sources of power in tough weather conditions and navigational hazards. See 
generally Int’l Mar. Org. [IMO], Supplementary Information to the Final Report of the 
Correspondence Group on Assessment of Technological Developments to Implement the Tier III 
NOx Emission Standards under MARPOL Annex VI, MEPC 65/INF. 10 (Feb. 8, 
2013) (countries including the United States, Finland, Japan, Germany, Sweden, 
and the United Kingdom reviewing technology developments to achieve Tier III 
standards for NOx emission that is to be in force in 2016). 
64   Several technically feasible means exist to achieve the relative 
standards for NOx emission under Annex VI. For low-speed two-stroke engines, 
compliance can be achieved through replacing conventional fuel valves by low-
NOx slide valves. For other engines, compliance is achieved through more complex 
engine modifications, including miller cycling, which achieves a lower temperature 
in the combustion chamber without a loss in power output; direct water injection, 
which rebuilds the engine to enable fresh water being sprayed into the combustion 
air to remove NOx from the exhaust gas; exhaust gas recirculation, where exhaust 
gases are filtered, cooled, and redirected into the engine to reduce the combustion 
temperature; selective catalytic reduction, a commercialized catalytic exhaust 
treatment system that is applicable to both new vessels and retrofit installations; 
humid air motor, which prevents NOx formation during combustion by adding 
water vapor to the engine’s combustion air; and low-NOx engines, which employs 
techniques to control fuel injection, spray formation, and fuel-air mixture to reduce 
temperature throughout the combustion process. See KÅGESON, supra note 62, at 
10-13 (Air Pollution and Climate Series 24, the European Environmental Bureau 
and the European Federation for Transport and Environment); Seita Akimoto et 
al., Techniques for Low NOx Combustion on Medium Speed Diesel Engine, 2(1) BULLETIN 
OF THE MECH. ENG’G SCIENTIFIC J., 8 (2000), available at 
http://www.jime.jp/e/publication/ bulletin/english/pdf/mv28n012000p08.pdf; 
KÅGESON, supra note 62, at 10 (Air Pollution and Climate Series 24, the European 
Environmental Bureau and the European Federation for Transport and 
Environment). Tier I and II standards of Annex VI, Regulation 13 are achievable 
with relatively simple engine modifications. See Johansson, supra note 8, at 20 (some 
engine manufactures have already been producing Tier II compliant engines for the 
last decade). The international shipbuilding industry is more concerned with the 
compliance with the Tier III standards. See Int’l Mar. Org. [IMO], Supplementary 
Information to the Final Report of the Correspondence Group on Assessment of Technological 
Developments to Implement the Tier III NOx Emission Standards under MARPOL Annex 
VI, MEPC 65/INF. 10 (Feb. 8, 2013). Currently, only three technologies could 
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primary evidentiary source for verifying compliance is the 
International Air Pollution Prevention Certificate,65 which should be 
issued to individual engines based on emission tests on the engine 
manufacturer’s test bed. 66  Therefore, although ship owners or 
operators seem to be the directly affected parties, the underlying 
rationale of Regulation 13 is to urge manufacturers to design vessels 
that meet higher emission standards by creating market demand from 
the ship owners and operators. 
In 2010, the EPA published a rule to regulate NOx emissions 
from new Category 3 engines with the same level of stringency as 
Annex VI, Regulation 13.67 The EPA rule applies to Category 3 
engines installed on U.S. vessels only.68 The regulated parties are 
mainly the manufacturers of Category 3 marine diesel engines,69 
most of which are incorporated in Finland, Germany, and Japan.70 
The U.S. vessel manufacturing industry is affected only to the extent 
that domestic vessel manufacturers have to adapt vessel designs and 
manufacturing processes to the new engine designs.71 
                                                 
meet Tier III standards: selective catalytic reduction, humid air motor, and liquefied 
natural gas engine. Jerzy Herdzik, Emissions from Marine Engines Versus IMO 
Certification and Requirements of Tier 3, 18 J. KONES POWERTRAIN & TRANS. 161, 
165-66 (2011) (IMO’s Tier III standards would require sharp increase in the 
development of new control systems adapted to the operation of compliant marine 
engines). 
65   MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 5, Regulation 1, ¶ 1; MARPOL 
Regulation 13, ¶ 7.3; MARPOL Appendix I, Form of International Air Pollution 
Prevention (IAPP) Certificate (Regulation 8). 
66   DET NORSKE VERITAS (DNV), supra note 49, at 9 (later onboard 
verification procedures are initially decided by the engine manufacturer). 
67   Category 3 engines refer to compression-ignition engines at or 
above 30 liters per cylinder. See 40 C.F.R. § 94, 1042 (2010). 
68   40 C.F.R. § 94.1 (b)(2). See also Bluewater Network v. EPA, 372 F.3d 
404, 412-13 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (upholding the EPA’s decision not to regulate 
Category 3 on foreign-flagged vessels because of particular deference to agency 
decision under the Clean Air Act).   
69   U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS: 
CONTROL OF EMISSION OF AIR POLLUTION FROM CATEGORY 3 MARINE DIESEL 
ENGINES (2009), pt. 1 at 5-6, pt. 8 at 3.  
70   Id. 
71   Id. 
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For foreign vessels, the NOx emissions are instead controlled 
directly through implementing ECAs.72 Hence, the compliance of 
foreign vessels with NOx emission standards relies largely on whether 
their countries of registry have given effect to Annex VI through 
legislation. The U.S. EPA plays only a secondary role in the sense 
that it has no direct control over the upstream regulatory necessities, 
viz., engine designs of the vessels that are registered and 
manufactured in foreign countries. As such, an “administrative 
vacuum” exists in enforcing Regulation 13 on foreign vessels.73 
II.         CHALLENGES OF ENFORCING ANNEX VI: AN UNEVEN 
GLOBAL REGULATIVE LANDSCAPE 
In the United States, APPS sets a rather low threshold for 
finding criminal liability, risking the efficiency and economy of the 
administrative enforcement process. In most foreign countries that 
are major maritime trading partners with the United States, however, 
Annex VI has not been fully enforced. The disparity between the 
compliance environments at calling ports in different countries needs 
to be addressed to minimize the enforcement cost borne by the 
United States in implementing Annex VI. 
A.         “Knowing Violation” as the Legal Threshold for Finding 
Criminal Liability 
The owner or other parties involved in a non-compliant 
foreign flagged vessel who “knowingly violates” MARPOL would be 
criminally charged. 74  But APPS provides no other language to 
substantiate the threshold of “knowing violation.” The EPA 
guidelines indicate indirectly that criminal liability could be found if 
the ship has previously reported non-availability of compliant fuel oil, 
or if insufficient quantity of compliant fuel oil is obtained at U.S. 
ports even though the ship operator knows that the vessel will return 
                                                 
72   40 C.F.R., Summary III, A.  
73   See generally Snyder, supra note 4, at 1072-80 (criticizing EPA’s 
Category 3 rule as inadequate for not extending to foreign vessels).  
74   33 U.S.C. § 1908 (a) (2008). 
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to the ECA and complaint fuel oil is unavailable outside the ECA.75 
The EPA also refuses to consider the cost of compliant fuel oil as a 
relevant factor to establish “unavailability.”76 
Recent cases regarding enforcement of MARPOL on foreign 
vessels indicate that federal courts are unlikely to limit finding 
criminal liability, especially when the violation is caused by an 
affirmative action, as opposed to omissions. In United States v. Pena, 
the court confirmed the conviction of a surveyor of an institute 
organized in Florida for failing to conduct the required survey under 
MARPOL Annex I of a Panamanian-flagged vessel.77 The court 
found “knowing violation” was established when the non-compliant 
performance of the ship had been in place for months and the 
defendant surveyor did not test the parts of the ship that he knew 
were not functional.78 
MARPOL Annex I was enforced in a more aggressive 
manner in United States v. Sanford Ltd.79 Defendant Sanford is a 
fishing company incorporated in New Zealand and transports cargo 
to U.S ports on a regular basis. Sanford was charged, inter alia, for not 
recording discharges of oily bilge water in the vessel’s Oil Record 
Book (ORB), even though such omission occurred in the high seas 
before entering U.S. water and would not necessarily result in 
criminal liability under the MARPOL enforcement regulations in 
New Zealand.80 The court upheld the conviction on two grounds. 
First, although finding APPS does not intend to apply 
extraterritorially, the court reasoned that the triggering point of the 
violation is “at the moment a vessel enters a U.S. port with an 
                                                 
75   See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INTERIM GUIDANCE ON THE 
NON-AVAILABILITY OF COMPLIANT FUEL OIL FOR THE NORTH AMERICAN 
EMISSION CONTROL AREA (2012), at 8.  
76   Id. at 5. 
77   United States v. Pena, 684 F.3d 1137, 1143-44 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. 
denied, 2013 U.S. LEXIS 573 (2013) (upholding U.S. jurisdiction over foreign 
flagged vessels).   
78   Pena, 684 F.3d, 1152-53. 
79   United States v. Sanford Ltd., 880 F. Supp. 2d 9, 11 (D.C. 2012) 
(finding that the law-of-the-flag doctrine does not bar the U.S. Government from 
prosecuting defendants for their violations of MARPOL implemented by the Act 
to Prevent Pollution from Ships). 
80   Id. at 12. 
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inaccurate ORB” rather than when the omission occurred.81 Second, 
the court held that the defense of being subjected unfairly to the 
peculiar rules of a foreign sovereign does not prevail when the U.S. 
and foreign regulations for implementing MARPOL are “on their 
face . . . functionally identical.”82 However, the court narrowed this 
holding to cases where the regulations of the United States and the 
foreign country are unlikely to be in conflict.83 The court noted 
implicitly that a “balancing of the delicate and important interests of 
comity and sovereignty” might be needed in some cases.84 
In a similar case, United States v. Ionia Mgmt. S.A.,85 defendant 
Ionia, incorporated in Liberia and headquartered in Greece, was 
convicted for making false entries in the ORB to conceal illegal 
discharges of oily wastewater and obstructing a federal investigation. 
The court upheld the order of forty-eight months of probation, a 
corrective ship management plan, and a fine of $4.9 million (USD).86 
The court held that the amount of the criminal fine, although not 
calculated based on the sentencing guidelines, was nevertheless 
reasonable given the culpability of the violation.87 The sentencing 
was enforced through several hearings during the subsequent three 
years.88 
B.         Enforcement of Annex VI Outside the United States: China 
as an Example 
                                                 
81   Id. at 14-15.  
82   Id. at 21-23 (finding the discrepancies as to the interpretation of 
“machinery space” insufficient to support a finding of material difference between 
the U.S. and New Zealand regulations). 
83   Sanford Ltd., 880 F. Supp. 2d, 22. 
84   Id. 
85   United States v. Ionia Mgmt. S.A., 555 F.3d 303, 305 (2d Cir. 2009).  
86   Id. at 310. 
87   Id. 
88   See United States v. Ionia Mgmt. S.A., No. 3:07-CR-134 (JBA), 2011 
WL 5304117 (D. Conn. Nov. 1, 2011); United States v. Ionia Mgmt. S.A., No. 3:07-
CR-134 (JBA), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126089 (D. Conn. Oct. 28, 2011); United 
States v. Ionia Mgmt. S.A., No. 3:07-CR-134 (JBA), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87122 
(D. Conn. Aug. 3, 2011); United States v. Ionia Mgmt. S.A., No. 3:07-CR-134 
(JBA), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12996 (C. Conn. Feb. 9, 2011); United States v. Ionia 
Mgmt. S.A., No. 3:07-CR-134 (JBA), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109063 (D. Conn. 
Oct. 11, 2010); United States v. Ionia Mgmt. S.A., No. 3:07-CR-134(JBA), 2009 
WL 3074727 (D. Conn. Sept. 22, 2009). 
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The benefits of implementing Annex VI will be fully realized 
only when both U.S. and foreign vessels actually operate under the 
same environmental standards.89 Not all countries, however, perceive 
air emissions from marine vessels as a significant pollution source as 
the United States does.90 A review of regulations and policies on air 
pollution control in China, an example of one of the largest 
waterborne trading partners with the United States,91 shows that 
such foreign countries are unlikely to enact legislation in the near 
term to implement Annex VI as stringently as the United States. 
China has not enacted particular laws or regulations to 
implement Annex VI,92 and will not do so, at least, until after 2015. 
                                                 
89   See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 69, pt. 6 at 1.  
90   Although the prioritization of sectors targeted in a country’s air 
pollution control strategy is not always “objective,” numbers do found a persuasive 
basis. In the United States, the transport sector contributes to about 54% of total 
NOx emissions. ANDREW AULISI ET AL., GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS TRADING 
IN U.S. STATES: OBSERVATIONS AND LESSONS FROM THE OZONE TRANSPORT 
COMMISSION (OTC) NOX BUDGET PROGRAM 3 (Margaret B. Yamashita ed., World 
Resources Institute, 2005), available at http://www.wri.org/sites/default/files/pdf/ 
nox_ghg.pdf (estimation based on inventory data released in EPA reports 
reviewing the performance of OTC NOx Budget Program); see also The 2011 
National Emissions Inventory, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (last updated on Dec. 24, 
2013), http://www.epa.gov/ttn/chief/net/2011 inventory.html (emission sources 
from transport sector contributes about 62% to the total NOx emissions from fuel 
combustion, gas stations, industrial processes, and road and non-road mobile 
sources). In other countries, the transport sector may contribute less to the total air 
pollutant emission by percentage than that in the United States due to the 
differences in industrial structure. In China, for example, the transport sector 
contributes only about 9% to the total NOx emissions in 2005. J. Xing et al., 
Projections of Air Pollutant Emissions and Its Impacts on Regional Air Quality in China in 
2020, 11 ATMOSPHERIC CHEMISTRY AND PHYSICS 3119, 3129 (2011), available at 
http://www.atmos-chem-phys.net/11/3119/2011/acp-11-3119-2011.html. The 
major source of NOx emissions is instead power plants. Id. at 3128. 
91   The waterborne container trade between China and the United 
States was at 29,477,025 TEUs in 2012. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., U.S. Waterborne 
Foreign Container Trade by Trading Partners (Sept 26, 2013), http://www. 
marad.dot.gov/library_landing_page/data_and_statistics/Data_and_Statistics.htm 
(last visited Oct. 21, 2013). 
92   China ratified MARPOL Annex VI in 2010. Status of Conventions, 
INT’L MAR. ORG., http://www.imo.org/About/ 
Conventions/StatusOfConventions/Pages/Default.aspx (last updated Sept. 30, 
2012). Ratifying parties “shall co-operate” in enforcement the provisions of this 
Annex. MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 5, Regulation 11, ¶1.  
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Only a set of quasi-regulative rules promulgated by the Ministry of 
Transport in 2010 requires that ships should hold certificates issued 
by the Marine Administration in accordance with international 
treaties that the Chinese government entered into or ratified. 93 
However, this 2010 rule does not make reference to MARPOL 
Annex VI or specify what certificates the ships should hold. 94 
Provisions of the 2010 rule are so generally stated that its on-the-
ground enforcement cannot be realized until the adoption of more 
specific regulations or plans.95 
Moreover, the approach employed by Chinese policies is 
rather different from the MARPOL approach to control air emission 
from waterborne transport. Once the numbers of national emission 
caps and energy saving objectives are established96 for every five-year 
planning period,97 the air pollution control policies for different 
sectors and sub-sectors are essentially allocations of the national 
goal.98 Hence, air emissions from the marine transport sector are 
                                                 
93   Zhonghua renming gongheguo chuanbo jiqi youguan zuoye 
huodong wuran haiyang huanjing fangzhi guanli guiding (中华人民共和国船舶及
其有关作业活动污染海洋环境防治管理规定) [Management Provisions on 
Preventing Pollution of Marine Environment from Ships and Related Activities of 
the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Ministry of Transport, Oct. 8, 
2010, effective Feb. 1, 2011), art. 1, 5, http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2010-
12/02/content _1758149.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2015).  
94   Id.  
95   See Nengye Liu & Frank Maes, Prevention of Vessel-Source Marine 
Pollution: A Note on the Challenges and Prospects for Chinese Practice under International Law, 
42 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L LAW 356, 358-59 (2011), available at 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00908320.2011.619373 - 
.Usf9sRr8U5s. 
96   See Guowuyuan guanyu yingfa shi’erwu jieneng jianpai zonghexing 
gongzuo fang’an de tongzhi (国务院关于印发”十二五”节能减排综合性工作方
案的通知) [State Council’s Notification on Promulgating the Integrated Work Plan 
for Energy Saving and Emission Reduction for the Twelfth Five Year] 
(promulgated by the State Council Aug. 31, 2011, No. 26), available at 
http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2011-09/07/content_1941731.htm.  
97   See The First Ten Five-Year Plans of the People’s Republic of China, THE 
CENTRAL PEOPLE’S GOV’T OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Mar. 20, 2006), 
http://www.gov.cn/test/ 2006-03/20/content_231421.htm.  
98   See Andrew C. Mertha, China’s “Soft” Centralization: Shipfting 
Tiao/Kuai Authority Relations, 184 CHINA QUARTERLY 791, 796-800 (2005), available 
at http://falcon.arts. cornell.edu/am847/pdf/Soft%20Centralization%20Final.pdf; 
see also Chenggang Xu, The Fundamental Institutions of China’s Reforms and Development, 
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regulated based on the total amount of emissions for specified 
pollutants and reduction in energy consumption, rather than 
prescribing standards for marine fuels and diesel engines as 
MARPOL Annex VI does.99 Currently, China is in the twelfth five-
year planning period, which runs from 2011 until 2015. 100  The 
Twelfth Five-Year Plan for Energy Saving and Emission Reduction, 
one of the master national policies for this planning period, sets a 
target of reducing energy consumption of vessels for marine and 
inland waterway transportation by 10% to 6.29 kilograms of coal 
equivalent per ton of goods per 1,000 kilometers by 2015.101 
                                                 
49(4) J. ECON. LITERATURE 1076, 1082-84, 1086-92 (2011), available at 
www.sef.hku.hk/~cgxu/04_Xu.pdf (the functioning of Chinese government is not 
a mixture of de facto federal state and a centralized regime: regional 
decentralization exists as to economic governance, while other political and policy 
decision-making processes follows closer to an authoritarian regime).  
99   See Jiakuai tuijin luse xunhuan ditan jiaotong yunshu fazhan zhidao 
yijian (加快推进绿色循环低碳交通运输发展指导意见) [Guiding Principles on 
Promoting Green Low-Carbon Transport Development] (promulgated by the 
Ministry of Transport, No. 323, May 22, 2013) (“Guiding principles (zhidao yijian)” are 
less rigid policies than “Opinions (yijian).”), available at Ministry of Transport website: 
http://www.moc.gov.cn/2006/jiaotongjj/07jiaotjnw/wenjiangg/201305/t2013052
7_1417741.html;(2013年运输行业节能减排工作要点) [Key Tasks for Energy 
Saving and Emission Reduction in 2013 in Transport Sector] (promulgated by the 
Ministry of Transport, No. 37, Jan. 10, 2013), available at 
http://www.moc.gov.cn/2006/jiaotongjj/ 
07jiaotjnw/wenjiangg/201301/t20130118_1356606.html; Gonglu shuilu jiaotong 
yunshu jieneng jianpai shi’erwu guihua (公路水路交通运输节能减排”十二五”规
划) [The Twelfth Five-Year Plan for Energy Saving and Emission Reduction in 
Road and Water Transportation] (promulgated by the Ministry of Transport, July 8, 
2011), available at 
http://www.moc.gov.cn/zhuzhan/zhengcejiedu/guihuajiedu/shierwuguihuaJD/xi
angguanzhengcefagui/201110/t20111010_1064457.html. 
100   See Guomin jingji he shehui fazhan di shierge wunian guihua 
gangyao (国民经济和社会发展第十二个五年规划纲要) [The Outline of the 
Twelfth Five-Year Plan for Social and Economic Development] (promulgated by 
the State Council, Mar. 16, 2011), available at http://www.gov.cn/ 
2011lh/content_1825838_2.htm. 
101   Jieneng jianpai shi’erwu guihua (节能减排”十二五”规划) [The 
Twelfth Five-Year Plan for Energy Saving and Emission Reduction] (promulgated 
by the State Council, No. 40, Aug. 6, 2012), Table 1, available at 
http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2012/content_2217291.htm (last visited 
Oct. 22, 2013).  
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Subsequently, the Ministry of Transport (MoT) announced in 
the sector’s leading policy102 that building green ports would be a 
major task during the twelfth five-year planning period. This “green 
port” policy trickles down to retrofitting port infrastructures to use 
alternative powers in place of diesel fuel, including upgrading rubber-
tired gantry to use electricity instead of fuel,103 scaling up the use of 
shorepower and solar power at ports, and establishing automatic 
management systems to monitor energy consumption on vessels.104 
Government funding for such projects generally shall be no more 
than ¥10 million (RMB), according to the Temporary Management 
Measures for Special Funding for Energy Saving and Emission 
Reduction Projects in the Transport Sector issued jointly by the 
MOT and the Ministry of Finance.105 
                                                 
102   Gonglu shuilu jiaotong yunshu jieneng jianpai shi’erwu guihua (公
路水路交通运输节能减排”十二五”规划) [The Twelfth Five-Year Plan for 
Energy Saving and Emission Reduction in Road and Water Transportation] 
(promulgated by the Ministry of Transport, July 8, 2011), section 4, sub-section 7, 
available at http://www.moc.gov.cn/zhuzhan/ 
zhengcejiedu/guihuajiedu/shierwuguihuaJD/xiangguanzhengcefagui/201110/t201
11010_1064457.html (last visited Oct 22, 2013) 
103   Rubber-tiered gantry (RTG), also called transtainer, is a mobile 
gantry crane used for stacking containers at container terminals. Diesel rubber-tired 
gantry (RTG) can represent a large percentage of a port’s total fuel consumption. 
Electricity-powered RTGs offer a promising alternative in face of the increasing 
price of diesel fuel and more stringent ambient air standards. The cost of 
converting a diesel RTG to an electric cable reel connected one is approximately 
$250,000. The effectiveness of such fuel-to-electricity conversion depends primarily 
on the availability of electrical infrastructures connecting to the port, the remaining 
service life of the RTG, and how much the RTG is used. ELEC. POWER RESEARCH 
INST., ELECTRIC CABLE REEL RUBBER-TIRED GANTRY CRANES: COSTS AND 
BENEFITS 1, 4 (2010), available at 
http://www.epri.com/abstracts/Pages/ProductAbstract.aspx?ProductId=0000000
00001020646. 
104   Id.  
105   Jiaotong yunshu jieneng jianpai zhuanxiang zijin guanli zhanxing 
banfa (交通运输节能减排专项资金管理暂行办法) [Temporary Management 
Measures for Special Funding for Energy Saving and Emission Reduction Projects 
in the Transport Sector] (issued by the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of 
Transport, No. 374, June 20, 2011), chapter 2, art. 7, available at 
http://jjs.mof.gov.cn/ 
zhengwuxinxi/tongzhigonggao/201107/t20110704_570700.html. 
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Recently, the Chinese government heightened the sulfur 
content standard for marine fuel oils. Under the new standard, the 
maximum sulfur content of fuel oils shall be 3.5% m/m,106 which 
comports with Regulation 14 of Annex VI for ships operating 
outside ECAs.107 Thus, even if all ships registered in China use fuel 
oils with less than 3.5% m/m sulfur content, many of them would 
still fail the U.S. standard since virtually all U.S. waters are in ECAs, 
where the sulfur content of fuel oils should be less than 1.00% m/m 
starting from July 1, 2010108 and 0.10% m/m starting from 2015.109 
The above review of policies and regulations shows that 
marine vessels have not moved to the top of the air-cleaning agenda 
of the Chinese government. 110  Any further legislation or 
policymaking to give effect to the terms of MARPOL Annex VI in 
China would probably only take place during the next planning 
period at the earliest, viz., after 2015. Given this timing, China would 
have to implement the most stringent emission standards provided in 
Regulation 13 and 14 by the implementation schedule specified in 
Annex VI to be comparable with U.S. standards.111 
C.         Deficiencies of the Current Enforcement Mechanism 
1.  Deficiencies on a global scale. - A compliance environment 
that exposes foreign ships with rotating crews, trading at different 
ports where the stringency of a treaty is approached differently, poses 
                                                 
106   Chuanyong ranliaoyou (船用燃料油) [Marine Fuel Oil Standard] 
(issued by the General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and 
Quarantine, Standardization Administration, GB/T 17411-2012, July 1, 2013).   
107   MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 5, Regulation 14, ¶1.2. 
108   Id. ¶ 4.2. 
109   Id. ¶ 4.3. 
110   See also Qiang Zhang et al., Cleaning China’s Air, 484 NATURE 161, 
161-62 (2012) (curbing emissions from power plants and coal consumption in 
general remains the priority for tackling air emission for China given the country’s 
continued rapid economic growth, even though tremendous governmental efforts 
have been made to raise the operational standards for coal-fired power plants).  
111   Recall that starting from January 1, 2015, the sulfur content of fuel 
oil used on board ships shall be less than 0.10% m/m and Tier III standard for 
NOx emission would start to apply in ECAs for engines installed on ships that are 
constructed on or after January 1, 2016. MARPOL Regulation 13, ¶ 5.1.2; 
MARPOL Regulation 14, ¶ 4.3. Again, MARPOL needs to be cited to earlier (see 
earlier notes) or if this is MARPOL VI it needs to be cited as such. 
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a daunting management challenge. 112  The uneven enforcement 
landscape for MARPOL Annex VI is the quintessence of a 
“prisoner’s dilemma” situation 113  for which international 
environmental conventions that are not self-executing are often 
criticized.114 If ratifying countries do not take enforcement measures 
of similar stringency, 115  some countries could obtain economic 
                                                 
112   See, e.g., Claudia Copeland, Cruise Ship Pollution: Background, Laws and 
Regulations, and Key Issues, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 26 (2010), 
http://www. eoearth.org/view/article/51dac6ac5948612528000716/ (the General 
Accounting Office found that the process for referring cruise ship violations to 
other countries does not appear to be working and recommended that the IMO 
encourage member countries to respond when pollution cases are referred to 
them). 
113   The Prisoner’s Dilemma was initially developed by Merrill Flood 
and Melvin Dresher in 2950, later named by A.W. Tucker. Paul W. Grimm & 
Heather Leigh Williams, The Judicial Beatings Will Continue Until Moral Improves: The 
Prisoner’s Dilemma of Cooperative Discovery and Proposals for Improved Morale, 43 U. BALT. 
L.F. 107, 108-09 (2013) [hereinafter Grimm & Williams, Judicial Beatings] (citing to 
Robert Axelrod’s book “The Evolution of Cooperation”). The Prisoner’s Dilemma 
is one of the models in the game theory trying to explain how self-interested, 
rational individuals interact in a collective decision-making process. MARTIN J. 
OSBORNE & ARIEL RUBINSTEIN, A COURSE IN GAME THEORY 15-18 (1994). It 
involves a scenario where two prisoners, retained separately under interrogation, 
must decide whether to keep silent or to confess. Grimm & Williams, Judicial 
Beatings, 43 U. BALT. L.F. 107, 108 (2013). Under the theoretical model of 
Prisoner’s Dilemma, the rationality exercised by individuals for their best interests, 
instead of leading to a scenario where all individuals’ interests are maximized, 
instead tends to lead to inefficient resource allocation, suboptimal environmental 
standards, and hence harms the overall welfare of the group of individuals. See 
Kirsten H. Engle, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a “Race” and Is It “To 
the Bottom”? 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271, 275-76 (1997).   
114   See ROSS A. KLEIN, GETTING A GRIP ON CRUISE SHIP POLLUTION, 
FRIENDS OF THE EARTH, 17-28 (2009), 
http://www.foe.org/sites/default/files/CruiseShipReport_Klein.pdf (criticizing 
MARPOL for not being self-executing resulting in its low on-the-ground 
effectiveness); John Charles Kunich, Fiddling Around While the Hotspots Burn Out, 14 
GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 179, 191 (2001) (the Convention on Biological 
Diversity is another example where the Convention carries no real consequences 
for those ratifying countries which take no action, such as domestic legislation, to 
enforce the terms of this international agreement).  
115   See Robert W. Hahn & Kenneth R. Richards, The Internationalization 
of Environmental Regulation, 30 HARV. INT’L L.J. 421, 429 (1989) (country has 
incentive to develop a competitive advantage in industrial production by enjoying 
the benefits of the other countries’ environmental protection activities, while taking 
limited action at home country).  
2015 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 4:1 
580 
advantages by holding to more relaxed environmental standards 
intentionally. 116  This “race to the bottom” phenomenon, or 
“reluctance to move to the top” phenomenon, in response to 
regulations on maritime safety and pollution has already been 
observed in the international shipping industry.117 Therefore, if land-
based transport routes are available to replace certain sections of 
marine transport routes, the business interests of U.S. ports would 
likely be adversely affected by the heightened environmental 
standards, which often implicate increased operational cost for 
shipping.118 
                                                 
116   See Peter P. Swire, The Race to Laxity and the Race to Undesirability: 
Explaining Failures in Competition Among Jurisdictions in Environmental Law, 14 YALE L. 
& POL’Y REV. 67, 80-82 (1996) (states respond to the interstate competition for 
industry by lowering regulatory standards forming a “race to the bottom” 
phenomenon, which might be remedied by promulgating federal laws); but see 
Karen Palmer et al., Tightening Environmental Standards: The Benefit-Cost or the No-Cost 
Paradigm, 9(4) J. ECON. PERSP. 119, 129-30 (1995) (arguing generally that no clear 
evidence to establish the conclusion that higher environmental regulation in the 
United States has a large adverse effect on economic competitiveness on U.S. 
firms, especially considering that the stringency of U.S. environmental regulations is 
actually similar to that of European regulations).  
117   Alan Khee-Jin Tan, VESSEL-SOURCE MARINE POLLUTION: THE 
LAW AND POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL REGULATION 7 (James Crawford & John 
S. Bell eds., 1st ed. 2006) (whenever any actor in the shipping industry tries to 
maintain safety and pollution prevention standards, he is faced with the prospect of 
losing business to cheaper standards; as a result, the proliferation of new rules and 
regulations confers a competitive advantage on sub-standard operators). But the 
other countries disadvantaged by the “race to the bottom” might push legislation to 
raise the environmental standard globally, when their firms already developed or 
have the capacity to develop the advanced manufacturing technologies to achieve 
such higher standards, to turn themselves back to the leadership in the industry. See 
RIMA MICKEVICIENE, THE ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY OF GLOBALIZATION 202, 216 
(Piotr Pachura eds. 1st ed. 2011) (a large part of technical innovations in the 
shipbuilding industry has to be presented in relation to the goal of reducing exhaust 
gas emissions).   
118   See Erin Tanimura, Pacific Merchant II’s Dormant Commerce Clause 
Ruling: Expanding State Control over Commerce Through Environmental Regulation, 47 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 419, 421-26 (2013) (arguing that the court’s ruling in favor of 
California’s more stringent air emission standards on ships would disadvantage 
business and commercial interests as these standards would increase the operational 
cost by $30,000 (USD) per call); Harilaos N. Psaraftis & Christos A. Kontovas, 
Balancing the Economic and Environmental Performance of Marine Transportation, 
TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH PART D 15, 458, 459 (2010) (a side-effect of 
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Theoretically, the threat of civil penalties and criminal 
punishment would induce the shipping industry, and eventually the 
shipbuilding manufacturing industry, to modify their practice as a 
whole to internalize the business externalities, viz., the environmental 
and health impacts caused by air emissions from marine vessels.119 
But before reaching that point, the industries have to first internalize 
the increased shipping costs due to delays in voyages to obtain 
compliant fuels,120 or otherwise face possible civil penalties. The 
industry tends to respond by using cost-saving measures that usually 
require less capital investment than new engine designs or ship 
retrofitting.121 Generally speaking, under the pressure of both the 
higher environmental standards and continued preference of cheaper 
carriers from powerful clients such as oil companies,122 ship owners 
would choose to register their international vessels in countries where 
MARPOL is implemented much less seriously,123 even though no 
differentiated treatment based on flag state is afforded officially,124 
hire cheaper and usually ill-trained seafarers who are more likely to 
cause environmental violations, and demand standard quality ships to 
                                                 
requiring speed reduction, a way to reduce ship emissions, in short but sometimes 
deep sea shipping may induce a shift to more environmentally intrusive land-based 
transport modes).  
119   See Stephen J. Darmody, The Oil Pollution Act’s Criminal Penalties: On 
a Collision Course with the Law of the Sea, 21 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 89, 118-21 
(1993). 
120   See infra text accompanying notes 127-34. 
121   See generally Nikopoulou et al., supra note 9, at 145 (for a Selective 
Catalytic Reduction system for NOx control, a 2.7 years of payback period is 
required for 100% return on investment; for a Humid Air Motor system for NOx 
control, a 3.8 years of payback period is needed for a 51% return on investment for 
a new ship, and a 4.2 years of payback period is needed for a 37% return on 
investment for retrofitting).   
122   KHEE-JIN TAN, supra note 117, at 40 (the volatile freight rates 
during the past few decades have caused oil companies to count for the cheapest 
available rate at any time, and therefore tend to favor sub-standard operators).  
123   See generally DEP’T OF TRANSP., COMPARISON OF U.S. AND 
FOREIGN-FLAG OPERATING COSTS 68-69 (2011), available at 
http://www.marad.dot.gov/documents/Comparison_of_US_and_Foreign_Flag_
Operating_Costs.pdf (the higher environmental costs when operating in the United 
States is one main reason accounting for the higher operational costs incurred by 
U.S. flagged vessels than foreign-flagged vessels). 
124   See 33 U.S.C. § 1902 (5)(A), (B) (2008). 
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be delivered at the lowest price possible.125 In response, shipbuilders 
often use cheaper materials, rendering ships more vulnerable.126 
For different reasons, including the limited time and 
resources of administrative agencies to undertake thorough 
inspections or bring prosecutions, or simply “good luck,”127 the 
number of vessels that operate in full contravention with MARPOL 
remains “unacceptably high,” both in the United States 128  and 
internationally.129 Apparently, some vessels are still able to continue 
business as usual by taking the risk of being caught then 
implementing those cost-saving measures discussed above. 130 
Arguably, one reason for the large number of violations could be that 
the punishment is not severe enough to carry a sufficient deference 
effect. However, given the precedents of imposing a criminal fine in 
the millions of dollars,131 a more plausible inference should be that 
the MARPOL standards have not operated in synergy with the 
economics of the maritime transport sector.132 In fact, this lack-of-
                                                 
125   KHEE-JIN TAN, supra note 117, at 6. 
126   Id. 
127   See ROSS A. KLEIN, supra note 114 (many reports of MARPOL 
violation have come from citizen observations and therefore detection of violations 
could be missed, unless the cruise ship staff and the company for which they work 
report voluntarily); Jeanne M. Grasso & Gregory F. Linsin, United States: Current 
Trends in MARPOL Enforcement – Higher Fines, More Jail Time, The Banning of Ships, and 
Whistleblowers Galore, MONDAQ (Oct. 7, 2011), 
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/148086/Marine+Shipping/Current+Tre
nds+In+MARPOL+Enforcement+Higher+Fines+More+Jail+Time+The+Banni
ng+Of+Ships+And+Whistleblowers+Galore (more than 50% of the MARPOL 
cases in recent years stem from whistleblowers making reports to the Coast Guard). 
But the number of whistleblowers for Annex VI violations might decrease as it 
would be rather difficult to detect excessive air emission with naked eyes.  
128   David P. Keho, United States v. Abrogar: Did the Third Circuit Miss the 
Boat? 39 ENVTL. L. 1, 41 (2009). 
129   ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV. (OECD), COST 
SAVINGS STEMMING FROM NON-COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS IN THE MARITIME SECTOR 47 (2003). 
130   See generally id. at 4 (about 5,000 to 7,500 substandard commercial 
vessels are engaged in international trade). 
131   Ionia, 555 F.3d at 310 (imposing a fine of $4.9 million (USD)).  
132   This inference should not be simply rephrased as “the compliance 
cost is too high.” Virtually no regulated party would ever gratefully applaud the 
reasonableness or inexpensiveness of compliance measures. The meaning of 
“synergy” can be understood from two perspectives: monetary cost and the 
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synergy could well be the reason for IMO to finally consider and 
agree with delaying the implementation of Tier III standards for NOx 
emission for five years. The industry is frustrated with this expensive 
“green storm.”133 More incentives in the enforcement regime for 
compliance with MARPOL seem to be needed.134 
                                                 
prevalence of technologies to achieve compliance in the regulated industry. Of 
course, the rare availability of necessary technologies that can be commercialized in 
the market is accountable for the high monetary cost. See THEO NOTTEBOOM ET 
AL., supra note 41, at 70-71 (concluding based on analysis of European shipping 
industry that Annex VI requirements may be quite costly for the shipping industry, 
driving up the cost by 25.5% to 40% depending on the specific type of low-sulfur 
fuel used).  
133   Remarks of Christopher Koch, President & CEO of the World 
Shipping Council, World Trade Association of Philadelphia 2 (Nov. 8, 2013), 
available at http://www.worldshipping.org/public-
statements/CLK_Philadelphia_Speech__November_8_2013.pdf (criticizing 
MARPOL Annex VI as “the single most expensive environmental regulation the 
shipping industry has ever faced”). 
134   See KHEE-JIN TAN, supra note 117, at 17 (MARPOL is far from 
really working).  
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2.  Deficiencies viewed from the perspective of foreign flagged vessels. - 
One chief concern has been the non-availability of low-sulfur fuels 
since IMO’s adoption of Annex VI. In the final working group report 
to IMO Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) at the 
57th session meeting in 2008, the International Petroleum Industry 
Environmental Conservation Association135 cautioned that the oil 
industry did not expect marine fuels at 0.10% and 0.50% sulfur 
content would be available to all regions by desired dates of 2015 and 
2020, respectively.136 
The availability of low-sulfur fuel under the scenario of full 
compliance with MARPOL Annex VI is too complex an issue to be 
generalized by a “yes” or “no” conclusion.137 The prediction of 
availability depends on the combination of multiple factors including 
the enforcement area, fuel price, cargo load, volume of pre-purchased 
fuels under the contracts between vessel operators and fuel suppliers, 
projected capacity of refineries, shipping route, number of suppliers 
at specific ports, and the type of fuel used. 138  Although some 
                                                 
135   The Int’l Petroleum Industry Envtl. Conservation Ass’n (IPIECA) 
is the global oil and gas industry association for environmental and social issues 
veering over half of the world’s oil production, formed in 1974 following the 
launch of the United Nations Environment Program. IPIECA is the industry’s 
principal channel of communication with the United Nations. About Us, IPIECA: 
THE GLOBAL OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL AND 
SOCIAL ISSUES (2013), http://www.ipieca.org/about-us. 
136   See IMO, Prevention of Air Pollution from Ships: Report of the Working 
Group on Annex VI and the NOx Technical Code, MEPC 57th Session Agenda Item 4, 
MEPC 57/WP.7 (Apr. 4, 2008); see also MARPOL Annex VI Revision Signals New 
Low-Emissions Era, Annex VI Special Report (May 19, 2008), available at 
http://www.bunkerworld.com/news/magazine.download?magazine_item_id=120 
(Linda K. Wright, Global Director at ExxonMobil Marine Fuels, warned at the 
29th International Bunker Conference held in April 2008 that there is no guarantee 
that sufficient low-sulfur fuel will be available and the oil industry’s misgivings 
about the significant refinery investment cost associated with producing more low-
sulfur fuels). 
137   See TETRA TECH, LOW-SULFUR FUEL AVAILABILITY STUDY 2-3, 11 
(2008), 
http://www.portoflosangeles.org/DOC/REPORT_Fuel_Availability_Study_Final
_041408.pdf. 
138   See id. at 53-60, 62-67, 76; MICHELLE KOMLENIC ET AL., 
EVALUATION OF THE AVAILABILITY OF LOW SULFUR MARINE DISTILLATE FUEL 
FOR OCEAN-GOING VESSELS THAT VISIT CALIFORNIA 9-12 (2008), available at 
http://www.arb.ca.gov/regact/2008/fuelogv08/ appffuel.pdf. 
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estimation findings are more optimistic than others, the common 
conclusion is that low-sulfur fuel (less than 0.5% m/m sulfur 
content) shortages exist mainly in Central and South America and 
Asia, especially in China,139 Japan, and Korea.140 
Ideally, port states should exercise their responsibilities under 
Annex VI to formally establish equivalents, such as add-on exhaust 
cleaning systems to reduce air emissions, which vessels shall use in 
case of non-availability of low-sulfur fuels.141 Absent such formal 
recognition of alternative compliance measures, the solution to avoid 
regulative penalties would be to store up compliant fuels at ports 
along the voyage when compliant fuel is available. However, for 
foreign flagged ships which are registered in countries where low-
sulfur fuel is likely to be unavailable and do not have predictable 
schedules to visit U.S. ports, they seem to have little incentive to 
purchase more low-sulfur fuel than what is necessary to sail out of 
the ECA.142 When such vessels decide to visit U.S. ports again, they 
may have to change planned voyages to buy low-sulfur fuel since the 
compliant fuel is unlikely to be readily available at their departing 
terminals.143 Otherwise, they would likely face criminal charges for a 
“knowing violation” in the United States.144 
                                                 
139   Low-Sulfur Marine Fuel in the Pipeline, CHINA DAILY (Sept. 4, 2010, 
10:56 AM), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2012-
09/04/content_15731857.htm (PetroChina planned to expand its provision of low-
sulfur bunker to Yangshan port near Shanghai to satisfy increased demand). 
140   See TETRA TECH, supra note 137, at 68-72; DET NORSKE VERITAS 
(DNV), supra note 49, at 15 (highly uncertain as to whether the availability of low 
sulfur fuel will be adequate in worldwide ports); KOMLENIC ET AL., supra note 138, 
at 57; Starcrest Consulting Grp., Evaluation of Low Sulfur Marine Fuel Availability 
– Pacific Rim 3 (2005), available at http://webcache.googleuser 
content.com/search?q=cache:E8b1JJZr3g4J:www.portoflosangeles.org/DOC/RE
PORT_Fuel_Study_Pacific_Rim_Exec_Sum.pdf+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us.  
141   MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 5, Regulation 4, ¶ 1. 
142   See generally Deal, supra note 41, at 4 (ECA compliant fuel, blend of 
marine distillates and ultra low sulfur diesel, is about 25% to 30% more expensive 
than the marine distillate fuel that is currently used in TOTE ships). 
143   See id. (there is currently not enough distillate fuel to meet global 
demand for the world’s entire commercial fleet to switch from residual fuel oil to 
distillate fuel to meet fuel standards when operating in ECAs). 
144   See supra text companying notes 73-87. 
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Additionally, shipping companies have been using “slow-
steaming,” a technique that emerged along with the soaring fuel 
prices in 2002 and global environmental movement for greenhouse 
gas reduction, to reduce fuel cost.145 Some voyages now take longer 
than they used to.146 The increased expenditure on fuels to comply 
with Annex VI would only make this practice more prevalent, at least 
in the short term. As such, an enforcement regime that structures 
itself around the “panacea” of criminal liability, 147 coupled with 
issues associated with the availability of low-sulfur fuel and the cost-
saving culture of the shipping industry, is likely to operate contrary to 
the intent of Annex VI of preserving the freedom of navigation on 
the high seas.148 
3.  Deficiencies viewed from the U.S. perspective. - Litigation arising 
from the enforcement of Annex VI on specific vessels has been silent 
except for suits against the creation of ECA.149 Given that the 
memorandum between the EPA and the Coast Guard to enforce 
Annex VI was only signed in 2012,150 current enforcement venue can 
                                                 
145   See Remarks of Christopher Koch, supra note 133; RASMUS 
JORGENSON, SLOW STEAMING: THE FULL STORY, MAERSK 2, available at 
http://www.maersk.com/Innovation/WorkingWithInnovation/Documents/Slow
%20Steaming%20-%20the%20full%20story.pdf.  
146   See Ronald D. White, Ocean Shipping Lines Cut Speed to Save Fuel Costs, 
L.A. TIMES (July 31, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jul/31/business/la-fi-
slow-sailing-20100731 (some freighters were taking fifteen days to make a Pacific 
crossing that used to take eleven days). 
147   See Keho, supra note 128, at 41 (the U.S. Department of Justice has 
used a two-pronged approach that involves the prosecution of both the corporate 
ship operators and chief engineers or other supervisory crew members as the best 
way of changing the non-compliance culture and increasing deterrence in the 
shipping industry); Darmody, supra note 119, at 143. 
148   See MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 5, Regulation 18, ¶ 2.2 (no 
delay or change of planned voyages shall be required to achieve compliance). 
149   See Alaska v. Kerry, No. 3:12-cv-00142-SLG, 2013 U.S. Dis. LEXIS 
133687, at 21-100 (D. Alaska 2013) (State of Alaska sued the Secretary of States 
and the EPA for the designation of ECA under the APPs and the Administrative 
Procedure Act but the suit was dismissed by the court).  
150   Memorandum of Understanding Between United States Coast 
Guard and United States Environmental Protection Agency Regarding 
Enforcement of Annex VI as Implemented by the Act to Prevent Pollution from 
Ships, June 27, 2011, available at http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/ 
documents/annexvi-mou062711.pdf (last visited Oct. 17, 2013). 
2015 Shi 4:1 
587 
be presumed to be primarily administrative. 151  But the effective 
administration of compliance by foreign flagged vessels, especially 
those registered in countries where Annex VI is not fully enforced 
and do not participate regularly in the U.S. commerce, is likely to 
become more difficult. 
As the Annex VI enforcement scheme rolls out, incidents 
where “knowing violation” could be established are likely to increase, 
despite the deterrence effect of criminal charges. On the one hand, 
the number of foreign flagged vessels calling at U.S. ports is likely to 
increase continuously.152 The total number of vessels of the top 
twenty-five flags of registry was 28,178 as of January 31, 2013, 
increased by 14% of the total in 2010.153 This 14% increase comes 
almost entirely from countries and regions where no ECAs are 
designated.154 On the other hand, the situation of low-sulfur fuel 
shortages and lack of regulation on engine designs is likely to 
continue due to some foreign countries’ reluctance to adopt 
regulations to enforce Annex VI during the next few years.155 Many 
vessels might still choose to keep their businesses as usual, especially 
if they do not spend much time in ECAs. Furthermore, “knowing 
violation” is a low threshold for finding criminal liability, 156 
                                                 
151   See generally KLEIN, supra note 114, at 17-28 (violations of MARPOL 
standards are largely revealed by reviewing of ship logs and reports from citizen 
observations; as such, a large number of violations may not be detected).  
152   See America’s Ports: Gateways to Global Trade, AMERICAN 
ASSOCIATION OF PORT AUTHORITIES (2013), http://www.aapa-
ports.org/Industry/content.cfm?ItemNumber=1022 (by 2020, the total volume of 
cargo shipped by water is expected to be double that of 2001 volumes). 
153   U.S. Dep’t of Transp., Top 25 Flag of Registry (Sept 27, 2013), 
http://www.marad.dot.gov/library_landing_page/data_and_statistics/Data_and_S
tatistics.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2013).  
154   Id. These countries and regions include Liberia, Marshall Islands, 
Hong Kong, Singapore, Malta, China, Japan, Antigua and Barbuda, and Malaysia. 
Id. 
155   See supra section III, C, 2.   
156   See David M. Uhlmann, Environmental Crime Comes of Age: The 
Evolution of Criminal Enforcement in the Environmental Regulatory Scheme, 2009 UTAH L. 
REV. 1223, 1235 (2009) (numerous commentators criticized that the Congress had 
reduced the mental state requirement for environmental crime when it changed the 
“willfulness” standard to the “knowingly” standard, and the number of 
environmental criminal cases surged because of the adoption of this standard); see 
also Wesley D. Sherman, The Economics of Enforcing Environmental Laws: A Case for 
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considering the practical difficulties for some vessels to obtain means 
to achieve compliance. Courts have also been relaxing the standard of 
proof to establish the required mens rea in environmental crime 
cases. 157  Such a relaxed threshold for finding criminal liability 
expands prosecutorial discretion,158 which could counterbalance the 
deterrence effect of these environmental laws. 
To deter crimes, one fundamental economic theory is that the 
expected cost of punishments on the violators should exceed the 
gains from violation.159 If p is the possibility of being criminally 
charged and M is the monetary loss incurred because of the criminal 
charge and eventual penalties, the expected cost of punishments is 
p×M.160 For vessel owners, the gain from a violation is primarily the 
avoided capital investment in the air emission control measures to 
maintain the operational cost at the pre-regulation level. If such 
capital investment is C, non-compliance seems to be more attractive 
economically if C > p×M. 
To enhance the deterrence effect, enforcement agencies 
could try to increase p, the possibility of a criminal charge. A major 
                                                 
Limiting the Use of Criminal Sanctions, 23 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. LAW 87, 95, 104 
(2007) (culpability should be established based on a higher level of mens rea than 
“knowing” violation considering that courts do not require the knowledge of the 
environmental law at issue, the seriousness of the penalties, and the complexity of 
the environmental laws).   
157   See Darmody, supra note 119, at 122-26. 
158   Uhlmann, supra note 156, at 1242. 
159   Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76(2) 
THE J. OF POLITICAL ECON. 169, 180 (1968).  
160   This formula is adapted from Becker’s proposal. In Becker’s 
formula, the cost of punishments is the probability of conviction multiplied by 
costs to the offender. But deterrence should arguably take effect when an offender 
thinks of the possibility of being served by a court order. So the actual cost of 
punishments could be distorted since the actual conviction is also affected by many 
technicalities of the trial process, and tends to be smaller than the probability of 
being charged. These technicalities of the trial process might not play in the minds 
of offenders when they learn the charges through word of mouth and media 
exposure, and feel being deterred. Alternatively, the cost of punishment may be 
magnified if it is calculated based on the probability of detection, because the 
discretion of government agencies and whistleblowers tend to make the actual 
number of criminal proceedings brought against the offenders less than the 
number of detected violations.   
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implication is on agency budget because criminal convictions are 
generally more costly than agency adjudication.161 Also, enforcing the 
implementation of corrective action plans, as in the Ionia case, could 
be lengthy.162 If no additional budget is allocated, agencies might be 
left with wide prosecutorial discretion to decide whether to bring an 
enforcement proceeding. 163  Courts are generally deferential to 
prosecutor discretion164 as it is a function of resource allocation, 
policy considerations, and the delegation of power from Congress to 
allow agencies to resolve the ambiguity of the statute.165 However, 
even though foreign defendants are unlikely to prevail on claims 
challenging such agency discretion in prosecuting Annex VI 
violations, reputational criticisms from the public against such 
practices may emerge, ultimately compromising the integrity of the 
enforcement regime. 
Alternatively, the severity of penalties could be raised through 
judicial discretion to increase the cost of punishment, p×M. But, the 
shipping industry has been using a controversial arrangement called 
                                                 
161   See Roger Bowles et al., The Scope of Criminal Law and Criminal 
Sanctions: An Economic View and Policy Implications, 35(3) J. OF LAW AND SOCIETY 389, 
405, 415 (2008) (raising the probability of detection is costly); see also Wesley D. 
Sherman, The Economics of Enforcing Environmental Laws: A Case for Limiting the Use of 
Criminal Sanctions, 23 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. LAW 87, 95 (2007) (a criminal justice 
system is more costly than using administrative law to protect the environment). 
162   See Sherman, supra note 161, at 85-88. 
163   See David A. Barker, Environmental Crimes, Prosecutorial Discretion, and 
the Civil/Criminal Line, 88 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1405 (2002) (prosecutorial discretion 
became a concern when the Environmental Crimes Section of the Department of 
Justice refused to prosecute a substantial number of referrals from EPA and 
refused to consent to some prosecutions sought by local U.S. Attorneys); see 
generally Charles J. Babbitt et al., Discretion and the Criminalization of Environmental Law, 
15 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1, 3-4 (2004) (environmental administrators and 
the prosecutors to whom they refer criminal cases together enjoy very broad 
prosecutorial discretion, limited primarily by the Constitution and the rules of 
prosecutorial ethics). 
164   See United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 161-62 (1984) (holding 
non-mutual collateral estoppel does not apply to governmental litigant); see also 
United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 285 (1943) (“the good sense of 
prosecutors, the wise guidance of trial judges, and the ultimate judgment of juries 
must be trusted”). 
165   See Richard J. Lazarus, Meeting the Demands of Integration in the 
Evolution of Environmental Law: Reforming Environmental Criminal Law, 83 GEO. L.J. 
2407, 2453, 2456, 2460 (1995).   
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“one-ship” companies to limit their exposure to liability.166 Under 
such arrangements, shipping carriers are shielded behind the 
corporate veil by organizing companies for the sole and explicit 
purpose of owning that ship.167 The limited capital of such shell 
companies is likely to hinder the fulfillment of judgment, particularly 
concerning the payment of huge criminal fines. Moreover, unlike the 
compensation and penalty calculation in oil spill cases, the estimation 
of the economic harm to third parties caused by inhaling additional 
air pollutants such as SOx and NOx from a vessel tend to be more 
speculative, primarily because of the considerable lapse between 
exposure to air pollutants and actual formulation of diseases, 
numerous intervening causes, and the difficulties in measuring the 
scale of harmful level of exposure. Hence, non-monetary sanctions 
seem to be a more pragmatic redress to Annex VI violations.168 
As to the capital investments by foreign vessels to achieve 
compliance, C, the EPA could play only a limited role except for 
trying to engage industries to provide sufficient low-sulfur fuels. 
Foreign manufacturers and buyers of ocean-going vessels169 would 
have to decide together who should bear the up-front cost of 
advanced design170 if the buyers intend that their ships meet Annex 
VI standards. 171  The buyers also need to take into account 
                                                 
166   KHEE-JIN TAN, supra note 117, at 34-35. 
167   Id. 
168   See Roger Bowles et al., The Scope of Criminal Law and Criminal 
Sanctions: An Economic View and Policy Implications, 35(3) J.L. & SOC’Y 389, 405 (2008). 
169   See generally MICKEVICIENE, supra note 117, at 207 (China has 
surpassed Japan in 2006 in ship building. South Korea, in 2009, became a main 
player in the global ship building industry, exporting ships to about 169 countries 
and regions, mainly to Asia and Europe). 
170   See generally ALAN E. BRANCH, ELEMENTS OF SHIPPING 28 (8th ed. 
2007) (in choosing the type of ship to be built, the ship-owner must consider the 
primary trade in which she is to operate, which governs the size and propelling 
machinery, and the cost and availability of fuel, the length and duration of voyages, 
minimum carrying capacity required, and other technical and statutory 
considerations); see also Nikopoulou et al., supra note 9, at 136, 147 (switching to 
LNG would increase shipbuilding costs by 20 to 25%). 
171   See MICKEVICIENE, supra note 117, at 202, 214 (government 
subsidies and favorable loads, mandatory requirements on domestic ocean going 
ship buyers to order ships at domestic yards, and cheap labor are the main reasons 
for China’s high-order book volumes).   
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technological developments and associated uncertainties 172 during 
the time lapse between the order and delivery.173 In many countries, 
governments are extending generous credit facilities, subsidies, 
favorable tax treatment, and direct investment grants to maintain 
their national yards as competitive in the global market.174 These 
financial instruments, at the discretion of foreign governments, could 
be powerful instruments to impose Annex VI compliance conditions. 
In contrast, the regulative authority of a U.S. government agency 
appears pale in these contract negotiations. 
III.        MAKING “ENDS” MEET 
A.         The Need for Market-Based Requirements 
Previous discussions on the deficiencies of the Annex VI 
enforcement regime indicate that certain additional elements may be 
necessary to change the weights of the two sides of the formula. An 
option that is within the control of the EPA is to provide incentives, 
so that C – I < p×M, where I is the monetary incentives obtained 
from participating in governmental programs. 
Programs that are initiated by the government and industry 
leaders to provide incentives to induce wider voluntary compliance 
based on market-based principles, often referred to as Market-Based 
Mechanisms (MBMs), are not new in the United States.175 MBMs 
                                                 
172   See Frederick Adamchak & Amokeye Adede, LNG AS MARINE 
FUEL, 7 (Gas Technology Institute training materials, 2013) (one main problem 
with using LNG as marine fuel is the “chicken-and-egg” situation between ship 
owners. This is when developers for LNG fueling infrastructures and ports remain 
uncertain as to who would and should act first), available at 
http://www.gastechnology.org/ Training/Documents/LNG17-proceedings/7-1-
Frederick _Adamchak.pdf.  
173   World Shipping Council, The Liner Shipping Industry and Carbon 
Emissions Policy, 17 (2009) (ships are often ordered in a set of four to ten. Moreover, 
they are ordered three or more years in advance of delivery), available at 
http://www.worldshipping.org/pdf/liner_shipping_co2emissions_policy_septemb
er.pdf. 
174   BRANCH, supra note 170, at 481.  
175   See generally EPA CLEAN AIR MARKETS DIVISION, AN OVERVIEW 
OF THE REGIONAL CLEAN AIR INCENTIVES MARKET (RECLAIM) 1-2 (2006) 
(RECLAIM is the first trading program in the national created to reduce SO2 and 
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provide business operators means to reduce compliance costs as 
much as possible176 while the industrial standard is under transition 
in response to regulative changes.177 MBMs would also likely reduce 
the practical disparities for shipping companies when they operate 
worldwide, and eventually help overcome the political difficulties in 
bringing comparable environmental standards to all voyages’ end 
destinations. 
MBMs are most suitable when the emission standards can be 
achieved through alternative technologies and the cost of emission 
abatement differs widely among regulated sources.178 Both of these 
conditions are present in the case of enforcing Annex VI. In addition 
to fuel-switching,179 the industry has also identified several alternative 
technologies including selective catalytic reduction systems, humid air 
motor systems, seawater scrubbers, and using LNG-fueled vessels.180 
                                                 
NOx emissions in urban areas), available at 
www.epa.gov/airmarket/resource/docs/ reclaimoverview.pdf. 
176   See ROBERT N. STAVINS, EXPERIENCE WITH MARKET-BASED 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY INSTRUMENTS 2-3 (Karl-Göran Mäler et al. eds., 2001) 
(holding all firms to the same environmental target/standard can be expensive and 
sometimes counterproductive). 
177   See Mel Davies, Emissions Trading for Ships – A European Perspective, 
118(3) NAVAL ENG’G J. 131, 132 (2006) (ship emission trading could offer a way of 
complying on short notice, as a transition mechanism in the face of increasingly 
stringent regulations on a range of emissions from ship. The cost and long service 
life of cargo vessels may render regulations that require drastic changes of industrial 
standards within few years impracticable); See World Shipping Council, The Liner 
Shipping Industry and Carbon Emissions Policy, 17 (2009) (a container ship capable of 
carrying 8,500 TEU’s costs approximately $100 million (USD) and will be used for 
20 to 25 years), available at http://www.worldshipping.org/pdf/ 
liner_shipping_carbon_emissions_policy_presentation.pdf. 
178   See James J. Corbett et al., AN EVALUATION OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE 
INCENTIVES TO REDUCE EMISSIONS FROM REGIONAL FERRIES: TECHNICAL 
MEMORANDUM TWO 14-15 (2004), available at 
http://policy.rutgers.edu/vtc/documents/ProgEval.FerryEmissions.pdf.  
179   See generally Theo Notteboom et al., ANALYSIS OF THE 
CONSEQUENCES OF LOW SULFUR FUEL REQUIREMENTS 2 (2010) (alternative fuels 
include low-sulfur fuel oil, marine gas oil, marine diesel oil), available at www.schone 
scheepvaart.nl/downloads/rapporten/doc_1361790123.pdf. 
180   Nikopoulou et al., supra note 9, at 141; see also ENNIO CODAN ET 
AL., IMO III EMISSION REGULATION: IMPACT ON THE TURBOCHARGING SYSTEM 
2-3 (2010), available at 
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Studies show that depending on the vessel’s conditions, the cost-
effectiveness of the same technology varies. Generally, compliance by 
bigger vessels is less expensive than smaller vessels.181 Compared 
with fuel switching, NOx abatement technologies take longer to 
introduce because they usually take about ten years to be amortized, 
and hence, more risk-taking is involved in investment.182 Vessels that 
approach the end of their service life183 or those that spend a small 
portion of service time inside ECAs are likely to struggle the most 
under the current Annex VI enforcement scheme.184 It has been 
reported that some shipping carriers have started passing the 
increased compliance cost on to customers. 185  The increased 
shipping price, an unintended effect of Annex VI, calls for the well-
recognized flexibilities that MBMs could offer.186 
                                                 
http://www05.abb.com/global/scot/scot267.nsf/veritydisplay/1abd7848c784998
1852578110051bee0/$file/IMO%20III%20Emission%20Regulation.pdf. 
181   KÅGESON, supra note 62, at 13. 
182   Id.  
183   See KÅGESON, supra note 62, at 26 (it is better for infrequent 
visitors or ships with few remaining years in operation to just pay for the costs of 
pollution); PER KÅGESON, ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS FOR REDUCING SHIPPING 
EMISSIONS: A PILOT PROJECT FOR THE BALTIC SEA 10 (2006) (abatement of SOx 
differs from that of NOx because a shift to low sulfur fuel might still be cost 
effective even for ships that are approaching the end of their operation life), 
available at www.airclim.org/sites/default/files/ documents/apc24_0.pdf. 
184   See Mel Davies, Emissions Trading for Ships – A European Perspective, 
118(3) NAVAL ENG’G J. 131, 136 (2006). 
185   See Jim Romeo, New IMO Low-Sulfur Fuel Regulations Creating 
Challenges for Vessel Operator, PROF’L MARINER (Nov. 8, 2012, 11:29 AM), 
http://www.professional mariner.com/December-January-2013/New-IMO-low-
sulfur-fuel-regs-creating-challenges-for-vessel-operators/ (ZIM Integrated Shipping 
Services Ltd. said that it will implement a low-sulfur fuel charge of $20 (USD) per 
20-foot equivalent unit for trade between North Europe/Mediterranean and all 
North American coasts in both directions); see also Michiel Vervloet, Emission 
Trading in the Shipping Industry: Where Goes/Is the Money? (Dec. 5, 2010) 
(unpublished Masters’ thesis, Ghent University) (on file with University Library, 
Ghent University), at 11. 
186   See generally T.H. Tietenberg, Economic Instruments for Environmental 
Regulation, 6(1) OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 17, 18, 30 (1990) (because emissions 
trading allows the issue of who will pay for the pollution from who will install 
pollution control measures, it introduces additional flexibility). 
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B.         Possible Market-Based Mechanisms (MBMs) 
MBMs could be categorized broadly as emission charges or 
emission trading regimes.187 Based on the “polluters pay” principal, 
emission charges could take the form of a tax, an abatement subsidy, 
or differentiated service fees. 188  Sweden pioneered differentiated 
fairway dues at ports to encourage reductions in NOx and SO2 
emissions at ports since 1998.189 Because all major ports participated 
in this program, adverse economic impacts, if any, on port businesses 
have not been evident.190 Norway launched a NOx tax, forming a 
funding pool, which provides grants to fund vessels to apply 
emission reduction technologies.191 Without getting into details, two 
main concerns arise if a MBM is designed that voluntarily imposes 
additional dues based on the environmental performance of vessels. 
First, the program would risk diluting the force of Annex VI 
enforcement regime by shifting the focus on vessels to ports, 
weakening the regime’s deterrence effects. Adequate levels of 
regulative pressure on foreign vessel owners should be maintained 
since they have to invest in emission control measures eventually. 
Second, viewed from ship owners’ standpoint, the purpose of the 
environmental charges duplicates that of the civil penalties under 
APPS. 
Therefore, this comment focuses on the other two main types 
of emission trading schemes: cap-and-trade and emission credit 
trading. This comment argues in favor of an emission credit trading 
mechanism based on a consumption-emission formula. This MBM 
                                                 
187   See DAVID HARRISON ET AL., ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS FOR 
REDUCING SHIPS EMISSIONS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 1, 9, 29, 45, 66 (2005), 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/air/pdf/task3_final.pdf; Tietenberg, 
supra note 186, at 18-21.  
188   See JINHUA ZHAO, IRREVERSIBLE ABATEMENT INVESTMENT 
UNDER COST UNCERTAINTIES: TRADABLE EMISSION PERMITS AND EMISSIONS 
CHARGES 18 (2000), available at http://www.card.iastate.edu/ 
publications/dbs/pdffiles/00wp252.pdf; see also Tietenberg, supra note 186, at 20-
21.   
189   HARRISON ET AL., supra note 187, at 45-46 (Germany, Finland, and 
the State of Alaska also have such environmental programs at their ports). 
190   KÅGESON, supra note 62, at 16. 
191   Id. at 34-35. 
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could be offered to the violator as a final leniency before the 
prosecutor brings a criminal proceeding. 
1.  Cap-and-Trade (Allowance Trading). - Under a cap-and-trade 
scheme, the regulatory body sets a figurative cap for total emission 
on the industry, and allocates emission allowances to participating 
companies, which are the existing pollution sources.192 Companies 
may continue to emit pollution as permitted by the pollution amount 
prescribed by the allowances until the allowances expire. When the 
initial allowances run out, the companies are supposed to purchase 
un-used allowance from other companies, which manage to reduce 
emissions through improved technologies.193 The government might 
auction off the allowances to the highest bidders or, in a 
corresponding amount to the polluter’s historical emission data, free 
of charge.194 
Studies on cap-and-trade programs indicate that vessels could 
potentially decrease a considerable amount of the cost on emission 
control technologies through participation in such programs.195 For 
SO2 emission reduction, a market-based approach that allows vessels 
in ECAs to either undertake fuel switching, install exhaust cleaning 
systems, or purchase SO2 emission allowances from other vessels 
could save each vessel up to $63 million (USD), annually.196 
One option is to create an emission cap based on 
geographical area. Under this scenario, a macro-level design issue is 
                                                 
192   See generally EPA CLEAN AIR MARKETS DIVISION, AN OVERVIEW 
OF THE REGIONAL CLEAN AIR INCENTIVES MARKET (RECLAIM) 1-6 (2006); 
Tietenberg, supra note 186, at 18-20.  
193   Id.  
194   See generally Sergey Paltsev et al., ASSESSMENT OF U.S. CAP-AND-
TRADE PROPOSALS 4-5 (2007) (the free distribution of allowances to upstream 
entities may create an inequitable outcome whereby the emission costs are passed 
on to downstream fuel users. Meanwhile, the revenue from auctioning permits 
could be directed to those who ultimately bear the cost of abatement), available at 
http://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/38460/MITJPSPGC_Rpt146.pdf
?sequence=1. 
195   See Nikopoulou et al., supra note 9, at 151. 
196   Wang et al., supra note 42, at 8233, 8235 (the estimation is based on 
analysis of U.S. foreign commerce ships traveling in European or U.S. West Coast 
ECAs). 
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whether emission trading between different sectors should be 
permitted. Some researchers’ answer is an ambitious “yes.”197 As an 
initial matter, a sufficient number of participating entities are required 
to keep the allowance trading market active.198 Permitting vessels to 
trade with land-based emission sources not only ensures the scale of 
the market, but also benefits the shipping industry substantially since 
abatement costs for shipping are lower than that for land-based 
installations in general.199 However, an over-inclusive trading scheme 
might give more room for companies to buy allowances or use basic 
cost-saving measures rather than being induced to invest in green 
technologies. 200  To determine whether the participating vessels 
would become “lazy” under such a program, an in-depth analysis of 
the emission reduction capacities of different sectors, which operate 
under quite different environmental and technical standards, would 
be required. 
Another option is to impose a cap on the shipping industry 
itself. A major concern about the cap-and-trade mechanism is its 
economic impact on the shipping industry as a whole.201 Reliance on 
ocean shipping to transport goods internationally is expected to rise, 
because ocean shipping is already one of the most economically and 
environmentally efficient modes of long-distance transportation.202 
                                                 
197   See KRISTINA HOLMGREN ET AL., GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS 
TRADING FOR THE TRANSPORT SECTOR 69 (2006), available at http://www3. 
ivl.se/rapporter/pdf/B1703.pdf. 
198   See EPA Clean Air Markets Division, AN OVERVIEW OF THE 
REGIONAL CLEAN AIR INCENTIVES MARKET (RECLAIM) 17-18 (2006) 
(RECLAIM is criticized for not being an actually active market with few entities 
participating in its trading actions). 
199   HOLMGREN ET AL., supra note 197, at 69. 
200   Richard Toshiyuki Drury et al., Pollution Trading and Environmental 
Injustice: Los Angeles’ Failed Experiment in Air Quality Policy, 9 DUKE ENVTL. L. & 
POL’Y F. 231, 275-85 (1999).   
201   WORLD SHIPPING COUNCIL, THE LINER SHIPPING INDUSTRY AND 
CARBON EMISSIONS POLICY, 9-10 (2009), available at http://www. 
worldshipping.org/pdf/liner_shipping_carbon_emissions_policy_presentation.pdf. 
202   WORLD SHIPPING COUNCIL, THE LINER SHIPPING INDUSTRY AND 
CARBON EMISSIONS POLICY, 9, (2009), available at http://www.world 
shipping.org/pdf/liner_shipping_carbon_emissions_policy_presentation.pdf; see 
also KHEE-JIN TAN, supra note 117, at 7 (the biggest contributor to marine pollution 
is land-based sources and pollutions from ships contributes a relative small fraction 
of the overall marine pollution (12%)). 
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Posing emission caps on the shipping industry is likely to force the 
industry to eventually purchase allowance from other sectors where 
similar cap-and-trade mechanisms apply.203 As such, a large amount 
of money would flow into other sectors that are not subject to the 
same air emission standards as the shipping industry.204 The emission 
reduction in other sectors would be a proxy to verify the 
effectiveness of emission control measures in the shipping industry. 
The result would probably be an “open-ended” regime where the 
actual emission reduction becomes difficult to track. 
Further, a cap-and-trade mechanism might not be effective in 
terms of engaging new polluters. Experience of the Acid Raid 
Program of SOs trading shows that most of the trading under the 
Program has been internal, namely, acquiring excess allowances from 
within the company, rather than inter-regional or inter-company.205 
If a cap-and-trade mechanism were applied to the shipping industry, 
large international shipping companies, which are already leading the 
industry’s emission reduction endeavors, would possibly prefer 
obtaining extra allowances internally to avoid delays and transaction 
costs. As a result, there might not be enough active allowances for 
trade with new ships. 
2.  Emission credit trading. - A more straightforward model is 
to focus on the difference in emissions between vessels, targeting the 
non-compliant vessels.206 The emission credit trading mechanism 
would require the establishment of a baseline of different ship 
models in terms of the correlation between the power output and the 
amount of pollutant emission.207 Alternatively, correlation could be 
                                                 
203   WORLD SHIPPING COUNCIL, THE LINER SHIPPING INDUSTRY AND 
CARBON EMISSIONS POLICY 9 (2009). 
204   See also IMO, Review of MBMs: Consolidated Proposal of Efficiency 
Incentive Scheme (EIS) Based on the Leveraged Incentive Scheme (LIS) and the Vessel Efficiency 
Systems (VES), Submitted by Japan and the World Shipping Council, GHG-WG 3/3/2 
(Feb. 24, 2011), available at http://www. worldshipping.org/industry-
issues/environment/air-emissions/Japan_-_WSC_Consolidated_Proposal__GHG-
WG_3-3-2.pdf. 
205   Jonathan Remy Nash, Too Much Market? Conflict between Tradable 
Pollution Allowances and the “Polluter Pays” Principals, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 465, 
488-92 (2000).  
206   See Vervloet, supra note 185, at 33. 
207   See KÅGESON, supra note 62, at 24. 
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established between the energy efficiency index of a ship208 or a 
modification of the index,209 and the amount of pollutant emission 
for the determination of the baseline. Trading entities should be 
primarily vessels. The participation by ship manufacturers should be 
limited or even prohibited, because the estimation of emission 
amount would be too speculative before the vessel is put into 
operation.210 
The amount of credits that a vessel obtains would be 
determined on the amount of deviation of the vessel’s performance 
from this baseline. The most powerful credit generators are large 
vessels that operate in ECAs for their entire service time. The 
purchasers who would benefit most from this scheme would be 
vessels that spend a small portion of their time inside ECAs.211 Non-
compliant vessels could be offered to opt-in to this trading 
mechanism; or else criminal proceedings would likely be brought. 
This offer could also be made during the plea bargaining stage.212 
Such offer should be conditioned on the facts that render the 
immediate implementation of compliant measures not cost-effective, 
such as the fact that the vessel is approaching its service life. 
Although, such program design requires a large volume of record 
keeping, it is nevertheless necessary for conveying a clear message to 
the polluters: this offer in lieu of criminal proceeding is not a way 
                                                 
208   See IMO, Amendments to the Protocol of 1997 to Amend the International 
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as Modified by the Protocol of 
1978 Relating Thereto (Inclusion of Regulations on Energy Efficiency for Ships in MARPOL 
Annex VI), Resolution MEPC.203(62) (July 15, 2011). The regulation requires ships 
to be certified based on an assessment of Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI) 
and all ships shall have Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plans. The EEDI is a 
non-prescriptive, performance-based mechanism that leaves the choice of 
technologies to the industry, as long as the required energy efficiency level provide 
in Regulations 20 and 21 is attained. The amendment came into force on January 1, 
2013. Id. 
209   See Vervloet, supra note 185 at 33-34. 
210   Id. 
211   See Mel Davies, Emissions Trading for Ships – A European Perspective, 
118(3) NAVAL ENG’G J. 131, 136 (2006). 
212   See also James B. Nelson, Alternative Sentencing under the MARPOL 
Protocol: Using Polluters’ Fines to Fund Environmental Restoration, 10 HASTINGS W.-N. 
W.J. ENV. L. & POL’Y 1, 23-26 (2003) (advocating the use of alternative sentencing 
provisions to MARPOL prosecutions to provide funding for clean-up projects to 
correct the harm caused by the defendant’s actions).   
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through which vessels could pay to pollute, but only a regulative 
mercy considering the violator’s economic hardship. 
Additionally, participating foreign-flagged vessels should be 
required to designate local agents for service of process. 213  An 
independent trans-governmental authority could be established to 
monitor and verify the quality of credits.214 This entity could be 
financed through the civil penalties collected from the non-compliant 
ships. 
C.         General Considerations on MBMs 
Ideally, the MBM should be built under a bilateral agreement 
between the United States and its major waterborne trade partners 
that have not enforced Annex VI in full, such as China. Although 
treaties and executive agreements are treated alike under international 
law, an executive agreement would be preferable from a U.S. point of 
view, because no advice and consent of the Senate would be required 
as long as the executive agreement does not contradict statutory 
provisions.215 The EPA would have the authority to run this trading 
program under the 1990 Amendments of the Clean Air Act, which 
added Title IV, relating to controlling acid deposition including SOx 
and NOx.
216 
Manifestly, the influence of a governmental agency, acting on 
its own, is rather limited when its ultimate purpose is to induce 
domestic legislation in a foreign country. Therefore, the overall 
structure of a bilateral agreement would lay a stronger foundation for 
the subsequent agreements on the technical parameters of the MBM; 
                                                 
213   See SOUTH COAST AIR QUALITY MGMT. DIST., OVER A DOZEN 
YEARS OF RECLAIM IMPLEMENTATION: KEY LESSONS LEARNED IN 
CALIFORNIA’S FIRST AIR POLLUTION CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM, Chapter 1, 8 
(2007). 
214   See also Richard E. Ayres, Expanding the Use of Environmental Trading 
Programs into New Areas of Environmental Regulation, 18 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 87, 117 
(2000). 
215   See Kathryn C. Wilson, The International Air Quality Management 
District: Is Emissions Trading the Innovative Solution to the Transboundary Pollution Problem?, 
30 TEX. INT’L L.J. 369, 384-85 (1995).  
216   1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 101-
549, 104 Stat. 2399. 
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the discussion of which could be led by agencies in the respective 
countries. Further, high-level official negotiation is more likely to 
identify and define the necessary flexibilities to connect the priorities 
of the United States and targeted foreign countries in controlling air 
pollutions. Given the facilitation by national governments, as 
opposed to administrative agencies delegated with the authority to 
enforce Annex VI under national laws, companies are more likely to 
agree upon the qualifying emission reduction measures to meet the 
same emission standards under Annex VI. 
Finally, two important technical components need to be 
agreed upon under the bilateral agreement. The first component to 
be established is the eligible equivalents. 217  A clear mutual 
understanding of equivalents would not only help keep the trading 
market active,218 but also benefit the later monitoring and verification 
of emission credits during implementation. The second component 
to be clarified is the monitoring and reporting procedures. Safeguards 
need to be established to prevent fraud and missed reporting, and 
furthermore, to ensure information transparency.219 When necessary, 
penalties should be imposed on repetitive violation of reporting 
rules.220 
CONCLUSIONS 
The current U.S. regulatory scheme to enforce Annex VI 
leaves an administrative vacuum in terms of ensuring foreign-flagged 
vessels’ compliance when operating in U.S. waters. The conventional 
combination of civil penalties and criminal charges is challenged 
when the enforcement of international environmental law is achieved 
through an uneven worldwide regulatory landscape and depends 
                                                 
217   See KÅGESON, supra note 62, at 18. 
218   See Nikopoulou et al., supra note 9, at 149 (switching to 1% sulfur 
residuals, without other alternative compliance measures, has the major 
disadvantage in that it does not create cost efficient credits for trading in the 
emissions’ markets). 
219   See SOUTH COAST AIR QUALITY MGMT. DIST., OVER A DOZEN 
YEARS OF RECLAIM IMPLEMENTATION: KEY LESSONS LEARNED IN 
CALIFORNIA’S FIRST AIR POLLUTION CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM, Chapter 5, 1-3 
(2007).  
220   Id. at 9-10. 
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heavily on the technological developments in the private sector. This 
comment recommends an emission credit trading mechanism as a 
supplement to the current Annex VI enforcement regime. The credit 
trading mechanism would encourage firms, based on their superior 
knowledge about the market and effectiveness of various 
technological options, to find the best solution in response to the 
regulative requirements without compromising their valued 
commercial interests. If the establishment of a credit trading 
mechanism is initiated through high-level official dialogues, as 
recommended by this comment, the U.S. enforcement agencies 
would be afforded a proper platform to work with foreign agencies 
to establish compliance equivalents under Annex VI. MBMs, 
therefore, would serve an important role in making the current rigid 
enforcement regime more adaptive during the transition period 
where firms are yet to phase out substandard vessels and plan for 
investments in vessel designs that are far more environmentally 
friendly. 
 
